ML19323J049

LER 80-005/03L-0:on 800517,2J Emergency Diesel Generator Tripped After Starting & Operability of 2H Diesel Generator Was Not Verified within 1-h.Caused by Existing Procedures Not Specifying Test Connections Required to Test Diesel

ML19323J049
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	06/11/1980
From:	Cartwright W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19323J046	List: ML19323J045 ML19323J049
References
LER-80-005-03L-02, LER-80-5-3L-2, N-80-18, NUDOCS 8006170701
Download: ML19323J049 (2)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTROL-BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1 (4) / / / (5)

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ RE

/L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/5/1/7/8/0/ (8) /0/6/1/1/8/0 (9)

OU E DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / At 0640 on May 17, 1980, with Unit 2 at Hot Shutdown, "2J" emergency diesel /

/0/3/ / generator tripped af ter starting. The operability of the "2H" diesel __/

/0/4/ / generator was not verified within one hour as required by the ACTION /

/0/5/ / statement of T.S. 3.8.1.1 and reportable by T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. The health /

/0,6/ / and safety of the public were not affected since both off-site sources /

/0/7/ / were available and the "2H" diesel was still operable /

/0/8/ / /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /E/B/ (11) /D/ (12) /2/ (13) /Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/ (14) [Z/ (15) [Z/ (16)

SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LER/R0 EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.

(17) REPORT NUMBER /8/0/ /-/ /0/0/5/ /\/ /0/3/ /L/ /-/ [0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT.

TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MAhTFACTURER

/G/ (18) /G/ (19) /2/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) [Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /C/4/7/0/ (2(.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The "2H" diesel generator was not tested within one hesc bace9se existing /

/1/1/ / procedures did not specify the test connections required to test the diesel /

/1/2/ / to prove operability. The off-site power breaker alignment was verified /

/1/3/ / at 1130 on May 17, 1980 and a test procedure was temporarily changed to allow /

/1/4/ / testing of "2J" diesel which was declared operable at 1438 on May 17, 1980. /

FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS  % POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

/1/5/ /B/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA __/_ (30)/B/DISCOVERY (31) / OPERATOR OBSERVATION /

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

[1/1[ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR TYPE DAMACE TG FACILITY (

DESCRIPTION

/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA _/

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY

/2/0/ ./N/ (44) / NA /////////////

8 00617 W S NAME OF PREPARER W. R._CARTWRIGHT P40NE (703) 894-5151

4 s Virginia Electric and Power Company ISrth Anna Power Station, Unit #2

Attachment:

Page 1 of 1 Docket No. 50-339 neport No. LER 80-5/03L-0 Description of Event At 0640 on 5-17-80 with Unit 2 at hot shutdown, "2J" emergency diesel generator tripped after starting. The "2J" diesel generator was

~

being started to prove operability prior to performing maintenance on

'"2H" diesel generator. The operability of the "2H" diesel generator was not verified within one hour as required by the ACTION statement of T.S.

3.8.1.1 and reportable by T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence The health and safety of the public were not affected since both offsite sources were available and the "2H" diesel was still operable.

In addition, the "2J" diesel generator shutdown relays were reset and the control switch placed in " Manual-Remote". Since it is believed that "2J" diesel trip was due to high crankcase pressure, an emergency start signal would have started the diesel and high crankcase pressure would not have caused a trip. .

Cause of Event The "2J" diesel generator trip was ,pparently due to high crankcase pressure since the trip occurred approximately 20 seconds after the start signal and the diesel had reached 900 RPM in less than 10 seconds.

Since the "2J" diesel generator tripped, personnel referred to the ACTION statement of T.S. 3.8.1.1 which requires testing the frequency and voltage response of the other diesel generator. However no procedures were written which included instructions for connecting test equipment necessary for verifying frequency and voltage response as required by T.S. 4.8.1.1.2.a.4. Greater than one hour passed before procedure changes required for testing could be written and approved. In addition, the Maintenance Operating Procedure, 2-M0P-6.90 was in error in that it did not contain requirements for testing frequency and voltage response as required by T.S. 4.8.1.1.2.a.4.

Immediate Corrective Action The "2J" diesel generator shutdown relays were reset and the control switch placed in " Manual-Remote". The offsite power breaker alignment wat 'erified as per T.S. 4.8.1.1.1.a at 1130 on 5-17-80. Temporary change > sere made to the diesel periodic test 2-PT-82.1B, and the diesel was satisfatuorily tested and returned to operable status at 1438 on 5-17-80.

Scheduled Corrective Action Maintenance Operating Procedures for the diesel will be changed to include testing requirements of T.S. 4.8.1.1.2.a.4.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence Periodic Tests have been changed to include the connection of test equipment necessary to meet testing requirements of T.S. 4.8.1.1.2.a.4.

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