ML19326C184
| ML19326C184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Arkansas Nuclear, Rancho Seco, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1976 |
| From: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Phillips J ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19326C185 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004210678 | |
| Download: ML19326C184 (5) | |
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Arkansas Power & Light Company DEC 13 IS76 cc w/ enclosure:
Horace Jewell, Esquire House, Holms & Jewell 1550 Tower Building Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Phillip K. Lyon, Esquire House, Holms & Jewell 1550 Tower Building Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Nr. ' Donald Rueter Manager, Licensing Arkansas Power & Light Company Post Office Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Arkansas Polytechnic College Russellville, Arkansas 72801 e
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w ENCLOSURE 1 QUESTIONS ON ANO-1 OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION PROPOSALS 1.
The criteria discussed at the November 5 meeting and detailed in are listed below:
1.
Credit for operator action 2.
Single failure criteria 3.
Testability 4.
Seismic design ano IEEE 279 criteria Provide information regarding how you intend to meet these design criteria. Where deviations from the criteria are contemplated, provide a detailed justification including the technical basis for not meeting the criteria and, when significant, the impact on the schedule for implementation.
Describe all redundant and diverse systems which are available to provide overpressure protection.
2.
Provide schematic piping and instrumentatien diagrams of all systems which are utilized during plant shutdown and startup operations:
indicate primary and alternate flow paths, fluid and heat sources, pressure and flow controllers, RCS pressure protection systems, and ECCS and make up systems.
3.
Provide a failure modes and effects analysis of the overpressure protection system for startup, shutdown, and testing operations which defines the limiting combination of initiating event and additional single failure or operator error subsequent to initiation of the overpressure transient.
4.
Indicate for your low temperature overpressure protection system how the system has been designed to handle ommon failure modes such as those resulting from loss of offsite power and seismic events.
Describe the failure mode of the air operated makeup flow control valve and the letdown flow control valve upon loss of air supply.
Identify the events / failure modes which could result in ioss of air supply.
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, 5.
Discuss the basis for _ determining the most limiting initial conditions for analysis of the overpressure transient.
Items that must be considered include but should not be limited to: RCS pressure, valve opening time, steam generator temperature difference, reactor coolant pump seal pressures, pressurizer level, makeup tank level, accumulator pressure, relief valve water relief capacity, and pump heads and flows.
6.
Provide a transient analysis of the reactor coolant system response to inadvertent actuation of a single train of high pressure injection pumps.
Describe what administrative controls and procedures are used during startup and shutdown, and during component and/or system testing to justify the assumption that inadvertent injection by more than one high pressure train is not credible. Provide a similar ciscussion and analysis of a core flood tank discharge. For both situations indicate the basis for identifying the limiting single failure or comon failure mode.
7.
Does your plant have relief capacity installed in the decay heat removal system that could provide additional protection in the event of an overpressure transient? What is the water relief capacity of the valve? Is the decay heat removal system automatically isolated on RCS high pressure? What are the pressure setpoints for the DHR relief valve opening and its automatic isolation?
8.
During the November 5th meeting, the possibility cf limiting the volume of water in the RCS makeup tank was. discussed.
It was stated that this could preclude filling the pressurizer if the makeup control valve should fail full open.
Is this procedure a viable option at your facility? Is water level in the makeup tank generally. controlled automatically? Specify your assumptions for initial pressurizer level, makeup tank water volume, and other design considerations which would result in limiting RCS pressure to within Appendix G limits.
9.
Describe what instrumentation and alarms are available to the operator to aid in detection and termination of an overpressure transient.
- 10. What precautions are taken during startup, shutdown and testing to verify that critical procedural steps are performed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertently i' itiating an overpressure transient n
and minimizing the impact of the transient on the RCS. Would steps such as lock out of pumps and accumulators and reducing the water level in the pressurizer and makeup tank be accomplished by double check off and sign off procedures to insure against error? What procedures normally are followed for altering the status of pumps or valves under administrative restriction?
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7 11.
If power is removed from valves as part of administrative controls used for overpressure protection, what status lights and indicators
- are available.to verify their proper alignment? When administrative controls call for removing power from a valve or a pump, is this accomplished from the control room ~or from a motor control center?
- 12. Describe any testing procedure proposed to insure operation of overpressure protection devices. At what times would these tests be perfonned?
- 13. The problem of pressurizer relief valve maintenance was also discussed at the November 5th meeting. The relief valve is normally. isolated and removed during shutdown conditions if maintenance is required.
This would reduce the level of protection available to mitigate the conscquences of a pressure transient. Please discuss what measures will be taken at your plant to provide overpressure protection when the relief valve is removed from service and indicate how the criteria enumerated at the November 5th meeting will be met.
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