ML19319C785

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Prevention of B&W Reactor Vessel Overpressurization

ML19319C785
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	01/07/1977
From:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Rogers J FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8003040745
Download: ML19319C785 (6)

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Distribution IIfC FDR Local PCR V. Ocore Docket File <{~~~T'.bilmer LWR-1 File li. Ernst o'.4 ', 7 m-

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3. 50-202 D. Vassallo W. Gannill F. J. Williams Chris Helson J. Stol z ELD rlori b Pc*ter Corncrt. tion J. Angelo IE (3) t.TT " -

"r. J. T. hodgers E. Hylton ACRS (16)

.ssistant Vice President and R. Heineman, SS Tuclear Fro.iect !'ana"cr D. Ross, SS n.o. e,... v. o..r

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J. Knight. SS m

d. Rtersturo, lorida 33733 R. Tedesco, SS H. Denton, DSE rer,tl e,:

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J. R. Buchanan, MSIC T. B. Abernathy, T_IC l'DtIFICf.TIO ' FOP CO"rLI. UCE l'ITi: I.PPENDIy r P"ESSiCE-TE"?EETUPE LI".ITS

','"7IT "T/RTUP /"3 SHUTE 0'.l! (CRYSTli RI\\*ER UHIT 3 !!"CLEM CE!!EPATIHr-

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't c. Novcrier 5,197G neeting ' lith licensces ve indicated that ce nulif advise < :.ch licensee of the additional infomation needed to co' late cur evaluation of the naasures proposed by licensoas to rrevent rsector vessel cverpressurizatien cf Da'ccck and Uilccx' rocctors. This information bcs not! been identified and is listed in the anclosure, n ' inforation rencested in tM enclosure is in addition to the ir.for:7. tion recuestcd in our letter dated October 1,197G.

In crAr t'nt Ue my coTlete our revire t in a tinely nanner, you are c

rF,uestsd t7 su%it the information listed in th enclosure i ithin B & ys o# r:ceint of this letter, In responding to eur reautst for cdiitional infomation you nay include by reference the infemition thet ;ou reve already provided to us in your interin resconsc: dated n.cher 2,197F.

r If you have cny furtPer c:ucstions regarding this matter, please con-t r.c t u r..

Sincerely, ossne sundW John F. Sidi Jchn F. Stolz, Chief Licht Ucter Peactors E #U I'C h IIU ' I r{p O r

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t Et? CLOSURE 1 l

REQUEST FOR ADDITIO!!AL INFOR?4ATI0I1

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 fiUCLEAR GEllERATING PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-302 i

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1.

In light of design criteria discussed on f?ovember 5,1976, it appears that further analysis may be necessary to verify that your overpressurization system design is adequate to meet Isppendix G limits assuming an additicnal single failure. Please provide a schedule for submittal of further system analyses, or justify why further analyses will not be necessary.

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2.

The criteria discussed at the !?ovember 5 meeting are listed below:

1) Credit for operator action

2) Sing'le failure criteria

3) Testability v

4) Seismic design and IEEE 273 criteria Provide information regarding how fou intend to meet the above design criteria. Where deviations from the criteria are contem-plated, please provide a detailed justification including the technical basis for not meeting the criteria and, when significant the impact on the schedule for implementation.

Describe all redundant and diverse systems which are available to provide overpressure protection.

3.

Provide schematic ' piping and instrumentation diagrams of.all systems which are utilited during plant shutdown and startup operations, indicate primary and alternate flow paths, fluid and heat sources, pressure and flow controllers, RCS pressure protection systems, and ECCS and make up systems.

4.

Provide.a failure modes and effects analysis of the everpressure protection' system for startup, shutdown, and testing operations which defines the limiting ccmbination of initiating event and additional single failure or operator error subsequent to initiation of the overpressure transient.

5.

Indicate for your low temperature oveGressure protection system '

hcw the system has been designed to handle common failure modes such as those resulting frca loss of offsite pcwer and seismic events.

Describe the failure node of the air operated makeup flow centrol valve and the letdown flow centrol valve upcn loss of air

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supply.

Identify the events / failure modes which could result in loss of air supply.

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G.

Discuss the basis for determining the nost limiting initial

. conditions for.ntlysis of the overpressure transient.

Items thtt must be considered include but should not be limited to; RCS pressure, valve opening time, steam generator temperature i.

difference, reactor coolant pump seal pressures, pressurizer level, makeup tank icvel, accumulator pressure, relief valve water

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relief capacity, cnd pump heads and flows.

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7.

Please provide a transient analysis of the reactor coolant system 4

response to inadvertent tctuation of a single train of high pressure injection pumps. Describe what administrative controls and procedures are used during startup and shutdown, and during component and/or system testing to justify the assumption that intdvertent injection by more than'one high pressure train is not credible.

Provide a similar discussion and analysis of a core flod tank discharge. For both situations indicate the basis for identifying the limiting single failure or co= ion failure mode.

8.

C;es your plant have relief capacity installed in the decay heat removal system that could provide additional protection in the event of an overpressure transient? What is the water relief capacity of the valve? Is the' decay heat removal system automa-tically isolated on RCS high pressure? What are the pressure

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setpoints for the DHR relief valve opening and its automatic isolatien?

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9. - During the November 5th meeting, the possibility of limiting the iolume of water in the RCS i ake up tank was discussed.

It was stated that this could preclude filling the pressurizer if the make up control valve should fail full open.

Is this procedure a viable option at your facility? Is water level in the Make Up 4 Tank generally controlled autcmatically? Specify your assumptions for initial pressurizer level, make up tank water volume, and oth'er design considerations which would result in limiting RCS pressure to within Appendix G limits.

Describe what instrurentation and alarms are available to the 10.

operator to aid in detection and termination of an overpressure transient.

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11. Uhat precautions are taken daring startup, shutdcwn and testing I

to verify that critical procedural steps are performed to reduce the likelihcod of inadvertently initiating an overpressure transient and rainimizing the impact of the transient on the RCS.

Uculd steps such as lock out of pumps and accumulators and reducing the ilater icvel in the pressurizer and make up tank be z.ccomplished by double check off and sign off procedures to insure against error? Uhat procedures normally are followed for altering the status of pumps er valves under administrative restriction?

12.

If p;wer is removed from valves as part of administrative controls used for overpressure protection, d at status lights and indicators h

are available to verify their proper alignment? When adminis-trative controls call for removing power from a valve or a pump, is this accomplished from the control room or frcm a motor control center?

13.

Cescribe any testing procedure proposed to insure operation of cverpressure protection devices. At what times would these tests be performed?

14. The problem of pressurizer relief valve maintenance was also discussed at the !!ovember'Sth meeting. The relief valve is nor-melly isolated and removed 'during shutdown conditions if main-

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tenance is required. This would reduce the level of protection available to mitigate the consequences cf a pressure transient.

Plcase discuss what measures will be taken at your plant to provide overpressure protection when the relief valve is removed from service and inuicate how the criteria enumerated at the UcVember 5th meeting will be met.

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