ML19322C469
| ML19322C469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1979 |
| From: | Gerusky T PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | Lunden B PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001170792 | |
| Download: ML19322C469 (6) | |
Text
gwEALTH or PENNs CON MI 4
DI.IMRTMENT OF ENVIROMIENTAL RES0tTRCES n4na$$I[r'rNEN4E2 ma June 18, l')/9 Mr.' Bruce T. Lunden Staff Director President's Comission on the Accident at Three Mile Island -
2100 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037
Dear Mr. Lunden:
This is written in response to your May 22, 1979 letter requesting information from this office concerning our activities during the Three Mile Island accident.
1.
Enclosed is a copy of the Bureau's response plan for Three Mile Island.
The General Plan was rewritten in 1977.
The Three Mile Island Annex was written in 1974.
All Annexes to the Plan are written in " Draft" form since they are routinely changed to update personnel and telephone numbers.
The original " Pennsylvania Plan for the Implementation of Protective Action Guides" (PAPIPAG) was written in 1973.
It was completely revised in 1977.
This plan is intended to address Bureau operations only.
2.
This organization was contacted by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) duty officer (Clarence OcIler) at 7:03 a.m. on March 28.
The Bureau's duty officer for the nunth was William Dornsife, Nuclear Engineer, who was at hone a t the tine.
Mr. Dornsife was informed that TM1 had centacted the PEMA iluty officer at 7:01 a.m. and that a site emergency had been declared.
TMI had requested that the Bureau call Unit 2 control room as per standard procedures.
Mr. Dornsife first contacted I'
Ms. Margaret Reilly, Chief, Division of Environmental Radiation, to inform her of the incident and request that she and other staff members proceed to the of fice immediately.
At approximately 7:05 a.m. Mr. Dornsife called i
the TMI switchboard and was unable to be connected to the Unit 2 control I
room.
He was contacted at hone by Unit 2 control room at 7:06 a.m.
In general, they stated that a site emergency had been declared, high radiation levels were present in the plant and that they may have had a small loss of coolant accident.
The leakage was stopped and the plant was stable and being cooled normally.
In addition, on-site surveys found no detectable radiation levels above background. Other information relating to plant status was obtained to assure that conditions were stable.
No recorrrnendation wa" - de for protective actions for off-site populations.
While on the phone, iir. Dornsife remembers hearing a public address announcement to evacuate the fuel handling and auniitary building.
He was then transferred to a plant health physicist who verified out-of-plant radiation levels.
The individual then said he had to go- "I'll call you back"-..and hung up.
Mr. Dornsife proceeded into the office as per the h
80011707 %
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' Mr. Bruce 'I. l.unden June 18, 1979 D
By that tine, Ms. Reilly had contai.ted Thonns Gerusky, Director of the Bureau, to inform him and to request that he Icave for the nffice.
She also called Kevin Malloy, D.inphin Connly 1:n:rgency fianagement. Director, to inform him of the accirk'nt and suggest that he head for hie: of fice.
{
M r. Thoma: Gerusky was the first to reech the office, contacted TMI at 7:25 a.m. by telephcne and i:stablished an open line with Unic 2 control room. '
l's. Reilly arrived noncretas i1.y and Mr. Dorn'.i fe folInwed within 10 minutes.
f, sumnary M the infonnatiini obtained from the t.cntrol room _ (taken frum notes and recall is as follew,:
There was a site emergency at Unit 2--steam generator failure, primary to secondary leak and loop isolated.
At approximately.
7:30 a.m. a general emergency was declared because of a high reading of 800 R/hr in the reactor containment building.
The unit had been shut down, theFe was sone failed fuel, the high pressure injection system was initiated, sone primary coolant was lost and high radiation areas in the auxiliary building.
With the done nonitor reading 800 R/hr, the procedure is to estimate off-site doses in the event of a leak in the containment building.
Assuming a 0.2". leak rate and the wind out of 300, the estimated exposure on the west side of the river was 10R/hr from a reference containment atmosphere mix.
A State Police helicopter was at the site and the Bureau requested that TMI survey teams be flown across the river to establish the exposure rate.
Meanwhile, other Bureau of Radiation Protection staff were in contact with the Pennsylvania Energency Managenent Agency to notify them of the reactor ccndition, that an evacuation of an area southwest of the plant in York County (between Goldsboro and York Haven) was a possibility and that York County should be alerted.
A no radiation levels above background were detectable.few minutes later it PEMA was so notified.
Following this information, we notificJ other staff nembers and the Department administration 01 the accident and present conditinns.
We alerted the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, Divisinn o' Milk Sanitation, of the event.
We 'had learned during the Chinese fallout episode of 1976 that telephones t.ould be tied up, that tha press would be contacting us and that comuni cations would be a problem.
We maintained tlie open line~with the site and contacted the Department's Public Infornation Officer to handle press inqui ries.
Our regular clerical staff was experienced in responding to public inquiries and had all press calls referred to the Public Information O f ficer.
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i Mr. Bruce 'T.
Lunden June 18,1979 Q
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Mr. Charles Meinhold, Director of Health and Safety at DOE's Brookhaven National Laboratory and head of the Federal Interagency Radiation Assistante program Team at BNL, contacted us by telephone to state that their team was ready to assist us at our request.
At that point, no off-site problems were occurring so we told them to hold until we had more information.
At about 11:00 a.m. we requested assistance.
At 9:00 a.m., Mr. Dornsife was requested by the Deputy Secretary to go to lieutenant Governor Scranton's office to brief him on the situation and to participate in a press conference at 10:00 a.m.
He contacted Gary Miller, TMI station superintendent, to be updated on what had occurred.
Mr. Miller's briefing of Mr. Dornsife is reconstructed (based partly on notes and partly on memory) as folluws:
At about 0400 a turbine trip occurred at 982 power. As designed, the re.u t.ir tripped and al1 safensard sy,tems, including high prm.sure injection, actuated automatically when required.
There was a violation of technical specifications, specifically, that the auxiliary feed system block valves were initially closed.
The electromatic relief valve on the pressurizer lifted and did not reset; however, the indication in the control room (electrical signal to valve) let the operator to believe it had reclosed.
The block valve downstream of the relief valve is now closed.
The pressurizer may have gone solid and low pressure p
in the reactor coolant system probably caused flashing and steam w
bubbles in the syst*cm.
This may have led to a temporary loss of main coolant circulation.
There was a possible primary to secondary leak in the "B" steam generator which has been isolated.
The boron concentration in the primary has been diluted to about 100 ppm.
This may have been caused by secondary to primary feedback through the leaking steam generator when the system was pressurized.
There has been a slight amount of failed fuel.
The exact magnitude is not certain at this time--it may have been only wne gap activity.
The reactor building dome monitor was reading 600R/hr and the reactor building pressure was about 1 psig.
The fence post dose was less than 1 mrem /hr.
The wind is currently blowing to the west at about 1 to 2 mph and they are sending mnnitoring teams to Goldsboro.
At approximately 10:45 a.m. the utility notified us that radiation was being detected off-site and that exposure rates were 3 mr/hr or less. A Bureau radiation monitoring team was sent out to verify the TM[ readings.
Similar levels were observed.
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-.l Mr. Bruce T. Lunden June 18, 1979 b
We were vinc.crned about the prnbable pre".ence uf radioindines in the plune of radioq.asi s from the plan'.
lhe 1)fR !!nreau of Radiation Protection (BRP) was not equipped to do mobile in-the-field airborne iodine estimates.
(We did have a fixed nonitor at the Observation Building which we chose to leave ia place for a historical sa:.iple.) TMI' field teams were out, though, making these measurements according to plan.
Several of their field estimate samples were suggesting I-131 concentrations of up to tens of thousands of picocuries per cubic neter.
l!nconfirmed, this concentration range would suilgest an eventual (day;) need for protective actions agains't" inhalation with plant deterioration and a significant impact on fresh fluid milk production and use.
Since the backgrounds at the facility had unJ(rstandably increased,
'~N Mr. Dubiel, TML health physicist, ask3d if we could recount the samples in our labs at Harrisburg.
We agreeci.
The samples were transported by helicopter to the helipad at Holy Spirit Hospital and thence to the lab by BR" itaff.
Spectrum analysis, using GeLi detector, indicated no I-131 (sensitivity at about 10 pCi/m').
We began to suspect the current direct exposure node to be noble gases with little, if any, I-131.
This was consistent with knowledge that the dominant source was the water on the aux huilding floor and the existent charcoal filters on the aux building vent.
We advised the Agriculture Department that milk sampling should begin with fann sampling of milkings of Wednesday evening (3/28) and fhursday
(
norning (3/29).
The results of the analyses of those samples showed milkborne 1-131 to be in the range of tens of picacuries per liter--
hardly an acute contaminating episode.
The sampling of fresh milk continues.
For the remainder of the first day--ground surveys performed by teams from this Bureau, DOE, NRC and utility confinned that the off-site levels of radioactivity were in the range of about 1-10 mrem /hr (8-y).
Occasional higher levels were observed on site, in the plume and in relatively stagnant pockets due to the meterological condition.
The meterological conditions during the first few days were: such that the wind speed was very low and the direction was variable.
Therefore, very 1-ittle dispersion was occurring and pockets of noble gases'with higher than average radiation levels were not uncomnon near the site.
Reports from the site and from the NRC I&E teams which had arrived first after 10:00 a.m. confinned that the primary source of radioactive releases were noble gases which were being offgassed from reactor coolant water which had been pumped from the reactor building sump to the auxiliary building sump tank and that the sumps had overflowed onto the floor.
Prior to this it had been suspected that the main source of release nad been the venting of steam from the "A" steam generator directly to the, atmosphere which had occurred mcst of the mnrning, h
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Mr. Bruce T. Lunden June 18, 1979 b
During that morning..the l'r'at h Gottom Atomic l'ower Plant staff called of foring a%istante, as did the '.itate of hcw Jersey and Pennsylvania State Uni ve rsity.
L'evels of radioactivity in the environment remained at or below 3 mr/hr thruug out the next day with some occasional high reading found on site and in the plume.
Helicopter surveys were being performed by the ARMS aircraf t which came with the DOE teams.
Levels detected in the plume right over the release stack ranged up to 3000 mr/hr (6-y).~
~ '
On Friday morning, March 30, releases from the plant increased due to i
venting of gases from the make-up tank.
Levels _as were observed for a short period of time just off-s.high as 20-25.mr/hr (S ite.
One helicopter reading of 1200 mr/hr (8-y) was found at 600 feet. 300 feet above the reactor building and in the plume.
DOE teams and Bureau teams were measuring ground level radiation leycis off-site as was the NRC and the utility.
The Bureau received a call from PEMA stating that " Doc" Collins of NRC-Bethesda had called them reconinending evacuation out to ten miles downwind because of the 1200 mr/hr reading.
We advised PEMA that off-site readings did not indicate a need for evacuation and that the plant had stated that the venting should be over shortly.
Ms. Reilly and Mr. Dornsife contacted Mr. Collins at NRC-Bethesda to ask Q
why the recommendation was made.
He stated that the " top brass" had recommended it and he was only following orders.
By that time telephone lines were tied up, and Mr. Dornsife went to PEMA headquarters while Mr.
Gerusky went to the Governor's office.
Ms. Reilly stayed in contact wi th TMI and the survey teams.
Both Mr. Dornsife and Mr. Gerusky recommended against evacuation due to current conditions.
Radiation levels off-site steadily decreased to 1 mr/hr or less during the day.
Some intermittent readings were higher in the insnediato vicinity of the site and on-site.
Levels remaint"! at that point until they declined to background much later in the episode.
Effective March 28, 1979, the Bureau of Radiation Protection office went on a 24-hour schedule.
The Bureau has a full-time Harrisburg staff of 19 including four laboratory personnel.
Good working relationships had been long established with tne NRC Region I office, with the DOE emergency teams and with the utility's radiation protection organization.
Following the March 30 episode, addiational EPA, HEW, DOE and NRC health physics personnel were involved in environmental radiation surveillance activity.
The operation of the Bureau became one of collecting and analyzing data.-and making reconsnendations based upon the data. Assistance in operations was gained from other program personnel in the Department and the Laboratory.
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_*l Mr. Uruce T. 1.unden June 18, 1979 C
The Bureau stayed on a 24-hour schedule for approximately two weeks, a 12-hour schedule for the third week, and bac.k to normal for the remaining time.
On Friday, May 30, 1979, the Bureau Nuclear Engineer was assigned to the Threer Mile Island Site on a 12-hour-a-day basis to keep the Governor's Office and this Bureau informed of any activity which could cause off-site p robl ems.
Dedicated telephone lines were installed in our office with the NRC Region I trailer, NRC headquarters, DOE operations at the HarrisburrJ-York State Airport, and the FDA Bureau of Radiological llealth. On about April 1,1979 representatives from NPC, LOC and FDA were Incated in our Harrisburg office as liaison personnel to t.ollect and relay information with their raspective organizations.
Water releases ucre' also' a problem and addit.fonal monitoring was required. ~
The Departirent's Bureau of Water Quilit.y Managernent, the I!ureau of Radiation Protection and tiSEPA combined resounes to provide a water sampling and analysis prodram.
A copy of that program is attached.
Activities wound down slowly until the reactor was placed in a natural circulation cooling mode.
With the "trisis" over, the Bureau continues a long-tenn operation to monitor the environment during the recovery stage.
3.
Consnents There is no doubt that there was a lack of understanding of the scope
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of the problem during the first days of the accident.
It was known that sory! fuel cladding failure had occurred but the extent of core damage Was not known until later. Off-site consequences were initially caused because of contaminated water being pumped from the containment tc the auxiliary building and the sumps overflowing.
Other releases resulted when venting of radioactive gases occurred prior to hooking up a line to return the gases to the containment building.
Based on the nonitoring information that we had received throughout the accident, we felt assured that the maximum accumulated off-site dose to any individual would not have exceeded 100 mrem.
This was a factor of ten below the EPA protective action guidelines upon which our. plan was based and where we were prepared to take protective actions to limit further off-site cumulative dose.
After the decision was made to move the NRC headquarters staff to Middletown and to set up an adequate.:nianunications system, tne problems became more solvible and calmness returned to the area.
Ther:: was a serious probleu in conununic.itions from the facility, to Commonwealth and Federal officials and to the general public.
This was partially resolved when the decision was made tn issue press statements from either the G.overnor's Office or NRC-Middletown.
TMG/ MAR /WPD/dnun cc: Bill Cornsife Sincer.e, ly yours,
'- /
gtw d cf Bruce Segal, DOE y
Historian's Office.
/ /LF ma 1 Rm. C478-GT Thomas M. Gerusky, Director
/
00E, 20545 Bureau of Radiation Protectiord wa h_fh\\Ih~
ildh Att.
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