ML19321A826
| ML19321A826 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1980 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Peoples D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007240250 | |
| Download: ML19321A826 (9) | |
Text
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',k UNITED STATES E v.(
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
5 Q nI wA:HINGTON D. C. 20555 c%,[. /.
July 9, 1980 Docket No. 50-10 Mr. D. Lewis Peoples Director of Nuclear Licensing Comonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690
Dear Mr. Peoples:
RE: FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW FOR DRESDEN NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO.1 We have reviewed your submittals in regard to fire protection modifications at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1 as indicated in Enclosure 1 to this letter.
The status of our evaluation is also indicated in the same enclosure. is our Evaluation of Der ign Details and includes requirements resulting from our consultant's review.
Enclosure 3 provides our review of items 3.2.3 " Fire Water System Feeds" and 3.2.4 " Exposed Structural Steel." Both of these items need additional attention and therefore none of the 3.2 items are complete to date.
Enclosures 4 and 5, include the results of our consultants review on item 3.1.3 " Fire Water Pump" and design review items 3.1.1 " Fire Detec-tion Systems" and 3.1.5 " Water Suppression Systems."
Please respond to the items in Enclosures 2 and 3 within 30 days of receipt of this letter.
Si erely. nu Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chi f Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See page 2 6007240260 F
Mr. D. Louis Peoples July 9, 1980 cc w/ enclosures:
Isham, Lincoln & Beale Director, Technical Assessment Counselors at Law Division One First National Plaza, 42nd Floor Office of Radiation Programs Chicago, Illinois 60603 (AW-459)
U. S. Environmsntal Protection Mr. B. B. Stephenson Agency Plant Superintendent Crystal Mall #2 Dresden Nuclear Power Station Arlington, Virginia 20460 Rural Route il Morris, Illinois 60450 U. S. Environmental Pr,tection Agency U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Federal Activities Branch Resident inspectors Office Region Y Office Dresden $tation ATTN:
EIS COORDINATOR RR #1 230 South Dearborn Street Morris, Illinois 60450 Chicago, Illinois 60604 Susan N. Sekuler Assistant Attorney General Envi ronmental Control Division 188 W. Randolph Strect Suite 2315 Chicago, Illinois 60601 Morris Public Library 604 Liberty Street Morris, Illinois 60451 Chai rman Board of Supervisors of Grundy County Grundy County Courthouse Morris, Illinois 60450 Department of Public Health ATTN: Chief, Division of Nuclear Safety 535 West Jefferson Springfield, Illinois 62761
ENCLOSURE 1 RESOLUTION OF INCOMPLETE ITEMS - STATUS DRESDEN 1 Licensee Staff Evaluation Response Due 3.1.1 Fire Detection Systems (1)
In the control room Requirement (2)
In the sphere penetration Complete 3.1. 3 Fire Water Pump Requirement and Drawings 3.1.5 Water Suppression Systems (a) Sphere Cable Penetr.
q Area Compiete (b) North Auxiliary Bay Ongoing (c) Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit Comp;ete (d)
Cable Passageway Complete (e) Trackway Complete (f) Screen House Complete (g)
Core Spray and Post Incident Area Complete (h) New Fuel Receiving Area Compl?is (1)
Clean and Dirty 011 Rooms Complete 3.2.1 Detection Systems Tests Information 1/80 3.2.2 Technical Specifications for Existing Fire Protection Systems and Hose Stations Information 3/81 3.2.3 Fire Water System Feeds Information 8/80 3.2.4 Exposed Structural Steel Requirement 3.2.5 Emergency Condenser Valves SEP 3.2.6 Emergency Condenser Makeup SEP 3.2.7 Emergency Condenser Level Indication SEP
ENCLOSURE 2 DRESCEN UNIT 1 FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW -
SUMMARY
OF REOUIREMENTS BASED ON EVALUATION OF DESIGN OETAILS The following provides a summary of requirements based on our consul-tant's evaluation of the design details submitted by the licensee for proposed modifications. Our consultant's evaluation is contained in Enclosures 4 and 5.
Numbers in parenthesis following each heading refer to the sections in our previously issued SER which address these design details.
Fire Detection Systems (3.1.1)
Our SER noted that the licensee would submit design detail; on the detection systems for the Control Room and the Sphere Penetration Area.
On December 4,1979, the licensee submitted the design details for fire detection systems in the Control Room and Sphere Penetration Area. We have reviewed the detection system drawings and the results of our review are as follows.
Control Room We will require tha't smoke detectors be provided in the control room consoles.
Sphere Penetration Area We find that the detection system for the sphere penetration area provides the protection intended in our SER and is therefore acceptable.
Fire Water Pump (3.1.3)
Our SER noted that a 2500 gpm diesel driven fire water pump would be provided to replace the existing fire pump, and would be installed in conformance with NFPA-20.
Further, that the screen wash pumps would be isolated from the fire water system by motor operated valves.
By letter dated December 4,1979, the licensee provided drawings c, the fire pump installation showing the discharge piping. We have reviewed the drawings and our evaluation results are as follows:
We will require that the eight (8) inch discharge pipe for the 2500 gpm pump be replaced with a ten (10) inch pipe to conform to NFPA #20, or that calculations be provided to demonstrate that this pump can meet the pressure requirements for the maximum water demand with the added losses due to the eight (8) inch pipe.
l
We will require that a 2-inch bypass be installed around the normally closed motor operated valves that control the flow of water from the Unit 2 and 3 screen wash pumps and the fire water system.
(The licensee has agreed to this position in a telecon; however, this commitment has not been documented.)
Water Suppression (3.1.5)
Our SER noted that the following items would be reviewed for design adequacy:
1.
Sphere Cable Penetration Area Deluge System.
2.
Sprinkler System - North Auxiliary Bay.
3.
Water Deluge System - Hydrogen Seal Oil Area.
4.
Water Spray Preaction System - Cable Passageway.
5.
Sprinkler Protection - Unit 1 Trackway, Laundry Storage and Welding Shop.
6.
Diesel Fire Pump - Automatic Water Suppression System.
7.
Core Spray and Post Ir.cident Pump Areas - Automatic Water Suppression.
8.
New Fuel Receiving Area - Water Sprinkler System.
9.
Clean and Dirty 011 Storage Room - Extra Hazard Sprinkler Systam.
The licensee by letter dated December 4, 1979, forwarded design drawings for the asteriske,d items under 3.1.5, Water Suppression Systems, in the issued SER.
We have reviewed the licensee's submittal and have the following require-ments and comments:
1.
Automatic Preaction System - sphere cable penetration area.
a.
We will require the feed to the preaction system for the cable penetration area to be an independent feed from the feed that supplies the system protecting the tunnel.
b.
The proposed design for the preaction sprinkler system in the cable penetration area includes two motor operated valves on the feed to the preaction system.
A fire in the penetration area could cause a signal for containment isolation resulting in closure of these valves and loss of suppression water. We will require one of the following:
(i) rerouting of any cables which could cause a containment isolation due to a fire in the cable penetration area; or (1.1) barriers or enclosures to adequately isolatt those cables which could cause a containment isolation signal from the rest of the combustibles in the penetration area; or
(iii) provide a check valve in the preaction system line inside containment in lieu of the motor operated valve, and provide a handwheel on the motor operated valve outside containment.
(c) We will require that low air supervision be provided on the closed head spray piping with annunciation in the control room.
(d) We will require that the automatic spray heads be located at the centerline of each of the trays in the penetration area and that the protection to be provided will be extended from the containment wall to the point where the caole trays divide.
(We were unable to confirm this from Drawing #26-1734 sheet 1.)
(e) We will require that deluge valve for the containment penetration system be located outside the containment boundary.
2.
Automatic Sprinkler Protection - north auxiliary bay - drawings not received. To satisfy the requirements of our previous SER, we will require:
(a) a water suppression system for both cable tray and area exposure protection; (b) the sprinkler or spray heads protecting the cable trays should be located between and on the center-line of the trays; (c) the density design shall meet the requirements of NFPA-15; (d) if the licensee chooses to install a preaction syst2m, we will require detection to be between the cable trays and at the ceiling.
Low air supervision should be provided on the closed head piping system with alarm and annunciation in the control room; and (e) the water feed for the water suppression system shall be independent of the hose station feeds in the area.
3.
Automatic Deluge System - hydrogen seal oil unit.
(a) We will require that the density for the protection of the tank be 0.25 gallons per minute per square foot over the entire surface area of the tank.
(NFPA-15 paragraph 4.4.3.2b.)
(b) We will require that a remote actuation station for the deluge. system be locaten outside the entrance to the room.
4.
Automatic Preaction Systems - cable passageway.
(a) We will require that the spray heads be located at the center line of each of the trays being protected.
(b) We will require that low air supervision be provided on the closed head spray piping with annunciation in the control room.
5.
Automatic Sprinklers - unit 1 trackway.
Design found acceptable.
6.
Automatic Sprinklers - screen house - diesel fire pump. Design found acceptable.
7.
Automatic Sprinklers - core spray - post incident pump area.
Design found acceptable.
8.
Automatic Sprinklers - new fuel receiving area. Design found acceptable.
9.
Extra Hazard Automatic Sprinklers - clean and dirty oil room.
We will require the density requirements to be 0.28 gallons per minute per square foot over the entire room to meet the density requi rements of NFPA 13 paragraph A2-2.1.2.6.
Subject to the satisfactory implementation of the above requirements, we find that Water Suppression Systems provide the protection intended in our SER and are, therefore, acceptable.
ENCLOSURE 3 RESOLUTION OF INCOMPLETE ITEMS EVALUATION The following provides our evaluation of the incomplete items.
The number in parenthesis following the heading refers to the section of our previously issued SER which addressed this incomplete item.
Fire Water System Feeds (3.2.3)
Our SER noted that we had requested the licensee to separate the feeds for hose stations from the feeds for fixed suppression systems in the post incident-core spray area, Unit 1 cable passageway, the north auxiliary bay, and primary and secondary feed pump areas.
The licensee indicated he would evaluate this concern.
By letter dated August 2, 1979, the licensee stated that:
The post incident / core spray area may be reached by hose station F-40 and is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system.
This sprinkler system is separated from the hose station by an isolation valve on the header.
The cable passageway is covered by hose station F-29.
It is also covered by a preaction water suppression system.
Isolation valves are provided to isolate the hose station from the preaction water suppression system.
A hose station is being added at each of the two tie-in points for this preaction water suppression system.
By telecon on March 11, 1980, the licensee agreed to provide sufficient hose at each hose station to reach the mid point of the passageway.
Pending receipt of written confirmation of this agreement we find the hose station feeds are acceptable.
The primary and secondary feed pump areas are protected by a local automatic flooding gaseous carbon dioxide system and also by two hose stations which provide water coverage for this area.
The hose station ties to the header are provided with isolation valving between the two stations.
Since there is no fixed water suppression provided for the primary and secondary feed pump area there exists no need to provide isolation between the fixed suppression (in this case the C02 system is a separate system) and the hose stations. We find that tne feeds for the hose stations for this area are also acceptable.
l
By letter dated August 2, 1979, the licensee indicated that the north auxiliary bay could be. reached by two hose stations (F-21 and F-22) and that both stations and the fixed suppression are separated on the header by isolation valves.
However, drawings for the new fired water suppression _ system for the north auxilir y bay were not submitted for review and we therefore, could not verify that the feed for this new system was separated from the hose station for the area. We have previously stated a requirement to resolve this concern (item 3.1.5-2(f) from Enclosure 2).
Subject to resolution of item 3.1.5 as described in Enclosure 2, we find that adequate fire water system. feeds are provided to satisfy staff guidelines, and accordingly are acceptable.
Exposed Struc' ural Steel (3.2.4)
Our SER noted that we had requested that the exposed structural steel above the large concentration of cables in the north auxil'ary bay be provided with flame retardant coatings.
By letter dated August 2,1979, the licensee provided information on i
f the north auxiliary bay stating the combustible content, indicating that the diesel fuel and lubricants were being removed, and concluding that since the fuel loading was low and sprinklers were to be provided, no structural protection was necessary.
l We find that transient combustibles will be removed-from the area to minimize the amount of combustibles in the area; however, there continues to exist a need for changeout of the lube oil fer the reactor feedwater
~
i pumps.
This could mean that the area sees as much as 120 gallons of oil during the changeout process.
The reactor feed pump area is not separated from the north auxiliary bay (wire glass double doors which are normally open separate the two areas) by fire rated _ barriers.
Our evaluation indicates that since the reactor feed pump area is not separated from the (cable spreading) North Auxiliary Bay, and since we have not accepted administrative controls to assure safe shutdown, we will require that either 3-hour fire proofing be provided on the structural steel or that shutdown capability be provided
. independent of the area. Our evaluation of the ability to achieve safe shutdown for postulated fires is still under review.
h
ENCLOSURE 4 i.
BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY ASSCCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.
t;cren. Nr u Vcm 19973 Ceccrirrent et Nuciect Energy (510 3 6 2144 Febnaary 13, 1980 Mr. Rccert L. Ferguson Plant Systems Branch U.S. fluclear Regulatory Canmission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Bob:
Attached is the Brockhaven National Laboratory fire protection review for Dresden 1 nuclear power plant, Item 3.1. 3, Fire Water Pump.
Respectfully yours,
- / _
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/, g, w a _. f.~., W s Robert E. Hall, Grcup Leader Reactor Engineering Analysis REH:EAM:sd attachment cc.:
R. Cerbone wo/att.
W. Kato E. MacDougall V. Panciera wa/att.
E. Sylvester W
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Y ORESDEN 1 Fire Protection Review Item 3.1.3 Fire Water Pump Under a cover letter dated December 4,1979, the licensee famarded design de-tails for the new 2500 gpm at 145 psi diesel drive fire pump to replace the existing pump.
This item is covered under 3.1.3 Fire Water Pump in the Dresden 1 SER.
The review of the documents submitted show a discrepancy between the drawing M-970 and specification sheets.
The specifications indicate a hose header with eight (8) 2-1/2 inch gated hose connections will be used but the drawing shows only six (6).
The oischarge cone is six (6) inches in diameter with a ten (10) inch discharge but the drawing shows only a six (5) inch discharge.
The motor operated valve required in the SER to separate the screen wash sys-tem from the fire protection system is not shown on the drawing.
NFPA #20 requires a ten (10) inch discharge pipe for a 2500 gpm pump. The ex-isting dischage is only eight (8) inch. The licensee should replace the eight (8) inch pipe with a ten (10) inch pipe or the licensee should submit calculations showing that the pump can meet the pressure requirements for the water demand with the added loss in the eight (8) inch pipe.
The drawings do not show the proposed 52 gpm jockey pump. This pump should be installed to maintain supervisory pressure in the fire loop. The actuation of the fire pumps should be based on the loss of this pressure.
The present P&ID drawing M970 is incorrect and should be modified to reflect existing and preposed piping. This drawing should be resubmitted along with the design drawings for the piping layout in the pump house.
On February 6,1980 a telephone conference call was held with the licensee and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. At this time the licensee prcposed the foll owi ng:
6 Correct i.il the dimensional problems listed above.
e Document these changes on print M970 and forward revised print to the NRC.-
Eliminate the jcley pump ar5 replace with a 2 inch by-pass around the e
normally closed motor operated valves that control the flow of water from the unit 2 and 3 screen wash pumps and the fire water systen.
Based upon the above review and contingent upon NRC review of the drawings to be resubmitted we find the 3.1.3 Fire Water Pumps acceptable.
I We recommend that the staff approve the emission of the jockey pump based on satisfactory ccmpletion of the changes listed above. We further reccomend
,that the staff approve the dimension changes if docurented by the licensee.
We further caution that should the existing 8" dischage pipes not be changed to 10" that the licensee be required to submit evidence that he can meet the NFPA #20 pressure requirements.
- ~
~~
ENCL (iSURE 5
..., 7 BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.
UCfcn. New vera 11973 Ceccrrment of Nuc!ect Energy (516) 345 2144 February 20, 1980 Mr. Robert L. Ferguson Plant Systems Branch U.S. N'Jclear Regulatory Ccmmission Washington, D.C.
20555 RE: Dresden 1, Fire Protection Review, Items 3.1.1 and 3.1.5.
Dear Bob:
Attached are items 3.1.1, Fire Detection Systems, and 3.1.5, Water Suppression Systems for the Dresden 1 nuclear power plant.
, Respectfully yours, 3,
,;, --- g
,I
/) &.<,v b4,WPu Robert E. Hall, Group Leader Reactor Engineering Analysis REH:EAM:sd attachment cc.:
R. Cerbone wo/att.
W. Mato E. MacDougall V. Panciera wo/att.
E. Sylvester M
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