ML19318C212
| ML19318C212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1980 |
| From: | Naughton W COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007010211 | |
| Download: ML19318C212 (49) | |
Text
- - _ _
Ch Commonwealth Edison
[
~
) One First National Ptza, Chicago, Illinois
(
3 7 Addr;ss R; ply tx Post Offica Box 767 N
/ Chicago, Illinois 60690 o
1 June 26, 1980 i
Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Zion Station Units 1 and 2 Implementation of 120 Day Item of Confirmatory Order NRC Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304 Reference (a):
February 29, 1980 letter from H. R. Denton to D.
L. Peoples
Dear Mr. Denton:
Refereaaa fa) contained a Confirmatory Order dated February 29, 1980 for 7 alon Units 1 and 2.
That Order required Commonwealth i son Company to perform certain actions within 120 days of the date of the Order.
Attachment A to this letter provides Commonwealth Edison's response to those items.
Please address any questions that you have concerning this matter to this office.
One (1) signed original and thirty-nine (39) copies of this transmittal are provided for your use.
Very truly yours, William
. Naughton Nuclear Licensing Administrator Pressurized Water Reactors Attachment 4764A
.THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
% P00R QUAUTY PAGES 8007.010 g//
ATTACHMENT A Commonwealth Edison Company's responses to the NRC Staff's 120 Day items of Section E of Appendix A in Reference (a) follow.
E.1 The licensee shall examine key plant system vulnerability areas and possible operator dependent areas with the intent of maximizing the reliability in the subject areas.
Specifically, the licensee shall:
a.
Verify that the pump for ESF recirculation is free of debris and determine if flow test verification was initially performed.
If not performed, cxplore means to verify.
Review existing procedures and training on recirculation alignment and RWST refill.
b.
Review administrative check and verification procedures for assuring that the two single failure points (manual) valves in AFWS supply line are in the correct position.
c.
Impose and administrative order requiring expeditious shutdown whenever an independent train of the auxiliary feedwater system and any one of the following are inoperable:
All backup sources of of fsite power, one of the two disel generators supplying power to other independent train or either of the other rains of the auxiliary feedwater system.
d.
Develop station blackout procedures addressing:
1.
grid dispatcher actions 11.
reactor operator actions 111.
diesel generator -repairs e.
Assure that DC-powered lighting is available at the steam-turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
f.
Review causes for, and procedures and c'perator training required to diminish, the overall numbr r of reactor and main feedwater trips.
g.
Develop or review procedures to restors main feedwater promptly after a trip and to mitigate the consequences of an ATWS event (e.g. emergency boratior-and CVCS control).
h.
Review administrative controls on the manual valve (s) whose misalignment could fail all ECCS.
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Commonwealth Edison has examined key plant system vulnerability areas and possible operator dependent areas with the intent of maximizing the reliability in thse areas.
Specifically, Commonwealth Edison has addressed the following items.
a.-
The sump for ESF. recirculation is routinely examined prior to reactor startup to verify it is free from debris.
Examinations have been performed on both units within the last 6 months.
A pre-operational flow test was successfully performed on Unit 1 verfying sufficient flow capability.
While the ESF sump screens were not in place during the preoperational test, calculations on required screen flow area show sufficient flow will be available even with 80% screen-blockage.
The Unit 2 system is comparable to the Unit 1 system such that an additional pre-operational test on that unit was not warranted.
As a result of TMI small-break LOCA concerns, the recirculation alignment portion of existing Emergency Operating Procedures (ECPs) has recently gone through an extensive review as well as a checkout on the Zion simulator to verify its reliability.
Revisions to the appropriate E0P have been made as a result of this review.
A review of the RWST capacity requirements verified that a refill of the RWST is not necessary to cope with a LOCA.
Thus, no emergency procedures or special training have been implemented for this concern.
However, procedures for refilling the RWST do exist.
b.
Manual valves in the AFWS supply flow path are locked open during normal plant operation.
A review was conducted of plant operating and administrative procedures to ensure that manual valves are positioned correctly after maintenance, surveillance, or normal plant operating events.
Procedures were adequate with the exception that a change was added to the station's Out of Service piocedure to further clarify management verification requirements.
- In addition, proper position of accessible manual valves in
' key safety systems is verified during periodic Technical Specification surveillances.
c.
Technical Specification 3.15.2.A already requires shutdown within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> if only one of two sources of off-site power is available to the unit.
A Standing Order has recently been issued requiring implementation of proposed
' Technical Specifications on the definition of "operabla".
These. proposed Technical Specifications require the associated dierel generator to be operable in order to consider the auxiliary feedwater pump to be operable.
An
additional Standing Order has been issued requiring reactor shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if 2 out of 3 auxiliary feedwater pumps are inoperable.
These actions meet the requirements l
specified in E.1.c above.
d.
E0P-7, Station Blackout Operation, already addresses in detail the actions to be taken by the Reactor Operator during a station blackout, including actions to assist the Load Dispatcher in restoring off-site power supplies to normal operation.
The Load Dispatcher, who is located offsite, is connected by a dedicated telephone line and radio communication to the Control Room and has his own procedures governing his actions to be taken in the event of a loss of of f-site power to Zion Station.
An additional note was added to E0P-7 which directs the Reactor Operator to a System Operating Instruction (SOI) for diesel generators which includes a procedure for trouble shooting in the event that problems develop with the diesel generator.
e.
Additional DC (battery powered) lighting has been installed at the steam-turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump for each unit.
f.
The causes for main feedwater and reactor trips have been reviewed and are catagorized in the following table.
Included are all events where main feedwater system problems led to a reactor trip or transients where the plant operators were able to recover without a reactor trip.
NUMBER OF EVENTS Operator-Equipment Technician Type of Event Malfunction Error Trips during startup or shutdown 52 0
Trips while at power 69 16 Transients without reactor trip 35
_0 Total 156 16 As.the table; indicates, the majority of events resulted from equipment malfunction.
Of these equipment
malfunctions, over 50% can be attributed to feedwater pump speed control system problems.
A program to completely replace the original control system was initiated in late 1978 and completed in June.1980.
All other equipment malfunctions have been or are presently being addressed.
For every reactor trip, a deviation report is written which describes the event.. The report is reviewed by management personnel (On-site.and Off-site) for causes, recurrence of events and corrective actions required to prevent recurrence of events.
To date, several maintenance and operating procedures, as well as modifications to the system, have been made to diminish the number of events.
Additional means to further diminish reactor and main feedwater trips is a. continual function of station personnel.
g.
Restoration of main feedwater af ter a reactor trip is not desirable because of potential cooldown accidents and possible water hammers.
An Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) has been developed to restore main feedwater in the event that no auxiliary feedwater is available.
This procedure uses both the main feedwater pumps and condensate pumps to deliver cooling water to the steam generators.
Appropriate cautions on avoiding excessive cooldown transients are included in this procedure.
With regard to un ATWS event, a review of the Zion Emergency Operating Procedures was conducted.
A new Emergency Operating Procedure, E0P-12, Failure of Reactor to Trip, was implemented to cope with an ATWS event.
l' Additonal training on the ATWS event was conducted for appropriate licensed personnel.
h.
The answer provided to Item b above for the manual valves in the auxiliary feedwater system also applies to manual valves in the ECCS system.
i n
E.2.
A review of control room emergency procedures shall be conducted for.the purpose of improving these procedures from a human factors engineering standpoint.
Improvements which can be_ attained by modifying procedures shall be implemented within 120 days.
Control room displays shall also be reviewed for the purpose of idenfying improvements which will increase the operator's ability to assess plant conditions.
A report will be submitted to the NRC to describe the improvements recommended and _the schedule for their implementation.
Commonwealth Edison formulated a task force to perform the recommended reviews.
Details of the reviews performed, improvements made and improvements recommended with their implementation schedule are contained in the enclosed report dated June 1980 and entitled, " Human Factors Review of the Zion Station Control Room".
4764A L:
I i
HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF THE ZION STATION CONTROL ROOM i
i June 1980
)
E Prepared by:
Commonwealth' Edison Company Task Force-1
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Table of Contents Section Pages A..
Introduction 1
B.
' Review Objective 1
. C.
Control Room Task Force Experience 2
D.
Task Force Review Approach 2
. E..
Control Room Improvements and Implementation Schedule 3
1.
Emergency Operating Procedures 4
1.1 Video-Tape Review 4
1.2 Procedure Guidelines Review 4
1.3 Control Board Verification 4
1.4 Procedure and Nomenclature Comments 5
2.
Control Room Displays 5~
2.1 TMI Modifications 5
2.2 Demarcation Lines 5
2.3 Annunciator Alarms 6
1.
2.3.1 Single Alarms 6'
t' 2.3.2 Multiple Alarms 7
2.3.3' Dark Board Concept 10
^
2.4 Illumination 11 2.5 Human Factors Review 12 2.6 Out of Service Tags 12 i
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List of Attachments Attachment 1 - Zion Station Human Factors Control Room Review Task Force Experience Attachment 2 - Zion Station Human Factors Control Room Review Approach Attachment 3 - Procedure Retiew Guidelines Attachment 4 - Emergency Operating Procedure Step Changes Completed Attachment 5 - Emergency Operating Procedure Wording Changes Completed Attachment 6 - Control Board Labeling Changes Completed for Conformance to Emergency Operati.ig Procedures Attachment 7 - Equipment Status Light Changes Completed Attachment 8 - Control Board Labeling Changes Completed for Improved Unit Operations Attachment 9 - TMI Modifications Completed on Zion Unit 2 Control Board 0 - Control Board Functional Demarcation Lines Completed 1 - Out of Service Tagging Revision Completed List of Appendices Appendix A - Bibliography Appendix B - Human Factors Review of Control Room Displays
HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW 0F THE ZION STATION CONTROL ROOM A.
INTRODUCTION This report is submitted to meet the 120 day requirement of Item E.2 of the Zion Station Confirmatory Order dated February 29, 1980.
The report provides the findings of the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) Task Force assembled to review the human factors engineering aspects of the Zion Station Control Room.
The members of the Task Force were selected to provide experience and knowledge in the human factors concerns discussed in the Kemeny and Rogovin Reports.
The Kemeny Report claimed that inadequate attention to the human factors of operation was the root cause of the severity of the Three Mile Island incident.
The report also claimed that industry failed to recognize sufficiently that human beings who manage and operate the plants constitute an important safety system and need to be treated with equal importance as equipment.
The Rogovin Report places importance on the human factor concerns of human failure.
These concerns include:
inadequate training, poor operator procedures, a lack of diagnostic skill on the part of the entire site management group, misleading instrumentation, plant deficiencies and poor control room design.
Therefore, a human factors study of the Zion Station Control Room, which concentrated on addressing the human factors concerns identified in the Kemeny and Rogovin Reports, was prepared by the Commonwealth Edison Company Task Force for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
B.
REVIEW OBJECTIVE The objective of the control room review was to improve the human f actors engineering interf aces between the control room operators, the emergency operating procedures, and the Zion Station Control Boards.
The review was conducted to increase the ability of the control room operator to assess plant conditions under stress This 'eport provides the results of the CECO Task Force situations.
r review and includes the following items requested by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
1.
A review of the Zion Station Units 1 and 2 control room procedures f ar the purpose of improving the procedures f rom a human factors engineering standpoint.
2.
A review of the Zion Station Units 1 and 2 control room displays for the purpose of identifying improvements.
2 C.
CONTROL ROOM TASK FORCE EXPERIENCE A task. force was assembled with seven individuals from the Zion Station, Station Nuclear Engineering Department, Station Electrical Engineering Department, Westinghouse Electric Corporation and General Physics. Corporation.
The CECO individuals were selected because of their previous. Zion Station operating experience.
Each of the CECO and Westinghouse individuals on the Task Force has obtained a reactor operators license or a senior. reactor operators license.
The experience of the Task Force members is listed in Attachment 1.
A consultant with ten years of industrial experience in man-machine interface was added to the Task Force to provide an i'
individual with indepth experience in human factors engineering technology.
The human factor consultant's participation overlaid human factors experience on the Task Force operating experience.
i
-This method results in the application of both c)erating and human factors experience to each control room design and operating concern 1
i reviewed.
D.
TASK FORCE REVIEW APPROACH
}
The Task Force multi-disciplinary experience and knowledge allowed a number of items to be reviewed in parallel.
summarizes the flow of the issues into the Human Factors Task Force Review.
The Westinghouse Zion Simulator was also used to observe operator performance under emergency operating procedure conditions i
and to collect data on annunciator alarm occurrence rates.
This I
information was used in the Human Factors Task Force Review.
The Review resulted in the improvements described in this report.
The Task Force also recognized that valuable information
.regarding control board design and operating issues could be obtained from the experience of the individuals most familiar with the control
}
board operations.
Consequently, a questionnaire was developed for control board operators and shift foremen.
The questionnaire requested the identification of improvements in the control room to increase the ability of the operator to' carryout emergency and 4'
abnormal operating. procedures.
The questionnaire also requested improvementsLin control board labeling, demarcation lines and annunciator _ alarm usage.
In general, individual Task Force members participated in several of the-tasks and the findings were reviewed within the Task Force to consolidate opinions, identify improvements and schedule improvement implementation.
The findings of the Task Force adhere to applied human ~ engineering design conventions and, in most cases, follow theoretical guidelines documented in human perceptual and information processing literature..A Bibliography of literature, used in the formulation of the Task Force approach and in the collection and l
analysis of. data in-this report, is listed in Appendix A.
The findings of the Task-Force were subdivided into two major areas:
L Emergency. Operating Procedures and Control Room Displays.
- The emergency operating procedures review included:
(1) a review
~
of the video tapes of the emergency procedure walk throughs to identify areas needing improvement, (2) an evaluation of the written procedures using a set of procedure review guidelines, listed in, (3) a walk through of each Emergency Operating Procedure at the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Boards to verify similarity of wording on control switches, valve tags, annunciator windows and emergency status light windows, and (4) an appraisal of additional comments submitted to the Task Force for consideration as improvements to control board nomenclature or procedure wording.
The control room displays review included:
(1) a review of the control room display modifications made to the board resulting from the Three Mile Island incident, (2) a review of the use of demarcation lines between controls and displays, (3) a review of annunciator alarme, (4) an illumination review of control room displays, (5) a human factors review of control room displays, and (6) a review of the out of service tagging of control room displays.
The control room improvements and the implementation schedule are scumarized in Section E.
This summary was developed from the findings discussed in subsections E.1 Emergency Operating Procedures and E.2 Control Room Displays.
E.
CONTROL ROOM IMPROVEMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE Summ ary are listed in Attachments 4 through 11. porated into the Zion Station The improvements identfied and incor These improvements. except for the TMI modifications in Attachment 9, were also incorporated into the Westinghouse Zion Simulator.
Additional improvements to be implemented at the Zion Station and their expected completion dates are:
1.
To relamp the control room. (August 15, 1980) 2.
To review relocation of the three annunciator alarm horns to the Engineered Safeguards, Reactor Control and Balance of Plant panels.
(August 15, 1980) 3.
To complete painting of the star rotary pointers with white paint for improved indication of switch position. (July 31, 1980) 4.
To have Westinghouse personnel train CECO operators to check-off procedure ~ steps during E0P implementation on the Engineered Safeguards Panel while conducting simulator training.
(April 30, 1981) 5.
To install normal operating green bands under selected instrument pointers. (December 31, 1980)
.4_
E.1 Emergency Operating Procedures l'.1 Video Tape Review In' general, the emergency operating procedures were determined to be adequate in meeting the requirements of
-off-normal plant operations..
These procedures have evolved over the years to respond to plant operator's experience, to system design requirements and to operational modifications.
Diagnostic performance by the control room operators observed on the Westinghouse Zion Simulator was found to be efficient.
Operator simulated walk-throughs of emergency procedures were video taped at the Simulator and later were reviewed to identify areas needing improvement.
The operators were able to proceed through the steps of the procedures without obvious difficulty in interpretation with the exceptica of two cases.
The procedural changes resulting from the review are listed in and were incorporated into Emergency Operating j
l 1.2 Procedure Guidelines Review The text of the procedures was also reviewed and compared to the guidelines discussed in Attachment 3.
Generally, the current procedures adhere to the guidelines.
Single operator actions were associated with each procedural step which was stated clearly and concisely.
Upper and lower case letters outlined cautionary statements and underlining was employed wherever appropriate.
Meter values referenced in the text of the procedure for operator action were modified as required.
i Engineering drawings and safeguard logic diagrams are readily available to the operator in the control room via the 1
microfilm readers.
Furthermore, the latest revision of the procedure was used with diagnostic diagrams to support the text material.
s 1.3 Control Board Verification Each of the Zion Station Emergency Operating Procedures was walked through comparing the wording of the text to the wording of the tags on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Boards.
The procedure changes, listed in Attachment 5, were incorporated into the appropriate E0P's to provide conformance to control board labeling.
The Control Board Labeling Changes, listed in, were incorporated into the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Boards to provide conformance to E0P wording.
The Equipment Status Light Changes, listed in Attachment 7, were
' installed on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Boards to improve the Llabeling.
A. Permissive Annunciator Window was also changed on Unit 1 to conform to the wording on Unit 2.
The annunciator window wording-was changed from " SIS Actuation 1 Minute Blocked" l
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to " Auto Safety Injection Blocked".
In addition to the above changes, a second set of Emergency Operating Procedures and Abnormal Operating Procedures was added to the Station Control
' Room Engineers-desk to assist control room operators and foremen in assessing plant' conditions.
- 1.4 Procedure and Nomenclature Comments Comments were submitted to the Task Force for consideration as improvements to control board labeling.
The original labels, listed in Attachment 8, were changed to new labels on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Boards for clarification.
Future comments by the control room operators on improvements to the control boards will be processed through the established Zion Station work request procedure.
In addition, to assist in the training of new equipment operators for control board positions and to provide a reference to control board operators the following label was added to each control board:
RC System Loop A
B C
D Valve A
D B
C The above label on the control board provides reinforcement of the relationship between the RC System loop and valve lettering.
The tags on the valves in the RC System loops in the plant provides proper identification for operat:on of the valves.
The valve tags contain the loop letter, valve name, valve number and valve letter.
E.2 Control Room Displays 2.1 TMI Modifications Five TMI modifications to the control room displays were made to the Unit 2 Control Board during the May-June 1980 Refueling Outage.
The modifications were reviewed for usage, location and procedures.
The results of the review improved the containment sump level instrument location.and the RC loop drain, fill, and power relief valve switch locations.
The results of the review are presented in for the TMI modifications completed to the Zion Unit 2 Control Board.
2.2 Demarcation Lines Red, Blue and Black taped outlines were applied to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Boards to increase the operator's ability to assess plant conditions.
The color of the tape has the following meanings:
Red Outline:
Reactor Shutdown Enhancement l
To provide visible enhancement of manual switches that result in direct reactor shutdown.
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- 2.2 Demarcation Lines (Cont'd)
Blue Outline:
System Separation To provide spatial separation of plant systems.
Black Outline:
Subsystem Separation To provide visible reference, as required, to avoid inadvertent operation of switches and pushbuttons, and to provide easier recognition of instrumentation readouts. 0 contains a list of the places were the tapes were used to improve the demarcation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Boards.
2.3 Annunciator Alarms 2.3.1 Single Alarms The annunciator alarms are one of the most used displays by the operator to assess plant conditions on a single alarm basis.
The annunciator alarms were reviewed from a single and a multiple alarm frequency to determine if improvements could be made.
For a single alarm, an annunciator window lights to provide a visible alarm and one of three horns sound to provide an audible alarm.
The annunciator is treated individually and provides the operator with information about plant status.
The three annunciator audible alarms are coded by using different tones for the Engineered Safeguards,
)
Reactor Control and Balance of Plant panels.
These audible i
horns are located above the operators desk.
The visible and audible alarms, on annunciation, flash and sound approximately 1
100 times a mir.ute with a 50% on and 50% off annunciation rate.
The visible alarm, on reset, flashes approximately 100 times a minute with a 25% on and 75% off flash rate to distinguish. reset from annunciation.
The audible alarm sounds once (like a bell chime) to notify the operator of reset.
The instructions for operator response to each alarm are contained in the annunciator response manual in the control room.
The Zion Station is presently reviewing the relocation of the annunciator horns from above the operators console to the associated control board panel.
This will provide the operator tone and sound direction to alert his attention to an j
annunciator alarm.
The review of the relocation will be completed by August 15, 1980.
7-To reduce operator distraction from control board activities caused by nuisance alarms, the control board operator is allowed to use one annunciator audio defeat blocking device per unit for any of the five annunciator acknowledge locations.
The blocking device defeats the audio portion of the alarm only, the visual portion of the alarm still occurs.
The use of the annunciator blocking device is under administrative control by a standing operating order.
The Zion Station also has administrative procedures for writing work. requests to investigate and eliminate nuisance annunciator alarms.
When needed, administrative procedures are also used to install jumpers or to lift a lead to silence an individual nuisance annunciator alarm.
Therefore, an i
annunciator defeat blocking device is considered appropriate during the investigation and resolution of annunciator alarms to prevent the operator from having his attention distracted from the operation of the Unit.
2.3.2 Multiple Alarms A multiple alarm condition usually occurs for a reactor i
trip or safety injection.
Priorization of the cause of the reactor trip. occurs on the first out annunciator panel on the reactor control board.
The 31 annunciators on this panel identify the plant condition that caused the reactor trip and/or safety injection.
The first annunciator to alarm is identified by a red light; subsequent reactor trip annunciators are identified by white lights.
In both cases, an audible horn sounds.
The color coding draws the reactor operators attention to the cause of plant shutdown.
At this point, the operator performs the immediate actions according to Emergency Operating Procedure-O (E0P-0) for safety injection and/or E0P-1 for reactor trip.
The operator uses, according to E0P-0 and E0P-1, control board instrumentation, position indication of valves, and status of running equipment to' verify a safe reactor shutdown.
After completion of E0P-0 and/or E0P-1 by the operator, the annunciator alarm panels are reviewed by the operator to determine if any abnormal conditions exist.
It appears to be inappropriate to prioritize alarms other.than the first out alarm.
The operator first reviews plant instrumentation and equipment controls required by E0P's for safety injection and/or reactor trip to verify safe-shutdown of the plant.
Later, the operator reviews the remaining annunciator alarms and equipment-instrumentation and controls for abnormal equipment
. conditions.
The Westinghouse Simulator was used to tabulate the total number of alarms that occurred.at specified times on the control boards during the first-120 seconds of a reactor trip and a safety injection.
The data collected is shown on the following pages in Figures 1 and 2 for the Engineered Safeguards, Reactor Control and' Balance of Plant panels.
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. increase.in alarms on the Balance of Plant panel, between 30 and 60 seconds, were primarily caused by the generator trip 50 seconds after the reactor-trip.
Each alarm caused a visible light to appear in an annunciator window and caused an audible horn to sound on that panel.
For a reactor trip, the data indicates the initial alarms occur during the 0-5 seconds.
During this time and shortly thereafter, the control room operators are walking the board using their instrumentation to perform the immediate actions to verify safe shutdown of the plant.
During this time the operators appear too busy to be distracted by the alarm lights and horns.
After the immediate verification of operator actions, each of the annunciator horns are silenced and the operators proceed to use their E0P's.
During the initial minutes of the trip, the annunciator horns were observed to be silenced frequently when the horns became a distraction to the operators using their procedures, knowledge and experience to 1
analyze plant conditions.
For a safety injection, the annunciator data shows the alarms continuing throughout the 120 second interval.
- Again, the annunciator horns were observed to be silenced frequently when the horn on each of the three panels became a distraction to the operators using their procedures, knowledge and experience to and analyze plant conditions.
The annunciator review indicates the audible annunciator horns appear to be a root cause of operator distraction during the analysis of plant conditions after a reactor trip or safety injection.
As a result of this review, Zion Station will analyze the use of a manual annunciator silence timer with a range of 15-30 seconds on the Balance of Plant panel.
The purpose of the timer is to allow the operator to manually silence the audio distraction of the Balance of Plant annunciator alarms immediately after a reactor trip or safety injection.
The visual alarm in the annunciator window will still occur.
This feature is expected to improve the operators ability to assess plant conditions under a stress situation.
I 2.3.3 Dark Board Concept The Zion Station is continuing to remove the white
-illuminated annunciator windows from the control boards that are not abnormal conditions.
During this review the Station initiated work requests to:
1.
Remove the positive displacement charging pump out of service condition from the " Charging Pump Out of Service" annunciator window.
This will allow the annunciator window to alarm for only the centrifugal charging pumps used as an engineered safeguards function.
2.
Remove the " Condenser Discharge or Different Temperature High Alarm".
No longer a Technical Specification requirement.
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The Zion Station also changed the white annunciator light bulbs to green light bulbs in-the following annunciator
. windows that are normally lighted during power operation.
1.
" Source Range Loss of Detector Voltage" 2.
- " Source Range High Shutdown Flux Alarm Blocked" 3.
" Bank D Rod Withdrawal Limit" 4.
" Auto Stop' Trip Reset" The white annunciator is reserved for abnormal status and the green. annunciator is reserved for normal status.
In addition to the above efforts, Zion Station is completing &
modification to remove the " Auto Stop Trip Reset Alarm" from the annunciator panel.
a t
2.4 Illumination The illumination at the control board displays was measured to determine whether or not the emergency and/or the normal lighting intensity levels conform to current Human Factors Engineering criteria.
4 4
Incident and reflected light i ntensity values were measured using a Gamma Scientific light meter at the midpoint of each four foot section of the Unit 2 control board and using normal lighting.
This data was taken for both the vertical and the slant portions of the board.
(The Zion Station Control Room is symmetrical, so_the Unit 2 data is representative of either board)to the other, using the Emergency and ESS lighting, wereReflec unit.
l so small only the minimum and maximum values were recorded.
i Direct illumination levels (light meter facing the lamps) i n the center of the control room, under normal and emergency lighting conditions, were also recorded.
(
' Control room lighting is supplied from redundant sources to assure adequate lighting under all conditions.
The normal control room lighting for each unit is supplied partially from each unit, while the ESS lighting on each unit i s supplied by the Diesel Generators.
Emergency lighting for each unit is supplied from the batteries for that particular unit.
Data collected confirmed that the control room light
- intensity conforms to current-acceptable values in Mil-Standard 1472B and Van Cott and Kinkade.
The existing normal and lighting intensit emergency (incident readings)y is approximately 50 and 3 foot candles respectively,-as compared to the minimum. acceptable values of 20 and 1 foot candles.
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The control room was designed on the basis of using " Cool Light" fluorescent lamps.
A random variation of " Cool Light" (3150 lumens) and " Day Light" (2650' lumens) is presenti; being used.
The " Day Light" lamps reduce the overall light intensity and introduce objectionable shadows on the vert ical sections of the control board.
Since old lamps give off less illumination han new lamps and " Day Light" lamps give off less illuminatiot than " Cool Light" lamps, all lamps in the control room wili be replaced at one time with " Cool Light" lamps.
The first entire re-lamping and cleaning is to be completed by August 15, 1980.
The " egg crates" under the lamps and the reflectors above the lamps will be cleaned, as the normal practice, during the re-lamping.
2.5 Human Factors Review A Human Factors review of the control room displays was performed to identify improvements.
The review involved the following:
1.
A human factors engineering guideline checklist, developed by General Physics and tailored to a power plant control room, was used to evaluate the control room displays.
2.
Collecting data to evaluate the readability of displayed information was performed using control room operators.
3.
A structured questionnaire was administered to control room operators to evaluate their preference for indicator pointers, scale designs and colors.
The findings of this review are presented in Appendix B of this report.
2.6 Out of Service Tags The Out of Service Tag for use on the control board was reduced by 55% in length to prevent them from covering up switch indicator lights.
The tagging improvement is shown in 1.
The large tag is still used in the plant for high visibility for out of the way valves and switches.
e Zion Station Human Factors Control Room Review Ta_sk Force Experience Rogovin Report Concerns Task Force Experience 4
Training Zion Station Westinghouse Site Representative and former Westinghouse Simulator Instructor.
Zion Station Training Instructor and former control room operator.
Procedures Zion Station Procedure Coordinator and former control room operator.
Management Skills Zion Station Senior Operating Engineer i
with two weeks of augmented post TMI technical training in control room 4
operation.
Instrumentation Former Zion Station Electrical Operating Engineer.
Now a Station Electrical Engineering Department Controls and Instrumentation Engineer.
l Plant Deficiencies Former Zior lestion Shift Foreman.
Now responsible for directing the Station Nuclear Engineering Department root cause analysis program of outage and derating problems.
Control Room Design Former Zion Station Shif t Foreman.-
Now responsible for developing a Station' Nuclear Engineering Department Control Room Design Standard.
l Human-Factors Consultant General Physics.
Masters'in L
Human Factors and Phd in Applied Experimental Psychology.
Ten years.
industrial experience in man-machine interface design.
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Zion Station Human Factors Control Room Task Force Review Approach Issues Review Essex Corporation data, video tapes and comments on human factors review of Zion Station Control Room on 2/27-3/1/80.
Operating shift questionnaire comments to improve operator ___
ability to assess plant emergency condicions.
Human Factors Report of the Installation of TMI
-4bTask Force
> Human Factors instrumentation and control Review Review of the modifications on Unit 2 s s Zion Station control board during Control Room May-June 1980 refueling S'
. outage.
Task Force observations at C@ntrol room display Westinghouse Zion checklist review.
Simulator Control room annunciator review.
Emergency Operating Procedure review
Procedure Revicw Guidelines 1.
Review procedures to assure that each procedural step is related to one operator action.
2.
Each step should be clear, concise and short.
3.
Color code, shape code (upper / lower case) or spatially code (right-hand column on page) all cautionary statements.
4.
Controls and meter readings / markings referenced in the procedural text must adhere to those appearing on the controls and within the scales of the meters on the actual boards.
5.
Insure compatibility between controls and display descriptors referenced in procedure and panel label identifiers.
6.
Feedback readings that require the operator to take action should be specified prior to proceeding to successive steps.
7.
Reference diagrams (with numerically coded controls and displays) should be available for procedural statements.
Areas within the drawing that are applicable to a particular procedure should be identified.
8.
Procedures should be reviewed for completeness.
9.
Procedures should be reviewed for the overall size of typeface in procedures.
10.
Provide all necessary information on title page (i.e., title, purpose, last revision date).
11.
Include reference documentation.
12.
Consider left page for text; right page for supporting figures.
13.
Consider a simplified operator action diagram, wherever possible, including check points.
14.
Improve procedure documentation indexing to decrease search time.
15.
Consider the limited use of a digital data base for procedural storage, retrieval and display.
l
Emergency Operating Procedure Step Changes Completed EOP-3 Feedwater Malfunction Purpose of Change To-clarify control room operator instructions about automatic operation of control rods af ter a feedwater pump trip, heater drain pump trip or condensate / condensate booster pump trip.
Change Revise procedure step to read:
Check or place rods in auto.
If a reactor trip occurs proceed according to E0P-1.
(Per Westinghouse guidance manual rod control is required above 90%
power unless control bank 0 position is above 215 steps.)
E0P-9 Loss of Reactor Coolant Purpose of Change i
To clarify the stopping and starting of safety injection and charging pumps during RHR pump switchover from cold leg injection to cold leg recirculation when the RWST low low level is reached.
Change 1.
Eliminate Caution Note and add step:
Restart SI pumps if stopped due to RWST low low level 2.
Eliminate Caution Note and add step:
Restart charging pumps if stopped due to RWST low low level.
l
Attachmerit 5 Emergency Op:: rating Proccdura Wording Chang s Completed Original Proccdure Term N:w Procidure Term 1.
Generator 345 KV OCB's Generator 345 KV Switch Yard OCB's 2.
VC HCV 182 RCP's Seal Water Pressure Control Valve HVC 182 Labyrinth DP Control
Emergency Makeup from RWST Valves (M0V-VC ll2D&E) 4.
NIS RAD TILT, Rod Sequence Deviation "CMPTR Alarm NIS RAD TILT Rod Dev/Seg" 5.
BIT Recirc Valves SI 8870 A&B and SI 8883 A0V-SI 8870 A&B Boron Inj Tank to Boric Acid Tank Isol and A0V-SI 8883 Boric Acid Trans Pp to Baron Inj TK Isol Viv 6.
R-ll, Cor.tainment or Vent Air R-ll Air Particle Monitor, Containment Vent 7.
R-12, Containment or Vent Air R-12 Radio Gas Monitor, Containment Vent 8.
R-14, Aux. Bldg. Vent Exhaust R-14 Stack Gas Monitor, Plant Vent Stack 9.
RT-PR09, Containment Purge Exhaust RT-PR09A, Containment Purge Exhaust Stack Effluent Gas Monitor RT-PR09B, Containment Purge Exhaust St ck Effluent Iodine Monitor RT-PR09C, Containment Purge Exhaust Stack Air Particulate Monitor 10.
Containment Purge RV-1,2,3,4 Dampers Containment Purge Inlet & Outlet Isol Valves RV-1,2,3,4
- 11. Containment Vent Isol Valves RV-5,6 Containment Relief Isol Valves RV-5,6 12.
Secondary Storage Tanks Condensate Storage Tanks
RHR Crossover to Cold Leg Inj. (MOV-RH 8716A&B) 14.
RHR Pump B Crosstie to SI Suction (MOV-SI 8804B)
RHR System to SI Pumps Valve (MOV-SI 8804B) 15.
RHR Pump A Crosstie to Chg Suction (MOV-SI 8804A)
RHR System to Chg Pumps Valve (MOV-SI 8804A)
RHR Train A to RCS Cold Leg B&C Isol. (MOV-SI 8809A)
- 17. RHR Pump B to Cold Leg Inj. (MOV-SI 88098)
RHR Train B to RCS Cold Leg A&D Isol. (MOV-SI 88098) 18.
Pressurizer Level Deviation Pressurizer Level / Pressure Alert
Control Board Labeling Changes Completed for Conformance to Emergency Operating Procedures Original Tag Label New Tag Label 1.
Steam Generator Atmospheric Dump Isol. Valves SG A Atmos Relief Isolation Valve (MOV-MS 0017)
SG B Atmos Relief Isolation Valve (MOV-MS 0020)
SG C Atmos Relief Isolation Valve (MOV-MS 0018)
SG D Atmos Relief Isolation Valve (MOV-MS 0019) 1 2.
Permanent Magnet Supply Breaker Generator Exciter Field Breaker 3.
Cont. Sump Level.
Cont. Recirc Sump Level 4.
HCV 182 Charging Header Valve (labyrinth /( P)
HCV 182 RCP Labyrinth DP Control 5.
Non-Filter Vent Hdr. Isol. Vlv.
Aux. Steam Line Low Point Drain 6.
Resid HxA to Reactor Cool Loops B&C (MOV-SI 8809A)
RHR Train A to RCS Cold Leg B&C Isol. (MOV-SI 8809A) 7.
Resid HxB to Reactor Cool Loops A&D (MOV-SI 8809B)
RHR Train B to RCS Cold Leg A&D Isol. (MOV-SI 88098)
Equipment Status Light Changes Completed Original Status Light Wording New Status Light Wording Unit 1 Unit 1 1.
RHX HL AC 1.
RHX CL BC 1-8809A 1-8809A Closed Closed 2.
RHX HL BD 2.
RHX CL AD 1-8809B 1-88098 Closed Closed 3.
RHR CL INJ 3.
RHR HL REC 1-8716A 1-8716A Closed Closed 4.
RHX HL AD 1-9000 1-9000 Open Open Unit 2 Unit 2 1.
RHX HL AC 1.
RHX CL BC 2-8809A 2-8809A Closed Closed 2.
RHX HL BD 2.
RHX CL AD 2-8809B 2-8809B Closed Closed 3.
RHR CL INJ 3.
RHR HL REC 2-8716A 2-8716A Closed Closed 4.
RHX HL AD 2-9000 2-9000 Open Open
Page 1 of 2 Control Board Labeling Changes Completed for Improved Unit Performance Original Tag Label New Tag Label 480 Bus 147 480 Bus 137 OEI-APO4 OEI-AP04 Boric Acid Boric Acid Tk 0A Temp Tk OC Temp 2TI-103 2TI-103 Overpressure Overpressure Test Test Date SI Pump Flow SI Pump 1A 1FI-922 Disch Flow 1FI-922 SI Pump Flow SI Pump 1B 1FI-932 Disch Flow 1FI-932 SI Pump Flow SI Pump 2A 2FI-922 Disch Flow 2FI-922 SI Pump Flow SI Pump 28 2FI-932 Disch Flow 2FI-932 SI Pump Pressure SI Pump 1A 1PI-923 Disch Press 1PI-923 SI Pump Pressure SI Pump 1B 1PI-935 Disch Press 1PI-935 SI Pump Pressure SI Pump 2A 2PI-923 Disch Press 2PI-923 SI Pump Pressure SI Pump 2B 2PI-935 Disch Press 2PI-935
Page 2 of 2 Original Tag Label New Tag Label Brg. Oil Pump Turb. Emer. Brg.
Disch Press Oil Pump Disch PI TO 08 Press PI TO 08 SJAE & GLND Exhaust Off-Gas System Particulate Rad Mon.
Particulate Rad Mon.
i RT-PR 26 RT-PR 26 (2B Heater Drain Pump (2B Heater Drain Pump Recirculation Valve)
Recirculation Valve) auto close auto open SJAE & LFND Exhaust Off-Gas System Gas Monitor Radio Gas Re-15 Monitor Re-15 Gov. Vlv. Latch Gov. Vlv. Latch Permissive (Dyno tape)
Permissive (Made Permanent Label)
(No Original Tag Label)
(Computer-Driven readouts meters)
Address Range l
(Deborating Demins Valve)
(Label and indicator light wiring changed)
Normal Divert Demins Bypass
Page 1 of 5 TMI Modifications Completed on Zion Unit 2 Control Board Introduction Five TMI modifications to the control room displays were made to the Unit 2 Control Board during the May-June 1980 Refueling Outage.
The results of the human factors review of these modifications are discussed herein.
1.
Modification
- Containment Wide Range Pressure Indicators Usage
- The two containment pressure indicators with a range of - 5 psig to 200 psig are an extension of the existing four 0 to 60 psig containment pressure indicators in the control room.
Location - The installation of two wide range pressure indicators next to the existing four narrow range pressure indicators will provide the control room operator with temperature, humidity, pressure, and hydrogen content indication of the containment at one location.
Procedures - Changes to E0P's were not required since containment wide range instruments are supplemental information to control room operators.
Control room operator action is determined by existing 0-60 psig range instruments.
2.
Modification - Containment Hydrogen Content Indicators Usage - The two hydrogen indicators with a range of 0-20% hydrogen are placed below the containment wide range pressure indicators.
The flow valves into and out of the hydrogen indicators isolate on a safety injection signal.
After reset of the safety injection signal, the control room operator will have containment hydrogen content indications.
Location - The installation of two hydrogen content indicators below the containment wide range pressure indicators provides the control room operator with temperature, humidity, pressure, and hydrogen content indication of the containment at one location.
Procedures - Add to E0P-9, Loss of Reactor Coolant:
a.
A step to open hydrogen indicator solenoid valves after cold leg recirculation and resetting of safety injection, b.
A step for opening hydroger. indicator solenoid valves after resetting of safety injection for a small reactor coolant system break.
(Procedure changes will be incorporated into existing procedures prior to making the system operational.)
Page 2 of 5 3.
Modification - Containment Sump and Containment Level Indication Usage
- The 0-40 inch Containment Sump Level measuring the water level below the containment floor and the 0-10 foot Containment Level measuring the water level above the containment floor provides the operator with the water level condition in the containment.
Location
- The location of the indicators were changed to install the containment sump level to the left of the recirculation sump level lights and the containment level to the right of the recirculation sump lights.
This arrangement of indicators and lights will transmit accident information to the operator in a left to right sequence.
For instance, the containment sump will first fill, followed by the level light indication on the recirculation sump, and last the filling of the containment as shown on the containment level indicator.
Procedures - Included in E0P-0, Safety Injection / Accident Diagnostics a high containment sump level as a symptom of a steamline, feedline, or reactor coolant system break inside of containment.
4.
Modification - Reactor Head Vent Usage - To provide two sets of two solenoid valves in series to allow the reactor vessel high point vent to remove noncondensable gases.
Location - The reactor head vent valves were to be installed on the control board as two sets of two valves in series near the pressurizer power relief valves.
The vent valve switches were arranged on the control board to provide a vent upward flow path.
This approach requires the lower valve to be opened first and the upper valve to be opened last as follows:
VENT UP FLOW PATH A
n RC Head RC Head Second Valve Vent Valve Vent Valve To Be Opened RC-11 RC-10 a
a RC Head RC Head first Valve Vent Valve Vent Valve To Be Opened RC-09 RC-08 Primary set Secondary set of Valves of Valves
Page 3 of 5 4.
Modification - Reactor Head Vent (Cont'd)
A review of the original control board in Figure 1 showed a variety of subsystem flow paths.
The Task Force reviewed the rearrangement of the valve switches on the control board to provide the operator with an improved arrangement of flow paths shown in Figure 2.
The control board switch arrangement was improved by relocating the Reactor Coolant System drain, fill, and power relief valve switches before installing the reactor head vent valves
- switches, Since the power relief isolation valves are closed during power operation, the relocation of 8000A valve with the PCV 456 valve and the relocation of the 80008 valve with the PCV 455C is deferred.
This last change is expected to be made if the plant is operated with the power relief isolation valves open.
Procedures - Modify appropriate E0P's as soon as guidance is received from Westinghouse on the use of reactor head vent valves.
5.
Modification - Reactor Vessel Level Usage - The -40 to 0 foot indicator pegged high and the -40 to 80 foot indicator on the 80 foot level mark, with the reactor coolant pumps on, indicate mass flow through the reactor core.
With the reactor coolant pumps off, both instruments will read the zero level mark with the reactor vessel full.
With the reactor coolant pumps off and the instruments on the negative scale, the reactor vessel is not full.
Location - The level indicators were installed in the central area of the vertica', section of the Reactor Control panel to provide visibility to the operator.
Procedures - Modify appropriate E0P's as soon as guidance is received from Westinghouse on use of reactor head level indicators.
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- 0 Page 1 of 2 Control Board Functional Demarcation Lines Red Tape:
Reactor Shutdown Enhancement 1.
Engineered Safeguards Panel
- SI Actuate Switch 2.
Reactor Control Panel
- BIT Inlet and Outlet isol. Valve Switches
- Emergency Make Up From RWST Switches
- Emergency Boration Switches
- Reactor Trip Switch
- SI Actuate Switch
- Emergency Boration Flow Meter 3.
Balance of Plant
- Reactor Trip Switch Blue Tape:
System Separation 1.
Engineered Safeguards Panel
- Main Steam / Main Feedwater
- Main Feedwater/ Aux. Feedwater
- Aux. Feedwater/ Steam Gen. Blowdown
- Steam Gen. Blowdown / Safety Injection
- Safety Injection / Accumulators
- Accumulators / Reactor Containment Fans
- Reactor Containment Fans / Containment Spray
- Containment Spray / Aux. Feedwater Pumps
- Aux. Feedwater Pumps / Service Water
- Service Water / Component Cooling
- Component Cooling / Residual Heat Removal 2.
Reactor Control Panel
- Safety Injection /RCS and CVCS
- RCS and CVCS/ Reactor Control
- Reactor Control / Reactor Control System 3.
Balance of Plant
- Main Feedwater/ Heater Drain
- Heater Drain / Extraction Steam
- Extraction Steam / Condensate Water
- Condensate' Water / Circulating Water
- 0 Page 2 of 2 3.
' Balance of Plant (Cont'd)
- Circulating Water / Turbine Control
- Turbine Control / Main Electric Power
- Main Electric Power / Aux. Electric Power
- Aux. Electric Power /4 KV Busses
- 4 KV Busses / Diesel Generators Black Tape:
Subsystem Separation 1.
Engineered Safeguards Panel
- Phase "A" Isol. Pushbuttons/ Phase "B" Isol. Pushbuttons 2.
Reactor Control Panel
- Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Loops "A"/"B"/"C"/"D"
- Reactor Coolant Loops "A"/"B"/"C"/"D"
-3.
Balance of Plant
- Main Feedwater Famp Trains "A"/"B"/"C"
- Atmos. Relief Valve /Feedwater Reg. Valve
- around Gland Steam Exhaust Fans
- around Turbine Trip Pushbuttons
- Diesel Generator Trains "B"/"A"/"0" Unit 1 Diesel Generator Trains "B"/"A" Unit 2 1
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i Appendix A Bibliography i
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Appendix A Page 1 of 2 BIBLIOGRAPHY Chapanis, A.
Research Techniques in Human Engineering.
Baltimore, Maryland The John Hopkins Press, 1959.
DeGreene, K. B.
Systems Psychology.
New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1970.
Edeth, H. E.
Conditions for Im) roving Visual Information Processing, (Final Report ONR-TR88).
?altimore, MD:
The John Hopkins University, 31 August 1976.
Engel, S. E. & Granda, R. E. Guidelines for Man Display Interfaces, (IBM Technical Repert #TR00.2720).
Poughkeepsie, New York Laboratory, December 1975.
Fleishman, E.
A.,
and Bass, A. R.
Studies in Personnel and Industrial Psychology (3rd ed.).
Homewood, IL:
Dorsey Press, 1974.
Gagne, R. M.
Psychological Principles in System Development, New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston,1962.
Horton, Display Systems Engineering.
Random Systems Press, 1970.
IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Display and Control Facilities for central control Rooms of Nuclear Power Generating 5tations (IEEE STD. 566-1977).
NY:
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc., 8 July 1977.
Kerlinger, F. W.
Foundations of Behavorial Research.
New York:
- Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc.
Human Factors Methods for Nuclear Control Room Design (EPRI NP-1118-54), Palo Alto, CA:
Electric Power Research Institute, June 1979.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc.
Human Factors Review of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Design (EPRI NP-309-SY).
Palo Al to, CA:
Electric Power Research Institute, November 1976.
McCormick, E. J.
Human Factors in Engineering and Design. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1976.
Military Standard.
Human Engineering Desic n Criteria for Military Systems. Equipment, and Facilities (FIL-STD-14728).
Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 31 December 1974.
Morgan, C.
T.,
Cook, J.
S., Chapanis, A.,
cnd Lund, M. W. Human Engineering Guide to Equipment Design. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1976.
~
Appendix A Page 2 of 2 Report ~of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, (Kemeny Report).
Washington, DC, October, 1979.
Rogovin, M. and Franston, G. T.
Three Mile Island:
A Re) ort to the Commissioners and to the Public, Volume 1.
Nuclear legulatory Commission Special Inquiry Group, 1980.
Seminara, J.
L.,
Pack, R.
W.,
Gonzaler, W. R.
and Parsons, S.0. " Human Factors in the Nuclear Control Room."
Nuclear Safety 18 (December 1977):
77-790.
Sheridan, T. B. " Human Error in Nuclear Power Plants."
Technology Review 82, 4, (February 1980):
22-23.
Swain, A. D.
Preliminary Human Factors Analysis of Zion Nuclear Power Plant (SAND 76-0324; NUREG 76-6503).
Albuquerque, NM:
Sandia Laboratories, October 1975.
Van Cott, H. P. and Kindade, R. G. Human Engineering Guide to Equipment Design.
Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Pri nting Of fice,197 2.
i Woodson, W. E. & Conover, D. W.
Human Engineering Guide for Equipment Design.
New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1963.
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Appendix B Human Factors Review of Control Room Displays
Appendix B Page 1 of 6 Human Factors Review of Control Room Displays Introduction A Human Factors review of control room displays was performed by:
1.
Using a Human Factors Engineering Checklist, 2.
Collecting Indicator Readability Information, and 3.
Interviewing control room operators by using a questionnaire.
The results of the review are described herein.
1.
Human Factors Engineering Checklist A Human Factors Engineering Checklist was developed by General Physics Corporation and consisted of a number of engineering design guidelines related to controls, labels, displays and work spaces.
The design guidelines were derived from MIL-STD-1472B and related checklists used within the aerospace industry and tailored to a power plant control room.
j The checklist items were compared to the design of the board by two reviewers.
One reviewer was a Human Factors Engineer and the other was an Instrumentation and Controls Engineer familiar with the operation of the control board.
The compliance of each control board design feature to the checklist was evaluated by the reviewers and rated on a scale from one to five, where a value of 1 indicated low compliance and a value of 5 indicated high compliance.
Comments and rationale for the rating values were also noted.
In general, the checklist revealed reasonably good design of controls and displays.
Although there were exceptions, the majority of the controls and displays were found to comply to standard human factors engineering criteria.
Exceptions to this trend were particular controls associated with the Engineered Safeguards Panel.
The Zion Station filled in the recess of the pointers on three star rotary switches with white paint.
The white pointer will improve the indication of the switch's position.
These three switches are on Containment Spray Pump Test Switches lA, 1B, and 1C on_the Engineered Safeguards Panel.
Particular approaches to imp oving the use of the Engineered Safeguards Panel during emergency condi. ions were evaluated.
One immediate solution was determined to have the operator check-off E0P procedural steps as the control room action is completed.
This technique would more closely tie each operator action to a particular switch on the board in the sequential steps required by the procedure.
The Zion Station has instructed the Westinghouse Zion Simulator to train CECO operators to check-off precedure steps during E0P implementation on the Engineered Safeguards Panel.
Appendix B Page 2 of 6 The checklist also revealed a certain degree of nonconformity among control display labeling and identification.
That is, thero was some variation in character height, label size and labal colors.
Placement of labels above controls and below meters was not always consistent. to this Appendix provides criteria for control displays where emphasis between subsystem, module and component labels are needed.
Threa feet is the normal viewing distance at the control board and twelve 'eet is the normal distance for standing back and scanning the cor "a' board.
Also evident from the checklist evaluation was the predomi af electrical maintenance bus related information on the control disi JTels.
Improvements could be made by reducing the size of mai ntenar.-,
sring wherever it is required.
The results of the control room display labeling evaluation did not show detrimental impacts of tFe current labeling on operator performance.
2.
Indicator Readability The readability of visual indicators was evaluated by collecting data in the control room with the Unit shutdown.
The data was designed to determine the readability of the vertical indicators as a function of pointer color, viewing angle and indicator scale type.
Response time and reading measurements were collected from ten operators who examined ten selected vertical indicators, one at a time.
These indicators were:
Indicator Number Instrument Number IR Current NI-35B PR Full PWR NI-41B Loop A Tave TI-412 PRZR Level LI-459 PRZR Press PI-455 SG Level LI-519 Stm Flo FI-542 FW Flo FI-540 SG Pr ess PI-544 Cnmt Press PI-CS19 i
Appe-dix B Page 3 of 6 The pointer colors evaluated were black and red and viewing angles were 900 (direct viewing) and 600 (indirect viewing).
The data collected was for 2 colors, 2 viewing angles and 10 indicator scale types.
Analysis of Variance Administration (ANOVA) of pointer colors was counterbalanced over the two groups of five operators per group.
Angles of view and indicator type were presented randomly.
The following is a summary of the results of the data collected.
1.
There was a slight increase in meter reading accuracy with a dark red pointer as compared to a black pointer.
(This improvement in reading accuracy would have been greater if a more contrasting pointer color like a bright red or an orange / red pointer was evaluated.)
2.
Performance accuracy with either a red or black pointer depended on indicator type.
With certain indicators (log scale), there was no difference between black and red pointers as a function of viewing angle.
3.
There was great variability among operators in reading accuracy.
4.
Performance varied significantly depending on indicator scale type.
The normal viewing distance of the indicators was three (3) feet.
As the distance increased to twelve (12) feet, the distance contributed to the lack of accuracy.
This inaccuracy also made it difficult to establish clear, si between black and red pointers. gnificarc differences in performance However, throughout the collection of 1
data operators commented on the ease of detection of a red pointer over that of a black pointer.
The general consensus was that the red pointer made it easier to detect the location of the pointer on the scale from a distance.
Consequently, following the administration of the questionnaire, the operators were asked to examine selected colors documented in the Federal Standard No. 595a color chart.
Four colors in the gloss, semi-gloss and lusterless series were evaluated.
Federal color series Red, Orange, Yellow and Fluorescents.
Each operator reviewed each color using a 3/16 x 1/2 inch triangular pointer cut-out overlay and chose the pointer color he felt to be the most appropriate for a pointer color.
The results of the evaluation of the color series are presented here.
Operators Selection OPERATOR #
COLOR NUMBER
- 1 Fluorescent _ orange 38903 2
Fluorescent orange 38903 3
Fluorescent orange 38903 4
Fluorescent red 38905 5
Fluorescent orange 38903 6
Fluorescent orange 38903 7
Fluorescent orange 38903 8
Fluorescent orange 38903 9
Fluorescent orange 38903 10 Fluorescent orange 38903
- Numbers refer to Federal Standard No. 595a COLORS
Appendix B Page 4 of 6 It is clear from the data that the mijority of preferences were for a lusterless fluorescent orange (Federal.tler number, 38903).
Although easily detectable from a distance, it was determined (after a review of the theoretical perceptual literature) that a highly bright reflective color does not necessarily enhance target detectability, but can create a certain degree of annoyance.
Consequently, a semi-gloss fluorescent orange color finish was determined as the best color, Federal color number (28915).
The reflectance properties of the semi-gloss 28000 series are lower than the lusterless 38000 series.
3.
Structured Operator Questionnaire The primary objective of the readability data collection was to assess the accuracy of indicator readability by using human performance data.
However, additional data regarding indicator visibility was acquired by developing a structured questionnaire that was used to subjectively assess the readability and interpretability of three selected indicators.
The operator was required to rate (on a scale from 1 to 7) particular dimensions of indicator design.
These were:
- Readability of indicated valve
- Readability of meter scale
- Interpretability of indicator scale
- Pointer size
- Detectability-of pointer The results of the questionnaire can be summarized as follows:
1.
Pointer size has no effect on reading accuracy.
That is, reading accuracy is limited by the size of the indicator values.
2.
Pointer location detection accuracy varied as a function of viewing angle and viewing distance.
3.
Indicator scale value readability was poorer at far distances and non-direct viewing angles.
However, this was scale dependent, where log scales were more difficult to read and interpret than linear scales at any distance or viewing angle.
An additional, important issue ideritified by the questionnaire results was the need for a technique to aid the operator in determining the general location of the indicator pointer.
Pointer location accuracy has been shown to improve with increases in pointer size and pointer / background contrast.
Due to limitations in changing pointer size, it was determiaed (following a simulator evaluation) that providing a green color-coded area on the indicator representing a normal operating range improves the operators' ability to locate the general location of the pointer.
Green was chosen due to its conventional association with normal or safe operation and a Federal color standard was specified (32430).
Appendix B Page 5 of 6 The pointer fully overlapping the green band underneath the pointer would provide sufficient color contrast information.
Sufficient pointer / band-visual edge information where the pointer overlaps the band would be available to increase the operators' ability to detect the pointer's general location.
An enlarged example of the information available to the operator under these circumstances is provided in Figure 1.
The actual pointer is a triangle with a 3/16 inch base and 1/2 inch altitude.
The green band is 1/4 inch wide.
As a result of the study, the Zion Station will start in August 1980 to install green normal operating bands under selected pointer instruments during normal calibration.
The installation of the green bands is expected to be completed by December 31, 1980.
1
o Appendix B Page 6 of 6 e
Green Normal g/
Operating Band Mx The four (4) edges provide Pointer j 55jy e
an illustration of where the operators attention is drawn to the pointer and the band combination.
The combination provides visual enhancement of the pointer location.
Figure 1.
Instrument Pointer Enhancement (An enlarged example of color and edge information available to the operator for detecting the location of a pointer on a green background.)
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e Appendix B Page 1 of 2 Human Factors Engineering Criteria for Control Display Labeling 1.
For room illumination levels above 1 ft. candle, black lettering on a white background is recommended.
This convention should be used throughout except in areas where the illumination levels are below 1 ft. candle.
Under these conditions white lettering on a black background should be used.
No whole-label color coding should be employed.
2.
Labels should be placed below all indicators.
This convention should be followed_except in cases where there are space constraints.
3.
Labels should be placed above controls.
This convention sholi'd be followed except in cases where there are spare constraints. *However, consistancy, within a subsystem, module or component area, should be the rule.
4.
Print Size
- 12 ft.
3 ft.
Viewing Distance Viewing Distance a.
Height:
Subsystem:
3/8" 1/4" Module:
1/4" 3/16" Component:
1/8" 1/8" b.
Maintenance / Electrical Bus Information = 1/8" height c.
Width:
3:5 ratio to height d.
Stroke width:
1:6 ratio height 5.
Print, word, line separation a.
Font:
one stroke-width b.
Word:
one font width c.
Line:
one-half font width
Appendix 8 Page 2 of 2 6.
Abbreviations a.
Limit to 5 or less characters
~
b.
Employ standard identifiers c.
Consistency used throughout 7.
Place control board schematics (permanent) adjacent to proper control and/or display.
8.
Eliminate, wherever possible, vertically-oriented labels and replace with horizontal labels.
l
. Consistency should be used wherever possible.
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