ML19325D526

LER 89-019-00:on 890919,determined That No Procedural Problem Existed & Equipment Problem Caused 890915 Test Deficiency.Caused by Reaching Incorrect Conclusion.Train Restored to Svc After Replacement of relay.W/891018 Ltr

ML19325D526
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	10/18/1989
From:	Bailey J, Mike Williams WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-019, LER-89-19, NO-89-0181, NO-89-181, NUDOCS 8910240314
Download: ML19325D526 (6)

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W$LF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION i > (d c'i m A. asuey ' i mm ,

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. October 18,.1989  ;

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U. S. Nuclear: Regulatory Conunissha

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' ATTN' Document Control Desk l*v Mail Station Pi-137

-  : Washington, D. C. 20555-i Subjects. Docket,No.'50-482: Licensee Event Report 01-019-00 a  ;

.b 0- Centlemen:

, The' attached Licensea Event Report (LER). is submitted- . pursuant 'to l

10 CPR 50.75 (a) (2) (1) concerning a Technical Specification. violation.

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} Very truly yours.

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L  % g . M s

i John A. Bailey ,

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Vice President i Nuclear Operations

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u 9 ACILITT NAME (t) DOCKtf NVainst R (2) PAGE G Wolf Creek Generating Station 0 1610101014I 812 1 loFl 0 l 5 Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry caused By Discovery of Equ'.pment Inoperability In One Train While The Other Train Was Out Of Service

t. ,> EYlNT DATS tel Llm NVM8tR tel REPORT DATE 171 OTHE R , ACILITit t INVOLvl0181 MONT H OAY YlAR YEAH j 'Ab

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. ARtACODE Merlin G. Williams - Manager Plant Support 3l1 i6 3,6 (4 l-l B i 8 3l1 COMPLlf t O..t LINE FOR B ACH COMPONENT f ALLURE DESCRISED IN THIS REPORT (13t MA C. " *T 8 CAV84 6 'f t tM COMPONeht n{0 NPR CAu$t 84 STE M COMPONEN? hE' }'O Nf RD ' ' '

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$UPPLOMENTAL R& PORT SKPECTED tiet MONTH DAV YEAR I svowssiON N Yts tir u.

v remorm EXP(*1tO svewsssON OATEI NO l l l AesTi ACT tua,ir w sm w.ca. u. .aoremmar .rmea r e,no c. rema,ne,, o, > ns, I

On September 15, 1989, during perfomarce of a surveillance test sw o-lure, l

the "A" train Centrifugal Charging Ptmp (CCP) Minimum Flow Valve, BG HV- .

8110, did not stroke procerly in respanse to a sinulated flow signal. 'Ihe i

surveillance test was sniperded pending a review of the procedure l

, nethodology as tha sw slure had recently been revised. On September 19,  :

l 1989, at 0420 CDP, a preventative traintenance outage began for several "B" ,

train components, including the emargency power source for the "B" train l CCP. At approximately 1200 CD? on Septaber 19, it was determined that no p proce'aral prdblem existed, and that an equipnent problem associated with BG l l HV-8W) had likely caused the September 15 test deficiency. At  ;

l cppr.ox.imately 1755 CDP, it was determined that with BG HV-8110 inoperable, i the "A" train CCP could not be e.:cnsidered operable. Because the "B" train ,

CCP was also inoperable, the unit entered 'Iechnical Specification (T/S) 3.0.3 At 1940 CDT, the "A" train CCP was reatored to service after replacenent of i a faulty slave relay, and T/S 3.0.3 was exited at that ti;ne. This event l

occurred'as a result of maching mrrect conclusion when initially i evaluating the test deficiency. 9 '

ation's philosophy of a conservative l

aprcoach to pr.oblem solving w' .s It @. sized to licensed personnel.  :

L The :.esponsibilities of test <

rners has been reiteratert to Instr.utentation and Control D .sannel.

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wac Nm apeA . U s. Nucttan r.toutaiow commission P' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEX ( CONTINUATION waovto on wo mow EkPIRil:Bf31/m e Acattiv NAM 4 Ill DOCKLT NUMBLR 423 f tR NUMBER ($l PA06 (31 l va'a "203^'  ?#32 Wolf Creek Generating Station 0 l5 [0 l0 j 0 l l0[ 0l 019g O0 0 g5

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i. TENT (# rnare spece a segweef. arse ammsons/ NRC Form ap5WsH171 pmmucrIm j On Septenbar 19,1989, at 1755 CDP, the unit entered Technical Specification l (T/S) 3.0.3 because of the inoperability of two independent naargency Core 2 Cooling System subsystems [BP, BQ). At the time of this event, the "B" train O.s paicy Diesel Generator [EK-DG) was out of service for planned maintenance activities rendering the "B" train Centrifugal Charging Punp .

[BQ-P) inoperable. It was subsequently detennined that the "A" train l Centrifugal Charging Punp was also inoperable. At 1940 CDP, the "A" train Centrifugal Charging Punp was restored to operable status and T/S 3.0.3 was exited. '1his report is being subnitted pursuant to 10CER50.73 (a)(2)(1)(B) as a cond). tion prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. ]

l DESCRIPTIGE & EVElff )

On September 15,1989, at 1455 CDP, Instruinantaticn and Centrol (I&C) 1 L Fiu;issuel ocmnanced performance of surveillance test suc lare SIS IC-603A, ,

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" Slave Relay Test K603 Train A Safety Injection." This s ucM ure, in part, denonstrates pa:5er operation of valve BG W-8110, the "A" Train Centrifugal  ;

Charging Punp Mininum Flow Valve [BQ-V). Under nonel operation, BG-W-8110 ,

is open to provide recirculation flow to the centrifugal charging punp.

l Following receipt of a safety injection signal, the mininun ficw valve  ;

I should remain open if there is not sufficient flow passing through the flow

switch in order to maintain adequate minimum flow to the centrifugal charging punp. 2his recirculation flow is necessary at high Reactor Coolant  !

System pressures in order to prevent damage to the centrifugal charging punp I under low flow conditions. The minimum flow valve also receives an auto-closure signal to autenatically isolate the recirculation line when sufficient flow has been sensw by the flow switch. This automatic closure ,

I- feature ensures adequate safety injection flow is delivered to the reactor  !

coolant system..

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During performance of the sucedure, BG W-8110 stroked closed on a high flow sir; al as expected and then stroked back open, which was not expected.

Because the gvcedure had recently undergone a major revision, the test performer believed that a s ucadural problem had likely caused the unexpected str i s or a of BG W-0110. STS IC-603A was susguded at 1542 Car to allow for further review of the procedure methodology. l l

l On September 19,1989, at 0420 CDT, several "B" train ccmponents, including i Eg==ynicy Diesel Generator "B" and Residual Heat Renwal Punp "B" [BP-P)  !

were tagged out of service for preventative maintenanc.e activities. Entry I was made into T/S 3.8.1.1, Actions b and d. Action b requires, in part, I that with one ciesel generator of the requW A.C. electrical pcmr somnec inoperable, demonstrate the operability of as offsite A.C. sources witLn 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter and demanstrate the operability of the renaining operable diesel generator within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable diesel generator to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 1

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• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AwRovio ovs No mo-om EXPIRE 4: t/3008 7 ACsLif y Naut DI DOCKit NUMStR g)

LfR NUMBER @ PA06 (3) I g

"aa " EP. W,?,n  !

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TEXT (# snore speco is esqpgyod. afee eeWhortsf hRC ,oren MW M7) or be in at least 1.ot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> arxi in cold shutdown -

within the followbg 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Acticn d requires, in part, that with one -

diesel generator inoperable verify that all required systens, subsystems, trains, conponents, .and devices that depend on the remaining operable diesel generator as a source of energency power, are also operable, and that the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater punp [BA.-P) is q = m ble. Entry was also c nade into T/S 3.5.2, Action a, which requires, in part, that with one Liamsysncy Core Cooling Systen subsystem inoperable, to Iestore the inoperable subsystem to cperable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. An Emergency Core  :

Cooling System subsystem consists of one Centrifugal Charging Pump, one Safety Injection Punp [BQ.-P), one Residual Heat Renoval Punp and one

Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (BP-HK).' +

!- At approximately 1200 CCT, on September 19, 1989, I&C personnel ocnpleted a .

l review of STS IC-603A and concluded that no st-Mm1 problem existed. It (

was determined that a circuitry problem, most likely a bad relay, had caused '

the unexpected test result on Septanbar 15. An evaluatica was initiated to determine if ingvpar operation of BG HV-8110 would cause ine== ahility of.

I the "A" train Centrifugal Charging Ptmp. While this evaluation was being conducted, work was suspended on Limyzicy Diesel Generator "B" and efforts -

were focused on restoring it to service. In ack11 tion, preparations to replace the suspect relay were initiated.

At approximately 1755 CDP, Safety Analysis personnel concluded that there nay be insufficient huh head Safety Injection flow for certain accidents  !

frcan the '"A" Centrifugal Charging Pump if the recirculation valve were to malfunctlon. '1herefore, the "A" Centrifugal Charging Punp could not be considered operable. The "B" Centrifugal Charging Punp could not be ,

considered q=mble because of the ingamhility of its emergency power  !

sou::ce. Becense the Technical Specifications do not contain provisicms for ingamhility of two Limyisicy Ctre Cooling System subsystems, the plant ,

entered T/S 3.0.3.

At approximately 1827 CDT, IEC pw..caniel confirmed the gooence of a faulty slave relay (JG-EY) . By 1940 CDP, the slave relay had been replaced and STS IC-603A had been ca pleted satisfactorily, thus restoring the "A" Centrifuoal Charging Punp to oprable status. T/S 3.0.3 was exited at that time.

STS IC-603B, the corresponding "B" train surveillance gvc= dure, was subsequently perfonned satisfactorily to confirm supw: operation cd the slave relay controlling the recirculation valve for the "B" Centrifugal Charging Ptmp.

By approximately 2212 CDP, on September 21, 1989, the "B" train Limvency Diesel Generator was restored to c,perable status, and the Action Staternents of Technical Specifications 3.8.1.1 and 3.5.2 were exited at that time,

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181RC F.am PA U $ NUCLE 12 KE2VL AToAY COMMitSION TTO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AreRovto ove =o mo-om exeints. e se. 1

/' f AC14tTV hANt Hi DCtR61 NUM9tR (2) gg h NuggER 16) PA05 (3) f vta. "un;r  ::.y i h . Wolf Creek Generating Station o ls jo lo l0 l 4l8l 2 8l9 ._

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L ROOP CADSE AIO Qmar.LTNE ACPINS l

This event occurred as a result of an incorrect conclusion being reached when initially evaluating the test deficiency encountered during the c performance of STS 10-503A. W e I&C technician performing the surveillanme test believed that the test deficiency could have been caused by a s vcodore '

error. W ie was the first performance of the s uc= dure utilizing a new methodology. When dispositioning the test deficiency, the Shift Supervisor (utility licensed operator) classifisi the deficiency as a sucedural error and believed that t w suc dare uould be reviewed and revised as necessary.

h I&C technician was unaware of any urgency to review the procedure methodology because the surysillanN " late date" was vct until Septanbar 30 and because the Shift Supervisor had classified the deficiency as a Non-l Technical Specification failure. Consequently, the technician did not

! initiata a' review of the sucedure until he returned to work en Tuesday, September 19. . After determining that no sveadore error existed, I&C pm.cunel pronptly notified the Control Rom that an equipnent problem did I exist. Following natificatim that there was a proble:n with equipnas.t in the "A" train, Control Roczn personnel initiated an evaluation of the condition and initiated actions to expedite restoration of equipnent to service.

u In order to reamphasize Wolf Creek Generating Station management philosophy relative to a conservative approach to problem solving, this Idoensee Event Report will be incorporated into Required Reading for all licensed personnel. In addition, a letter clarifying the test performer's responsibilities upon discovery of a test deficiency has been issued as required reading for I&C personnel. h letter highlights the inportance of i making conservative assunptions when a test deficiency is encountered and  ;

when notifying the Shift Speisor that a deficiency has la identified. l h faulty relay was found to be eticking in its energized position with no I power to the coil. While renoving the relay, it cycled to its de-energized (correct) position. N relay was then cycled several times with no further problems encountered. A new relay was installed, and the faulty relay was taken to the I&C shop for further root cause analysis. h faulty relay was mnufactur".d by Potter & Brumfield, Model No TY93-MDR-4103-1.

l l

ADDITIONAL IFJRMATIm ,

1 During the time of this event, the unit was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at approximately 100 perc e t Icted W ermal Power. Centrifugal Charging Panp "B" was available to pr. ovide high head injection flow, although it was technically inoperable because its associated einu.gewy power supply was inoperable. Centrifugal Charging Punp "A" was also capable of delivering flow to the Reactor Coolant Systen. The Wolf Creek Steamline l

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i 88AC Paran ateA U.S Nut *LE A3 7.tguLATORY COMMISSION I f**! ' ' ' UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION anao. io ove No. mo-oioa (KPIRE S. 8/31/MI FAC6Lify Naast itl DOCR ET NUMBER (21 Ltd NUMelR (61 PA95 ($1 l naa " $ '?,i "iTJ,W .

t Wolf creek Generatano Station o l5 l0 l0 lo l 4l8 l 2 8l9 - 0 l lj 9 -

0l0 0]5 or 0l 5 -

TEXT fJ anose apoco e regenest, use m 44C perrn JesAw (17; break end IOCA analycos have been examined to determine the inpact of a reductica in safety injection flow frun CCP "A" due to the failure of the auto-closure function of the centrifugal charging pung mininum flow recirculation valve. It is concluded that there is no adverse effect en the s+-1% break analysis due to the case in which a OCP Icininum flow g isolation valve fails in an open position. No penalty was noted for the large treak IOCA 4.nalysis while a penalty of 68 degrees Fahrenheit wa::

i. calculated for the anall break IOCA analysis. 'Ihe Peak Clad Tenparature (PCT) for the limiting emall break case with a reduction in safety injection flow as h rt M above is 1858 degrees Fahre heit. 'Ihis resultant POT for the.amall break IOCA case maintains considerable margin to the 2200 %= s l- Fahrenheit limit of 10CPR50.46 and continues to be bounded by the large  :

l break IDCA result of 2111.5 degrees Fahrenheit.  ;

I There have been no previous similar reportchle occurrences. ,

i 4

0 NRC FORM PSSA *ll 8* CP0e 1988-3 20- SM O M 711 0