ML19309A848
| ML19309A848 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1980 |
| From: | Randy Hall BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY |
| To: | Ferguson R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004010410 | |
| Download: ML19309A848 (9) | |
Text
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- , u BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
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!? 3 3 ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.
m Upton, New York 11973 Department of Nuclear Energy (516) 345-2144 March 26, 1980 Mr. Robert L. Ferguson Plant Systems Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.
20555 RE: Lacrosse, Fire Protection Review, Items 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.1.5, 3.1.6, 3.1.13, 3.1.14, 3.1.20, 3.1.22, 3.1.25, 3.1.19, 3.2.2, 3.2.5, 3.2.6.
Dear Bob:
Attached are all the Lacrosse fire protection review items for which we have received licensee information.
Respectfully yours, h ( Wh sYvh Robert E. Hall, Group Leader Reactor Engineering Analysis REH:EAM:sd attachment cc.:
D. Eisenhut W. Kato wo/att.
T. Lee M. Levine wo/att.
E. MacDougall V. Panciera E. Sylvester 4
fool s
//
800.4010@8
LACROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW Item 3.1.3 - Interior Hose Stations SER Section 3.1.3 indicates that:
(1) Hose reach tests would be perfonned and additional hose stations pro-vided as necessary to insure all points in safety-related areas, and areas which contain major fire hazards, can be effectively reached by at least one hose stream; (2) Tests and calculations will be performed to confirm that the pressure at each fire hose station outlet is greater than or equal to 65 psig with 100 gpm flowing; (3) Administrative controls will be established to prevent access to manu-al fire fighting equipment from being restricted by temporary storage of materials within the plant.
By letter dated February 6,1980, the licensee indicated that:
(1) Hose reach tests were accomplished on December 15, 1978; (2) Flowing pressure at a fire hose station outlet in the containment is adequate with the one auxiliary high pressure service water pump (diesel fire pump) flowing 100 gpm; (3) LACBWR Administrative Control Procedure 40.1, issued February 19, 1979, requires that accessibility of manual fire fighting equipment be checked on a weekly basis.
In regard to Item (1), the licensee did not state if all areas could be effec-tively reached, or provide any test results. We recommend that tPe staff re-quire the licensee to provide the results of the hose reach tests, and to pro-pose necessary modifications to assure that all points in safety-related areas, and areas which contain major fire hazards, can be effectively reached with at least one hose stream.
Concerning Item (2), analysis of the pressure requirement at hose station shows that with the pump supplying 100 gpm the calculations are correct. However, with the pump supplying a total flow of 550 gpm, or more, the minimum 65 psig with 100 gpm flowing at the hose station is not met. Except under emergency accident conditions, which require the use of the alternate core spray or high pressure spray systems, the normal demand on the pump is about 75 gpm for the crib house screen wash. Therefore the requirement is met.
The licensee did not provide any details of the control procedure; however, the general description provided appears to be adequate.
We will complete our evaluation of Section 3.1.3 (1) when the required informa-tion has been received. We recommend that the staff accept the licensee's re-sponse on Items (2) and (3).
Item 3.1.4 - Fixed Suppression Systems SER Section 3.1.4 indicates that:
(1) The automatic sprinkler system protecting the turbine oil reservoir will be extended to also protect the associated turbine oil piping; (2) An automatic water fire suppression system or an oil shield and col-lection system will be provided to protect or prevent an oil fire at the reactor coolant recirculation pumps; (3) An automatic fire suppression system will be provided to protect the "A" diesel generator room; (4) A fixed dry pipe sprinkler system capable of quick connection to a manual hose will be provided on the exterior side of the cable pene-tration of containment; (5) An automatic water suppression system will be provided to protect against a fire in the outside transformers.
By letter dated February 6,1980, the licensee stated that:
(1) The automatic sprinkler system over the turbine oil reservoir was ex-tended to protect the associated piping on May 8, 1979; (2) An oil shield and collection system is to be installed. The instal-lation, at the date of the letter, was approximately 50 percent com-plete, with the remainder to be completed during the next refueling or other outage of sufficient duration to allow access to the recircula-tion cubicle; (3), (4) and (5) Design details for the suppression systems are not avail-able at this time.
No drawings, design criteria or other details needed to evaluate the sprinkler system protecting the turbine oil reservoir and associated piping have been provided. We recommend that the staff request that the licensee submit design drawings and hydraulic calculations to verify that the sprinkler system design is satisfactory and the water supply is adequate.
The drawing included in the licensee's response as page nine " Oil Dripshield for Forced Circulation Pumps," does not provide sufficient details for a com-plete evaluation. We will require the lube oil collection system to meet the following criteria:
I e The proposed system provides a complete enclosure for all potential leak-age points, including lift pump and piping, external oil cooler, flanged l
l
connections, drain plugs, fill points, upper and lower reservoirs, sight glasses and overflow lines.
e During a safe shutdown earthquake, the effects of the seismic event on the system will not adversely affect plant safety.
e Strainers or other means of preventing clogging of drain piping are pro-vided.
We will complete our evaluation of licensee responses following the receipt of required design details.
Item 3.1.5 - Heat Detector Circuit Supervision SER Section 3.1.5 indicates that the circuits of heat detectors which actuate the carbon dioxide suppression system protecting the "B" diesel generator room will be electrically supervised for power failure, ground faults or circuit breaks and will alarm and annunciate these abnormal conditions in the control room.
By letter dated February 6,1980, the licensee proposed to install a meter re-lay at the "end-of-line" thermo-switch circuit. This meter will monitor the voltage along the detector string for short circuits, open circuits and g rour.ds. Any of these fault conditions cause the meter to read low.
This fail-safe unit will have a remote annunciator in the control room.
We do not accept the licensee's proposal to install an "end-of-line" meter relay. The description of operation indicates that the proposed meter relay will not perform all the required functions; i.e., a ground fault condition on the neutral power leg will not be annunciated.
We recommend that the staff require the licensee to provide a supervisory de-vice listed by UL or FM for the intended purpose.
Item 3.1.6 - Breathing Air SER Section 3.1.6 indicates a six hour on-site breathing air reserve should be provided for each of the existing eight breathing units based on 20 minutes of air per bottle.
Two spare bottles will be provided for each unit.
By letter dated February 6,1980, the licensee indicated that 17 breathing air units and 12 spare air bottles are available on-site, and that the cascade re-charging system has adequate capacity to provide the required air reserve.
The licensee's response did not indicate the rate at which the cascade system could refill the breathing air bottles. We recommend that the staff request the licensee provide this information and verify that, including the time to transport the bottles to and from the fire fighters, the required number of fire fighters can be supplied for a period of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
We will complete our evaluation of this item following receipt of the required information.
1
Item 3.1.13 - Protection of Service Water Piping SER Section 3.1.13 indicates that the licensee has provided p:otection for the service water pipes and their supports in the oil storage room against a fire in the room.
By letter dated February 6,1980, the licensee indicated that the high pressure service water and low pressure service water piping and hangers in the oil storage room have been insulated with a 2 inch layer of Owens-Corning KAYLO 10 pipe insulation and covered with metal. The licensee has estimated that this insulation would prcvide a fire resistive rating of at least four hours based on a ::omparison with similar materials.
The licensee has provided no documentation or calculations supporting his claim of equivalent four hour fire resistance rating for the insulation material.
The information provided by the licensee on the KAYLO 10 asbestos free pipe in-sulation indicates a service temperature of 12000F, lower than might be ex-pected during a fire. Based on our analysis of the information provided, we do not accept the licensee's modification. We recommend that the staff require the licensee document the fire resistance of KAYLO 10 by test or analysis or use an insulation design approved for the intended purpose.
Item 3.1.14 - Neutron Shields SER Section 3.1.14 indicates that the polyurethane neutron shield blocks around the control rod drive system below the reactor will be replaced with those of noncombustible material.
By letter dated February 6, 1980, the licensee stated that they plan to replace the existing neutron shield blocks with Type 277 shielding, manufactured by Re-actor Experiments, Inc.
Based on manufacturer's literature provided by the li-censee, the proposed shielding represents a significant impi ovement over fire hazards of the present shielding. We recommend that the staff accept the li-censee's proposed modification.
Item 3.1.20 - Unrated Barrier SER Section 3.1.20 indicates that the licensee wiil upgrade the unrated barrier between the "A" diesel room and the machine shop to provide a fire resistance comensurate with the hazards on both sides of the barrier.
By letter dated February 6, 1980, the licensee indicated that the door between "A" diesel room and the machine shop has been replaced by a door with three hour fire rating. Calculations were also provided estimating that the barrier has a fire resistance of 2.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. A local contractor is also preparing a bid to upgrade the barrier to a 2.8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> rating.
The licensee's estimate did not indicate the type of aggregate in the concrete block. A concrete block with the described dimensions and unknown aggregates has an estimated fire resistance rating of about 1.3 hcurs. We do not accept the licensee's calculations. We recommend that the staff require the licensee
to upgrade the fire resistance of the wall to a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating, based on the es-timated fire resistance rating of 1.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for the existing wall. We recom-mend that the staff further require the licensee to document the proposed modi-fications prior to implementation.
Item 3.1.22 - Protection for Electrical Equipment and Control Rooms SER Section 3.1.22 indicates that the licensee will:
(1) Relocate record file cabinets stored in the electrical equipment room out of safety-related areas; (2) Provide an automatic suppression system for the electrical equipment room; (3) Provide additional protection such as enclosure, coating, or auto-matic suppression for cables in the concealed spaces above the con-trol room.
By letter dated February 6,1980, the licensee indicated that the record file cabinet which had been stored in the electrical equipment room was relocated out of safety-related areas on January 21, 1980. The licensee also indicated that wiring located above the control room ceiling consists of normal lighting and emergency lighting, three paging system speakers, and security system wir-ing. All this wiring is in conduit mounted above a "see-through" grid ceiling.
Three exposed cables are also located above this ceiling. Two of these are used for remote alarm and reset for high radiation entry alarm, and the third is used during refueling outages for closed circuit television signals.
Lighting cables are G.E. polyurethane-flamenol cable, paging speakers are two conductor PVC, and security wiring ie 24 pair, 3 cable polyurethane.
High ra-diation alarm and reset is two conductor two cable PVC, and the closed circuit television cable is one conductor, polyurethane coaxial.
The licensee indicated that none of the few cables above the control room are safety related, and therefore, no further protection is required in this area.
We accept the licensee's modification regarding the record file cabinet in the electrical control room and the licensee's response regarding wiring above the control room ceiling. We will require the licensee to submit design details on the proposed automatic suppression system in the electrical equipment room.
Item 3.1.25 - Gas Suppression System Actuation SER Section 3.1.25 indicates that the licensee will:
(1) Provide the actuation power for the carbon dioxide system that pro-tects the "B" diesel room from the essential service bus which derives the on-site backup power from the "A" diesel generator; (2) Modify the emergency manual release of the carbon dioxide system to conform with the provisions of NFPA 12-1977, Section 1-8.3.5.
"All valves controlling the release and distribution of carbon dioxide
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shall be provided with an emergency manual control. This does not ap-ply to slave high pressure cylinders.
It is possible for the normal manual control to qualify as the emergency manual control if the provisions of 1-8.1 are satisfied.
The emergency means, preferably mechanical, shall be easily accessible and located close to the valves controlled.
If possible, the system should be designed so that emergency actuation can be accomplished from one location. This does not apply to slave high pressure cyl-inders."
By letter dated February J6,1980, the licensee indicated that the activation power circuit for the carbon dioxide system will be modified as required by June 1, 1980, and that the emergency manual release for the carbon dioxide sys-tem in the IB diesel generator room will be modified by adding two remote man-ual releases in the adjacent electrical equipment room.
The licensee's response did not include any design details of the proposed mod-ifications to the actuation power circuit. We will require the licensee to submit the details of the proposed modification.
We recommend that the staff accept the licensee's proposed modification of the emergency manual release for the carbon dioxide system.
We will complete our evaluation following receipt of the required actuation power design details.
Item 3.1.29 - Signaling System SER Section 3.1.29 indicates that:
(1) The licensee will test the sprinkler system water flow alarm at two month intervals.
(2) - The licensee will perform sprinkler system drain tests following oper-ation of system control valves; (3) The licensee will install a timer for each detector zone to provide warning when the detector zone has been bypassed for a certain period of time.
By letter dated February 6,1980, the licensee indicated that a timer is being installed in each detector zone by August 1, 1980. The licensee's response in-cluded a brief operational description, but the referenced circuit drawings
_.(identified as " Attachment C") were missing from the submittal. We have not received the licensee's response to Items (1) and (2).
The operational description of the timing circuits included in the licensee's response appears to be adequate except that Attachment C was not included and the licensee did not indicate the maximum timer setting. We recommend that the staff require the licensee submit Attachment C and indicate the maximum timer setting. We also recommend that the staff require the licensee confirm their
commitment to test sprinkler system water flow alarms at two month intervals, and perform sprinkler system drain tests following operation of system control valves.
We will complete our evaluation following receipt of the required information.
3.2.2 - Fire Water System SER Section 3.2.2 indicates that the licensee will provide the results of the study of the arrangement of the fire pumps in the yard main piping which will assure that a sufficient number of pumps are available to meet the fire water demand at all times, taking into account the possibility of a fire involving both diesel driven fire pumps, failure of a fire pump, or failure of a section of the fire water piping system. The study will include consideration for (1) separate pump feeds to the yard main, (2) additional sectional valves, and (3) interconnection with the fire water system at adjacent fossil units.
By letter dated February 6,1980, the licensee indicated that Nuclear Energy Services has completed a study of the LACBWR fire water system and combined water demand. A draft of this study has beea reviewed by LACBWR staff and is presently being revised to incorporate minor changes.
It is anticipated that the final study of the draft of the fire water system and the combined demand study will be submitted to the NRC by February 15, 1980.
We have not yet received the licensee's report. We will complete our evalua-tion following receipt of the required infomation.
3.2.5 - Security Modification of Fire Doors SER Section 3.2.5 indicates that the licensee has provided further documenta-tion to demonstrate that the fire resistance rating of those fire door assem-blies provided with physical security modification are not reauced by the mod-ification.
By letter dated January 31, 1979, the licensee had provided documentation that the installed electric door strikes are Underwriters' Laboratories listed for fire and burglary services.
The fire performance of a fire door and frame assembly depends in part on ade-quate reinforcement of the frame in the area of the strike-plate. The licensee has not shown that the door frames now comply with the provisions of Section 6 l
of UL Standard 63, Fire Door Frames, relating to strike-plate reinforcements.
We recommend that the staff require the licensee to submit further documenta-I tion demonstrating that following modifications necessary for installation of l
the electric door strikes, the fire door frames still comply with the applica-i ble provisions of UL Standard 63, Fire Door Frames (Fifth Edition). We will complete our evaluation following receipt of the required information.
3.2.6 - In-Situ Detector Testing SER Section 3.2.6 indicates that the licensee has provided a description and acceptance criteria for the in-situ tests for the fire detectors. This infor-mation is currently being reviewed.
The licensee's submittal did not provide sufficient detail for the staff to de-termine the acceptability of the method as a means of verifying the adequacy of the type, number and distribution of fire detectors in the plant. Recent stud-1es have indicated that the type of test envisioned by NRC is probably beyond the present state of the art. NRC is in the process of developing alternative acceptance criteria for fire detector installations. We will address this is-sue when such criteria become available.
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