ML19324A056
| ML19324A056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/22/1980 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19324A055 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-1720, NUDOCS 8006200155 | |
| Download: ML19324A056 (31) | |
Text
.
B&OTF WORK PRODUCTS s_)
EACH OPERATING PLANT BULLETIN EVALUATION REPORTS e
B&W PLANTS SAFETY EVALUAT10t!S LIFTING ORDERS e
LETTEP.S ISSulNG AFW REQUIREMENTS e
LETTERS APPROVING GUIDELINES FOR SBLOCA EMERGE e
OPERATING PROCEDURES REPORT SUMMARIZING B&OTF REVIEW 0F BULLETINS, ORDERS AND e
GEtlERIC EVALUATION OF SBLOCA AND LOFW (NUREG-0645)
REPORT ON GENERIC EVALUATION OF DELAYED RCP TRIP e
DURING SBLOCA IN PWRs (NUREG-0623)
REPORTS ON GENERIC EVALUATION OF SBLOCA AND LO e
OPERATING REACTORS NUREG-0565 (B&W)
NUREG-0611 (H)
NUREG-0626 (GE )
NUREG-0635 (CE )
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8006200g.5
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B&OTF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR B&W-DESIGNED PLANTS SYSTEMS RELIABILITY INSTALL AUTOMATIC BLOCK-VALVE CLOSURE SYSTEM e
OPERATIONAL TEST OF AUTOMATIC BLOCK-VALVE CLOSURE SYSTEM e
EVALUATION OF PORV OPEUING PROBABILITY DURING OVERPRESSURE TR e
REPORTING FAILURES AND CHALLENGES TO THE PORVs e
$VALUATIONOFSAFETYVALVERELIABILITY e
REPORTING FAILURES AND CHALLENGES TO THE SAFETY VALVES e
REVIEW AND UPGRADE RELIABILITY AND REDUNDANCY OF NON-SAFETY GRA e
EQUIPMENT UPON WHICH SBLOCA MITIGATION RELIES CONSIDERATION OF DIVERSE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PATH FOR DAVIS-BESSE e
AUTOMATIC TRIP OF RCPs DURING SBLOCA - INSTALLED AND OPERATIONAL e
INSTRUMENTATION TO VERIFY NATURAL CIRCULATION - INSTALLED AND OPER e
ANALYSES ANALYSIS METHODS FOR SBLOCA, INCLUDING EVALUATION OF N0 DING e
PLANT-SPECIFIC CALCULATION TO SHOW COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.46 e
EVALUATION OF EFFECTS OF CORE FLOOD TANK INJECTION ON SBLOCAs e
ADDITIONAL STAFF AUDIT CALCULATIONS OF B&W'S SBLOCA ANALYSES e
EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION OF TWO-PHASE NATURAL CIRCULATION e
ANALYSIS OF PLANT RESPONSE TO A SBLOCA WHICH IS ISOLATED, CAUSING e
EIb RCS REPRESSURIZATION AND SUBSEQUENT STUCK-0 PEN PORY
ANALYSES (CONTINUED),
e ANALYSIS OF PLANT RESPONSE TO A SBLOCA IN THE PRESSURIZER SPRAY LIN WITH A STUCK-0 PEN SPRAY LINE ISOLATION VALVE e EVALUATION OF EFFECTS OF WATER SLUGS IN PIPING CAUSED BY HPI AND CFT FLOWS e EVALUATION OF RCP SEAL DAMAGE AND LEAKAGE DURING A SBLOCA e SUBMIT PREDICTIONS FOR LOFT TEST L3-6 WITH RCPs RUNNI.NG.
e SUBMIT REQUESTED INFORMATION ON THE EFFECTS OF NONCONDENSIBLE GASE (I) JUSTIFICATION FOR OMISSION OF RADIOLYTIC DECOMPOSITION AS A SOUR OF NONCONDENSIBLE GASES, AND (2) VERIFICATION OF PREDICTED CONDENSA-TION HEAT TRANSFER DEGRADATION e EVALUATION OF MECHANICAL EFFECTS OF SLUG-FLOW ON STEAM GENERATOR T EMERGENCY PROCEDURES e THE REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN B&W PLANTS BY C0t1 MISSION ORDERS, OPERATOR TRAINING e MINIMUM SIMULATOR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR SBLOCAs D
0
e BgGTF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WESTINGHOUSE-DESIGNFD OPERATING PLANTS SYSTEMS RELIABILITY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) TIME LIMIT ON AFW SYSTEM TRAIN OUTAGE (GS e
TS ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL ON MANUAL AFW SYSTEM VALVES-LOCK A e
POSITION (GS-2)
AFW SYSTEM FLOW THRGTTLING-WATER HAMMER (GS-3) e AFW SYSTEM FLOW PATH VERIFICATION (GS-6) e NON-SAF$TYGRADE,NON-REDUNDAtlTAFWSYSTEMAUTOMATICINITIATIONSIGNALS(GS-7) e AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF AFW SYSTEMS (GS-8) e PRIMARY AFW SOURCE LOW LEVEL Al. ARM e
e AFW PUMP ENDURANCE TEST INDICATION OF AFW FLOW TO THE STEAM GENERATORS e
AFW' SYSTEM AVAILABILITY DURING PERIODIC SURVEILLANCE TESTING e
AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF AFW SYSTEMS (GL-1) e SINGLE VALVES IN THE AFW SYSTEM FLOW PATH (GL-2) e t
i
B10TF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WESTINGil00SE DESIGNED GPERATING PLANTS (CONT'D) 1 ELIMINATION OF AFW SYSTEM DEPENDENCY ON AC POWER FOLLOWING A e
AC POWER (GL-3)
PREVENTI0tl 0F MULTIPLE PUMP DAMAGE DUE TO LOSS OF SUCTION R e
NATURAL PHENOMENA (GL-h)
NON-SAFETYGRADEjNON-REDUNDANTAFWSYSTEMAUTOMATICINITIATIONSIGNALS(GL-5) e i
INTERACTION OF SAFETY AND NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS e
)
INSTRUMENTATION TO VERIFY NATURAL CIRCULATI0fl PID CONTROLLER MODIFICATION e
PROPOSED ANTICIPATORY TRIP F091:ICATION e
o CCI-SUPPLIED PORY INSTALLATION OF AUTO ISOLATION OF PORVs e
TESTING 0F AUTO ISOLATION OF PORVs e
WESTINGHOUSE REPORT ON PDL FAILURE REDUCTION e
REPORTING PORV FAILURES AND CHALLEf!GES e
SAFETY VALVE FAILURE RATE BASED Oil OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE e
REPORTING SAFETY VALVE FAILURES AND CHALLENGES-e f
e REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP CONFIRMATION OF ANTICIPATORY TRIP e
s
g
' (CONT'D)
Bg0TF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WFSTINGHOUSE-DESIGNED _ OPERATING PLANTS ANALYSIS SMALL BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS METHODS - APPENDIX K e
PLANT-SPECIFIC APPENDIX K CALCULATIONS e
TWO-PHASE NATURAL CIRCULATION EXPERIMENTS e
EVALUATE ELIMINATION OF PORV FUNCTION o
MODIFICATI'ONS TO RELAP4 HEATUP CALCULATION e
EFFECTS OF ACCUMULATOR INJECTION ON RELAP4 CALCULATIONS e
MODIFICATION OF RELAP4 TO REPRESENT STEAM GENERATOR REALISTICAL e
EMEBGENCY PROCEDURES EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR INITIAflNG BACKUP WATER SUPPLIES (GS-4) e EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR INITI.ATING AFW FLOW FOLLOWING L e
REVIEW 0F PROCEDURES (NRC)
~
e REVIEW 0F PROCEDURES (NSSS Vf.NDORS) e SYMPT 0M-BASED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES e
4
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I; -
(CONT'D)
B&DTF RE 0MMENDATIONS FOR WESTINGHOUSE-DESIGNED OPERATING PLANTS OPERATOR TRAINING SIMULATOR TRAINING PROGRAM e
SIMULATION OF SMALL BREAK LOCA e
~
MONITORING, CONTROL' BOARD e
4 s
i M
7 B&OTF REC 0fY1ENDATIONS FOR CE-DESIGNED OPERATING Pt ANTF SYsTENS' RELIABILITY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) TIME LIMIT ON AFW SYSTEM TRAIN OUTA e
TS ADf11tilSTRATIVE CONTROL ON MANUAL VALVES - LOCK A!!D VERIFY e
AFW SYSTEM FLOW THROTTLING - WATER HAMMER (GS-3) e AFW SYSTEM FLOW PATIl VERIFICATI0!! (GS-6) e AUT0FITICINITIATIONOFAFWSYSTEM(SS-8) e PRIMARY AFW SOURCE LOW LEVEL ALARM e
e AFW PUMP EilDURANCE TEST INDICATION OF AFW FLOW TO THE STEAM GENERATORS e
AFW SYSTEM AVAILABILITY DURING PERIODIC SURVEILLAt!CE TESTING e
AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF AFW SYSTEM (GL-1) e SINGLE VALVES Ill AFW SYSTEM FLOW PATH (GL-2) e ELIMIf!ATION OF AC POWER DEPENDENCY (GL-3) e PREVENTION OF MULTIPLE PUMP DAMAGE DUE~TO LOSS OF SUCTION RES e
NATURAL PHENOMENA (GL-4)
REVIEW 0F RELIABILITY & REDUtIDAMCY OF EQUIPMENT e
4
2-B&OTF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CE-DESIGNED OPERATING PLANTS (CONT'D)
INSTRUMENTATION TO VERIFY NATURAL CIRLULATION e
INSTALLATION OF AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF PORVs e
TESTING AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF PORVs e
CE REPORT ON PORV FAILURE REDUCTIONS e
REPORTING FUTURE FAILURES AND CHALLENGES OF PORV AND SV e
e AUTOMATIC TRIP 0F RCPs ANALYSIS e
ANALYSIS METHODS-APPENDIX K PLANT-SPECIFIC APPENDIX K CALCULATIONS e
TWO-PHASE NATURAL CIRCULATION EXPERIMENTS e
EVALUATE THE ELIMINATION OF PORV FUNCTION e
MODIFICATION TO RELAP AND CEFLASH-4AS DUE TO UNCERTAINTIES IN HEATUP e
CALCULATIONS EFFECTS OF ACCUMULATOR INJECTION ON RELAP4 CALCULATIONS e
MODIFICATION OF RELAP4 TO REPRESENT SG BEHAVIOR REALISTICALLY e
4 4
B8,0TF RECOMMEllDATI0tlS FOR CE-DESIGiiED OPERATillG PLANTS (CONT'D)
Q1 Ell 6ENCY PRUdEDURES EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR INITIATING BACKUP WATER SUPPLIES (GS-4) e EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR INITIATING AFW FLOW FOLLOWING LOSS OF ALL e
AC POWER (GS-5) e REVIEW 0F PROCEDURES (NRC) e REVIEW 0F PROCEDURES (NSSS VENDORS) e SYMPT 0M-DASED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES OPERATOR TRAlf!Its EXPANDED USE OF SIMULATORS If! OPERATOR TRAINING e
e SIMULATOR TRAINING PROGRAM e
SIMULATION OF SMALL-BREAK LOCAs D
I
B&OTF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OEERATING AND '{ EAR-TERM OL 5YsTEM$'RELIAB}L111
- ISOLATION OF ISOLATION CONDENSERS ON HIGH RADIATION (A,2)
' RE8UCTION OF CHALLENGES AND FAILURES OF RELIEF VALVES (A.')
4
- REPORT ON OUTAGE OF ECC SYSTEMS (A,6)
- MODIFICATION OF ADS LOGIC (A,7)
- INTERLOCK ON RECIRCULATION PUMP LOOPS (Al8)
- LOSS OF SERVICE WATER FOR BIG ROCK POINT (A,9)
- RESTART OF CORE SPRAY AND LPCI SYSTEMS ON LOW LEVEL (A.10)
- AUTOMATIC SWITCH 0VER OF RCIC SYSTEM SUCTION (Bl1)
- CENTRAL WATER LEVEL RECORDING (B 2)
1 4
tb
B10TF RECOMMENDATJ;0NS"FOR OPERATING N!) NEAR TERM OL BWR' PiANTS(CONT'Dl)
EFFECT OF LOSS OF ALTERNATING CURREtlT POWER ON PUMP SEALS (B,4)
USEOFRHRFORFUELP0OLCOOLING(B'l5)
COMMON REFERENCE FOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTS (B,6)
QUALIFICATION OF ACCUMULATORS ON ADS VALVES (B.7)
DIVERSE INITIATION SIGNAL FOR RCIC SYSTEM (B,10)
PERFORMANCE OF ISOLATION CONDENSERS WITH NONCONDENSIBLES (B.13 REPORTING 0F FAILURES AND CHALLENGES TO SRVs (B.14)
ANALYSES _
REVISE SMALL-BREAK LOCA MODEL FOR COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX K (A PLANT-SPECIFIC ANALYSES WITH REVISED MODEL (A.13)
NO FUEL FAILURE REQUIREMENT FOR ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITH SINGLE FAILURE (Al14)
DEPRESSURIZATION WITH OTHER THAN ADS (A.15)
MICHELSON CONCERNS (A.17) t 9
.i B&OTF RECOMENDATIONS FOR OPERATING AND NEAR-TERM TESTPROGRAMFORSMALL-BREAKLOCAMODELVERIFICATION(B USE OF NON-ECC SYSTEMS IN ANALYSES (B.12)
IMPACTOFB&OTFRECOMMENDATIONS(bis)
LMERGENCY PROCEDURES IDENTIFY WATER SOURCES PRIOR TO MANUAL ACTIVATIO!! ADS REVISEDEMERGENCYPROCEDURES(Al11)
TWOOPERATORSINCONTROLROOM(Al16)
GUIDELINESFORSYMPTOM-BASEDEMERGENCYPROCEDURES(Bl8 OPERATOR TRAINfNd SMALL-BREAK LOCA ON SIMULATOR (B.11)
HARDWARE-TYPE RECOMMENDATIONS THE HARDWARE-TYPE RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUbE:
(A) PLACING THE PORV'S AND BLOCK VALVES ON EMERGENCY POWER l
(THIS RECOMMENDATION IS SIMILAR TO RECOMMENDATION NO. 2.1.
OF NUREG-0578);
i (B) DIRECT POSITION INDICATION OF PORV'S - (THIS RECOMMENDATIO l
iS SIMILAR TO RECOMMENDATION NO. 2.1.3.a OF NUREG-0578);
l (C) AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATING THE PORV'S ON LOW REACTOR SYSTEM PRESSURE AND (D) DERIVATIVE "FIX" - (THIS RECOMMENDATION IS APPLICABLE TO W-DESIGNED PLANTS ONLY. IN BRIEF, IT INVOLVES RAISBNG THE TRIP l
PRESSURE SETPOINT ON THE PID CONTROLLER WHICH IS USED ON MOST W-DESIGNED PLANTS. SINCE THIS RECOMMENDATION TENDS TO i
BE PLANT-SPECIFIC, AND SINCE IT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN THE AFFECTED PLANTS PER A SIMILAR RECOMMENDATION MADE BY WESTINGHOUSE,ITS EFFECTIVENESS WAS NOT ASSESSED.)
PLUS l
(E) CHANGING PORV SETPOINT - THE PORV SETPOINT WAS RAISED i
ON THE B&W PLANTS ONLY.
i 1
l W
SOFTWARE-TYPE RECOMMENDATIONS THE SOFTWARE-TYPE RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDE:
(A) OUAllFICATIONS - (THIS RECOMMENDATION IS SIMILAR TO RECOMMENDAT NO.79 IN NUREG-055,l.E., EVALUATING INTERACTIONS OF NON-SAFETY AND SAFETY SYSTEMS AND PROPER QUAllFICATION OF SAFETY SYSTEMS);
(B) OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND TRAINING - (THIS RECOMMENDATION PE TO NEW GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES TO MORE READILY IDENTIFY SMALL-LOCA*S AND TRAINING INVOLVING THE USE OF SEVERAL PARAMETERS,THE SATURATION METER AFD DIRECT POSITION INDICATOR ON PORV'S IN DIA4GNOS SMALL-BREAK LOCA's);
IC) McGUIRE CONCERN - (THIS MATTER INVOLVES THE FAILURE OF A PORV S BY CCI ON A SPECIFIC PLANT DURING TESTING. BECAUSE OFTHE SPECIFICITY OF THIS MATTER,THE EFFECTS OF THE **FIX" WEP.E NOT ASSESSED):
(D) FAILURE TO CLOSE "EAL" - (THIS RECOMMENDATION INVOLVES THE PROMP REPORTING OF PORV FAILURES IN CONFORM ANCE WITH THE EMERGENCY A f
LEVELS STATED IN NUREG-0610): AND (E) SHORT-TERM LESSONS LEARNED (STLL) RESEARCH - (THIS RECOMMENDA INVOLVES THE TESTING OF RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVES IN CONFORMANCE WI RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 2.1.1 OF NUREG-0578. INCLUDING THE TESTING OF VALVES UNDER THEIR EXPECTED DYNAMIC OPERATING CONDITIONS SUCH AS i
TWO-PHASE FLUID SLUG FLOW).
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ASSESSMENT OF CITED RECOMMENDATION IN REDUCINO THE LIKELIH OF SMALL-BREAK LOCA'S DUE TO STUCK-OPEN PORV'S Y
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SHEET 1 A (POST TMI)
INITIATING EVENTS LEADING TO STUCK-OPEN PORVS IN B&W PLANTS LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (P = 0.2/R-Y)
RAISED
+-
PORV SETTING 1 g NO E
(P = 0.9)
YES (P = 0.1)
END DOES NO PORV RECLOSE (P = 0.05)
?
YES (P = 0.95)
I f END I I CASE 1 SBLOCA DUE TO A STUCK-OPEN PORV
~
_AND LOSS OF OF FSITE POWER (P = 10-3/R-Y) 3 I f (Continued j
on Sheet 4) y D -17
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SnEET 2A I~~~~~]
I EVENTS RAISED
- A (Continued 2
on Sheet 3A CAUSING PORV PORV l
~
1 TO OPEN SETTING (P =.5/R Y)
DOES NO RE ACTOR j
I YES (P =.9)
If IS OF FSITE NO POWER LOST (P = 0.99) 1 I
?
THIS SEQUENCE MAY LEAD TO A N
SBLOCA. HOWEVER, SINCE OFF-YES SITE POWER l$ NOT LOST THE (P = 0.01)
OPER ATOR CAN ISOLATE THE FAULTED V ALVE EVEN WITHOUT THE TMI BASED RECOMMENDATIONS.
If (P a.46/R Y; SEE SHEET 6A FOR CASE 4)
DOES NO PORV RECLOSE (P = 0.05)
?
YES (P = 0.95)
CASE 2 f
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$8LOCA DUE TO A STUCK-OPEN PORV AND END LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER 4
(P2 = 2.2 X 10 )
I f
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(Continued 3
on Sheet di B-/1
(From Sheet 2A)
SHEET 3A IP = 5 X 10*2/R Y) v
- o BEtW PLANTS DOES PORV (POST TMil NO RECLOSE
,,3 7
I f
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3 YES
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(P = 0.95)
DOES SBLOCA NO CAUSE A SCRAM 7
i f 1 1 (P - 1.0) g 3
I f IS OFFSITE NO POWER (P = 0.99)
LOST
?
YES (P = 0.01) 3 7 A
i I
NOTE: THIS SEQUENCE RESULTS IN A $8LOCA; 17 HOWEVER, SINCE OFFSITE POWER IS CASE 3 AVAILABLE, THE OPERATOR CAN ISOLATE
$8LOCA DUE TO A THE FAULTED VALVE EVEN WITHOUT THE STUCK-OPEN PORV AND TMI BASED RECOMMEND ATIONS.
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (P 3 2.5 X 10-3/R-Y;SEE SHEET 7A FOR CASE 5) 4 (P3 = 2.5 X 10 / R.Y)
I I
/N (Continued 4
on Sheet di 0-11 C
(POST TMI)
SHEET 4 ASSESSMENT OF REDUCTION OF SBLOCA'S DUE TO STUCK-OPEN PORV'S IN B&W PLANTS (SHEET 1)
(SHEET 2)
(SHEET 3)
A A
A 1
3 4
N/
N/
- N#
A i f i f i f
+
s V
(Continued on STUCK-OPEN PORV AND Sheet 5)
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (IP = 1.2 X 10 3 )
SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS PORV&
PORV BLOCK VALVE POSITION ON EMERGENCY INDICATION POWER REVISED PROCEDURES l
^
AND TRAINING
~
THE EFFECT OF THIS RECOMMENDATION '
RES RCH CANNOT BE OUANTIFIED, BUT IT COULD 1 I REDUCE THE PORV FAILURE RATE USED IN SHEETS 1-3.
DOES OPERATOR NO ISOLATE OPEN j
PORV (P = 0.20)
?
I f YES SBLOCA DUE TO (P = 0.8)
STUCK-OPEN PORV 1 [
(P = 3 X 10-4 R-Y)
/
END (SBLOCA TERMINATED)
D46
l SHEET 5 (POST-TMI)
ASSESSMENT OF REDUCTION OF SBLOCA'S DUE TO STUCK-OPEN PORT!'S IN B&W PLANTS (P = 1.2 X 10-3) v LONG-TERM I f RECOP94ENDATIONS IS NO
^
STUCK PEN m
~
PORVI LATED (P = 0.01)
YES QUALIFI-FAILURE (P = 0.99)
CATIONS TO CLOSE I I (LL NO. 9)
(EAL)
END
~y THE EFFECTS OF THESE TWO RECOMMENDATIONS CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED.BUT THEY COULD REDUCE THE PORY FAILURE AND CHALLENGE RATES USED hl SHEETS 1-3. SUCh i' EDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT N AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT PROPORTIONAL TO THE MAGNITUD2 OF THE COMBINED REDUCTIONS, e.g., A 50% REDUCTION IN BOTH THE PORV CHAL-I f LENGE RATE AND FAILURE RATE RESULTS IN AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT OF 75%.
S8LOCA DUE TO A
~
STUCK-OPEN PORV (P = 1.2 X 10-5/R-Y)
(SUM OF CASES 1, 2 AND 3) i b
SHEET 6A INITIATING SEQUENCE:(FROM SHEET 2A)
PORY OPENS; REACTOR SCRAMS:
OFFSITE POWER REMAINS INTACT.
(CASE 4)-
i r IPOST TMil gg P =.45/R-Y THE PORV NO DOES AUTOMATICALLY OPERATOR
,JO ISOLATED (P =.014 ISOLATE THE (P = 0.2)
?
PORV?
YES YES (P = 0.991 tf (P = 0.8)
DOES NO PONV 1 1 RECLOSE (P =.06)
?
END P = 4.5 x 10-3 YES IP =.96)
SUBSEQUENT TO BE 0 SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS I f END if i
END 1 r (P = 2.2 X 10 SBLOCA 4 SUBSEQUENT TO BEr0 LONG TERM RECOMMENDATIONS D
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9 P
SHEET 7A INITIATING SBLOCA SEQUENCE:(FROM SHEET 3A)
PORV OPENS: REACTOR DOES NOT SCRAM; PORV DOES NOT (CASE 5)
RECLOSE: REACTOR SCRAMS ON SBLOCA: OFFSITE POWER REM AINS INTACT.
1 r (POST-TMil P = 2.5 X 10-3/R-Y THE PORV NO AUTOMATICALLY (P =.01)
ISOLATED I
1 y YES DOES (p =,gg)
OPERATOR NO ISOLATE THE I
"*I PORV7 q
SBLOCA YES END P = 2.5 X 10-5 (P =.8)
SUBSEQUENT TO B&O LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 1 f
, 7
^
END P = 5 X 10-4
(
j l
SUBSEQUENT TO B&O SHORT-TERM Q
RECOMMENDATIONS s%
W i
I
ESTIMATED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BEtO RECOMMENDATIONS IN REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF SMALL-BREAK LOCA'S IN OPERATING PLANTS DUE TO STUCK-OPEN PORV'S LIKELIHOOO OF SUCH EVENTS PER REACTOR-YEAR IN 88W PLANTS:
A.
PRIOR TO AFTER SHORT-TERM AFTER LONG-TERM CASE TMI RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 5 x 10-3 2 x 10~4 10-5 1
2 x 10-3 4.4 x 10-5 2.2 x 10-6 2
5 x 10'4 5 x 10-6 2.5 x 10~7 3
10'l 4.5 x 10-3 2.2 x 10'4 4
2.5 x 10 5 2.5 x 10-2 5 x 10 5
4
~10'l
~5 x 10-3
~2 x 10 TOTAL 5
LIKEllHOOD OF SUCH EVENTS PER REACTOR-YEAR IN C-E AND W PLANTS:
B.
PRIOR TO AFTER SHORT-TERM AFTER LONG TERM CASE TMI RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 4
10-5 10-3 2 x 10 1
6 x 10-5 1.2 x 10-5 6 x 10-7 4
l 2
4 x 10-5 8 x 10-6 4 x 10'7 3
2.5 x 10-3 10-3 5 x 10-5 4
2 x 10~3 8 x 10'4 4 x 10'5 i
5 4
D TOTAL
~6 x 10-3
~2 x 10-3
~10 i
r y
1
~4
CR3 KEY PARAMETERS AVAllABILITY CONTROL INSTRUMENT COMPUTER
__ NUMBER._
_EQ&RQ_
PARAMETER NO RC-14A-FT N0 RCS FLOW LOOP "A" NO RC-14B-FT NO RCS FLOW LOOP,"B" NO RC-4A-TT1 NO T HOT LOOP "A" RC-4A-TT4 N0*
N0 T HOT LOOP "A" N0 RC-4B-TT1 NO T HOT LOOP "B" N0*
RC-4B-TT4 N0*
T HOT LOOP "B" N0 i
RCl-LT1 NO PRESSURIZER LEVEL
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INSTRUMENT CONTROL
__30 MILER __
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(OMPUTER PARAMETER (CONTINUED)
NO RCl-LT2 NO PRESSURIZER LEVEL YES RCl-LT3 NO PRESSUR ZER LE9EL NO RC-5A-TTI NO T COLD LOOP "A" RC-5A-TT3 N0*
YES T COLD LOOP "A" RC-5B-TT1 NO NO T COLD LOOP "B" RC-5B-TT3.
N0*
YES T COLD LOOP "B"
' AVAILABILITY IF SELECTED D
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R 30r.5 CR3 KEY PARAMETER AVAllABillTY 5
INSTRUMENT CONTROL PARAMETER NUMBER
_30ARp_
COMPUTER ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS RC-3A-PT3 YES NO WrDE RANGE RCS' PRESSURE ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS WIDE RC-3B-PT3 YES NO RANGE RCS PRESSURE s
~
TC WrDE RANGE LOOP A RC-5A-TT4 YES NO TC WIDE RANGE LOOP B RC-5B-TT4 YES YES OTSG "B" OPERATING LEVEL SP-1B-lT3 YES NO OTSG "B" STARTUP LEVEL SP-1B-LT4 NO YES D
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50F5 INSTRUMENT CONTROL PARAMETER NUMBER BOARD _
COMPUTER (CONTINUED)
Low PRESSURE INJECTION D!1-1-DPT2 YES NO Flow 1
~
CORE FLOOD TANK "B" CF-2-LT2 YES YES LEVEL t
9 i
N B-4
i STATUS UN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH AUTO INITIATION OF AFW SYSTEMS LICENSEE CONCLUDES FROM ANALYSES THAT RETURN TO Au o INITI ION UWNER REQPONSE SUBSTANCE POWER AND (ONTAINMENT TATUS (
).
PLANT VENDOR UATE OF lESPONSE PRESSURE ACCEPTABLE W
DESIGN SUBMITTED C)
YES MILLSTONE 2 CE 01/25/80 PROVIDED ANALYSIS W
DESIGN SUBMITTED' Cl)
YES CALVERT CLIFFS CE 01/25/80 PROVIDED ANALYSIS Cl)
YES DESIGN SUBMITTED HADDAM NECK H
01/30/80 PROVIDED ANALYSIS W
DESIGN SUBMITTED Cl)
YES PALISADES CE 01/21/80 PROVIDED ANALYSIS
't Cl}
YES DESIGN SUBMITTED i
MAINE YANKEE CE 01/09/80 PROVIDED ANALYSIS Cl)
YES(2)
DESIGN SUBMITTED ST. LUCIE 1 CE 01/24/80 PROVIDED ANALYSIS Cl)
YES DESIGN SUBMITTED i
FT. CALHOUN CE 01/10/80 PROVIDED ANALYSIS 9
SAN ONOFRE H
01/16/80 DOES NOT PLAN TO N/A PARTIAi CONTROL GRADE 3ESIGN h
UNTIL OCT
.980 SUBMITTED SUBMIT ANALYSIS 1)
ANALYSES UNDER REVIEW BY CSB s RSB, PLAN COMPLETION IN AeRIL 1980 D3 g(2) 2-5 MINUTE TIME DELAY OF AFW INITIATION ASSUMED IN MSLB ANALYSIS
(
(3)
WILL NOT IMPLEMENT UNTIL STAFF APPROVES EISLl3 ANALYSIS
EXPERIENCE WITH PUMP TRIP DURING NON-LOCA DEPRESSURIZING TRANSIENTS r
NON-LOCA TRANSIENTS WHICH PRODUCED PRIMARY SYST ZATION TO SI ACTUATION SETPOINT AND REQUIRED RCP TRIP i
DATE PLANT TYPE EVENT 9/26/79 NORTH ANNA WESTINGHOUSE FW HEATER MALFUNCTION UNIT NO. 1 3-LOOP TURBINE TRIP-REACTOR
. TRIP / CONDENSER DUMP VALVE STUCK OPEN PRAIRIE ISLAND WESTINGHOUSE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE 10/2/79 UNIT NO, 1 2-LOOP BREAK 1/29/80 ANO-2 COMBUSTION TURBINE TRIP-REACTOR ENGINEERING TRIP / STEAM DUMP VALVE STUCK OPEN 2/26/80 CRYSTAL B&W 177FA REACTOR TRIP /ICS RIVER LOWERED LOOP FAILURE /SG OVERFEED S'
4 0
0 -31
_.