ML19322C249

Transcript of ACRS Subcommittee Meeting on Pebble Springs on 771028 in Portland,Or.Pp 1-30

ML19322C249
Person / Time
Site:	05000514, 05000515, Crane
Issue date:	10/28/1977
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR ACRS-T-518, NUDOCS 8001160689
Download: ML19322C249 (30)

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IN THE MATTER OF:

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SUSCCMMITTEE MEETI'a J

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PESELE SPRDiGS I

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Port. land, Oregon

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L

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protection une rce,r.: ired.

ima let no c'to, cc c r atte of I

1.;

L q cc:= cry, the rcenite is the suppic=sa: 17c. 3 11 e

We concludod thero ucc a nccd -- cnd I chill cite

• 1 U.

this frca tho report itsolf: th:t the main cts =linc 2rd 1

i f*

I j*l foedwn:cr penotratics arca is the principal contributcr to t

a e

8 I

s

!.. the overall risk from the potentici turbino r.ti::ciloc,cd 7

e

.I Oi that prctec ica cf thic cron frc= pctentici t -hine c:iccile.c I

ei uculd reduce the overall rick cubet:ntially if added protec-l l'

0 !!

tien is atado in thic crea l

3

.I.

i i

Ir. addition,.fe ctated we felt morc prottetica

c ;;

use needed in the sterr. generator enclosurac vithin tho-h E

I contain= cat, l

a

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m. cu

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,; il p

ct::ction thct would introl-c, if ycu uill, c stez:. velvc I

I J

n g jl tcctinc procOduroc progran to incronce the frecuency of t0ct-s it

-- y ing to provide an added c~ot=:t of protection frc= turbino i

y.

d 1

3p :.iccilee.

Thic :.ctter hcc been diccacced trith the applicant,

• y o.

1 g.

and I thin': I an at icact chlG to indicct: to you a scrtici 1

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wh3 1i in v. esterd.v. 's diccussion of volecnion.

In Febrc:ry of 1975 i

2. {l this locccd as a very lorre iccue, an.i: po:-tant icruc, pri-i!

i 3 f narily becausa cf the lack of acta en which to dr.- for j

I 4 '.

inforns' ion which would. give us a reacenabic conr:=rvative t

c t

i.

'S' bacis for the occigning of the plcnt.

Neverthoices, tho l

i si cpplicant proceeded to launch into an intensive effort in I

7 i

this crea, and can tencludo that vc have been able to s

agrco on a conservative b:cis for the design of, volcanic ash 3

9 at the Pchblo F,prings cite..

p All cf thic information is reported in supple-I 11 c::nt Kc. 3.

And for the sche of uir:s I'll chip wh:2 this t

12 centains, unlucc there are f --ther quantic== cn thic.

j h

1.,..

C L BUS *h Are thcro quecticus?

.s

(!io ::cecnce)

...u I guass net.

W a-1 V

l

~1. ET! **IS :

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l e.. il on t..10 cganda. n.tt v..nica nas Gen d:..ccucced: t.ac ::::.cr cz

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cectrit;'.

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so l

f Mc havs h:en discuccing this r:ctter with the I

.g l

s applictnt, and uc b.

s pointed cut te him the need to update j

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.t 3 l

3 vh10 1 t??.Sn-l* 70.

It ecc in = tima period lihe 1973, I beliove.

.'lt

• 13 Lect w2ch thoro uns a meeting with Dr Hr.ncuer

'l I

i 3j cnd all the principal ctcff of the ::RC, particularly the MRR, I

l' 4I the :ucicc: Rocccer 'Rcgulation office.

7.nd a repo-t war; i

5 (.t dictributed, a drcfc-draft report as chcrectericed by ii I

i..

S L Dr. Ecncuer, cc:co rc: hor accsive cnd ovcewhcIning looking 7

volumes which contained the st=nsry -- contained the detail:

t 5p ac well as the sun:. cry work that the Staff has unds: wcy and I

c i,.

tbo Tcch Force hcd undcr wcv in ec=ing to crice with nutting

('

I 10 1; togcther t.11 the pieces of che probica.

8 i t 11 This is now under principal steff review._ There 12 is e schedule thct het been actchliched, including two dis-cucciocs -- sevoccl dicccccicnc with tho 7.CRS, I believe.

i g

i. f, l

I feel thct thic matter has tchen c cie.nificent I

I

e. g ctsp fen:crd.

I don't hol'cyc it is yet rocdy for public i

16 hl diccuscien '2ut I think in the latt vinter tino secle, it's 3

l 1

37 ]

my parception, there cre going to he discaccicas with the ACRS l i

on ss.ie c u u>.., o c..

.c.,..,,.,

x,-

I a

L..,:

I t

k

.of DR. EUS2:

Uc"1 pich thic up cs a sencric item.

i-

[

in any event it '.c nice to kno,- that there ic progress being

.oo I'* " '

I: -

e

• O..

ET ~.Z :

1 Let mc go one.then, just to at lecct.I

'2 cit. the en rencining 2.tsas c.s ide.tified in the sc2ct*:-

I s.:.

P Evtluct cc O' port,. S;'.77.l's.cnt Nc, 3.

l u

,. is

'fiun rcycri to the eva'.ua' ict of finn cisi l

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p

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l.

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=

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k 4

donn. -

u --_.,

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gt et

's ll "hc ono rs=sining iten en.:lnic list, Sun. nic=ca.

.i r.2 a.

'p J,.. ~,, <, a o c.:c.. -

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n c~... u

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c,..=. a o ;

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. 5 :i.

vou by Pc ti =d G m.ral Elcetric. 9.is in the! dicsie.n of c::he < i 6 l, ?, deca.v heat rencvel e_ stcr.. - This is c matter that has not -

. l s.

i 1

7j wcc not received in Februar.,' of 1976.

It c= tinuce to be I

r..I E.-

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w~ ~m- '.C,a '." '.."2 -.a.c.

i A'.~.., 6~- s -- +m th e " on

.h*','#- "__-

i.

r Oa 12 (

the standar: plant of Sabcoch and Wilec=.

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9

i A

l a

i J

b. ' " '.

r 1s i

rm wbl2 1'

o the responses that the Cc=mittee has seca

nd reviewed I

tw 1

with regard to the standard plant of 23abcock and Wilco::.

l 3.

iiowever, if you wich, the handout provides a detailed responce s

4..

of the applicant. The Staff has not had c full opportunity

.p 5 ij to go through thene items, and therefero ! cannot state

• l y

!(

a i

unemf * -

SI..

.117 that we have agreed to all of them.

Some arc 2

2.q )

7 still in review by the Staff as 2.cgard: to the standard plant.-

i

.e Fou-teen positions, however, are issues that g

we had infor=cd tho applicant cro enec that must be responded to to.

The first twalva require resolution prior

'..o the issuance 11 of tho CP.

The remaining two ite:;c identified in this list 12 would co=e after that point in tir.c.

t'-)

13 UE' ED F0f thO I'2cc;d, you scy a handout.

14 i Is thic an amondment, or ic this a pre-cmandr. cat handant?

i 15 E. STTE: This, cir, in view of the ti=3 frame 16 '

and to nact our g0:1 hare of providing the Cenmittee all of I

7l the infernation current, it'c a pra-antninent, if you wish.

l.

f 7.11 of it vill be doct=cnted in rn anand:::nt to the ? san.

toe t-i 1J1 o$.tjic infor. cation and, of course, our evaluation, vill 39 t'

to..

I ic rJ1dted in the ac::t SI:R. ::V cal in Sucolement no. 4 I

2. I will &c - uill invcive all thesc ito=s as well as tho i

. r r-

" ll resolutic: of the 1872 carthcuahe for Fcbbic Springs.

d i

. ll That ec:plstes crj bricf c==ation.

g,[

g.

.E g

yg 7.. auss:

peraphracing uhat rou:ve sc.id then, I {

r CC led tC g

concludO that Supplc:*...i 4chould,- in cssenos, pici:

+

d.'

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grbi 1 l with sces ner i:2for= :icn en their annlysia.

You may find

~

Ithisofin: crest.

2 "Se Stcff hc: noc had the opp rtunity 3

I to di:cuns it;. I hepa in the na::t week or two we will., and AI percibl*a find a solurica to this, whct I venid concider one s

f I

5 "

rc=cining inc= cn turbine niesiles.

G B7.. BUIE: I,ct na, ct thir. staca, csh th.i.s questio:

7l cf the Staff:

8 I would asct=3 that, pro *iding you cc meet, or cpprc=ir.ately meet, your g :lc ti=2wica, then this particul r 9

fiubccr ittee nesting'~ u uld b.'ucch th:t it t.culc not require

~

~

10 j caother onc.

In othr werde, va could re-nd to the full 1

i 12 Cen=ittee, utilizing Supplcmant'4 to the SER, and it veuld N

O I

3

. not be necesscrj to he.- a anotheir. necting to se vs as an 14

. arbitrator, se to spe.k.

r-

.u,...

--3 li 6

h*.. S I t -  :

That ecs =v c.ccl. ci, that I would y

t.

ho ebla to p c enu to you all the iccuse, the periticas, cf 17 f6 the J$pplicent in cu r.

lyris so that tra could clinincto 19 the nocd for en additienti Subce:=tittee mzeting.

i n.

D?.. SUSF. :

I uce er cacdine. on t':ic cc umn. tion.

s

.?

21 FIF.. STI.E 2:

I havo just been rc=ind2d I heva 1

i ci'cd a very cnbiticut getl of gctring Supplement No. 4: but 22 i,

s

.r.5 e..:...

.._e

-., t

,cw-

.n.

n,..u....: a..a.

.r

,, e. s.

• c

.... ~ -.

2-

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j, s %..n. we. e. s....

2

---........%..n c.

$ w 4 '..w e::. -- y - -9

• 4 o.

• • %. s* 3 -.e.

J y

~ ~ -

-J.

.e

\\\\

p' Q14 <~w,-

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1-4..

,..... : - +, C. -.. c 1 o =

<"*U.s AO/#' ~ ~ ~, c*-

E'-

t.3 s

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w

= '

tk 11 i

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f.

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4i F rb3 1

I

22. Sp.SC : Yes.

V 2

iis have clenrod throc pcopic to retricw the Stadia

.i 3j rapert, and they.hcva reviewci it.

Thin was done principally i

t I

!' in conjunction with the Trojcn picnt opercting licence which - !

4

't I Nt.'re currcntly involved in the develepnent of ths nodified S

6r a

C )p - r ded security plan for Trojan, cnd as such va're quite

,.l Well acquainted with the re:;r.irenentc.

7 I

CR. BUSF.:

It has bacccc "them" now: I believe l

f 6

'l i.

I.

there are at leact two cicccified reporta, if Dr. I.awrocki j

9 j

10 l! ia acrrect.

I simply =cntion that in pcccing becc.use thic l

lt i

l li l it. an iten of cassing interect to Dr. Law:cchi cnd'I'm

]I

'I I

.r..e he vil.1 ack you chcut not c-dy eno raport but others.

cg p

l Q

1 P.R. W.C. -

Pa.icularls' Dr. Thc=ccen's rcucrt, i

a la i

1 f

I believe, l

4 j.

I.

.I

. on_,y

..es.

nc. ne cche questions.

A D,n.. o u::. :

15 i; l

itli = cation this beccuse you do have a couple of con:ho in tharc, ;.

g i.

h

.,,. Il. cnd if v.cu harcn't rend it he will ctrenglv. advice that ycu l

t 8

3 } do so.

I.

I 7.nd I hcve ende this point very Im. STEI.E:

3 m

is clea-to the Isenlicant, and I chink.re arc prcescding along

~ fl

(

g Il I

.. I Lhese linas, sir.

8 As I

DR. 7.022:

Lees the. Staff have anything further e

22 j?

I s

.?

s

'y****

Uc 2 l

• M*

• C.. ??J.2A:

TO' hr cen' lc ;Civ c' -icoti 70

it it, r

g f

"r Cnc

,~2."

': cps :

j just yattarity :c hr.d intcr cl diccussions.

1 4

3 I

I e

6 ^^

Ja j

l l

l rr.s o.g g

n o.

3

'd a

r.

I j-t

'..*.. t *~* <i "~...~ 3 '. 3. ~0'..g :." w-f1' O v #.G.',

4.E i,

\\

~

Cf.< u r...

%..C,:.

,....ur

g s.

4 g

r t.

-o,y,

,r,

o l

g,f

. r.

uw,.

• y. -. 2. ge

a.

.yu 1:

p, is e

~.

.io

- r I

6 i

lf I

. O e.jg,*1C^ ** *;

O

%,. c.,,.,

u

,...s.

2.a r.e.,, q u. g._.. gy4.C%.., w t.% 33oe,Cu.,.u

(~

., P' a%

.~

e c..r gag.e 4.ng,,,4 o.a. e 4.ce.

'I

.t c

e g,.L. C u _4.

4..

p.

e 4 e.t g.-

nw h.

s....

6 l

c.,C_ Ca

.w S em...p g.: w.s..t.e o.t o r.- 4.n s.31 1.e 4.

e u

j.

i o

i.

t

• c 2 '..~.o 9'.m ca" qu~ u'.~,.~:.=~

6, 1I * -~. m_ '. c.*-..h*

~.;...'..,

~

~~'M u-yi

? i Pchb*.c Springr. Tac revicU of the i:70uce th-t Ccri has cca-f

[e z

I t

c _c

, o. n

/

c. _ n,

t.. om -

..e s 4. 1.:

c.

c._, < e.

.e>

dg i

= i there is that potenHr1 t

pa o.,_

.c...4 t.ncr. c going to be a c.ong,,ct, a

1G

.l',

h

.w.

q>

1; f't Sm. ac you rnd I rec.?gnl:c.

.1 I

r.o ni g e

u-a otha-t..*_,.m. o# a 5.-

"o.*.~~~.~...4_*:.<.<...

e' e

t Os.

. e...

~

3 b.

1 13 '. he c E.:cstions of '-he Staff r.t ".his ti e?

. t. E.,

DE. 7 22S'?T:

Could von i.uct in a generr.1 va.>

s u

.e..t.gn,

n c :ouc3,c_cs.c,.s..c ge,,

u

) z :s t

e. - ~.w..

v,

.-.w 33 i;

S p,. :.

., e n,_... l

..n. e cc.a,..;

v.

.w

. c v.

3

.u :, -- a

e '

8 d

!II.. TNT.I. !

Dad,t. D" 00:C.E dCrCDiOn IJO h0.Vf; Etill I

a

, c,;

U.

. 3C.

-.L c.:r m. :

e.-

D,r..

r4

• e. *IJ t

lt

.O.

i

.sM wzue.

s.

g.

e W

?

.!.'.y

.,.s.,.m

c..,8. e # C a t...muld h..,

c.#.4. *= l ag'..#.w C.

ag u

t, U.,

% c.1.J C..

J

,4..*.e

=.* *.

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4.=..a o, *.*h.. 't S e,r.

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6

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.);..

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...... o n. ym e

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4 a, t,..

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4.

.... / c..... m..#..

J

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j,.

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b..

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A

,y.

,.I. g. 4. s.. 4... t _.!

k m.7....

Ah

.. u 3.w.e.,

s.,

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.4

a. y g,

4.*

a.

..r 6,. a &

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f.

l' 13 n

o:

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s.

e d.

.t.1 21l' l

i Orhs i 4 thee see =he ece==i=e ec a r=e ---- c= eat.

I 2 i, The rect c's the=, incluci.g the turbinn miscile, as I understand ho still l,i ic hic criginal cer.=itaent,which 2

'1 F.

5 4 ll ctc. ids b.s cf s. roviding cp.ero -icto protection.

Ec, however,

.I 5

is asking the. opportunity to ccnvince us with some additionni 6

analyces bout tha cntent of his cenritesnt in torms of 7

pr tec*i~'

I 8

Cur rcce ~ ndation, I believe, will ha ---evcn e

at the cres n mecent -- te proceed to tho full Cenmittac with a 1 1

10 the fec-'7 that thic is a.cir.nt i.hnt va would rccc meni I

B 1:

procaciing for licensing. ':hcre are docu=entatica pi chiens

]

.t 12 thtt ec -... nave c.c cz.cer up.

OC; I thi.h Or. Ficcsot's enactic.n was L

13 Dn. BUSE:

r

4 probably cpccific te..D7% cnd its docien i=plic'itions..

wn.

.,,.u...

~,,,n.

l c.

. e.

6.

i 16d Scbble Spring is no different thcn the c-3ers, lil-1 < fl c=$ =" ::renptics of what the rtport may cenclude uc.'t 23.! be nny-hr ctartling, 'cther than whet we've cirecdy bece It

(

19.l cence nci chaut. 7.nd thsrc c c sil cortc ci fino tuning --

s I

l IcertniCySeven'trendthereportindctcig,butnothing 20 I

I've seen.

l hcc cecrt. led cc frc= th s dicenccion thn:

21 O? EUSE:

7.cah Fot-Steve.

22 !.

s e

t-e-

1 iP rdd, de f eu hr.e c *rthing?

-- 1 i-O

.m...

v..m....... e.-r.e,.

.t O Iw y, :;

t i

22;. L*JES :

If not. than I belicyc re cre new up t:

h.i w

w l*l!tItt.

(?

8:

t 2

3,

.j b:.

p Y

g b6 1j Iter. 4, the Applicant's response to tha 130 Staff report.

l I

2.

I presure that this will tend to enpand upon your i I

1.ii.i.written handour..Is thct the c cc?

,f.

s

.i 4 ji yr. nrochi, I belicvo you're the stohcc:::an.

, r,i

~ z.a.v.

v.

u.

w..

i El We can retend to arplification of the t.Titten

.I

.7 i

report to whatever dog ce ycu would desire.

I would like, 4.,

i s 'i in addition, to cention the status of the turbine nissile j

i s d.

c=cstions. ' ion're cuarc ef the differences in our pocitions. I' t

?

i

!S i;:

D2. EUSH: I think we'rc prepared to listen to i

a e

if i

. e. il the turbine ones.

Lat =e find cut if the Subec::re.ittes

. T.

i.

q tg h has an interest in pu cuir:g specifienlly an oral diccussion J

9

- 4 g

i of those cther iss1dac.

I belicvc we were given this i.r. !!

v. ecterdav..

i..

1

?.ilt, do ron h:vc an i'-<me t.nu. wich to purce:.

a.

a iG!i UFOCifi0 ally 7 I.

s.

TwSa_, :

..c.

a

c..

if e

n DR. ECSE: Enrold?

y;

.i l

DR. Es.42.".ING'"ON :

Ib.

.t DR. BUSI~: Since

• • .t uill baconc a part of the 20,,

11d rec 0rd -- cr it iO a =crt of the record of this nectinr, P

4 th Ecpertar :nould acva received a ecptr to cttt. h, end of i

a w

cocsc ::.t trill pp:cr t s cn.=endnz :t.

We can pich therc

[

u.

O.

...e_,.,.

g.

l I

3

.20~: Ui2 Er'1, E CruGi'E, COG 33 rcd tO liOtCn Ec ~.*h3'.t h

~

r *.

.T. ?

t..

o T=

(I

~

z s.

t.

3 3

9.>

f.

p i

u t

7*

• i you have en the turbine missile.

I

[

2l I cuppena I h ve a vested intcrast.

..nybe I have I

3 'il a conflict of interect and shouldn't listen.

i

.e tl j

4 Incidentclly, just to set the etage, thcre have it S l.

been tvo==bine failurcs in the thres ~.nths.

4 6 gj

m. BRora.,

Unlike the ge.-Jegints, I have only

,.; 7)

I 7'

one e:<hibit here.

I B

(Laughter.)

DR. BUSii: You're going to c=nfusa us *ti*d facts, l O

1 10 l; ic that vour idea?

r 11 '

22. BROGL: Yes.

i 12 (Slide.)

.{

!2 )

You can see in, I believe it is page 3-S of the i

i SER, Jrcadrant 3, the Staff

ac up 'rith an ectiraata of 1

ft il 15 ll prebabilities for a rcclictic applicatien of our crit _ria.

if

!e The Stcff requestef. ccvarci codificatic== in order to make l.;'

16

=

7 our cpplicctior acccstchic.

Thesa no '~3 ~' ions included a 2

i 1

4, 8

g.l scal.:. 'cr.:cid, which t:ok cerc cf c scc 11 p chicm in the steam Il

-.. n !l Jina,r~n"::ction arca; we hcvc connittad ta this, j

i i

- *i 1

,7c...

.tn addition, we 'ra locking f:: a corr.itnent from I

gi m '. the y #uCS:turerc, c. vr.1va tacting progrt2. This we've i

e i:

z2 ] agreed to.

j r if.

F = hcr, va have ccanitted ec an inspect:.on l

c

]

pre.I

• It. to inpreve the.interity of the ""^i'"' dices.

l 25 '.{

In sddition to that, we hcve, of courss, diverse I

i

. b.!

e s*..

,6 6(.. f"t.. M +

b

l

(

f r

o.

s*

8.4 s

I:

1 33 Ie IC;[&*.13drnt ht*O"JiliC tr1PS.

I }I; t s.7,- thtce additions Os:11y affect the F-1 pr@a-ej:

a ger.

1 1

.r.f,ia.g gion.

I

• , e' 3{ 4./.a.. C.

r.).,

s..

s

-s f

~., s s

i

(

4t

~

8 4.

.t.. r lt 1

1 o[-

i.

f.o!

7 pi 3

9 1

W 1

4 e

em u,;l a

'f l

O I

i: i:

8 4;

e 12.,

U.C.

i i

1q l

6 S

8 e

i j

t 13 '

a i

i

+

16 l

4 i.

F 1

j t!

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,h jO l4

.o

.i.*

G4 4*

1

• 9 N.

l

+

t HM s.s*

I

?

l'

,,.e s t{

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l.'

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I

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)

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o,a t.

e

l. '

4 d

I h

i4 m

v

.e,-~.,n.--v- + - - -

,p3g 4

g

<.-m-

,----c~m,-

9

[t t

25 col l*

2C 1

Ancthor itc= that they had in there use that ue f

F. I, could lock to cncly cs to further reduce the very 1ct.' nt=-

l 3

bers that cro in.there. The caly two nt=h: s that we sec=cd 4-4 to.ae cen=cIned thout wara related to the ccatrcl rcom a. d

~

i 5i tne ponctration of the centM ~"nt,

,e 6

The control rec = is down; I don't recall the cract nu=uer.

It's on the en the order of 1.6 x 10-7 They ca=e

.I u

o' up for the estir::a. to cf strike that would cause danace in

~

1 l

the stec= gancrctor cc= par--~1t of 2.7 x 10~7 lie re--

p, 99 cnalyzed using that criterion and the MIS code and cc==

g up wita 2.17 = 10-7, whien -is in very cicsc agreament wita the Staff's ccacluaica.

1 a,.

O.m n

(

13 Cnc thing that was not =odeled by the Staff t -

1 tne stec: generators. The Pebble Springc crrangement be-

.i.

'l tween the tire of the original application uent in and the 1 e, i

resent situatica, we went from tuo to four moisture scpara-lo. a n

tor ICnenterC.

l l; e i dew thcce renec crc heppen to be located adjacent n.

• 6

!!

• to the LP stagas so t:hcv in effect provido additional o t, 8

tg e

20.h chicleM g betvcen the turbine and the contain= cat.

And vnes c

i it you apol.y tas callisticc criteria thror.:gh the moisture c.

le D'

.'. sep.rc c rahcatcrc it r: duces that nura:r down ec 1.5 ~

.,, I,:

, j = 10 f..,

nich is vo::j clen to tne r,3asured nv.rber,10 *.

t Nc30 Era toe nC*92r!.lloVing DC credit fCr de

u. 3 i

4ii inprO~.*Cf._-;Oi:5 WG h *.Vc i.cf 2 in the hacic :*.*.rbine d* sign C f.

, I C

+

n 1

., u,.

.t 1.

eo2

• e6 the tcctine of cho val.vcs.

t n

2 G, Ucu I don't knew of anybody Uho.

-ally put r

i.

i 1

3$

e n"-hr ca :nece. Tac best that I'~c bcon chi-to cena u

I. r' l

b.

l up wita ic Dr. Y.n : Taylor of I:na wn, did the turbine i..-

r e

r.. e.

c.,. u s.,. e..r. e...3. eig s u, e,.

sV.d g ;;

.4. 3 3.,...,.. t, 4... 4.,..

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3 :

s.c h:, - =.."a'.t s.4

• u c' u ' c' ~ a "- o.. '~' ~d e vem. ir z.

c. -

.v, t 3

...u.-

m h.

thc. crdtr of tt:o-ish or thrsc-ich. Oc use hic ecr'is, just e !!

fc the valve testing prograra.

tg..

g lj nct nr.::ter applied to his, of cou-se, brings 'it' t

e

.o y oclew the 10~='.

u 4

s. s.,i.

Chars crn s ac:::cer cf othcr conser r:tismc in i.

4 n

therc, and I thin:: just a judgment t *::: is wc a o cicsc

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t.

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. g.

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• * *' u M -. *. * * *

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,, 2Ur

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... i.

- =. - c 4-ti 1* <.w 4,

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v :*

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- s.nA b.,

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• g.,

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...,., - a t D O.' 4.e*.*u*

i'6.',

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., s i.

w.

13 bi g y, y.,,

,.gc..

a g c u

a. n..a c u.u..

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H abla to build s pica and cycrctc it as docignei.

m.,e.

, a, 1.

g jj Da. 1:U3:ir Let ::: rcico a pc'.nt char is p.:ri-2.:il o..:,.,

..a.c.o _.w.en any.n..n.. u.w. e, :), - +,,

e-c.s,

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i.?.(. 7.

i.

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.g.,.

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• :?

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a l.

t

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g

, e il 27l

'l I.I e

i h designs, there hcs been cracP.ing, scle.ctiva cracking, of l

co3 l

'll 2g turbinc d' ks, probchly due te plcotic concantrasics et a j

e i

2 lf given pocition in the low-prescuro sc.aga.

':'he significanca D

Il l

9 4 lj cf this I dun't think ncs reclly been establich:d.

Il 5 !.l ilowever, it docs represent a potential failurc 6

mechar. ice and it could exist not only in the overspeed 7

stage but could tico occur at neraal cperating cpeeds.

a, I ds not intend to exprces a judg= ant.

I guess I'm only askinc. c oncction if you:re accre of thic, and if c.

l e

s.o meccurcs cro being considered in the long run to eliminate t

3g or mitigate this particula. problem.

u 12 F.R. 11RCI'EL :

Yes, we cre awarc of thz potentici O

i 1

g,.

proble=, and we hevo t-to cctivities which we look for.rcrd j

l 1

6 il tc, to mini =ica cny potential.

One i.: certninly :naintaining g

g-an entre aly hig: quality in the water chemictry, cad the i

other is through in-sc:sfice inspeccion of the tu-bina dici:s. ;

gg l

DK. BUSH:

Cf cou;.cc the proolem witt stress j

7

!i cerresica is be:cuse cf its insidict.: nature, the

'.m uct of 8 3; i

s l

i credit. ycu can get fur in-corvice inspect icn't t.mita so nigh gg I

g, j as you night like to have becauce it =ay happen vo y r;pidly, t

l I Dalieve with a plant that is core yea c dcun I

I J

i

.i the stream it. cecope: en aca6snic ictus.

I'n c only reiring i 1

m 4

8 it at thic tics.

Obvict:1y you'rs c.ucra of the pr rlen, sad I;

i

~.

w i

O

'i g=e====31y my ese eime <cie gl a: :. c: =e, c= 11=e. there cey e.*-

1 g gl be a cc:.:.n:. iva colucien to enn prcOle=, but I thi.-U: it hcc c

i L:

1

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)

t 1

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r....

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+

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i 0

ue potonr.ial of being a scricus proble=.

i d

so4 5

et

s. -

., b.t

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.,s.

,i.,

.e..a ue- ?

siac.

!.I Do vou hava reauttal cr screthin~?

v

.)

l. '

,.c--

... toc.,.

. ;co a~-

- a

,c. '

i., :.,,,, w. 5 :.-..

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e.t.u, U

. 4 p.

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1

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Wa E... u

.i..

.~

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9 q il, cc=.osnv cnc in deine. co, instand c2.nc=_oine. drains forwr. d 3

i I-p 7j t".rougn our feedweter syston, wc c.ra danigning it to p:=2p s

gy, bac.v.raris.

Se un cre not concentrating mcybe in unc crce' l!

-.c _. e.n. -c 1ct.,..

,c

.s a-w

-..- a o 40._.:-

,.<.h1,u.

.u.,

s o be.

c-e i.s as

~

It its ths *.; '-pr0.eaurc turbinc, and. eninc. throngn t".c m:icture

. o-

4..

sdoart.'..cr.

.i i

f a

1 g

so v, a 3

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t v A.e ar 44c. :------,r w. c.

p. 3 g,

.}6 e

e..e, s.

. J.

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p.

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SUSH :

I Cino'" Wished to raise the issus.

t, i

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,4 6

3

, e 1, en wncrc "Ou arc tith ragard to the ragged edge of yetr

~

.vo -

ac~-~.

.'.a. cci Orch. '.414t'a

.).. o.

'1 1 H "' - =--,

t y

u

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-:.w '

,o Ii

-s.9 i

h ens i

auspect you ers.prcbably ccatrolled =cre by tha ler ::ajecto..y

.i. =issilo in taic situetic:;.

2 3

i MR. EKDEhL:

Yes.

4 D?.

3::SE: Earcid, do you have anything you wish

i. to add?

5

.t 6

Do you have any further cos:ncats in this crea?

i i

7 ll HR. S E EL:

do.

I!p 8 ij DR. BUSli:

Does FGS wish to introduce cnythi.ng Il a t{ else in the record orally?

i 10 (Sc response.)

l 13 l

Or 3USE: Well, I think we understcnd the situn-l<i 12 h tion with rogs d to the ncn-seist:ic issues. As I : dcr:tzad il is 1 it, th m 1: ci cer recclutica c: convergence :cuard reso-i 1 g;. lution en plent-specific it ::. And with regard to gcncric tems, ct least dare are posidenc ca se of the critid 15 W

ones.

Covious.lv there can't be en all of them.

su I

2 i'ita regard tc the itens--

I cuess this isn't 7 i.

2 really n retr: fit, is it, a retcacc vita regard te tt:

16 i

'L ESSAR-205? ne: nas very specific connccations.

19 l

I t

I i

20y I vetid scy uith ruga-6 t the scismic, this nas g

i i

9 e

l Decn P:Otty th:20'2ghly aired, end I c.an't spech fc wht: the 21 g

Cor::it ce vill f.c.

One c vic= coluzion rotJ.d bn c: w-ite 2

.)

,, I'i a gencric scir:1= lett:r. Iclev= to the No.c.uest but c

~ i.

prio ri, 2 ct.n ' : indienza uhr.: :i'.1 neppen.

';'nt: ses== ::

i 2,

i it it. se tne cer; lerical cpprocen.

.a.l'o

.i '1

't e

l

I 30 1

1 1

i li r

0 '-

" ' " * * * = * * * = ' " " " * " "

i 1

2 con =1ude an interesting t<o d=1s.

j c

3 (1 acroupca, at 1:50 p.:n., the meeting of tuo

{

.A 4

,0RS Subcon

ittec ca Pencic Springs wcs' concluded.)

i i

e 3

?

3 I

I 1

6 i

I s

9 i

I i

10 I

1 l

t.

- I g

i 59 I

h l

13 i,

4 I

14 T

I 15 I

16 l'

i 17 i

t i

f I

?

16 l

I i

i 19 1

1 i

i 8

20 Y

/

s (J a

.l 4,

M, it

=t 6

Oa g4 le y

1 l

1..

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i 1

i I

4 9

i l

'MISSILI. STF.IKES g CN STEAM w.N.r.4. TORS e

\\

l REC N 2.7 x 10 / year

~

/

f 1

i 2

MIS CODE:

1 ITITH NRC ASSUMPTIONS 2.17 x 10

+ 0.3 x 70

~

~

EITH NRC ASSUMPTIONS PLUS E DELINC CF MCISTURE-SEPARATOR-EU C*u~EI.S (MSEs)

-7 1.56 + 0.26 x 10 e n NW 2

+

em e e m he Neme ee aw e emummm meg e em.

m 1

4 4

e i.

7e

)

O O

0 i

F w

J I

i O

i 1

MISSILE STRIKES-ON STEAM GDTT ATORS n

ERC ESTIMATE 2.7 x 10~ / year 4

i i

IES CODE:

WITH NRC ASSUMPTIONS 2.17 x 10 i 0.3 x 10

~

~

d l

VITH NRC ASSUFE1"iCNS PLUS MODELING- 0F MOISTCRE-SEPARAT02-Ph*EES (MSRs)

-7 1.56 1 0.26 x 10 a

I i

i i

t i

N i

O 1

s 9

\\

/_ C T 2 7 N /_.7 1

~

PCI RESPONSES 'TO NRC OPEN ITEMS (TO BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO A CP)

OPEN ITEM NO. 1 Decav Heat Removal Svetem Isolation Valves - This issue is identified in Section 7.4.1 of the Pebble Springs SER. The power system arrangement to the DER system suction isolation valves is such that during a pipe break outside contaicsent, one train of the system cannot be isolated from the Reactor Coolant System assuming the single failure of one electrical bus. An acceptable design would be separate Class lE power supplies for each valve as was recently submitted in B-EAR-205.

Reseense to Oeen item No. 1 The Decay Heat Recoval System (DERS) vill be designed so that the system can be isolated frem the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) in the event of a pipe break outside Containment assucing the single failure of one electrical busa PGE recognizes an acceptable design.to be separate Class IE power supplies for each DERS suction isolation valve. However, PGI intends to evaluate alternative designs, fully meeti:g the NRC isolation criterion above, which may be more compatible with current plant design.

We 1lan to sub=it a proposed scheme for incorporating the NRC isolation criterion into the DERS design in a future PSAR amendment.

OPEN ITEM NO. 2 Overeressure Protectics at Low Ooeratine Te=ceratures - The staff is currently developing a position which will provide requirements for the design of a protection syste= for these events. The applicant cast co= sit to the fol-loving cini=um criteria prior to issuance of a CP:

O O

• t _ ! _...

~

-)

(1) Credit for_ooerator action. No credit can be taken for opetarcr action until 10 minutes af ter the operator is made evare that

~

a transient is in progress.

(2) Sincle failure criteria. The pressure protection <=* ten should be designed to protect the reactor vessel, given any event initiating a pressure transica:, and followed by a single active component y,-

failure.

T., 9We diver p pressure protection systems vill be considered as meeting the single failure criteria.

(3) Testabiliev. Provisions for periodic testing of the overpressure protection system (s) and co=ponents shall be provided. The program of tests, and frequency or scheduli thereof, vill be selected to assure functional capability vben required.

(4) Seis=ic desien and Standard 279-1971 criteria. Ideally, the pressure protection system (s) should meet both Seismic Category I and Standard

()

279-1971 criteria. The basic objective, however, is that the system (s) should not be vulnerable en an event which both causes a pressure transient and causes a failure of equipment needed to ter=inate the trans ient.

(5) Reliabilitv. The system (s) provided must not. reduce the reliability of the' e=crgency core cooling system or residual heat renoval syste=s.

v:.?

Resoonse t5'"Open Ites No. 2 i

l?i'O CEF 50 specifies the mini =um fracture toughness i

Append!3

requires =nts for ferritic caterials of pressure-retaining co=ponents of, the RCP3. These requirenents are provided in the Technical Syscifications f or nor=al and test conditions as a pressure, limit 7

which varies as a function of reactor coolant te=perature and rate F

of te=peratur. change, j

\\

Overpressure protection against exceeding these li=its is provided by (1) the pressurizer safety valves and (2) the decay heat re= oval t

systes relief valves.

,t' h, N e m

<[l 6 y l

l l

l As sh6vu in Figure 1, the pressure limit is relatively lov at low reactor ceolant temperatures and then increases to higher limits at higher reactor coolant temperatures. The Appendiz G limit shown in the fikure was determined using the following:

(a) 'The methods outlined in topical report BAW-10046, " Methods of Cocpliance With Fracture Toughness and Operational Requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G".

(b) RT stift predictions from Regulatory Guide 1.99.

(c) Actual base metal and weld wire material data (typical).

(d) Predicted accu =ulated radiation fer 32 effective full power years.

(e) Design heatup and cooldown rates.

O This is a typical limit curve for B&W plants and is applicable to pebble Springs.

The pressure linit is bounded by the pressure setpoints of the pressurizer safety valves and DERS suction line relief valves so that when the reactor coolant pressure limit is above the setpoint of the pressari:er safety valves, averpressure, protection vill be provided by the pressurizer safety valves; and when the RCS pressure li=it is below the setpoint of the pressurizer safety valves, everpressure protection vill be provided by the DERS suction line relief valves. This is ensured by requiring, in the Technical Specifications, that all four DHRS suction valves located between the RCS and DERS be normally open during DERS operation when the pressure li=it is below the setpoint of the pressurizer safety valves. In addition, the temperature range at which overpressure protection is required by the DERS suction relief valves coincides with the te=perature range for operation of the DERS.

The Appendiz G li=its are restrictive only at the lower reactor plan: tenperatures associated with RCS s:artup and shutdown operations.

Worst-case pressure transien:s that could occur under these conditions were de:er=ited :o be the following:

(a) RCS =aicup valve stuck full open.

(b) hree EPI pumps actuate.

(c) All pressurizer heaters energize.

(d) Loss of cooling water to DERS coolers.

i 1

(e) Core flood system valve opens.

(f) Star: cf a reactor coolant pu=p with hot water in secondary side of the steam geneistors.

L' These : znsients have been analy:ed, and the results are given in the follwing see: ions (the =ajority of :he inforn.a: ion is already contai:ed in Pebble Springs PSAR See:icn 9.3.5.4.1.a).

The resul:s show tha: the pressuri:er safety valves and DERS relief valves provide =i: iga: ion for all transients assuning (1) a single active ce=ponen: failure, (2) no operator ac: ion, a=d (3) loss ei offsite power.

With the OELS isolation valves open and :he systes cperating, the i

previously lis:ed transients or inciden:s can increase the RCS pres-

)

sure and thns the pressure in the DERS. These incidents have been analysed :o deter =ine the creimum required relief capacity to prevent :he CEE pe=p suction pressure from exceeding 500 psig.

The basis for analy:i.g the various transien:s was as follevs:

(a) OE23 is placed in cperation during plant cooldown at 305*y 105 :e perature.

e

(b) Pressurizer water level is at the normal level for power operation.

(c) Pressurizer pressure is at the cidpoint of the allovabic band for starting the DERS.

(d) No cre/it is taken for any spray into the pressurizer or"any steam relief from the pressurizer.

(e) No credit is taken for letdown flow rate to the Makeup and Purification System (MPS).

Following is a brief description of each incident analyzed:

(a) Loss of DERS Cooline. - It is assu: sed that DERS. cooling is lost by a loss of power to the DER pumps, loss of cooling water flev to the DER coolers, or two independent single failures causing inadvertent closure of one suction valve in each DERS train.

The rate of RCS pressure increase for the postulated latter incident is relatively slow, allowing ample ti=e for an operator to take action. An analysis of the transient showed that the operator has far more than the required 20 ninutes to assume corrective action.

Two conditions of initial level and pressure in the pressuri:er were exa=ined, which would correspond to expected conditions during cooldown for ECS temperatures below 170*F using the pressurizer model of the CADD code. Conditions for reactor enc 1&nt te=peratures higher than 170*F vere not considered bscause of the large pressure cargin between the DERS operation and the Appendix G li=it shown in Figure 1.

The analysis assumed, conservatively, that the reactor coolant expands in a completely isolated systec with the caxi:=c.= pctential decay

'o heat of 1 percent of full power with only partial credit taken for energy absorption by the RCS metal. The analytical results are as follows:

n.--

l l

l

[

Case 1 - Eow Pressure (initial conditions representative of ebnditions that exist on scoldown at 50 osia)

Time, Pressurizer

?rcssuri:er

=inutes_

oressure, osia level, ft 0

50 31.3 10

$3.5 32.8 20 56.3 34.4 Case 2 - Eign Temper,ature (initial conditiens representative of conditions that exist en coolcown at 170*F)

Time, Pressurizer Pressurizer minutes cressure, osia level, ft 0

100 25.1 10 105.8 26.7 20 109.7 28.3 This transient would be indicated by any of the folleving:

i. Increasing reactor coolant pressure (meter indication).

O ii. In:reasing reactor coolant te=perature (neter indication).

iii. Low flor.i in DERS (alar and ceter indication).

iv. EE25 puup cavitation.

v.

Closed valve indication for rue OE2S letdown valves (valve position indication).

The operator can citigate the transient by any of the follewtug methods-

i. Rerpen one of the DERS isolatien valves so that relief valve protection is restored.

ii. Open pressuriter electric-eperated relief valve.

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O'.

iii. In: ease pressurizer spray flew.

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()

iv. Open manual pressurizer vent to drain tank.

v.

Open letdown valve of MPS.

vi.

Initiate auxiliary feedvater operation.

(b) Makeue Control valve Fails Full Coen - It is assumed that

~

the =akeup control valve controlled by the pressuri=er level controller malfunctious and goes full open. For this analysis, no credit'vas taken for letdown to the MPS. The high flow rate through the makeup valve into the RC$ plus the seal injection flow race increases pressurizer water level thus increasing.

pressure.

(c) All Pressuti=er Heaters Energire_d - It is assumed that, although pressure is increasing, all pressuriser heaters are energized.and remain on.

For this analysis, a mini =us-pressurizer water level is assumed as it would produce the O.

fastest prs.ssure rise and highest relief rate requirement.

To stop the pressure increase, a miniuun outflow rate from the pressurizer =ust be created such that the heater capacity can generate an amount of steam equal to the additienal vapor space being created by the outflow rate. This required outflow rate is 911 gpc. The decreasing pressurizer water level vill cause the cakeup valve to go full open (with pressurizer level controller in " automatic"); this inflow rate (see above, Makeup Control valve Fails Full Open) cust be added to the 911 gpm to obtain the relief requirement.

When the pressurizer water level decreases to the low-level heater cut-out setpoist, the heaters will be automatically deenergized.

(d) Hich Pressure' Injection Svstee Accidentallv Actuated - It is as su=e d-that the entire HPIS is actuated. For the analysis, it was assc=ed that all three E?! pe=ps pump into the RCS

()

through the E?I lines, increasing pressurizer water level and thus increasing pressure.

i

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Two pu=Js operate in one E?! s: ring and one pump in the i

o:her. De three HPI pu=ps are powered by rvo separate electrical Suses. Nor= ally the design is such th'at only ene punp can operate on a single bus which results in a caxicus of two EFI pu=ps opera:ing si=ultaneously. For conserva:sse and safety, the 3E2S relief valve is sized for all tilree EPI pu=ps apera:i=g.

(e) Core Flood Tank Outlet valve Accidentiv Opened - It is assumed that the core flood casi (CET) outlet valve (motor-operated) is accide t:ly cpened. The CFT outlet valve was l

closed during plan; cooldov: beferi RCS pressure approached 600 psig. When i'. is acciden: ally opened, CFT water vill be pusheC into the 7 CS increasing pressurizer water level and thus pressurizer pressure u=til, CIT pressure and pressurizer pressure equalizt. Even with pressurizer presr.ure initially at the high end >f the band for starting the DERS, the resultant prissu rizer pressure is not high coough to (1) exceed the CERS design pressere ky more than 10 percent, or (2) exceed the li=its of 10 C7150, appendix G, even with the decay heat p =p opera:ing at shutoff head. For this inciden:, relief by the decry hea: letdown line relief valve is not required. The relief valve co 1d be actuarid depending upon initial pressurizer pressure, because pressure at the decay heat pu=p suction could reach the relief valve setpoint.

For this transient, the rea:::: coolant pressure increases rapidly to the equilibriu= pressures listed in Table 1, assu=ing no credit for relief valve action.

(f) Starting a Reactor Coolant ?: 3 - The initial conditions of this transie7t result frc the filling of the steam generator with 470*F feedvater with the rec:ct coolant at refueling te=pera:ure. This condi:ien is reached during s teas generator filling operations assu=ing tha: :he feedvater controls fail and the operator centinues :o fill the steam generator with (k

feedva:er in excess of the allevable 225*F feedva:er te=pera-ture. The te=perature of the feedva:er in the steam generator i

b

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R i

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reaches 240*F, as does the prinary water at elevations above the le ser steam generator tubesheet. This is a result of heat transfer from the secondary to the primary side of the -

steam generator during filling. It is assumed that the primary water below the lover tubesheet remains at refueling temperature. At the end of the filling operations, a reac: or coolant pucp is started. The peak expansion rate is approximately 1750 gpm, which is less than the DERS relief valve capacity.

As the analysis results presented in Table I show, the required min N capacity for DERS letdown relief valve is 2000 gpc. At a setpoint of 455 psig, minices required capacity is 2000 gpa at 10 per-cent accumalation. This relief valve vill prevent the DEES _ design pressure frem being exceeded by mere than 10 percent diring the incident concurrent with the dei pu=p operating at any developed vorst head up to and including shutoff head. Each of the dual DER letdown

[)

lines contains a relief valve sized for the full relief flow rate in the event that the "ERS is being operated on one letdown line only.

Nor= ally, both letdevn lines are used and the available relief capacity is therefore two ti=es greater than the require ent.

Steam condensation in the pressurizer during the insurge was not used in the analysis. Actually, steam vill condense during the l

co=pression of the steam bubble; accounting for the steam condensed I

would result in a lower rate of pressure rise than shown above.

However, it would not affect the calculated required ttlief capacity listed in the table. The relief valve must relieve a volume rate

~

equal to or greater than the insurge volume rate that flows into the pressurizer at the maximum desired pressure. The required relief capacities listed in the table have been determined in this manner.

I O

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TA3LE 1

^'

i PRESSURI RISE AND RELIIT VALVE CAPACITY 4

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Rate of Pressure Required Relief Incide:: Description Rise - esi/=in Capacity rps r

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Loss of DERS Cooling (10 psi in 20 =inutes 225 i

P.akeup Con:rol Valve 36 524 i

Tails Full Open All Pressurizer Heater's 5

1,425 Inergized 2

E? S A:ciden: ally Opened 162 2.000 (all three E?I pumps operate) i i

I 4

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Ieuilibrien ?rassure - esie At Pressuri:er At DEI Pe=3 S e t' q

CFT Outle: Valve j

A:ciden: ally Opened:

1

)

Initial pressurizer pressure 432 455 l

at nidpois: of band l

nitial pyessuri:er pressure 474 497 I

2 i

at high point of band i

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5 l

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.G 2600 PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE SET POINT (2500 PSIC) 2400 2200 TYPICAL APPEN0l! G TECH SPEC LlHIT 2000 (32 EFPT)

THIS CURVE WILL BOUND APPEN01% G 1800 LlHITS FOR ESAR (NOREAL HEATUP 205 PLANTS AND CCOLDONN) 1600 em"

.14CD O

C 1200 O=

1000 600 OHR SYSTEM SAFETY YALVE D

SETPOINT (455 PSIG) 400

[ TEMPERATURE SELDU tHICH THE CHRS ISOLATICN YALVES MUST 200 3 C5'

/

BE OPEN A

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100 200 300 400 500 RC Temp,*f FIG T 1 ASME COOE SECTIC:' lil APPEDIX G O

RCS O',*ERPRESG LIMIT,,

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OPIW ITEM NO. 3 ECCS Analeses - The applicant references t pical reports BAW-10100, 3AW-10074, and BAW-10104 for the analyses i= accordance with 10 CTR 50.a6.

Since the approval, by the staff, of the emersency core cooling sys:e= =odel described in 3AW-10104, several changes te the model have been suh=it:ed by i

Babcock & *dilcor and approved by us.

To have a referenceable' worst-break which is wholly in confor=ance with 10 CFR 50.46, Appendix K, and to ensure that the selected postulated breaks adequately define the "vorst-case" situations, additional analyses are required. (These a alyses were requested in a Commission letter frm: S. Varga of NRC to James H. Taylor of 347, dated May 10, 1977.)

Reseonse to Oeen Item No. 3 The worst-case large break analysis requested in the letter fren S. Varga to J. H. Taylor of May 10, 1977 was submitted.by let:e

()

fren J. H. Taylor to 3. Varga c Septe=ber 30, 1977. The results of this LOCA limi 6 analysis shev a peak cladding teeperature at the core nidp1;ce (6 f t. elevati ) of 2114*T, which is 1 *F less than calculated previously and reperted in 3AW-10102, Rev. 2 (Table 7-1).

The letter fres S. Targa of May 10,1977 also requested one (verst-case) small break analysis. This analysis is scheduled to be submitted to the NRT by the end of Ic ;?.

Based on a comparison of the results of the large and r=all break spectr=m analysee presen:ed in Pebble Springs FSAR Tables 15.13-17 and 15.13-18, the peak cladding te=ptra:ure for the verst-case r:all break should prove to be significantly lower than calculated for 4

the worst-case large break.

The analyses perfornec and reger:ed in 3AW-10102 and the le::er of September 30, 1977 assume a higher flev ra:e and a higher pever level :han that reported in :be Febble Spri:ss PSAR, as explai:ed in Section 15.13.* ?

An analysis has been performed for a plat:

si ilar to Pebt!-

. rings usi:g 35*4's August 1977 ECCS evalca ics codel. Three psrameters were cha:ged (pever level, RCS flew, and

l

/ ',. -

Contair. ment pressure) from those reported in the letter from J. H. Taylor of September 30, 1977. The power level and RCS fl'ov vere adjusted to correspond to 102 percent of the rated power level of 3600 We mod no=inal RCS flow of.03,500 sp=, the same values as used in the Pebble Springs PSAR. The Containment pres-e sure easd in the analysis showed a peak of 28.5 psig. The peak h

hr.m.m..pp?opriate for the 'Febble Springs ECCS analy-sis is 30.8 psig (Figure 3.4-2 of BAW-10102, Rev. 2), which indi-cates that the analysis is conservative for Pebble Springs. The results of this LOCA limits analysis yielded a peak cladding temper-ature of 2059'T at the' core midplane. This is 67*F below the equivalent temperatur. reported in 3AW-10102, Rev. 2, and $5*F belov the temperature repo.ted in the September 30, 1977 letter. All other criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 were also shovu to be satisfied.

OFF.N IE.! NO. 4 Eich Pressure In_iection Line Breck - A break in a high pressure injection line (EPI) between the reactor coolant systes piping and the last EPI check valve results in a small LOCA. We require additional infer =ation to evaluate the consequences and necessary operator actions to mitigate the consequences of this event.

Rest.nse to Open Item No. 4 The Pebble Springs makeup and purification / EPI pu=ps suction

• -h h charge header desi'gn has been revised (see letter dated

- E:pt::ber 7,1977 from W. J. Lindblad, PCE, to S. A. Varga, NEC).

The Pebble Springs E15I System, as modified, is presently functionally identical to the corresponding design described in 3-SAR-205.

Consequently, the discussion in Section 6.3.2.17.2 of B-SAR-205, which describes the necessary cperator action required to citigate

. the consequences of a postulated break in the RP; line between l'the RCS piping and last check valve, is applicable to Pebble Springs.

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Information will be provided in a future PSAR amendment to demon.

strate that the Pebble Springs and B-SAR-205 EPI System designs are equivalent insofar as the EPI injection line break analysis is concerned.

OPEN ITDI No. 5 Provisions for Shutdown - The applicant must demonstrate that the plant.can remain for a prolonged period in a hot shutdown condition assisming loss of off-site power and using only safety-grade equipment or show that the plant can be cooled and depressurized using only safety grade equipment (assuming loss of off-site power) to the level required for decay heat removal systus actuation.

Resoonse to Oven Item No. 5 PGE will provide inf' orc:stion in a future PSAE amendment to, demon-strate that the plant can remain for a prolonged period in a hot shutdown condition assuming loss of off-site power and using only safety grade equipment or that the plant can be cooled and depres-surized using only safety grade equipment (assu=ing loss of off-site power) to the level required for DERS actuation.

OPEN ITDi NO. 6 Makeue 1.ine Break - The applicant must evaluate the required actions and consequences resulting from a break in the normally pressurized makeup line considering all potential single active component failures.

Reseense to Osen Ite= No. 6 The Pebble Springs makeup and purification / EPI pumps suction ar discharge header design has been revised (see letter dated S 1977 from W. J.1.indblad, PGT., to S. A. Varga, dRC). The EPI System, as modified, is presently functionally ider corresponding design described in B-SAR-205.

Consis-l

h

,h 3-SAR-205 design, the third c.J.eup pump and supporting BOP auxil-iaries in the Pebble Springs design can be manually transferred to either ESF safety train and will be nor= ally aligned with the same train as the standby HPI pu=p.

Consequently, the respcase in.

3-SAR-205 to NRC Questions 212."147 and 112.227, which describes the required operator actions and consequences resulting from breaks in the nor= ally pressuri:ed makeup line and'other locations in the HPI pump discharge header, assuming a concurrent single active faiiure, is applicable to Pebble Springs.

Information vill be provided in a future PSAR amendment to demonstrate that the Pebble Springs and 3-SAR-205 HPI System designs are equivalent insofar as the makeup line break analysis is concerned.

OPE 5.**."Di NO. 7 Passive Failures - It is our position that detection and alarms be provided to alert the operator to passive ECCS failures during long-tern cooling folleving a LOCA vi.ich allows sufficient time to identify and isolate the faulted ECCS line. The applicant vill be required to commit to the staff's positie: (see also the detailed discussion in NUEIG 0138).

Resoonse to Onen Item No. 7 Pebble Springs design provides assurance that a postulated passive failure during the post-LCCA recirculation phase vill not degrade ICCS capability or contribute significantly to post-LOCA accident doses.

Potential sources of passive leakage include pu=p and valve seals and instru=ent fittings. Leakage fron the sources noted would be expected to be less than 1 gpm. However, for conservatism, it is assumed that a 50 gym leak rate is possible. Excluding the Centainment penetration area, potential sources of leakage are localiza.d in the Containnent spray pu=p and D'IR pu=p and heat exchanger compartments. Leakage in these conpartments will be e

s e

r'e.

3,; _

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routed to the Seismic Category 1, stainless steel-lined Auxiliary Building A er B sumps. High-level Seismic Category I se=p indica-tions are provided is the control roon. D erefore, high sump level would indi:ste a passive f ailure in either safet) train A or B, allowing appropriate eperator action to isolate the affected train.

e h is isola-ion pre edure would not degrade ECCS capability as the Tedule.. -Elcr.d cr=:..cLeuc spray trains would be more than adequate to satisfy ECCS requirements.

In addition, an ESF filtration system is provided that takes suction in the Contai= ment spray pump and DHR pump and heat exchanger compr.rtments. B is systes is automatically aligned on an ESFAS signal and is designed in accordance with Regulatory cuide 1.52.

D erefore, substantial passive. recirculation mode leakage vill not contribute significantly to post-LOCA deses.

ne amount of inventory loss from the Containment due to the passive leakage does not constitute an appreciable hasard to EST pu=p NPSH requirenents. Even at a 50-gym leakage rate, Containment recirculatirn level vould decrease at a rate less than 1 in./hr.

Further==:e, lev-level Seis=ic Category I Containment su=p indica-tion is p;cvided in the Control Room to alert the operator to any significant se :p level decreases.

.3 im OPEN n"D! NO. S

• pt-

..,'l'.'""Hf.1, Ma, ' Q*rges in ECCS - Experience has shown that consideration must be riven to the po,sibility that, prior to an accident, locally manual valvei(5ndv%=1].-i;htbe1:ft in the vroeg position and remain undetected.

T..e.taff vill require remote position indication in the control room for all such manual ICCS valves, the misposit.oning of which could comprecise t

ECCS performance.

4 0

-. n.c.c.

(

Resoonse to ooen Ite= To. 8 The status of esse::ial =anual valves in the ECOS will be verified f

in the following anner:

(a) Those valves which have to be operated during the sequence of a normal plant start-up and/or shutdown vill be provided with position switnhes and vill be monitored as part of the

" inoperable status" indication for that systen, J

(b) Those valves located is normally accessible areas will be visually verified for correct position at least once every 31 days in accordance with administrative procedures.

1 (c) Those valves located in normally inaccessible areas, where routine visual verification is undesirable, will be provided with position ruitches and will be monitored for correct position fran the control room.

The above criteria are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.47.

CFEN ITEM NO. 9 s

Excessive Heat Eenoval Iven:s ef Moderate Frecuenev - The applicant is required to show that no fuel damage occurs for such events (DNER >1.32).

gherefore,itisnotappropriatetoreferencethemainsteaslinebreak analysis which shows DNB1 <!.2: at 3.1 seconds into the transient.

Resoonse to Ooen Itre No. 9 Excessive heat rrmeral frem the RCS can result fren a maloperation or inadvertent operat:r adjustment of the feedvater control system which causes a redu:tirn in feedvater tenperature er an excessive O

U i

l l

I I

,k) increase in the feedvater flow. These transients have been analyzed in Section 15.10 of the PSAR and shown to result in a DNER >1.32.

An excessive heat removal accident could also result from the inadvertent opening of a stern safety, atmospheric dump, or turbine bypass valve by the operator or an equipment malfunction such.

as a pressure regulator failure. The steam pressure regulator malfunction or failure resulting in increasing steam flow has been analyzed in Section 15.1.36 of B-SAR-205.

For no fuel' damage to occur, these malfunctions or failures are limited to a maximum 15 percent step increase in steam load. The increase in steam flov resulting from a stuck open main-steam safety or modulating acnos-pherie dump valve would be limited to about a 6 p-rcent and 7 percent step increase, respectively. However, a maloperation of the turbine bypass system may result in a steam flow greater than 15 percent rated. To ensure that the-rated steam flow is limited to a maximum 15 percent step increase, interlocks (or alternative means) vill be provided to prevent incidents of moderate frequency frem causing spurious opening of the atmospheric and condenser dump valves.

The interlocks will not inhibit valve operation for a turbine trip, generator trip, or load rejection when dump valve operation is desirable.

OPEN ITEM NO.10 Decay Heat Removal System Cooler Breass Valves - The rate of cooldown is normally controlled with these valves. The concern is that loss of air to these valves, causing them to fail closed, may result in maxi =um flow being directed through the coolers. This could result in an excessive cooldown rate of the reactor coolant system.

0 s

L -

Resoonse to Oeen Item No. 10 l

The DERS cooler bypass valves VD*4 and V045 shown in FSA1 Figure 9.3-9, are pneu=atic operated valves which fail close on Icss of air. To reduce the probabili:7 that a loss of motive power could in,as el:essive cooldeva ra:e of the RCS during operation of result the DERS, the pneu=at e cycra: ors vill be modified to incorporate a 4

" fail in position" feature. The ce: ails of this revision vill be reported in ths FSAR.

OPEN ITEM NO. 11 Feedvater Isolatics - The main feed systes contains two heade rs, one for each steam genera:or. Each header con:*i-t only one safe;y grade feedva:er isolation valve which receive redundan: 157AS signals. The applicant must

^-

show that the failure of this valve is cecsidered in thos~e' Chapter 15 events j

requiring feedvater isolation.

h Resecuse to Osen. Item No. 11 The Chaper 15 accident analyses have included cccsideration of the failure of one of the TRIV's to : lose on demac4. For those accide::s where feedvater 13clation is required (the =ost li=i:ing being a main-stea= line break), the feeeva:e control valves, which receive redundant buffered ESTAS closing signals, provide a suitable backup to the TRI?'s.

Additional pro:e::ics is provided by huffered ESTAS signals that trip the turbine-driven feedvater pu=ps.

Credi: say properly be taken for these nonseis=ic Category : 'ra:kup devices' since the consequences of accidents involving spon:aneous secondary piping failures are significan:ly lower than those involving pri=ary piping failures. This position is in accordan:e vi:5 the NIC policy se: forth in NIRIG-0138.

i O

.se CPDi ITD! FO.12 Chanter 15 Events - n t applicant will be required : provide a discussion for each Chapter 15 event describing all of the acti:ns required in the recovery mode following a transient. Our interest is in evaluating the operator's role in achieving and caintaining stable cenditions. An example of such a situation would be the necessitr of the cwrator to secure the EFI pumps af ter a steam line break to prevent repressurization of the reactor coolant system at low temperatures.

Response to Ooen Iten No. 12 PCE will provide a discussion for each Cham:er 15 event describing major actions required in the recove:y mode following a transient such that the operator's role in se 's

'.:g ar,i maintaining stable plant conditions can be evaluated. This infrr=ation will be provided in a fu'ture PSAZ amendnent prior te 1suance of the construction permit.

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PCI RESPCNSES TO NRC OPEN IIIMS

( 0 BE REST.VED AFTER CP)

OPEN ITEM NO. 1 Credit for Nossafety Grade Svste=s - The applicant aust show that no credit is assumed for consafety grade syste=s for the mitigation of any Chapter 15 event. For example, the turbine trip analysis in the PSAR assumes power runback by the ICS. Table 15.0-3 shows the " Equipment Assumed Functioning in

~

the Acciden: Analysis".

Resoonse to Open Ite: No. 1 Ceseral - The use of nonsafety grade equipment for anticipated transients is shown in Table 15.0-3 of the'PSAR to be limited to the use of the (1) turbine trip (via CIDCS) and/or (2) the turbine bypass sys:es. The anticipated transients (of moderate g

frequency) so identified in the table are (a) rod group with-drawal at startup a:d at power, (b) control rod misoperation, (c) CVC3 calfene:ics (boron dilution), (d) turbine trip, (e) loss of I

nor=41 feedvater (f) excessive heat removal, (g) inadvertent operation of the ECCS, (h) loss of four pu=ps, (i) brea't in pri=ary system penetra:ic lines, and (j) control room uninhabitability.

yor the above-lis:ed transit::s, except turbine trip, ' reactor trip is initia:ed prior to : ripping the turbine. The turbine trip transient is the only c:e in the category of a turbine trip prior to reac:or trip. Analyses of the tur' ne trip transient with and without turbine bypass or aut sar'ic runback of the reactor have been performed for the B-SAR-205 applicatio=

vhich demonstra:ed as accep:2ble secondary system pressure response (see See:ics 15.1.7.2.4 of B-SAR-205). This analysis is also applicable :o Pebble Springs.

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The transients where the reacter trip occurs prior to turbine trip and subsequen: use of the bypass system are discussed below.

Use of Turbine B Aass Svatem - For transients where a reactor trip is initiated prior to tripping the turbine, the heat der.and for approximately 2 seconds following turbine trip is the same ubether or not' the bypass system is assumed to-function. In addition, the heat demand use.d in the Pebble Springs analysis more closely approxi=a:ee the heat demand without turbine bypass than' the heat demand vi:h turbine bypass. In view of the above two facts, it is not surprising that ree'ent analyses performed with the heat de=and sisu,ldting no turbine bypass system action showed negligible differences to the analysis presented in Section 15 of the pebble Springs PSAR. This statement can be su=sarized as fol'ows:

l

" Turbine bypass used as part of its normal role but is not a required function. Adequate secoi.tary steam pressure relief capacity is available without bypass actics through the atmospheric dc=p and/cr safety valves with negligible effect on transient response.(except for turbine trip analysis-I where failure of the hvpass is discussed)."

r Use of Turbine Trie via CECS - The anticipated transients identified as ite= h, loss of four pu=ps and Item i, break in primary syste=

penetration lines, cause a reactor trip prior to turbine trip.

The conclusions reached in the discussion above, which show negligible difference in resul:s, re=ain. valid.

Further= ore, since these two transients are characteri:ed as under-cooling transients, assu=ing that a turbine : rip occurs is conser-vative since less heat vill be renoved fro: :he pri=ary system, t

l accentuating the undercooling. Item i, cottrol room uninhabitability, is dependent on the initiating event cud is Jerefore covered by the spectrum of postulated events identified in Table 15.0-3.

The other undercooling events ' identified above that assume turbine trip with bypass system action are (a) rod group vithdrawal at str.rtup and at power, (b) control rod misoperation, (c) C7CS malfunction, and (e) loss of normal feedvater. ' The assu=ption of turbine trip would be conservative for these undercooling transients. Item g, inadvertent operation of the ECCS transient, although not an undercooling tran-sient, is an overpressure event and again the assu=ption of turbine trip is. conservative since removing less primary beat results in higher primary pressura s.

The remaining transient, (f), excessive bez: removal, is an overcooling transient which causes a decrease in pri=ary system pressure. It is not as obvious for this transient what effect turbint trip has on the results. The safety limit of concern for overcooling transients is the

{g DNER and the necessity of not exceeding the li=it of 1.32 (BAW-2) for transients of moderate frequency. To desostrate that turbine trip does not have a significant effect on the D::II, an analysis with a 205-FA plant, 3672-MWt initial condition was co=gleted. The transient analyzed was a steam pressure regulator =alfunction. Two cases were one assu=ed turbine trip and the second assumed no turbine trip.

run:

The reactor power, pressure, and DNER are plotted over the time frame in which minimun DNTR occurs in Figure O!.239-1 of B-SAR-205. The results show that in consideration of M3N11 limits the effects of turbine trip versus no turbine trip are negligible for overcooling transients.

The above information vill be incorporated into Chapter 15 of the FSAR as appropriate.

0 1

i

G OPES 1 tim NO. 2 Boron Dilu: ion Evee:s - The applican:==s: provide additional analyses of the boron dilution even:s cesidering :ne plant conditions c:ner chan power opera:ionorrefuelingjasspecifiedi:S:andardReviewPlan15.4.6). In addition, :ney =us: siscuss all potential dilution sour:es.

}

I Resoonse.to Oeen *:en No. 2

{

t Dilu: ion va:er is supplied :o :he RCS by the M?S in both the, Pebble Springs and 3-SAR-205 designs. These syste=s have iden:i:a1 interlocks and alar =s :o prevet: i= proper operatica as described in See: ion 7.7 ci the Febble Spri:gs ?SAR and 3-SAR-205. Alar:s are provided to annuncia:e tha: dne interlock se: points have been reached.

4 The curren: Febble Springs M?S design does not in:orpora:e a =4keup i

i

ank bypass line as reflec:ed i :he 5-SAA-205 M?S design. However, I

the 3-SAR-205 analysis, which :ensiders plan: conditices o:her than power operatica or refueling, sh: eld bracke: ?ebble Springs sic:e

{

grea:er dilu: ion ra:es are ass==ed and the pocencial dilution sour:es are equivalent.

i n

PGE vill provide addi:ional analyses in the PSAR of boron dilu: ion even:s : onside:ing plant condi: ions other than power operarica or refueling (as spacified in S:annard Reviev Plan l!.A.6),

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,