ML19322A649
| ML19322A649 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1972 |
| From: | Moseley N, Murphy C, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322A643 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-72-02, 50-269-72-2, 50-270-72-01, 50-270-72-1, 50-287-72-01, 50-287-72-1, NUDOCS 7911210712 | |
| Download: ML19322A649 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1972002
Text
e
.
.
4 :e (
e
UNITED STATES
$
~E' [
,*
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
.
'
oiv SION OF COMPLIANCE
i .j
e'
.
'
REGION ll - Suit E 818
^
g
230 PE AC HT REE ST REET, NORT HWEST
$p
9
AT LANT A. GEORGI A 30303
4r
TESTING AND STARTUP INSPECTION REPORT
C0 Report Nos. 50-269/72-2, 50-270/72-1, and 50-287/72-1
Duke Power Company
Oconee 1, 2, and 3
Docket Nos. 50-269,270 and 287, License Nos. CPPR-33,34 and 35
Category: A3/B1, A2, A2
Type of Licensee: PWR 2452 Mw(e), B&W
Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced
Dates of Inspection: February 22-25, 1972
February 29, 1972
Dates of Previous Inspection: January 18-21, 1972 (Unit 1)
December 7-10, 1971 (Units 2 and 3)
Princiral Tec,ector:
~7
/
.3 7k
C. E. Mur'phyi Reactor Inspector (Testing
Dat(
and Startup Unit)
Accompanying Inspectors:
9-/ 9-78
R.' F. Warnick, Reactor Inspector
Date
(Testing and Startup)
Y-?w
F. Jape, React M Inspector
Date
~
(Testing and Startup)
V
l9 7%
s
N. C. Moseley, Senior 3dactor Inspector
Date'
(Testing and Startup)
Other Accompanying Personnel: None
j
Reviewed By;
I//9//2
N.C.Moselef,Seniorkeactor[nspector
Date
(Testing and Startup Unit)
Proprietary Information: None
Nen 22 o Jt7
.-.
.. -
- - - .
.
.--
-
. . - .
.
.
O
.
/]'
C0 Report Nos. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-1
-2-
SECTION I
Enforcement Action
A.
Noncompliance Items
1.
Contrary to the requirements of Criterion XII of Appendix B
to 10 CFR 50, Section 2621 of ACI-318-63, and Section 5B.2.8.2
of the FSAR gauges used in determining jacking pressures had not
been calibrated.
Calibration of these gauges after completion
of stressing operations indicated that the calibration was not
maintained within specified limits.
(See Section II, Paragraph 4)
2.
Contrary to the requirements of Criterion VI of Appendix B
to 10 CFR 50, stressing of the tendons was performed using
a procedure that had been revised but had not been approved.
,
(See Section II, Paragraph 4)
3.
Contrary to the requirements of Criterion XI of Appendix B
to 10 CFR 50, and the licensee's Stressing Procedure N4, daily
calibration checks were not made of pressure gauges used in
tensioning.
(See Section II, Paragraph 4)
4.
Contrary to the requirements of Criterion XVI of Appendix B
to 10 CFR 50 and to Section 2621 of ACI 318-63 and to Section
5B.2.8.2 of the FSAR the cause of discrepancies between measured
and calculated values of elongation exceeding 5% were not corrected.
(See Section II, Faragraph 4)
5.
Contrary to the requirements of Section 5.4.1.2, of the FSAR
and Section 2606 (a) 1, of ACI-318-63, tendons may have been
stressed in excess of 0.8 f's during stressing operations and were
stressed to values exceeding 0.7 f's for post-tensioning tendons
immediately after anchoring.
(See Section II, Paragraph 4)
6.
Contrary to the requirements of Criterion II of Appendix B to
10 CFR 50, ~1nagement- did not regularly review the status and
adequacy or that ps:.c of the quality assurance program associated
with the tendon it.sta11ation.
B.
Nonconformance Items
None
C.
Safety Items
None
s-
!
,
,
.__
.
. _ . .
.
.
.
.
.
'
~
-3-
CO Report No. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-l
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters
1.
The licensce's response to the Compliance letter discussing the
inspection conducted-on September 7-10, 1971, was unacceptable.1/
The deficiencies were discussed with Lee and Thies during this
inspection. A supplemental letter will be sent by DPC in an effort
to resolve the deficiencies.
2.
Corrective action has not been completed on items identified in
CO Report Nos. 50-269/71-9, 71-10, 71-11 and 72-1.
Unresolved Items
Correction of hot functional functional tast procedures.
(See Section
III, Paragraph 4)
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items
1.
Failure to document corrective action.1/ Action not completed.
2.
Flowmeter error analyses and tests.2/ Action not completed.
3.
Verification of loop backflow analysis.2/ Action not completed.
4.
Effect of rerouting cable on preoperational testing.3/ Action
not completed.
5.
Valve wall measurements.$/ Action not completed.
(See Section II,
Paragraph 6)
Unusual Occurrences
Shrink cracks in stems of instrumentation and drain valves.2/ (gee
Section II, Paragraph 5)
1/ CO Report No. 50-269/71-9
2/ Co Report No. 50-269/71-10
3/ Co Report No. 50-269/71-11
4/ C0 Report No. 50-269/71-7
l
m.
!
l
I
=
_ __
.
,-
CO Report No. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-1
-4-
Persons Contacted
W. S. Lee - Senior Vice President, Engineering and Construction
A. C. Thies - Senior Vice President, Production and Transmission
R. L. Dick - Vice Presidnet, Construction
J. R. Wells - Quality Assurance Engineer, DPC
J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent
J. W. Hampton - Assistant Superintendent
L. E. Summerlin - Staff Engineer
K. S. Canady - Nuclear Engineer, DPC Steam Production Department
M. D. McIntosh - Operating Engineer
R. M. Koehler - Technical Support Engineer
E. D. Brown - Maintenance Supervisor
j
D. G. Beam - Project Manager
D. L. Freeze - Principal Field Engineer
l
W. J. Watson - Assistant Field Engineer, Civil
S. B. Hager - Senior Design Engineer, Civil
i
Management Interview
A management interview was held on February 25, 1972, and was attended
by Hampton, Canady, Beam, Freeze, Ansell, Brown, Koehler, McIntosh,
and Summerlin.
A second 2anagement interview was held on February 29, 1972, with
Thies ana Lee.
The following items were discussed during the February 25 meeting:
'
1.
Reactor building tendon installation and tensioning, Unit 2 -
Murphy advised Beam and Freeze that in his review of ;he records
and in discussions with QC and engineering personnel, he had found
numerous deficiencies in the tensioning of the tendons.
He further
stated that in his telecon discussion with Hager, he had been advised
that DPC would issue a report, similar to that issued for Unit 1,
'
that would discuss the effects of all installation deficiencies
on the integrity of the building.
The inspector also-stated that
it was his understanding that stressing procedure N4 would be revised
for Unit 3 to require documentation of the daily pressure gauge
checks.
Beam advised the inspector that these understanding were
correct.
(See Section II, Paragraph 4)
2.
Preoperational Test Guide - The principal inspector stated that it was his
understanding that the " Guide for Conducting the Oconee Preoperational
Test Program" would be revised to reflect Compliance comments.
Hampton agreed that this understanding was correct.
(See Section
II, Paragraph 9)
~
.
._
_
_.
. _ _ _ .
__
)
}
,
4
7)
C0 report no. 50-269/72-270,287/72-1
-5-
-
/
,
3.
Compliance comments on test procedures - The principal inspector advised
Hampton that because tests were being conducted almost as soon as
the approved test procedures were being issued, Compliance would in
many cases give comments by telephone.
In turn, Compliance would
want some type of confirmation of the disposition of the comments.
Hampton stated that this would be done either by. sending a note confirming
'
the comments or by sending a revised copy of the procedure.
4.
The inspector discussed weaknesses noted in a review of preoperational
'
test procedures.
The comments had previously been discussed and
resolved in an earlier discussion with Hampton, McIntosh, and Koehler
but were repeated here for the record.
(See Section IV, Paragraph 1 and 8)
5.
In response to Murphy's questions, Hampton stated that DPC would
incorporate the Compliance comments on the following procedures:
TP 600/4
TP 600/26
TP 600/5
TP 600/22
TP 600/25
(See Section III, Paragraph 4)
Murphy advised Canady that because of the difficulties experienced
. . .
with the main coolant pump vibration and with flow measurement
fluctuations, Compliance would want to review the evaluations made
by DPC of the performance of the reactor coolant pumps.
Compliance
will be interested in one, two and three-pump operation as well
as the four-pump operation.
Canady agreed that the evaluations
would be made available.
(See Section II, Paragraph 5)
7.
Murphy and Moseley met with Lee and Thies on February 29, 1971,
to discuss the changes made by DPC as a result of the November.3,
1
1971, meeting / to improve the implementation of the QA program.
These changes included:
a.
The addition of two additonal construction QC inspectors,
b.
Wells had been transferred to Charlotte and devotes almost full
time to quality assurance.
An engineer reporting directly to W. H. Owen, Vice President,
c.
Engineering, has been given full-time responsibility for the
DPC quality assurance manual.
l
.
If C0 Report No. 50-269/71-9
l
,_,
L
--
-
,
,
CO Report No. 50-2 69/72-2,270,287/72-1
-6-
g
J
d.
On each site visit, Lee audits at least one QA activity.
e.
Most sections of the DPC QA manual are being backfitted to
Oconee.
f.
The Oconee welding procedures have been rewritten and requalified.
Southwest Research Institute was retained to review the procedures
and procedure qualifications.
An outside consultant, Helmut Theilsch,
has been retained to determine the effects of the welding deficiencies
on the integrity of the piping and structural systems.
g.
Thies has held meetings with operating supervisors to get across
to them management's concerns for the test program.
,
h.
Smith has held two working sessions with operating personnel
i
to discuss the conduct of tests, test preparation and audits.
He has used specific problems to 11?ustrate what can go wrong.
1.
A complete review has been made of approved tests.
The Site
Review Committee (SRC) is reviewing all new procedures and revisions.
j. A new test guide has been published.
k.
A new procedure for handling drawings has been implemented.
1.
A steam production department engineer has been assigned to the
plant to assist the operating group in planning and scheduling.
m.
A program for retesting to assure correction of deficiencies
is being instituted.
4
' .'
,
4
'
_ _ - .
'.
.
CO Report No. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-1
~7-
,~s
.
SECTION II
Prepared by:
C. E. Murphy, Reactor
Inspector
' ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS INSPECTED, NOT IDENTIFIED IN SECTION I, WHERE NO
DEFICIENCIES OR UNRESOLVED ITEMS WERE FOUND
1.
General
Unit 1
The four reactor coolant pumps have been returned from the manufacturer
and reinstalled. Hot functional testing is in progress.
DPC now
expects to load fuel in May 1972.
Unit 2
Installation of the reactor coolant boundary piping is complete,
and all reactor coolant pump motors have been installed. DPC
now expects to load fuel in December 1972.
Unit 3
Installation of the reactor building liner plate is complete.
Installation and fitup of the reactor coolant piping is in progress.
DPC expects to load fuel in December 1973.
2.
Unit 2
The inspector reviewed the records related to the installation of
the reactor coolant boundary piping and made a visual inspection of
a portion of the completed installation. No deficiencies were
observed.
3.
Unit 3
The inspector reviewed records related to the installation of the
reactor building liner plate and made a visual inspection of portions
of the completed installation.
No deficiencies were observed.
DETAILS OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN SECTION I
4.
Reactor Building Tendon Installation and Tensioning - Unit 2
The inspector reviewed the quality assurance records relating to
,
l
the installation of the reactor building tendons.
These included
!
l
l
r - -
..
.
gs
CO Report No. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-1
-8-
the tendon pulling. cards, tendon.buttonheading cards, tendon stressing
cards, pressure gauge calibration test records and the stressing
procedure, N4.
The inspector also discussed'the installation with
the Quality Control Engineer, Watson.
No deficiencies were noted
in the tendon pulling and buttonheading records.
The review of the other records and the discussions with Watson,
however, revealed the following deficiencies in the stressing operations:
a.
The FSAR, Section 5.B.2.8.2, states, in part, "The gauge.(for
measuring jacking forces) indicates the preosure within the jack
within plus or minus two percent.
Force-jack pressure gauge
or dynamometer combinations are calibrated against precise
standards before application of prestressing force."
"The presence of two gauges, one gauge on the pump and one
gauge on the jack, provides a means to maintain a constant
check on the calibration of the gauges. . . . During stressing,
records are made of elongations as well as pressures obtained.
Jack-dynamometer or gauge combinations are checked against
elongations of the tendons and the cause of any discrepancy
exceeding plus or minus 5 percent of that corrected, and if
caused by differences in load elongations from averages, it is
so documented. Calibration of the' jack-dynamometer or pressure
gauge combinations are maintained accurate within the above
limits and, if requested by Duke Power, recalibrated or newly
calibrated combinations substituted during and at the end of the
tensioning operations."
Section 5.1.2 of the FSAR states, in part, "The structure is designed
and constructed in accordance with design criteria based upon
ACS 318-63."
The calibration test data for the pressure gauges used in
the stressing operations are summarized in the following table:
Initial
As Left
Final Test'
As Found
No.
Test Date
Error *
Date
Error *
G223
1/17/72
-200 psi
G224
7/10/71
0
1/18/72
0
G225
7/12/71
0
1/18/72
0
G227
7/10/71
0
-
G228
7/10/71
0
1/18/72
-500
G230
1/17/72
+300
-
G231
--
1/18/72
0
G236
7/26/71
50
-=
G238
1/18/72
0
G239
7/26/71
0
1/18/72
-200
G240
7/10/71
0
1/17/72
0
G242
7/26/71
0
--==
i
.-
--
.
.
S
7~
CO Report No. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-1
-9-
- Error at 7500 psig. Allowed error is +150 psig
Contrary to the requirements of the FSAR,. Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, and to ACI 318-63, the above data indicates that seven of
the gauges did not receive either the inital test or the final
calibration test.
Also contrary to the requirements of the
FSAR, four the the gauges did not meet the calibration requirements
at the conclusion of the stressing operations. The stressing
procedure, N4, requires in Section C that the readings of the
two pressure gauges. associated with each jack be compared
once each morning and once each afternoon and that the readings
should coincide within 100 psi.
There was no documantation,
however, to confirm that these checks had been made.
Also,
no records were maintained as to which gauges were used with
each jack.
The final calibration checks would indicate, however,
that the required daily checks had not been made.
Watson could
not verify with any certainty that the stressing crews had made
the checks.
b.
Section 5.4.1.2 of the FSAR states, in part, "The procedure
required the measured temporary jacking force, for a single
tendon to approach, but not exceed, 850 kips (0.8f's).
Thus
the limits set by ACI-318-63 2606 (a) 1, and of the prestressing
system supplier were observed." The requirements of ACI 318-63
2606 (a) 2 states that fs (tendon stress) should not exceed 0.7
f's for posttensioning tendons i= mediately after anchoring."
Contrary to these requirements, calculations by the inspector
using the maximum pressure, which could have been applied for
gauges that were not within the required calibration, indicate
that the jacking. force could have exceeded 0.80 f's and the fs
could have exceeded 0.7f's after anchoring.
In. response to the
inspector's questions, Watson stated that no records were main-
tained of the jack-pressure gauge combinations and, therefore, he
could not correlate the tendon elongation deviations with pressure
i
gauge calibrations.
The results of the stressing operations are summarized in the
table below.
One hundred fifty-three, or 16% of the tendons
had elongations which deviated from the calculated elongations
by more than the five percent required by the FSAR, Section
5.B.2.8.2 and by ACI 318-63-2621 (a) .
This discrepancy was not
documented in the Engineering Quality Assurance Problem list.
l
_
-,
.
'
.
CO Report No. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-1
-10-
, . ~ ,
)
Deviations.from Calibrated Values (%)
No. of Tendons
4
Negative Devistions greater than 5%
-9.52 to -8.00
13
.
-7.99 to -7.00
7
-6.99 to -6.00
9
-5.99 to -5.01
13
Subtotal of - deviations
42
Positive Deviation greater than 5%
5.01 to 5.99
38
6.00 to 6.99
37
7.00 to 7.99
9
8.00 to 8.99
6
9.00 to 9.99
3
10.00 to 14.99
13
15.00 to 19.99
3
22.05
_1_
Subtotal of + deviations
110
Unknown Deviations-
1
Deviations between +5% and -5%
817
c.
In discussing the deviations with Watson, the inspector was
advised by Watson that he did not consider the number of deviations
significant since only 17 tendons.were involved.
When the
inspector questioned Watson about the basis for this aumber,
Watson stated that only the deviations exceeding 10% of
calculated were considered significant.
Watson showed the
inspector a copy of procedure N4 that gave this figure as the
acceptable limit. When the inspector examined the procedure,
he found that it was an unapproved revision.
Watson ca7.2ed
Hager by telephone for clarification and was told that th-
,
10% value was incorrect.
In discussions with Freeze and Beam,
the inspector determined that they were unaware of the number
of deficiencies involved in the tendon tensioning or that
unapproved. procedure had been used. The inspector advised them
that the use of an unapproved procedure appeared to be contrary
to the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
i
o
.
r
.
.
'
.
i
g-)
C0 Report No. 50-269/72-2,270l287/72-1
-11-
The inspector discussed the deficiencies observed in the tendon
tensioning program.in the exit interview and advised Beam that
the matter would be discussed in.the Compliance. letter to
DFC discussing the results of the inspection.
The inspector
also discussed.the deficiencies by telecon-with.Hager.. . Eager
advised the inspector that DPC planned to issue.a report similar
to that issued for Unit 1, discussing the effects of the
deficiencies _upon containment integrity.
5.
Reactor Coolant Pumps
Smith advised the inspector that the problem of excessive vibration
of the main coolant pumps appeared to be resolved.
In response
to the inspector's questions, he stated that vibrations were greater
when only one pump was in operation.
The addition of each pump
brought about a reduction in vibration of the operating pumps.
He
also stated that apparent fluctuations in coolant flow could be
due to measurement difficulties rather than actual flow fluctuations.
He stated that the fluctuations were greater with single pump
operation than with multiple pumps.
He stated that evaluations
of both problems were continuing and that DPC would advise the
inspector of the results of these evaluations.
6.
Valve Walls
l
Lee and Thies advised the inspectors that the walls of 51 valves
had been examined.
This included all the Crane-Chapman valves larger
than one inch in the Unit 1 reactor coolant and emergency core
cooling systems. All valves met the thickness. requirements specified
in the tables in B16.5.
Seventy-five valves fabricated by other
manufacturers have not been measured. Lee stated.that he planned
no further action without direction from Compliance. Moseley advised
Lee that the information relating to the wall measurements would be
sent to headquarters with a request for clarification as to what
would be required.
7.
Pipe and Fitting Traceability
Lee advised Nbseley and Murphy that 16 sections of pipe and pipe
fittings have been identified in the Unit 1 reactor coolant system
boundary and the makeup systems that do not have complete traceability.
The failure of these components would cause a loss of coolant in
excess of the makeup capability. Moseley told Lee that Compliance
would review the information presented and advise Lee of Compliance's
position on traceability requirements.
'
l
~
1
i
l
I
,
_
.
.
.
i
CO Report No. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-1
-12-
[_,)
.
l
8.
Valve Stem Failure
Smith advised Murphy that the testing program had revealed cracking
in the valve stems of. instrumentation and drain valves supplied by
the Velan Company. All the stems of the affected valves (approximately
3000 valves for the 3 units) will be replaced.1/
9.
Review of Test Guide
The principal inspector discussed his review of the " Guide for
Conducting the Oconee Preoperational Test Program" with Smith.
Smith agreed that, because of the deficiencie that had been observed
in implementation of the licensee's test program, the guide would
be revised to require that the test coordinator reference FSAR re-
quirements in the acceptance criteria of the appropriate test
procedures.
The section heads also would be required to verify
that the FSAR requirements had been met when they reviewed the
test results.
1/
Inquiry Reports. 50-269/72-1, 270/72-1, 287/72-1
.
d
.
.
.
/ 'N,
CO Report No. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-1
-13-
- . _ _ .
1
SECTION III
Prepared By:
R. F. Warnick, Reactor
Inspector
ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS INSPECTED, NOT IDENTTFIED IN SECTION I, WHERE NO
DEFICIENCIES OR UNRESOLVED ITEMS WERE FOUND
1.
General
,
Summerlin prepared a summary of the preoperational and startup test
programs.
The status as of February 22, 1972, is as follows:
Total
Approved
Tests
Results Approved
Number
Procedures
Completed
Tests Signed Off
Tests Before Hct
Functionals
380
380 (100%)
380 (100%)
380 (100%)
Tests During Hot
,Functionals
173
159 (92%)
61
(35%)
48 (28%)
Tests Prior To
Core Loading
131
88 (67%)
58
(44%)
44 (34%)
^
Total Precperational
Tests
684
627 (92%)
499 (73%)
472 (69%)
2.
Preoperational Test. Program - Procedure Review
TP-1B-600-1, Revision 2, Controlling Procedure For Hot Functional
Testing.
TP-1B-600-8, Revision 2, Component Cooling System Operational Test.
1
TP-1A-600-15, Revision 2, Control Rod Drive System Operational Test.
TP-1B-600-21, Revision 4, Reactor Coolant System Hydrogen Addition
Test.
3.
Preoperational Test Program - Evaluation of Test Results
IP-1A-150-2, Revision 5, Reactor Building Structural Integrity
Test.
TP-1A-160-2, Revision 1, Reactor Building Coolers Functional
Test.
i
..J
.-
. _ _
_
. _ _ _ _ _
.
.
(
C0 Report No. 50-269/72-2,2707287/72-1
-14-
,
TP-1A-200-ll, Reactor Coolant Flow Instrument Calibration.
TP-1B-200-17, Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Level
'
Verification Test.
TP-1A-200-27, Reactor Level Instrumentation and Calibration
TP-1A-330-313, Control Rod Drive System DC Breaker Trip Test.
DETAILS OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN SECTION I
4.
Comments on Preoperational Test Procedures
The inspector reviewed nine hot functional test procedures, which
are part of the preoperational test program, and discussed comments
on five of them with Hampton, McIntosh, and Koehler.
The procedures,
the inspector's comments, and DPC's responses are as follows:
TP-1B-600-4, Revision 2, Chemical Addition and Sampling System
a.
Operational Test.
One of the test criteria states, " Boron concentration A ppm < 500 ppm."
The inspector questioned what was intended to be proved by tEis
part of the test. He told Hampton.that it would be necessary
to control boron concentration to much lower tolerances.
Hampton agreed to clarify procedural steps in Section 12.0, correct
mistakes in the acceptance criteria, and clarify the acceptance
criteria limits for changes in boron concentration.
b.
TP-1B-600-5, Revision 3, Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Test.
Some of the acceptance criteria are not sufficiently definitive.
The test method does not agree with the test procedure.
Some
of the procedural steps refer to acceptance criteria that have
not been specified.
Hampton agreed to revise this procedure and to rewrite the
acceptance criteria in language that a reactor operator can
understand and easily follow.
c.
TP-1B-600,22, -Revision 3, Degassification Test
This procedure does not specify whether or not the pressurizer
will be degassed.
Hampton indicated this would be clarified.
'
-
k
-
.
.
.
. ,
(]
CO Report No. 50-269/72-2,270,287/72-1
-15-
i
d.
TP-1C-600-25, OTSG Shell Surface Temperature Test
,
There are no acceptance criteria in the test procedure.
Koehler and McIntosh indicated B&W would evaluate the test
results.
In addition, they stated the test would not be run
on Unit 2.
They felt acceptance criteria were not needed.
The inspector indicated that any test important enough to be
included in the hot functional tests required acceptance criteria
to be complete.
e.
TP-1A-600-26, 1500 PSIG High Pressure Injection Engineered
Safeguard Test
"The inspector found this test deficient in that not all of the
engineered safeguards functions in high pressure injection system
are being tested.
4
Hampton indicated that he ' thought all high pressure injection
engineered safeguards functions were being tested. Warnick
enumerated the deficient items. Not all have been satisfactorily
resolved.
_
.
.
L
_
_
.
.
.
.
CO Report No. 50-26 9/72-2,270,287/R2-L
-16-
,3
i
SECTION IV
Prepared By:
F. Jape, Reactor Inspector
ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS INSPECTED, NOT IDENTIFIED IN SECTION I, WHERE NO
DEFICIENCIES OR UNRESOLVED ITEMS WERE FOUND
1.
Preoperational Testing
Preoperational test procedures were reviewed to evaluate the adequacy
of the program. The following seven tests were reviewed and either
minor comment or no comment was noted:
1.
TP-1A-600-10, RCS Hot Leakage. Test.
2.
TP-1A-600-11, Emergency Feed System and Steaa Generator Control Test
3.
TP-1B-600-12, Pressurizer Operational Test
4.
TP-1B-600-13, RCS Instrument Hot Operation Functional Test
5.
TP-1A-600-23, Emergency Operation of Nuclear Steam Supply System
6.
TP-lC-600-24, First-of-a-Kind Test Reactor Vessel and OTSG Support
Flange Temperatures, Oconee Unit 1
7.
TP-1B-270-33, Main Steam Relief Valve Test
i
2.
Evaluation of Test Results
'
The results of ten preoperational tests were reviewed. Minor comments
,
(i
were noted on four of these. The comments were discussed r?*h Duke
personnel and'all were resolved satisfactorily.
The ter,ta that sorn
reviewed are:
1.
TP-1A-150-4, RB Hatch Leak Testa
2.
TP-1A-150-3, RB Integrated Leak Eate Test
3.
TP-1B-230-7D, Gaseous Waste. Disposal System Functional Test
4.
TP-1A-620-9, Keowee Functional Tests of Auto-Emergancy Startup
of Keowee from Oconee
5.
TP-1B-340-8, Control Rod Drive System Dilute Contral Adjustment
6.
TP-1B-250-5, HPSW System Functional and Operational Test
7.
IP-1B-202-2A, HPI Letdown Line Hydro (Red Section}
8.
TP-1B-202-2C, HP Letdown Line Hydro
9.
TP-1B-202-2, HP System Hydro Test (Fuel Return - C range, Red,
Green,, Blue, and Yellow Sections)
10.
IP-1B-200-6, Pressurizer Heater and Controls Elect:rical Test
DETAILS OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN SECTION I
None
4
4
.N-
, _ .