ML19330A704
| ML19330A704 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1980 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Henry L AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19330A705 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007290064 | |
| Download: ML19330A704 (23) | |
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j NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION gg.3go E
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Ms. Linda Henry 5432 Hemitage Avenue No. Hollywood, California 91607
Dear Ms. Henry:
This is in reply to your letter of May 22, 1979, regarding the Three Mile Island accident and precautions to prevent such accidents.
I am sorry for the long delay in responding but we have been very busy with the aftermath of the TMI accident.
As to health effects, the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island stated:
"Just how serious was the accident? Based on our investigation of the health effects of the accident, we conclude that in spite of serious damage to the plant, most of the radiation was contained and the actual release will have negligible effect on the physical health of in 6 ' duals. The major health effect of the accident was found to be rantal stress."
With regard to your question about what precautions are taken, nuclear power plants are designed to prevent accidents, with protective systems provided to place and hold the plants in a safe condition if deviations from nomal oper-ations occur.
In addition, engineered safety features are installed to miti-gate the consequences of certain postulated accidents. Further, considera-tions of safety are involved in evaluating the suitability of proposed sites for nuclear power plants.
Finally, there are plans for emergency actions such i
as sheltering or evacuation of personnel if necessary.
An NRC Action Plan has been developed to provide a comprehensive and integrated basis for the actions now judged necessary to correct or improve the regulation and operation of nuclear facilities as a result of the experience from the Three Mile Island accident and official studies and investigations of the accident.
As to your questions about inspection of nuclear facilities, there are inspectors who are NRC employees as described in the enc.losed Chapter 7 of the NRC Annual Report for 1979, which has just been published.
TlilS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 80 07290064 POOR QUAUTY PAGES j
r June 18,1930
-2 Ms. Linda Henry Every effort is being made to protect the public health and safety at all nuclear power plants that are currently in operation or that may start operation in the future.
Sincerely, AfY w
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated
D e
e 1979 Annual Reoort
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Inspection and yS$M7 En:orcement gg M$IM!d!ffi N: emphasis = as gben in 1979 to direct NBC inmetion of doign, analytical and sther tednical actisities of contractors.
During 1979, the NRC continued to implement the Center, a plant, and the regional NRC office. In August, the 24. hour duty Officers in the regions were pisn calling for resident inspectors at each operating replaced by a communications system connected power reactor plant, at those plants in the later stages directly to the NRC Operations Center where 24. hour of construction, and at selected fuel cycle facilities.
duty officer coverage is maintained. All calls to The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) led to a deci-sion to increase the number of resident inspectors to a regional offices during non. duty hours are now diverted to the NBC Duty Officer at the Operations levzl of one inspector for each unit at a multireactor Center, who can promptly respond to the situation.
site. Single unit sites will have two resident inspectors.
As a result of these actions associated with the TMI By December 31,1979,60 inspectors w ere stationed as residents at 4S power reactor and fuel facility sites, accident and related inspections, the number of Ttble l provides a listing of these sites. This additional routine inspwtions in 1979 was less than originally effort has required an increase in the number of per-planned. Table 2 summarizes the inspections con-conne! from a staff ceiling of 715 in 1979 to 861 in 19S0 ducted during fiscal year 1979.
One or more noncompliance items were found in 33 for Se NRC Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement. By percent of the more than 6,000 inspections and in 36 the end of fiscal year 19S0 there will be 157 resident in-percent of the 121 imestigations. The more severe spectors on site compared to the original goal of 76.
sanctions imposed on licensees for failure to comply The reactor training prosided for operations inspec-with NRC requirements included nine civil penalties tors will be increased from a minimum of seven weeks and three orders to " cease and desist" operations, or to 10 weeks during 19S0, with additional simulator for modifications, or suspensions of licenses (see Tables cnd special plant observation training.
TM1 impacted heavily on the planned inspection 4 and 5).
program. Special teams were sent to all operating with pressurized water nuclear plants to review THE INSPECTION PROGRAM liansw management the actions required as a result of th: TMI awident. Review groups were formed to study the TMI accident and the lessons learned from it The inspection and enforcement program is directed l
that would affect future inspection programs. An by NBC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE),
cugmented 24. hour surveillance program was with a headquarters staff located in Bethesda established at TM1 that has required staffing support Maryland, and a field staff depfoved in NRC's five from all five NRC regional offices. From April through regional offices located in or near Piii!adelphia, Atlan-July of 1979, a 24-hour watch was established in each ta, Chicag,, Dallas, and San Francisco. About 80 per-r:gion and at the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, cent of the tatal office on-board staff of 730 is assigned M:ryland, to provide the capability for responding to the regions immediately to any incidents or accidents. A direct The oby.t m.s of inspections are:
" hotline" telephone system was insta!!ed in the Opera-
- To determit.e whether licensms are complying tions Center. This provides a direct line to each with NRC requirements.
operating reactor power plant and all fuel processing
- To identify conditio is that may adversely affect facilities in the country. The system provides con-public health and safety, the common defense l
ference call capability between the NRC Operations 1
154 Table 1. Sites Manned by Resident Inspector 5 During 197S and 1979 Facihty Location Licensec
- ArkansEs Nuclear Plant Russeldlle. Ark.
Arkansas Power & Light Co beaser Valley Power Station Shippingport. Pa.
Duquesne Light Co.
Beliefonte Nuclear Plant Smttsboro, Ala.
Tenneswe Valle) Authorit3
- Brow ns Fern Nuclear Plant Decatur. Ala.
Te...Jm Valley Authont>
bruniu sel Sicam Elwtric Plant Southport. N.C.
Carolina Pouer & Light Co Ca!]aw as Plant Fulton, Mo.
Umon Elertne Co.
Calsert Cliffs Lusby. Md.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.
- Comanche Peak Steam Elwtrie Glen Rose. Tet Tesas Power & Light. Dallas Ibw r Station
& Light. Texas Electric Sene DauwBesse Nuclea'r Power Station Oak Harbor, Ohio Toledo Edison Co.
- Donald C. Cook Plant Bridgman. Mich.
Iniana & Michigan Electric Co
- Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant San Luis Obispo. Cal.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
- Dresden Nuclear Power Station Morris. Ill.
Commonw ealth Ediwn Co.
- Edwin 1. Hatch Plant Bailey, Ca.
Georgia Power Co.
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station Platteville, Colo.
Public Senict Co. of Colorado Hartssille Nuclear Power Plant Hartsville, Tenn.
Tennessa Valley Authority
- 1nd ar. Point Station Ind;an Point, N.Y.
Consolidated Edison Co.
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Dothan. Ala.
Alabama Power Co.
Lt.sa!1e County Nuclear Station Sewa,111.
Commonwealth Ednon Co.
Limerick Generating Station Potts:o.m. Pa.
Philadelphia Electric Co.
Marble ibli Plant Madison, tru Public Serviw of Indiana
- Midland Nuclear Power Plant Midland. Mich.
Consumers Power Co.
' Millstone Nuclear Power Station Waterford. Conn.
Northeast Nucicar Energy Co.
North Anna Power Station Miner al, Va.
Virginia Elwtric & Power Co.
- Owner Nuclear Station Seneca, S.C.
Duke Power Co.
Pahsades Nuclear Power Station South Hasen, Mich.
Consumers Power Co.
Palo Verde Nuclear Station Winterburg, Ariz.
Arizona Public Scn-ice Co.
' Peach Bottom Atomic Power Peach Bottom, Pa.
Philadelphia Eltetric Co.
Station
- Prairic Idand Nuclear Plant Red Wing, Minn.
Northern States Power Co.
Quad Cities Station Cordova,111.
Commonwealth Ediwn Co.
Piancho Seco Nuclear Station Srcramento, Cal.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
- Salem Nuclear Generating Station Salem, N.J.
Public Servin Elwtrie & Cas Co.
" San Onofre Nucle at Station San Clemente, Cal.
Southern Califorrua Ednon Co & San Diego Cas & Electric Co.
Seabrook Nuclear Station Seabrook, N.H.
Public Service Co. of N.H.
Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Daisy, Tenn.
Tennessee Valley Authority Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Suffolk County, N.Y.
Long Island Lighting Co.
South Texas Nuclear Project Bay City, Tex.
Houston Lighting & Power Co.
Summer Nuclear Station Broad Riser, S.C.
South Carolina Electric & Cas Co.
- Surry Power Station Cravel Ne<k, Va.
Virginia El strie & Power Co.
- Susquehanna Steam Elwtric Station Be. mick, Pa.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
- Trojan Nuclear Plant Presmtt, Ore.
Portland General Electrie Co.
Turkey Point Station Florida City, Fla.
Florida Power & Light Co.
Washington Nuclear #2 Richland, Wash.
. Washington Public Power Supp!) 5 stim 3
- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Spring City,.
Tennnsee Valley Authority William H. Zimmer-Moscow, Ohio Cincinnati Gas & Electrie Co.
. Nuclear Power Station Zion Nuclear Plant Zion, Ill.
Commonwealth Edison Co.
- B&W-Anollo & Lenhburg" Apollo, Pa.
Babwek & Wilcox Co.
(Fuel Yacility)
- Westinghouse-Cheswick" (Fuel Parks Township, Pa.
Wntinghuuw Elwtric Corp.
Facihty)
- Nuclear Fuel Services (Fuel Facility)
Erwin, Tenn.
Nuelear Fuel Seniws, Inc.
" Assigned during calendar year 1978.
" Inspector stationed at A llo, Pennsylvania, acts as inspector on a rotating basis at B&W's Apollo and Imhburg f=eilitin and Westinghouse *s Cheswie facility.
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- 155 and security the environment or the safeguard-About 150 Part 21 Reports base been receised by ing of nuclear materials and facilities.
the NRC since the regulation became effective. The o To provide information to assist in developing a reports are reviewed to assess the reported defielency, basis for issuance, denial, or amendment of an the adequacy of the proposed correctise action and the authorization, perinit or license, possibility of generie problems. IE inspectors ensure that appropriate followup actions are taken.
o To determint whether licensees and their con-tractors and suppliers have implemented ade-quate quality assurance programs.
DPes of Inspect.ions When an inspection or int estigation discloses es ents or NRC's inspections are of two basic types: routine i
conditions that present a potential or actual t'areat to and reactive. In routine inspections, NBC inspectors public health and safety. the environment. or the concentrate on determining the effectis eness of quality I
safeguarding of nuclear materials and facil; ties, the assurance cystems by direct observation and serifica-NRC takes prompt action and routinely comrr anicates tion of licensee activities, and by reviewing pro-J with other parts of gosernment, licensees and the cedures, checking rteords, interviewing people, and, public.
where appropriate, making direct measurements.
During fiscal year 1979, 174 new inspection pro-Reactive inspections are conducted in response to in-cedures and/or instructions were issued and 123 were formation receised by NRC regarding conditions or revised. In the area of construction inspection, for ex-esents affecting licensed facilities or material under ample, 22 extensively revised inspection procedures NRC jurisdiction. Such informatien may come from i
pertaining to welding were issued.
routine NRC inspections; from an applicant, licensee, contractor or supplier; or from licensee employees or other members of the public.
Reporting Defects and Noncompliance Inspections cover the entire range of NRC licensed activities. Reactor related inspections cover all phases On June 6,1977, the NRC published in the Federal of nuclear power plants (preconstruction activities, Register a regulation (10 CFR Part 21) setting forth the construction, preoperational testing and startup, requirements for implementing Section 206 of the operation, shutdown and decommissioning) and
,]i Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Individual direc-similar phases of research and test reactors. In addi-g tors or responsible officers of a firm involved in the tion, NBC inspects the quality assurance propams of nuclear industry are required to report noncompliance contractors and vendors who supply safety-related with NRC regulations cr the existence of defects which equipment, components and services to power reactors could create a substantial health and safety hazard.
under construction or in operation.
Any such person who knowingly and consciously fails to provide the required reports to the NRC is subject to Licensee, Contractor and Vendor Inspection a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000 for each failure Program and a total amount not to exceed $25,000 within any 30-day period. The regulation became fully effective Approximately one-half the work associated with
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on January 6,1978.
constructing a nuclear facility is accomplished off-site.
Table 2. Inspections Conducted in Fiscal Year 1979 Number of Number of Program Licenses inspections P:wer Reactor Construction 114 1,787 Operating Power Reactors 70 1,761 Other Reactors 94 93 3'ud Facilit4s 39 203 Mrterials 8,586 1,976 Vendors 248 228 Safeguards 203 526 h._
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Inspections related to nuclear materials include in-This in;!udes facility desigr. and the fabrication of spection of the construction and operation of uraaium components of safety-related systems, inspections of mills; fuel fabrication, processing and reprocessing nudear steam system suppliers, architect. engineers plants; wa;te disposal facilities: and the industrial, and vendors of safety-related components are per-educational and medical u<es of radioactive material formed by NRC's Licensee, Contractor and Vendor NRC inspections also include measures for safeguard.
Inspection Branch (LCVIB) inspwtors, located in the ing nuclear material from theft snd sabotage, for Region IV (Dallas) office. During fiscal year 1979, physical protwtion of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, some 250 inspections were performed by the 21 LCVIB inspectors. Approximately 30 percent of these and for transportation of nuclear materials.
The number of inspections carried out during fiscal inspections w ere special reactive inspections invohing year 1979 (ending September 30) for each of these ac.
component fabrication or design related problems.
tivities is shown in Table 2.
During the coming year, a modest shift in inspection emphasis is expected in the LCVIB. Acthities ex-periencing change will include:
Covernment-Industry Efforts
- Performing more reaethe inspwtions.
e Redirwting emphasis toward the inspection of The NRC inspwtion program is based on the technical aethities performed by contractors.
premise that the licensee is repcnsible for carrying out licemed aethities safely and in compliance with NRC e Followup on Part 21 Reports, Bulletins and Cir-requirements. NRC determines whether the licensee cular issues.
has established the management control systems
- Inspecting and witnessing emironmental qualiff.
nwessary to mwt regulatory responsibilities. The in-cation of electrical, instrumentation and control spection pattern for large, complex nuclear facilities is equipment.
pyramidal, with each level of activity verified, in-e Inspecting design and analytical work performed Spected m audited by those above. The NRC inspec-by licensee contractors.
tion effort is essentially the apex of the pyramid, i.e.,
NBC performs the last in the series of inspections and audits conducted by many different groups. Since Performance Appraisal Program NBC inspation manpower is usually far less than that of licensees and contractors, NRC inspectors cannot During fiscal year 1979, five liwnsee management inspect all components and aethities; thus, they probe appraisal inspections and one IE program appraisal the" pyramid" to determine whether the licensees' and inspection series (pertaining to surveillance testing) contractors' methities are properly performed. In ad-were completed. Nine management appraisal inspec-dition, the IE inspection program provides for in-tions and four IE program appraisal inspwtions are dependent effort by NRC inspectors whenever the in-planned for fiscal year 19SO. Objwtives of the pro.
spector determines such action is necessary.
gram are to:
- Evaluate performance of utility management.
Inspection Activities Resulting from TMI o Analyze effectiveness of the NRC inspection pro-
- gram, Shortly after the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, o Confirm objectivity of NRC inspectors.
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tors participated in the IE investigation of the TMI ne-dressing the early lessons learned. The IE Bulletm.s cident; PAT inspectors aiso participated in other in-provided licensees with information about the series of vestigat,ons and special inspmtions, events that occurred at TMI and directed each licensee i
make changes to certain equipment and operating t
Independent Measurement / Verification procedures consistent with the reactor design, and to program conduct special operator training. In response to the Bulletins, licensees provided details for completion of immediate actions and plans for completion of longer IE hes increased its efforts associated with direct term actions. Special follow-up inspections were con-verification of licensee / contractor activities during the ducted to verify that licensws had taken appropriate construction phase. NBC periodically uses contractors action.
t) perform non-destructive testing acti ities, and, in During the period April 18-23, 1979, six specially August 1979, selwted a contractor to perform destrue.
trained NBC teams visited all operating pressurized tive testing of selected materials used in safety related water nuclear power plants, except those designed by structures and systems. Continued effort in these areas Babcock and Wilcox, designer of the TMI plant. These is planned for fiscal year 1980.
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i Trruuriad wster reactor control room simuiston, such as this one program brought incread student loa 6 to such facilitin earl 3n at the Tennem Valin Authority's Snguosah Nuclear rower the Tiwa! year, and the training u as inte ruifW esen more in the later months as deficiencin in o ierator training highlighted by the T! ant, came into greatly increawd ue in 1979. The tr.ining of Three Mile bland acrident twa;me apparent.
new iruperton to nuemmodate the growing NRC resident inspwtor teams resiew ed and discussed with licensee operations was significant. Efforts expended by inspectors at the personnel and station managt ment the Thf! accident TMI site, the expedited assignment of inspectors to at chronology and licensee actions that had been speci-Babcock and Wilcox power reactor facilities and the fied in the IE Bulletins. For the Babcock and Wilcox requirements imposed by the need for special inspec-designed facilities, the resident inspector, with tions of all operating power reactor facilities caused a assistance from regional-based inspectors, conducted thinner coverage, and in many cases deferral or dele-this special briefing.
tion of portions of the routine inspection program ac-thities.
By April 2, following the TMI accident, resident in-spectors had been assigned to all operating Babcock and Wilcox designed plants where resident inspectors On a continuing basis, increased emphasis has been had not previously been assigned. In addition to placed on identifying isolated plant problems and responsibilities normally assigned resident inspectors, generic issues and managing their resolution. To ac-inspectors at these sites performed additional inspec.
omplish this, the headquarters staff has tan tions to assure plant safety in light of the events at augmented with a group of highly spwialized systems
- TMI, engineers whose responsibilities include more in depth review and follo; -up on plant events.
Impact of TMI on Inspection Program Long. term inspection program changes to reflect lessons learned from the TMI accident are still in various formative stages. Specific problems-requiring The impact on the routine inspection program for program changes have generally been diagnosed. Pro-the first several months following the TMI accident gram modification, implementation and attendant h l
_g process evaluations bas e been done to the extent possi-number and significance. The NRC's Office of Inspec-ble for changes that represent an expansion of current tion and Enforwment has issued Bulletins since 1971, programs, such as resident impection.
Circulars since 1976 and Information Notice < for the Studies to evaluate certain major changes in em-first time in 1979.
phasis of the inspection program base been initiated to The IE Bulletin is used to notify licensees of specific determine the effativeness and efficiency of these actions to be taken. It usually requires that the changes as implemented. The results of the IE Special licemees provide a report to the NRC describing the Review Group on lessons learned from Thrw hiite actions thev take in respon e to the Bulletin. The Islend have prmided a basis for the integration of Bulletin adilresses matters of concern or esents related lessons learned into the current inspection program.
to reactor safety, material saf-guards. radiological safety or environmental protection.
Bulletins usually, although not always, require the i
Resident Inspector Program action on a one-time only basis. However. Bulletins are not intended to substitute for new or revised During 1979, the NRC made further progress in the license conditions or requirements. If a licen ee ref uses program to station inspectors full time at the sites of to perform an action set forth in the Bulletin, the re-nuclear power reactors and major fuel cycle f acilities.
quirement for the actior. may be impmed on the liansee Experience with resident inspwtion results and by an Order.
licensee events and actions have led to plans for fur-Particular considerations which might require the ther expansion of the resident inspector program. The issuance of a Bulletin include events in which the safe-program is being accelerated in consonance with the ty significance is of such a magnitude as to result in an President's message of Deamber 4, 1979 on the immediate impact on all of a wrtain tvpe of licensee.
Kemeny Commission Report. Steps to upgrade ns ef-The Three hiile Island accident repr'esents such an fectiseness also are being taken m response to recom-event, and it was addressed by multiple Bulletins.
mendations in a General Accountmg Ofhee report Other considerations include everJ.s having a potential issued to Congress in November 1979. As noted above, generic problem impact and where the event requires epproval has been given to assigning, in addition t action by a particular class of liwnse or permit holder.
the site resident inspwtor, resident mspectors t The IE Circular is used to notify licensees of actions nue' ear power reactor plant units (many sites have which the NRC recommends be taken. These matters i
more than one unit). The total number of resident m-are generally of lesser significance than those address-spectors at any site will generally equal the number of units at that site, with a minimum of two inspectors I
per site. This augmented coverage will provide addi-tional safety assurances through increasing NRC presence, including the number of independent
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to have its full complement of at least two inspectors j h
( f L
1 4
d nt inspectors will be deployed at 60 sites.
4
- lfg f
(
[j, 4 tt Q w j
by September 30,19S0, at which time some 130 resi-a y
it y
4@h,9 Thereafter, resident inspectors will be assigned to yd@
.j
/
reactors as they reach the pre-operational stage.
y V x (4 5: ~
,d'J f
t.
v The NRC also is assigning resident inspwtors to sites
" @Q M 1 where nuclear plant construction is in the final stage.
Further, resident inspectors will be assigned to sites
' M '. *"
- W I'
h,7 construction.
W 4 D
,,?
e =h g where problems are evident in earlier stages of plant ct MQ f hr,
% s V~
8}
h hg h hf Bulletins, Circulars and Information Notices l
During 1979, the NBC's issuance of Bulletins, Cir-NRC resident inspector cheds a weld in a ruc*or *essel thermal culars and Information Notices was increased both in sleeve at the Smqueharma Steam Electric Station at Berwid, PA.
ll l
160 Table 3. IE Bulletins, Circulars, and InfOrmation Notices Issued in 1979 BULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subject Date Ismed issued to 79-01 Erwironmental 2J6 *79 AU power reactor facilities with Qualification of an OL or CP Class IE Equipment 79 01 A Environmental 6.6'79 AD power remetor facilities with Qualification of an OL or CP Class IE Equiprnent (Deficiencies in the Environmental Qualification of ASCO Solenoid Vahes 79-02 Pipe Support Base 3'2/70 AU power reactor facilities with Plate Designs an OL or CP Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts 79-02 Pipe Support Base 6/21/79 All power reactor facilities with (Bes.1)
Plate Designs an OL or a CP Using Concrete p
Expansion Anchor Bolts 79 02 Pipe Support Base Plate 8!20!?9 All power reactor (Rev.1)
Designs Using Concrete facilities with an (Supplement 1)
OL or a CP 79-03 Longitudinal 3/12/79 All power reactor Welds Defects facilities with an in ASME SA-312 OL or CP Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Co.
79-04 Incorrect Weights 3'30!79 AU power reactor for Swing Check facilities with an Valves Manufactured OL or CP by Velan Engineering Corporation 79-05 Nuclear Incident 4 @79 All power reactor at Thrce Mile Island facilities with an OL and CP 79-05A Nuclear Incident 4/5/79 All B&W power at Three Mile Island reactor facilities with an OL 79-05B Nuclear Incident at 4!21/79 All B&W power Three Mile Island reactor facilities with an OL 79-05C&O6C Nuclear Incident at 7/26/79 To all PWR power Three Mile Island -
reactor facilitics Supplement with an OL I
f k
161 BULLETINS t
f Bulictm No.
Subicct Date issued issued to l
79 06 Roiew of 4!!Il79 All pressurized Operational Errors w ster power reacton with an and System Misalignments Identified During OL unpt B&W fatuities the Three Mile
. Island Incident 79-06A Review of 4!!4779 All pressurized Operational water power resetor facilities Errors and System of Wetinghouse Misalignments Identified During design with an OL the Threr Mile Island incident 79-06A Rniew of Operational 4/16'79 All pressurized (lies.1)
Errors and System water power reactor facilities Misaligriments identif ed During of Wetinghouse the Three Mile de-sign with an OL 1sland incident 79-06B Roiew of -
4114/79 All Combustion 1
Operational Enginwring designed Errors and System pressurized Water Misalignments power reactor facilities with Identified During the Three Mile anOL Island Incident t
79-07 Seismie Stress 4/14179 All power reactor Facilities with an Analysis of.
Safety.Related OL or CP Piping 79-05 Esents Relevant 4!!4179 All BWR power to BWR Resetors reactor facilities Identified with an OL During Three Mile Island Incident 79-09 Failures of CE 4/17179 All power reactor facilities with an Type AL2 Circuit Breaker in Safety OL or CP f
Related Systems 79 10
. Requalification 5/11/79 All power reactor i
facilities with an Training Program i
Statistics OL i
l 79-11 Faulty Overcurrent 5/22/79 All power resetor l
facilities with an Trip Devim in I
Circuit Breakers OL or a CP for Engineered f
Safety Systems I
I' 79 12 Short Period 5!31/79 All CE BWR l
Scrams at BWR facilities with l
Facilities an OL 7812B A Typical Weld 3/19/79 All power reactor
(
Materialin Reactor facilities with
- Pressure Vessel -
-i 1
~ -
--2__..
=
. - = _
=-
= _.
Q -. - - = = = _
= = = =.
Table 3. IE Bulletins, Circulars, and Information Notices Issued in 1979-Continue, BULLETINS-Continued Date Ismed Ismed to Bulletin No.
Subject 6'25 79 All PWIb with an 79-13 Cracking in OL for action; Fwdw ater Sptem all BWRs with a Piping CP for information 6'2 79 All power reactor 79-14 Seismic Analpes facilities with an for As-Built OL nr a CP Safety Belated Piping System 7/11/79 All pewer reactor 79-15 Diep Draf t Pump larnve with a Deficiencies CP and or OL 7/26'79 All holders of and 79-Ifi Vita! Area Access applicants for OL Control 7/26'79 All PWR's OL 79-17 Pipe Craclu in Stagnant Borsted Water Systems at PWR Plants 5!7/79 All power reactor 79-16 Audibility Problems facilities with an OL Enmuntered on Esaluation S/ 20 ~79 All power and research 79 19 Packaging Low Level reactors with OLs. fuel Radioactis e Waste for facilities except uranium mills, and Transport and Burial attain materials licenv,es S!)0!79 All materints hwnves 79 20 Packaging Low Lnel who did not rweive Radioactise Waste for Bulletin No. 79-19 Transport and Burial S'13'79 All PWRs with an OL 79-21 Temperature Effects on Lese! Measurements 79 22 P'ossible leakage of Tubes 9S:79 To each license w ho retrises tule of tritium of Tritium Cas in Timepieces gas used in timepie,ws for Luminosity for luminosity 9'12/79 All power reactor 79 23 Potential Failure of feeilities with an Emergency Diese! Cencrator OL or a CP Field Exciter Transformer 9'27/79 All power reactor 79-24 Frozen Lines facilities which hase either OLs or cps and are in the late stage of corntruction CIRCULARS Date issued issued to Circular No.
Subject 79-01 Administration of 1/12/79 All holders of j
Unauthorized lianws except telethe,apy me<!ical Byproduct Material Licenses and Each p
To Humans Radiopharmaceutical Supplier
.i
-- m y - -
163
=
Dotr hsued issued to Circular No.
Subicci 2:1679 All holders of 79-02 Failure of 120 reactor OLs and Vol,t Vital AC cps Pdwer Supphes 2'23:79 A!! holders of 79-03 Inadequate Guard and applicants for Training spwial nuclear Qualiheation ard material licemes Fahihed Training in safeguards R words Group 3'1679 All holders of Loow Locking Nut reactor OLs or 79 04 on Limitorque Vahe cps Operators 3'20.79 All' holders of hioisture Leakage reactor OLs or 79-05 in Stranded Wire cps Conductors 4119:79 All holders of 79-06 Failure to Use medical liwnses Syringe and except teletherapy Bottle Shields licenwestuued to In Nuclear hiedicine 5/2'79 All holders of 79-07 Unexpnted Spwd
-BWR OLs or cps Increase of Reactor Rwiteulation AfC Set Resulted in Reactor Power increase 5'1879 All fuel 79 05 Attempted facilities Extortion Low licensed by NRC Enriched Uranium 6'22/79 All materials Occurrence of priority 1, fuel 79-09 Split or Punctured Cycle and Regulatory Diaphrans Operating in Certain Self reactor licenses Contained Breathing Apparatus 6!26/79 All power reactor 79 10 Pipefittings licensees with a hianufactured from CP and'or OL Unstseptable Nfsterial 6/27/79 All applicants 79-11 Design' Construction for, and holders Interface Problem of Power Reactors cps 6'2S!79 All power reactor Potential Diese!
operation 79 12 Generator facilities and all Turbocharger utilities having a CP Problem y
7/10/79 -
A!! power reactor 13 Replacement of Operations
. Diesel Fire Pump facilities and Starting all utilities Contactors having a CP
' 79-14 Unauthorizal Procurement and 7/13/79 All medicallicensas except teletheraphy Distribution of XE-133 medical licensees and to all radiopharmaceu tical supplie:s 3
c
164 Table 3. IE Bulletins, Circulars, and InfOrmation Notices Issued in 1979-Continued CIRCULARS Circular No.
Subject Date issued Ismed to 79 15 Bursting of liigh Pressure llose S16/7 9 All ma:erials Pnority 1, and hjalfunction of Relief fuel cuele and operating Yahe "O" Eing in Certain Self-pown reactor haruts Contained Breathing Apparatus 79 16 Exxssise Radiation Exposures 8!!6/79 All radiography To htemben of the general Public hwrwo and a Radiographer 79 17 Contact Problem in SB-12 8'14!79 A!! power reactor Switches on General Elmtric licerse with a CP and' Company hfetal Clad Circuit or OL Breakers 79-18 Pro--r Installation of C 10/79 All holders of power Target Rock Safety Relief reacton OLs and cps 79 19 Loose Locking Devices 9/13/79 All holders of power on Ingersoll Rand Pumps reactors OLs and cps 70 20 Failure of CTE Sylvania 9/24/79 All holden of power Relay Type Phi Bulletin reactors OLs and cps 7305. Catalog 5&l2-II AC INFORMATION NOTICES information Notice No.
Subicct Date Isrued issued to 79-01 Bergen-Paterson 2/1'79 All power reactor Ilydraulie Shock facilities with and Sw ay Arrestor an OL and or CP 79-02 Attempted 2/2!79 All fuel Extortion of Low facilities Enriched Uranium 79-03 Limitorque Valve 2/9!79 Ali power reactor Geared Limit facilities with Switch Lubricant an OL or a CP 79-04 Degradation of 2/16!79 All powei reactor Enginwred facilitics with Safety Features an OL or a CP 79 05 Use of Improper 3/21/7 9 All power reactor h1aterials in facilities with Safety Belated an OL or CP Components 79-06 Stress Analysis 3/23!79 All holders of of Safety-Related remetor OLs or Piping CP 79-07 Rupture of 3!26/79 All power reactor Radw aste Tanks facilities with an OL or CP 79-08 Interconnection of 3/28/79 All power reactor Contaminated facilities with Systems with an OL and Pu Servim Air prowssing fuel Systems Used as facilities the Sourw of Breathing Air
_,,a_
=165
=
information Date hmcd hsued to Notice No.
Subject 3/30'79 All power reactor 79-09 SpiH ei facilities with Radiosuhely anOL Contaminated Resin 4116'79 All power reactor Nonconforming facilities with a 79 10 Pipe Support CP Struts 5*7/79 All hc! den of 79 11 Lower Reactor reactor OLs and Vessel ficad cps Insulation Support Problem 5/11/79 All fuel 79-12 Attempted Damage facilities, toNew Fuel research reacton.and power reactors Assemblies with an OL or CP 5'29'79 All holders of Indication of Low reactor OLs and 79-13 Water Level in cps the Oyster Creek Reactor 6/11/79 All power reactor 79-14 NBC Position on facilities with a Electrical Cable CP Support Systems All holden of 6/7/79 79 15 Deficient reactor OLs and Prowdures cps 6'22'79
/.11 rewarch 79-16 Nuclear Incident reacton and test at Three Mile reacton with OLs Island
& 20!79 All holders of 79 17 Sot. w lioider reactor OLs and Aswmbly Damage cps from Mhfit Between Assembly and Reactor Upper Crid Plate 7/517 9 All holden of 79-18 Skylab Reentry reactor OLs 7/17/79 All holders of reactor 79-19 Pipe Cracks in Stagnant OLs and cps Borsted Water Spiems At PWR Plants E/10/79 All holden e,f reactor NBC Enforwment Policy OLs and cps and production 79-20 NRC LIwnsed Indisiduals liwrwes with liwnsal oFraton 9/7/79 All power and rewarch Transportation and Commercial reacton with OLs 79 21 Burial of Radioactive Material 9/14179 All power reactor 79-22 Qualification of Contro!
facilitis with Systems OLs and cps 9'25179 All power reactor 79-23 Emergency Diesel Generator facilities holding OLs Lube Oil Coolers and cps 9/28/79 All power reactor facilitis 79-24
. Overpressurization of with a CP Containment of a PWR Plant After a Main Steam Line Break u
f1
-166
- Pump performance ed by a Bulletin, and a written resporse by the licemee is not required. The licensees may or may not initiate
. Piping analysis and as-built conditions the recomrmnded netion. However,if further analysis 6
- E'"'
'S andtor information regarding the matter indicates in-e Structural concrete creased significance, it may result in the issuance of a
- Foundations Bulletin.
The particular conectns which might require is-suance of a Circular include those for w hich a Bulletin is of less is applicable, except that the impact ENFORCEN. IENT ACTIVITIES significance and is not sufficient to warrant specific actions by license or permit holders.
The Information Notice was first put in use in 1979.
The regulatory program is designed to assure that It is a mechanism by which the NRC is able to rapidly 1
licensees perform in accordance with NBC regula.
transmit information applicable or potentially ap-i tions, licenses and permits and with applicable see.
plicable to license and permit holders. The informa-tions of Federal statutes. NBC is empowered to tale tion may or may not have been analyzed by NBC. It enforcement action when licensees are not satisfying does not require acknowledgment or response but these requirements or are conducting operations in a licensees are instructed to take appropriate action if the information applies to their facility. The concerns way that might endanger the public health and safe which might require issuance of an Information or the environment, or adsersely affect the common Notice include those for which a Bulletin or Circular defense and security.
Enforcement action may be talen, for example, may be applicable, but for which significance of the when certain significant safet) related matters not event or condition does not warrant issuance of a j
Bulletin or Circular. Of course, a Bulletm or Circular meeting NRC requirements have escaped the licens attention or when procedures are improperly con-may be issued subsequent to an Information Notice on trolled and the fact is first diseosered during an NEC a particular concern as a result of problem evolution J
inspwtion. Such situations refixt adsersely on the and further evaluation. Information Notices may als fwtiveness of the licensee's management or qualite be used to transmit additional information on previously issued Bulletins or Circulars to license and assurance program. Enforcement action requi i
licensee to correct the particular problems and 4
permit holders, A listing of the Bulletins, Circulars, and Informa-establish measures to preclude reoccurrence-tion Notices issued from January 1,1979, through including deficiencies in his quality assurance program September 30,1979, is included in Table 3 to indicate if such deficiencies allowed the problem to occur, con-the types of conditions addressed by these different The severity of SRC enforcement actions saries tinue or reoccur, publications.
with the seriousness of the matter and the previous compliance record. Severallevels of NR P' ^d'd
" " "'.*itten Notices of Violation are provided for Other Reactive Effort
,Mr stances of noncompliance with NRC re-quirements.
During fiscal year 1979, the effort expended on
- Cisil penalties are considered foi licenses who
' j reactive inspections, investigations and related work evidence significant or repetitive items of non-has increased considerably, in addition to that expend-compliance, particularly when a Notice of Viof a ed on investigation and evaluation of the TMI acci.
tion has not been effective. Civil penalties may also be imposed for particularly significant hrst-
-dent.
Some construction sites have required between 50 of a kind violations.
and 250 man-days of unplanned reactive effort
- Orders to " cease and desist" operations, or for resulting in some cases in the postponement of routine modification, suspension, or revocation of-Inspection activities. A considerable amount of this licenses, are used to deal with licensees who do reactive effort relates to inspection, investigation and l
not respond to civil penalties or to deal with sio
- follow up effort, associsted with allegations, Part 21 tions that constitute a significant threat to pub!ie Reports and Bulletin, Circular and Information mat-health and safety or to the common defense en ters. The following construction problems have re-quired substantial pactive effort by both headquarters security. In the latter case, an order may be m effective immediately.
J j-and regional personnel:
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the enforcemen l
- Pipe support base platelanchor bolts taken during the report period.
~
167 d
Table 4. Civil Penalties Imposed-Fiscal Year 1979 Reason Amount Liceruct.
Failure to perform a
$7,000 Wisconsin Pubhe Senice suney required by (reported as regulations to assure Corporation Pending control of personne!
Creen Bay, Wisconsin m FYTS)'
~(Kewaunee Plant) exposures.
Licensee requested a hearing, howeser, a negotiated settlement was accepted by the licensee and the licensee paid the -
87,000 penalty.
Failure to fo!!ow 826,000 J rsey Central Power and radiation safety Light Company procedures and Morristown. New Jersey noncompliance items (Oyster Creek Plant) in the safeguards area.
Exposure to the lower
$2,500 back of an individual.
Twin City Testing and Engineering Labs., Inc.
Failure to perform St. Paul, Minnesota necessary radiation (Radiograpi.er) surveys.
Noncompliance items
$16,000 in the physical Niagara Mohawk Power (pending)
Corporation security area.
(Nine Mile Point Unit 1)
Noncompliance items
$15,750 United Nuclear Corporation in the pM al Wood Riser junction, Rhodelsland (pending) security area.
(Fuel Processor)
Inadequate training
$2,300 Unisersity of Wiwonsin of personnel, failure Madison. Wisconsin to evaluate internal (Academie Broad exposures of personnel and releases of airborne License) material to unrestricted areas.
Whole body exposure
$15,000 of an individual and Virginia El<rtric and Power (pending) failure to follow Company (Surry Unit 2) prowdures.
Distribution of l
324,000 radioactive material Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc.
(pending) not intended for Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Radiopharmaceutical iw an use to medical I
Distributor) dice:>ees, relabeling and pisrepresenting the.naterial as suitable for humar 'ue.
hposures of three
$4,300 hidi@luals S airborne Unhersity of Minnesota Minneapolis, Minnesota radionnive r..terial and other noncumphs items in the health and safetyarea.
' ? W U 4r r @ + 7,,w rw a,
o 16S material in an unnamed U.S. city. Although the Enforcement Irnp;mernents Federal Bureau of Imestigation (FBI) had the lead in the case, the NBC was conwrned about the pos<ible The Office of Inspection and Enforcement is seeking radiological consequences of the threatened act and continued improvement in enforcement. In December prodded technical support to the FBI. In this case the 1979 the enfbreement criteria concerning the transpor, FBI quickly apprehended a suspect and located the tation of radioactive material were upgraded. The stolen material.
Commission also has forwarded to Congress a request The other major incident involved the NRC to increase NBC's statutorv authority to impose civij reponse to the Three Mile Island accident. The center penalties. If this request is impleme'nted by amend.
did function as a major focal point for the NBC, as in-
. ent of the Atomic Energy Act, NRC's rnaximum tended, but the limited facilities were quickly over-allowable penalties will iricrease from $5,000 to extended during this event. As a result of TMl and in-
$10G,000 for a single violation and from $25,000 to no creased emphasis on responding to future incidents.
limit for all violations committed by a licensee within major revisions to the NRC incident response program 30 davs. Such an increase would provide greater in.
will be made.
centiles for major NRC licensees to comply with the The third incident for which the Operations Center regulatorv requirements. A greater range would also was activated occurred in October when a release of permit th'e penalties to be imposed by NRC to reflect radioactive gases from the Prairie Island nuclear plant more equitably the different classes of licensms and took place.
the seriousness of offenses. The Commission approved The Operations Center is manned 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s-per-day a proposal that copies of escalated enforcement orders by a qualified senior engineer.
and civil penalties be routinely forwarded to State public utility regulatory groups and to State attorneys general for their information. Routine mailing o these INVESTIGATIONS f
communications started m December 1979.
An important adjunct to NRC's inspection effort is NBC is continuing efforts to develop better methods for the evaluation of the regulatory performance of the investigative program which covers not only in-depth probes of irregularities revealed during inspec-major licensees. By identifying licensees whose perfor-mance may require improvement, NRC hope to an-tions, but also investigations of incidents, secidents, ticipate potential safety and security problems and allegations or any unsual circumstances occurring atA or related to NRC-licensed facilities or actitities avert them through prompt remedial action. This heightened public awareness and interest in nuclear would also improve the effectiveness of NRC's use of inspection resources. Identifying valid measures of power has resulted in an increase in the number of allegations rweived by NBC. As each allegation must licensee performance is a complex aad controversial process. Measurer considered to date include li&nsees' be carefully in estigated to determine its possible im-compliance records, evaluations of licensees by NRC pact upon the public health and safety, NBC has more inspmtors, and detailed trend analysis of reportable than doubled the number of trained investigators in its employ within the past year.
licensee events.
Imestigations are conducted by experience 4 in-vestigative personnellocated in each of the in NRC t
the im-NRC Operations Center regional offices. Investigators are assignw mediate staff of the regional director, both to em-phasize the importance of the investigative program The NRC Operations Center was activated on three and to provide better support to the various functional occasions during 1979. This center is the focal point branches in the region. Since NRC investigations are for NRC's initial response to significant incidents in-usually technical in nature and may involve several vohing NRC-licensed activities. The 2,000 square-foot scientific or engineering disciplines, the investigator center presently in use includes: a conference room for frequently works with and coordinates the actisities of briefing NBC management; an operations room for technical personnel who may be assigned to proside monitoring and evaluating information about the inci-assistance. Investigators also maintain close liaison dent; a secure communications room; word processing with Federal, State and local law enforcement agen-and computer support areas; and a library to house cies and work closely with them on investigations of j"j, necessary information resources. The center is equip-mutual interest. Within the past year, IE investigators ped with a specially-designed communications system have provided assistance to agencies having primary ar d a variety of audiovisual aids.
jurisdiction in investigations invohing the thtft of The first activation occurred in January as a result of an extortion threat against the General E!uctric Fuel special nuclear material, the intentional damaging of fuel elements at an operating nuclear power plant, the Fabrication Facility in Wilmington, North Carolina.
attempted bombing of a nuclear power station, and A letter demanded money for return of stolen uranium the falsification of records relied upon by NRC.
or the extortionist claimed he would disperse the A
-169
=
Table 5. Enforcement Orders-Fiscal Year 1979 Reason Date ciceme Order terminating 11/30176 Radioassay Systems. Inc. ~
proceedmgs.
Southfield. Michigan (Materials Licensee)
Beason: Licertwe disposed of all material and requested termination of the licensee. On Tel375, the licensee w as issued an Order to show cause for pronssing and distributing rnaterial without authoritation.
Order authorizing 6'15/79 Arksnsas Power & Light resumption of Company
- operations.
LitJe Ro'ck, Arkansas Beason: Licensee (Arkar.:=s Nuclear One satisfied the Unit 1) conditions of the 6'0/79 Order.
Order confirming 8/15!79 Public Servi & of Indiana suspension of Pltinfield. Indiana construction.
(Marble Hill Units 1 & 2)
Reason: Serious problems with respect to the adequacy of concrete placement and the limnsds quality assurance program.
Oversight of the NBC investigations program is ac-miles south of Topeka and three miles northeast of complished by a small investigative staff located at Burlington, Kansas.
herdquarters. During fiscal year 1979, 121 investiga-On March 15, 1978, the licensee reported to the tions were conducted by inspection and enforcement NBC that concrete samples tested for compressive personnel. Of these,76 were prompted by allegations strength at the age of 90 days had not all met the decling with reactor construction or operational specified 5,000 lbs.-per. square. inch (psi) design events at licensed facilities. Other investigations were strength. The samples represented 6,600 cubic yards of conducted into events involvingloss or thef t of licensed.
concrete placed in a continuous two-day operation to material, overexposures, and general public interest.
construct the reactor containment building base mat.
In 78 of the investigations, licensees were cited for The licensee initiated a series of studies to determine f:llure to meet NRC requirements.
the cause of the low strength in samples and to deter-Significant specisi investigations conducted during mine whether the base mat met the construction per-tha year are described below.
mit criteria. The licensee concluded, in a final report in Oct ber 1978, that the base mat was acceptable and Wdi Creek Generating Station met specifications for 5,000 psi compressive strength concrete on the basis of supplemental tests. The ap-The Wolf Creek Cenerating Station of the Kansas Cas and Electric Company is located in east-central parent low strength samples were attributed to faulty K nsas in Coffey County. The site is approximately 50 testing procedures by the licensee.
-e4 44 A
E Y
gggg99 g
-,g g_,,
g_
,,,p
170 The NRC initiated an in estigation that resulted in related concrete work until certain QA actions were the licensee's halting the placement of all safety-completed to the NRC's satisfaction. On the basis of related concrete on December 19, 1976. Numerous observation by IE inspectors of a large non-safe:)-
deficiencies which could have contributed to the ap-related concrete placement, safety-related concrete work was allowed to resume.
parent low-str ngth concrete were found, as well as In July 1979, the National Board of Boiler and quality assurance problems. The NRC concluded that Pressure Vessel Inspectors reported ses eral deficiencies the faulty testir. w as not the cause of the apparent low strength sz
'es. Additional studies were in-at the site (not related to concrete) and recommende of the utility's American Society of itiat:d by the It ace. The NRC retained an indepen-suspension Mechanical Engineers Owner's Certificate for ap-dent consultant and a test laboratory to provide addi-parent Code violations of Section 111. Division 1, of tional information independent of the licensee.
the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. As a resu While this work was underway, voids w ere found in the containment wall in two locations when forms of further investigation by IE inspectors which iden-tified contruction management problems, an order were remosed in December 1978. These defects and confirming the suspension of work was issued on their causes were reviewed by IE inspectors. Repair 14,1979. A series of corrective actions must be was subsequently accomplished, utilizing approved August completed before construction of safety-related items procedures.
On March 6,1979, after changes related to quality will be allowed to resume.
I assurance had been made, the licensee was permitted to resume the placement of concrete in safetv-related McGture N,uclear Plant structures except for the reactor containment building.
It was not until Julv 12,1979 that concrete placement The McGuire Nuclear Plant of Duke Power Com-was permitted in 'the containment, because of the Pany is located 17 miles northwest of Charlotte, N.C.,
unresolved questions concerning the base mat. Place-adjacent to the Catawba River.
ment was allowed as a result of reanalyses of the reac.
In March 1978, the NRC received telephone calls
~
tor containment building by the lic nsee using the and a letter from an individual regarding alleged safe-lowered concrete strength values as the actual as-built ty problems at the McGuire facility. A meeting of strength of concrete. The reanalvsis showed that NRC staff with the individual resulted in reduction of enough margin remained in the design to accom.
the concerns to 12 allegations. IE ins estigators worted modate the low-strength concrete, since the Wolf on th-case through July and were able to resolve all Creek unit is one of a series of standardized plants but one allegation. This one allegation pertained to which are designed for more severe site conditions calculations completed by Duke Power Company to than exist at Wolf Creek. As a result of the studies andascertain whether a fuel cask could fall into the spent investigations, greater assurance has been obtained fuel pool under various hmothetical circumstances.
that the structure will perform adequately, Additional investigatory effort identified a conser-vative calculation-not previously shown to the NRC-which showed that the cask could enter the Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station spent fuel pool. The license has taken corrective action to prevent the occurrence of such an event.
The Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station of Public Sersice of Indiana is located in southeastern In-Midland Nuclear Plant diana in Jefferson County. The site is approximately nine miles northeast of Milton, Ky.
The Midland Nuclear Plant, which is owned by Beginning in April 1979, a series of noncompliances associated with concrete construction were identified Consumers Power Co., is located just south of Midland, Michigan, adjacent to a large industrial by IE inspectors. In May, the NBC met with the complex of the Dow Chemical Co.
licensee to request additional information on in-place In September 1978 the licensee reported greater concrete. Many of the noncompliances were attributed than expected settlements had occurred in the diesel to inadequate implementation of quality assurance / control programs by the licensee and his generator building complex. IE investigations disclos-contractor. In June, a series of a!!egations related to ed that many of the commitments the licensee had made at the construction permit stage had been resis-concrete construction were made by a former worker ed without changes in the safety analysis reports. Mat-at the site. These allegations indicated that voids in the l
concrete had been found but not properly reported nor ters related to revised criteria and remedial action were transferred to NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor properly repaired.
An NRC investigation, with the aid of the worker, Regulation (NRR).
Joint IE-NRR efforts are still underway to define found additional areas which were deficient because what corrective measures need to be taken.
of voids. In June, the licensee agreed to stop safety-
171 In reports on the first three quarters of the fiscal Surry Nuclear Power Station year, eight abnormal occurrences were covered, in-The Surry Nuclear Power Station, which is owned cluding the axident at Three Mile Island (see Chapter bv the Viryinia Electrie and Power Company (VEP.
2). Three additional events were under consideration C'O), is located about eight miles south of for reporting in the fourth quarter (July-September 1979) but had not been officially identified as abnor-Williamsburg, Va.
mal occurrences at the end of the report period and On Mav 7,1979, while conducting inspections of are, therefore, omitted in the listing below. Abnormal new fuel'for Surry Unit 2, the licensee found that occurrences which took piece during the fiscal year at plastic protective liners on 62 of 64 nuclear fuel facilities under the jurisdiction of Agreement States assemblies had been tampered with. Further inspec.
tion revealed that a white crystalline substance had are treated in Chapter 6, " State Programs."
been poured on the assemblies. Preliminary analysis Loss of Containment Integrity. The occurrence in-by VEPCO indicated that the substance was sodium hydroxide. The new fuel is stored in a building which v Ived a loss of containment intepity at two nuclear is' locked and alarmed, and to which access is controll-p wer plants-Millstone Unit and Salem Unit 1-reported in July and September of 1976 respwtive-ed b~v the issuance of specially coded access cards.
ly. The issue is discussed in Chapter 3, under Investigation of this incident by the FBI culminated "Mwha, cal Operability of Containment Purge in the surrender of two VEPCO employees to Surry
\\ alves," in the section, "Other Techrucal Issues.
County authorities on June 19, 1979. Charges of breaking and entering with intent to damage electrical Electrical System Deficiencies. The occurrence con-facilities (felony) ar,d willful destruction of utility cerned degraded enginwred safety features at the company equipment (felony) were lodged against the Arkansas Nuclear One site, invohing both Units 1 and two employees. Two additional charges against both 2 there, and disclosed serious deficiencies in electrical men were introduced for conspiracy regarding the two distribution system operation and design. It was felonies, for a total of four felonies and one misde-reported in September 1978 and is treated in meanor against each man. These charges were filed on NUREC-0090, Vol. 2., No. I behalf of the Co nmonwealth of Virginia, since cur-Piping Reanalysis at Five Plants. The occurrence rent Federal statutes do not provide penalties for such derived from the discovery that certain piping systems r.ets of vandalism. Pending legislation may result in and pipe suports in five nuclear plants had been con-making intentional damage to a reactor facility a structed according to a faulty calculation. The issue is Federal crime.
e vered in Chapter 3, under " Shutdown and Seismic The two individuals, who were later tried, con-Reanalysis of Five Operating Reactors,"in the section, vieted on charges of willfully destroying utility com-
"Other Technical Issues."
psny equipment and sentenced to two years' imprison-ment, claimed that they had damaged the fuel rods to Extortion Attempt. The occurrence arose from an call attention to poor security practices and unsafe extortion attempt in the form of an anonymous letter conditions at the VEPCO f acility. Subsequent to their sent to officials of the General Electric Company's fuel tritl, they were interviewed by NRC investigators and fabrication facility at Wilmington, N.C., alleging that en -investigation into their allegations is currently the sender was in possession of an amount of low underway.
enriched uranium oxide and threatening to send por-tions of it to various persons and to release the materal in certain cities if payment was not made. The extor-Abnorrnal Occurrences-Fiscal Year 1979 tionist was apprehended and the material recovered.
An " abnormal occurrence" is defined in Section 20S (See Chapter 5, under " Safeguards Events-Fiscal Year 1979.)
cf the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 as "an unscheduled incident or event which the Nuclear Loss of Feedwater Transient. The occurrence took Regulatory Commission determines to be significant place on May 2,1979, at the Oyster Creek facility, from the standpoint of public health or safety." The where a loss of feedwater transient resulted in a signifi.
same Act requires that such events be reported cant reduction of the water inventory above the reac-quarterly to the Congress by the NRC and also be in-tor core area, as measured by one set of water levelin-cluded in the Annual Report. The four quarterly struments. It was later determined that the water level reports covering fiscal year 1979 are published as had fallen below the safety limit, but that no part of NUREC-0900, Vol.1 No. 4, and Vol. 2, Nos.1,2 and the core was uncovered and no fuel damage occurred.
3, and are available from the Division of TechnicalIn-formation and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Vandalizing New Fuel Rods. The occurrence in--
. Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 volved the pouring of sodium hydroxide on new fuel r nd from the National TechnicM Information Service, assemblies and is discussed above under the heading Springfield, Va. 22161.
"Surry Nuclear Power Station."
172 Emergency Feedwater Unavailable. In June 1979 at tained that there was no procedural requirement that Unit I of Arkansas Nuclear One, an NRC inspector the system status be checked before startup. The plant found that, as preparations were made for startup of was returned to cold shutdown for 12 days, until pro-the facility the controls for the emergency feedwater cedures could be reexamined and revised. All holders system were so positioned that the system could not of reactor operating licenes and construction permits automatically respond if needed. It was later ascer-were informed of the event and its implications.