ML19317E193

Prehearing Brief for Intervenors Re Effect of FPC Decision on Present Proceeding.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19317E193
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee, McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	02/15/1973
From:	Bouknight J, Stover D DUKE POWER CO., TALLY, TALLY & BOUKNIGHT
To:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 7912170430
Download: ML19317E193 (21)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION In the Matter of DocFet Nos. -269A, 50-

)

DUKE POWER COMPANY ) 270A, 50-287A, 50-369A, 50-(0conee Units 1, 2 & 3; ) 370A McGuire Units 1 & 2) )

PREHEARING BRIEF FOR INTERVENORS (CITIES OF HIGH POINT, ET AL.)

ON THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION ON THE PRESENT PROCEEDING l

15 February 1973 i

TALLY. TALLY & BOUKNIGHT arro - v av Law 7 91217 o y3 M

PREHEARING BRIEF 0F INTERVENORS (CITIES OF HIGH POINT, ET AL.) ON THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION ON THE PRESENT PROCEEDING Applicant Duke Power Company (Duke) contends that the decis-ion of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in Docket No. E-7557 serves as a determination of certain subissues involved in the present pro-t ceeding.

The subissues in dispute concern alleged monopolization and exclusionary conduct by Duke and Duke's alleged use of monopoly power at one level of the industry to reduce competition at another level. These matters are clearly relevant to this proceeding; and, unless estopped or barred, the Department of Justice and the inter-vening Cities are entitled, according to fundamental due process, to have the disputed issues heard, considered and resolved by the AEC. Therefore, we surmise that Applicant's contention is that the Department of Justice and Cities are barred by res judicata or es-l topped under the doctrine of collateral estoppel from presently as-1 serting these issues.

Our position is that no party to the present proceeding is l

l barred or estopped by the FPC decision and that the FPC decision has no legal effect on the present determination. Beyond the narrow

! istue, we think there are significant practical reasons why the FPC decision is unrelated to the present proceeding.

TALLY TALLY & BOUKNIGHT ATTORNEYS AT LAW FAYETTEVILLE. N. C.

4 ,y  %,

I .,. THE STATUTORY STANDARDS IN THE TWO PROCEEDINGS ARE VASTLY DIFFERENT A. The Standard of the Atomic Energy Act At issue presently is whether activities under certain requested atomic power plant licenses will " create or maintain a situation in-consistent with the antitrust laws". (' Atomic Energy Act, Section 105(c).) The legislative history of the 1970 amendments to the Atom-ic Energy Act (House Report No. 91-1470) is clear that " inconsistent with the antitrust laws" embraces inconsistency with the policies which underlie the antitrust laws -- policies against monopoly and in favor of competition.

The AEC's antitrust function is to pre-condition licenses so as to alleviate or avert anti-competitive situations. The AEC is not con-cerned with assessing penalties or damages for technical violations of the antitrust laws. Its task is to implement, through its licensing process, the Congressional policy embodied in Section 105 and, par-ticularly, to assure that nuclear energy will be used in a manner com-patible with antitrust policy.

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The Department of Justice and the intervening Cities are not faced here with the standard of proof applicable to an antitrust plain-tiff who seeks damages or divestiture. We think our case is made upon a showing that an unconditioned license will aid in the creation or maintenance of a monopolistic rather than a competitive situation in the relevant market or markets. Thus evidence of monopoly conscious-ly acquired or maintained in the past is probative that monopoly will l be maintained by activities under an unconditioned license; and evi-TALLY. TALLY & BouKNIGHT ATTOstNEYS AT LAW l FAYETTEVILLE. M. C.

dence that wholesale monoply power has in the past been used to gain competitive advantages in one or more relevant retail markets is pro-bative that there will be similar activities under the license. All of this evidence supports license conditions designed to open doors to competition under the license.

This is the nature of the statutory standard to be applied in the present proceeding.

B. The Federal' Power Act FPC Docket No. E-7557 arose under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824d). Duke filed proposed rate schedules; certain par-ties intervened in opposition to the proposed rates; and the FPC con-ducted an investigation into the " justness and reasonableness" (16 U.

S.C. 824d(a)) of the proposed rates. The intervenors in E-7557 sugges-ted that Section 201(a) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824(a)),

which refers to regulation "in the public interest" requires the FPC to consider, in setting just and reasonable rates under Section 205, antitrust policies. The courts have held that Section 201 (and its companion section in the Natural Gas Act,15 U.S.C. 717(a)) require the FPC to consider antitrust issues as part of the "public interest".

Northern Natural Gas Co. v. F.P.C. , 399 F.2d 953 (C.A.D.C. ,1968), City of Lafayette, Louisiana v. F.P.C. , 454 F.2d 941 (C.A.D.C. ,1971).

The extent to which antitrust policy is to be determined in an FPC proceeding is not clear. In the Northern case, the Court said, at page 961:

In short, the antitrust laws are merely another tool which a regulatory agency employs to greater or lesser de-gree to give " understandable content to the broad statutory Thu.v. TALLY & BounNisNT AMOANEYS AT LAW FAYETTEVILLE. N. C.

concerr of the 'public interest.'"

In Lafayette, the same Court said, at page 948:

The regulatory library includes a host of decisions establishing that where an agency is called upor to determine whether a proposal or condition satisfies the 'sublic interest',

or another similar broad standard, the agency has the author-ity and typically the responsibility to consider a challenge based on the asserted anti-competitive purpose or consequence of the proposal.

This generality is not necessarily conclusive. The same statutory phrase may have different meanings in different contexts, and the statutes, agencies and court decisions are not necessarily fungible. A particular statute may have such a setting that, on consideration of its legislative history, the nature of the agency, and breadth of responsibility involy-ed, and other material factors, a court may come to the con-clusion that though its public interest language is broad its meaning in context warrants a relatively restricted reading.

The FPC is charged with many responsibilities other than imple-menting antitrust policy. Principal among these are its responsibil-ities to avoid confiscation of utility property and its responsibil-ity to assure that rates produce revenues sufficient to insure the financial integrity of a utility and thus its ability to provide ade-quate electric service.

This contrasts with the present prcceeding in which only antitrust matters ar'e at issue.I And the statutory standard of setting just and

1. No question of balancing the need for power in the Carolinas against antitrust considerations arises here because no party contends that any license ought to be denied Duke. Only the question of appro-priate conditioning of the licenses is here in issue.

TALLY. TALLY & BoUKNIGHT ATTOftNEYS AT LAW FAYETTEVILLE. K. C.

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reasonable rates? with regard to the public interest is radically different from and weaker (from an antitrust point of view) than the specific antitrust standard set out in Section 106 of the Atomic Energy Act.

2. In connection with the statutory phrase "just and reasonable", it should be noted that a fiading by the FPC that a rate is "just and reas-onable" does not mean that the rate cannot be reduced -- whether to remedy anticompc^' e conditions or for another reason -- without be-coming unjustly and unreasonably low. "Just and reasonable" implies a zone, not a point. This was first recognized in F.P.C. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942) (construing the very similar pro-visions of the Natural Gas Act). The rule was reiterated and developed in City of Detroit v. F.P.C., 230 F.2d 810 (C.A.D.C.,1955), the Per-mian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), and F.P.C. v. Sunigay, OX 011 Co., 391 U.S. 9 (1968). In Permian the Court said (page .767):

Moreover, this Court has often acknowledged that the Commission is not required by the Constitution or the Natural Gas Act to adopt as just and reasonable any particular rate level; rather, the courts are without authority to set aside any rate selected by the Commission which is within a " zone of reasonableness."

l l Thus the fact that a rate is declared just and reasonable does not preclude further inquiry into whether that rate conceals anticompeti-tive elements. For it is impossible to say that a different rate, free of such anticompetitive consequences, would not equally well have passed FPC scrutiny and been declared just and reasonable.

I TALLv. TALLY & Bouxn:GHT AMDRNEYS AT LAW FAnnTEWLLL N. C.

With these statutory 'ackgrounds in mind, let us examine the FPC decision itself.

II. THE FPC DID NOT DECIDE THE PRESENT ISSUES A. The Test Applied by the FPC The FPC decided that certain wholesale electric rates are just and reasonable under Section 205 cf the Federal Power Act. In so de-ciding, the FPC gave no " determinative weight"3 to antitrust issues raised by intervenors in that proceeding. In dealing with those anti-trust issues and in summarizing and approving the initial decision, the FPC said (0 pinion No. 641, p.11):

As noted above, the Examiner rejected all of these argu-ments on the ground that Duke had not violated the antitrust laws, that the level of Duke's industrial rates was a question for the State Commissions presently pending before,them and subject to the same arguments that the Intervenors are enti-tied to rates based on fully allocated costs the same as any other customers.

The FPC imposed a test of violation of the antitrust laws and refused to consider the relationship between Duke's wholesale and retail rates. This alone should dispose of Applicant's present con-tention and lay to rest any fears that matters presently in issue have been determined by FPC.

Below, we speak more comprehensively to specific issues and remedies.

3. Initial Decision, p. 21. Affirmed in Opinion No. 641.

TALLY. TALLY & BoOKNIGHT

! ATTOANEYS AT LAW IPAYETTEVILLE. N. C.

l B. The Price Soueeze The intervenors in Docket No. E-7557 argued that Duke had created and maintained a price squeeze by charging the municipal and coopera-tive customers the same rate, or at times a higher rate, than it caarged its own industrial customers. The intervenors argued, and produced evidence, that this scheme prevented them from competing fairly with Duke for large, high-load-factor industrial customers. Duke offered evidence that such competition was possible. Faced with this conflict, the presiding Administrative Law Judge said (Initial Decision, p. 28):

• *

• the sales to industrial customers, as.well as the rates charged to the latter by Duke and by the municipalities and the cooperatives, are retail sales and retail rates. The reg-ulatory jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission pursuant to Part II of the Federal Power Act does not extend to the regu-lation of retail rates, charges, and services; that is express-ly recognized as a matter of state concern. Gainsville Util-ities Deoartment, et al. v. Florida Power Corooration, suora, at p. 1242. Thus, the question of competition for strictly l retail service is a matter within the purview of, and for resolution by, state regulation.

The Commission agreed with this treatment of the issue (0 pinion No.

641, pp. 2,11-12).

The FPC denied jurisdiction over the entire matter.

The issue before this Board is not whether the Administrative Law Judge and the FPC were correct in ruling that the matter of competi-tion for industrial loads was subject in toto to State jurisdiction';

indeed, Intervenors would argue that they were not. The immediate l question is whether the FPC has found that no price squeeze exists.

The Administrative Law Judge included in his initial decision a l TALLY TALLY & BOUKNIGit?

AMOANEYS AT LAW FAYONEVILLE. N. C L

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connentary on the conflicting price squeeze evidence before him. He said (Initial Decision, pp. 26-27):

Apparently, the margins between the costs to be irnered and the revenues to be derived from industrial service may vary, depending not only upon the volume and load factors oi the whole-sale and the industrial customers, but also the coincidence or diversity of their respective peak demands. In order to deter-mine, with some reasonable precision, the profitability or the feasibility of a municipality serving a particular new industrial customer, all of the facts and circumsta.7ces surrounding that service must be taken into account. It is, therefore, understand-able that, to the extent that the parties have assumed or have stressed the existence of somewhat different conditions, the results they reach must necessarily also differ. Thus, perhaps, neither side is wholly right nor wholly wrong. In any event, the evidence indicates that, on an overall basis, the municipalit-ies and cooperatives have been in a position to compete with Duke for retail industrial customers for many years, as demon-strated by the consistently lower average costs per kwh to the wholesale customers, as compared with such average ca.sts to the company's industrial customers.

If there is any justification for the contention that the FPC has found as a fact that tnere is no price squeeze, it must be extracted from this paragraph. The Administrative Law Judge again gave no considera-tion, in this paragraph, *.o the relationship between Duke's wholesale

' rates and the rates it charged its own retail industrial customers.

And this paragraph must be read in light of (1) the language previous-ly quoted, regarding the division of jurisdiction between the FPC and the states; and (2) the nature of the proceeding before Judge Kaplan.

The disclaimer of FPC jurisdiction over "the question of compe-tition for strictly retaii 'ervice" means that, whatever the factual merits of the claims advanced by intervenors before the FPC, the re-lief asked for could not be granted. This in turn means that, as a TALLY. TALLY & BOUKNIGHT ATTORNEYS AT LAW FAYETTEVILLE. N. C.

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necessary corollary of the FPC's view of its own jurisdiction, any finding of fact on the actual existence of a price squeeze in the re-tail industrial market was simply gratuitous. Not only would such a finding not influence the FPC's decision, but it would have no force as res judicata. The Restatement of Judgments, Section 1, states that Where a reasonable opportunity has been afforded to the parties to litigate a claim before a court which has jurisdic-tion over the carties and the cause of action, and the court has finally decided the controversy, the interests of the State and of the parties require that the validity of the claim and any issues actually litigated in the action shall not be liti-gated again by them. (Emphasis added.)

Now in the present case there is a flat disclaimer by the FPC of jurisdiction to decide the very question to which the factual " finding" cf ability to compete refers. When the tribunal itself disclaims jur-isdiction to decide the controversy, as the FPC has done, two of the conditions expressed in the Restatement section just quoted are not met: there is no jurisdiction over the cause of action, and there has been no final decision of the controversy. The subsidiary (and unnecessary) factual observation therefore cannot be res judicata even l

on the identical parties.

Since the record closed in E-7557, Duke has imposed two additional, I

separate, and severe price squeezes upon Cities. Thus the price squeeze cannot, in any event, be removed as an issue in this proceeding.

1 C. Exclusionary Conduct The FPC did not permit discovery into Duke's alleged anticompeti-tive activities. Thus all e/idence presented on which FPC based its finding that Duke "had not violated the anti-trust laws" (0 pinion No.

6al, p. 11) censisted of public, or semi-public documents. Of these, TALLY. TALLY & BOUKNIGHT AUC ANEYS AT LAW FAYETTEVibbE. N. C.

the Administrative Law Judge excluded two major ones. Duke's Green River intervention, which was presented as evidence of Duke's pur-suit of vexatious and burdensome litigation, was excluded from con-sideration on the ground of pendency of that license application proceeding before FPC. Evidence of Duke's denial of coordination with municipal systems in the generation of nuclear power was exclu-ded because of the pendency of the present proceeding. The FPC's Administrative Law Judge said (Initial Decision, p.18):

Moreover it would be improper for this Commission to usurp the functions delegated to a sister agency, the Atomic Energy Commission. The latter now has before it certain pending pro-ceedings in which the request of certain municipalities to share in the ownership and output of Duke's proposed nuclear plants and the weight to be given to the policies of the an-titrust laws are under consideration.

The FPC had before it no factual questions on the matter of exclu-sionary conduct. It simply applied the Federal Power Act, as it in-terprets it, to certain public documents.

Surely that is not dispositive of the question of application of the standard of Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act to conduct l evidenced by the same documents together with the fruits of discovery in this proceeding -- particularly in light of the FPC's deference to this Commission on "the weight to be given the policies of the antitrust l

laws".

D. Remedies The remedies considered by the FPC and those presently requested are entirely different.

Nowhere in our pleadings or arguments before this Board have we TALLY, TALLY & BOUKNIGHT AMCRNEYS AT LAW FAYCTEVILLE. N. C

urged it to interfere with the rate levels set by the Federal Power Commission. The determination of those levels is comitted by law to the FPC and, even if that agency does so without considering is-sues it is legally bound to consider, the remedy lies with the Court of Appeals and not before the Atomic Energy Comission. But we have here asked not for a different rate, but for an alternative to pay-ing the rates prescribed -- i.e., an alternative source (or access to alternative sources) of bulk power. The fact that Duke's rates for a particular service have been approved by the FPC does not mean that some other agency, with a broader antitrust responsibility (or a broader view of its antitrust responsibility) cannot require the company to offer some different kind of service as a means of ending or averting a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

That this last statement is consistent with the FPC's own view of its responsibilities and powers is clear from Judge Kaplan's statement (Initial Decision, p.18):

There are no provisions specifically granting authority for the imposition of conditions, such as those proposed by inter-l venors, in connection with the exercise by the Comission of its ratemaking powers under Sections 205 and 206 of the Act, as j

compared, for example, to the express provisions contained in sections 10, 203(b), and 204(b) of the Act. Moreover, it would be improper for this Commission to usurp the functions delegated to a sister agency, the Atomic Energy Comissu - I The latter has now before it certain pending proceedings in which the re-j quest of certain municipalities to share in the ownership and i

output of Duke's proposed nuclear plants and the weight to be given to the policies of the antitrust laws are under considera-tion.2 * * * . It is only appropriate that the merits of the l

TALLY. TALLY & SOUKNIGHY ATTORNEYS AT LAW j FAYETTEVILLE. N. C.

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issues directly raised therein, including the desirability of competition, should be fully determined in those proceedings, rather than here as a collateral matter on a fragmentary re-cord.

1. 68 U.S. Stat. 938; 42 U.S.C. 2135.

2. Duke Power Company, Oconee Un;ts 1, 2, and 3, AEC Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287.

This pronouncement forms part of the " correct and comprehensive" treatment by Judge Kaplan of the antitrust issues, which the FPC ex-plicitly affirmed. The proposed conditions referred to by Judge Kap-lan were:

1. That Duke be allowed no rate increase unless it permitted intervenors to participate on reasonable terms in the benefits of nuclear energy by ownership of a share, or entitlement to a par-tion of the output, of the Oconee and McGuire nuclear stations;

2. That Duke be allowed no rate increase unless it would de-liver en reasonable terms such energy or any other energy available

{

to the intersenors; and

3. That Duke be allowed no rate increase unless it ceased any and all acts designed to prevent the intervenors, individually, jointly, through the vehicle of a membership corporation, or other-wise, from generating and transmitting their own electric energy.

See his Initial Decision, p.13.

These are, in large part, the types of relief Intervenors are seeking here.

The Federal Power Commission has therefore spoken with unusual explicitness regarding the limits of its responsibilities. It has TALLY. TALLY & BOUKNIGHT AMORNEYS AT LAW FAYETTE&LE. N. C.

_13 disavowed both the power and the intention to grant any of the re-lief sought here. It has stated that it will not consider the con-tentions advanced by the municipalities with regard to competition in setting just and reasonable rates, and it has indicated that once those rates have been determined its responsibilities under se'ctions 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act are discharged. Intervenors, on the other hand, do not ask this Board to take any action affecting the rates approved by the FPC, but to determine whether the statute governing the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission requires that Inter-venors be given access to an alternative source (or sources) of bulk power supply. In order to execute that responsibility, this Board must consider whether there is, or will be created, a situation in-consistent with the antitrust laws. Part of that determination must rest on a further determination whether Duke's rates have an anticom-petitive effect, even if Intervenors must continue to pay those rates as long as Duke is their sole supplier. Seen in this light, there is no conflict between the statutory duties of the FPC and the action we ask this Board to take.

III. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL We think we have demonstrated that the following differences ex-ist between FPC Docket No. E-7557 and the present proceeding:

1. The statutory standards in each are markedly different.

2. The issues decided by FPC are very different from the issues TALLY. TALLY & Sougn:GHT AUCRNEYS AT LAW FAYETTEVILLE. N. C.

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presently in question.

3. The remedies which we request here were beyond the power of the FPC (by its interpretation of its powers) in E-7557.

Here we speak to the specific doctrines of res judicata and cal-lateral estoppel. Professor Davis' discussion of the administrative application of the two doctrines4 leads us to think it unprofitable to Jraw here any distinction between them.

Professor Davis and the case law lay out the requirements which must be met before the doctrine of res judicata or collatera' estop-pel can be imposed on a party to an administrative proceer'.ing.

A. Identity or Privity of Parties It is well settled that a party cannot be barred from seeking adjudication of rights unless that party, or a party in privity with i.t, was involved in the earlier adjudication.

Decisively, tha Department of Justice, the party which has as-sumed the initial burden to proceed in the present case, was in no way involved in E-7557.

The FPC proceeding was litigated by Electricities of North Car-olina, representing virtually all the North Carolina municipalities l served at wholesale by Duke, as well as by a number of South Carolina cities and cooperatisas from both states. The comments on the evidence and the rulings made on the proposed rates were necessarily general and dealt with this entire class of customers, since the FPC customar-ily sets rates for broad classifications of purchasers. A relatively smaller group of North Carolina cities are intervenors here. Clearly, there is no logical identity between the two classes, and such logical tau.v. rAu.y a sourniour 4. 2 bu, M. W Madu M ON,1970 Supp.)

ATTORNEYS AT LAW FAYDTEVALE. N. C.

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differentiation constitutes a further obstacle to the application of res judicata.

B. The Statutory Context Must Be the Same A party is not barred from relitigating an issue identical 5 to one litigated earlier in a different statutory context. For examole, j in Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (C.A.D.C.,1968), Sherman Act jurisdiction depended upon construc-tion of the term " foreign commerce". The Federal Maritime Commission had considered squarely whether the company was engaged in " foreign comerce" under the Shipping Act of 1916 and had ruled that the com-pany was not. The subsequent antitrust suit was based upon alleged unlawful conspiracy against the same company. The question, said the Court (at p. 810), was whether the activities in issue constituted a " restraint on United States foreign commerce subject to the Sherman Act." The Court ruled that the earlier finding of the Federal Mari-time Commission was not determinative, and accepted Sherman Act juris-diction.

Here we have two entirely different statuten contexts. The is-sue of collateral estoppel was considered by the United States Supreme Court in a case very similar to the present in United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 394 (1958).

RCA and Westinghouse had agreed to swap certain radio stations.

RCA sought the approval of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

Antitrust issues concerning the swap were considered by the FCC under

5. Not that the present question involves issues at all identical. II, supra.

TALLY. TALLY & SOUKNIGHT ATTORNEYS AT LAW FAYETTSVILLE. N. C.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, for the reasons herein set forth, Intervenors (Cities of High Point, et al.), request the Board to determine that no party to this proceeding is barred or estopped by the FPC decision, and that the FPC decision has no legal effect on the present determina-tion; and to proceed with the determination of the issues in this Case.

Respectfully submitted, TALLY, TALLY & BOUKNIGHT Attorneys for Intervenors, Cities of High Point, et al.

M i y

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G V.

1 2AL .

Washington, D.C., this 15th day of February 1973.

TALLY. TALLY & BOUKNIGHT ATTORNEYS AY LAW FAYETTEVILLE. N. C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-269A

)

50-270A

)

50-287A DUKE POWER COMPANY 50-369A

)

2, and 3; ) 50-370A (Oconee Units 1, McGuire Units 1 and 2) ) .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BRIEF I hereby certify that copies of the attached Emm:ms, dated if Femag EEEE==2 1973, in the above captioned matter have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or air mail, this Mth day of e2mmz3,1973.

E4 febmsg Honorable Walter W.K. Bennett Troy B. Conner, Esquire Chairman, Atomic Safety and Reid & Priest

• 1701 K Street, N.W. ,

Licensing Board Washington, D.C. 20006 Post Office Box 185 Pinehurst, North Carolina 28374 Carl Horn, Esquire Honorable Joseph F. Tubridy President 4100 Cathedral Avenue, N.W. Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. 28200 Washington, D.C. 20016 i

l l William H. Grigg, Esquire l Honorable John B. Farmakaides Vice President and Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel General Counsel U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Duke Power Company 20545 422 Church Street Washington, D.C. Charlotte, N.C. 28201 William Warfield Ross, Esquire W.L. Porter, Esquire I George A. Avery, Esquire Duke Power Company Keith Watson, Esquire Toni K. Golden, Esquire 422 South Church Street Wald, Harkrader & Ross Charlotte, N.C. 28201 1320 Nineteenth Street, N.W.

Washingten, D.C. 20036

Mr. Frank W. Karas, Chief Atomic Safety and Licensing, Public Proceedin'gs Branch j Board Panel Office of the Secretary of U.S. Atomic Energy Commission the Commission Washington, D.C. 20545 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission ,

Washington, D.C. 20545 l Joseph Rutberg, Esquire Benjamin H. Vogler, Esquire ,

Chairman, Atomic Safety and Antitrust Counsel for AEC Licensing Appeals Doard Regulatory Staff U.S. Atomic Energy Commission U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D.C. 20545 Washington, D.C. 20545 Wallace E. Brand, Esquire Mr. Abraham Braitman, Chief Antitrust Division l Office of Antitrust and Department of Justice Indemnity P.O. Box 7513 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission washington, D.C. 20044 Washington, D.C. 20545 t

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