ML19262C578
| ML19262C578 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1980 |
| From: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254F983 | List: |
| References | |
| LAC-6774, NUDOCS 8002140561 | |
| Download: ML19262C578 (35) | |
Text
s DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE Ba Grosse, OYisconsin 54601 February 6, 1980 In reply, please refer to LAC-6774 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. Dennis L.
Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555
SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS
References:
(1)
Phone Conversation, October 9,
- 1979, James Shea, Kim Lee, and R.
E. Shimshak.
(2)
Amendment No. 17 to License No. DPR-45 forwarded by NRC Letter, Ziemann to Linder, dated July 27, 1979.
(3)
NRC Letter, Ziemann to Linder, dated September 14, 1979.
Gentlemen:
Reference 1 requested design details regarding certain plant modifi-cations required by Reference 2 to improve the fire protection program at the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor.
Available design details and status of fire protection requirements of Reference 2 are described in Enclosure 1 to this letter.
Work on the LACBWR Fire Protection Program and submission of reports have been delayed due to manpower requirements of seismic issues, the security program, and prolonged ASLB proceedings regarding LACBWR's proposed spent fuel storage expansion.
In addition, considerable effort has been spent responding to correspondence related to TMI which has required review of procedures, planning of plant modifica-tions and resubmission of docketed materi l.
Additional required information will be submitted later this month.
If there are any questions regarding this response, please contact us.
Very truly yours, b
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
/2d4L L
W Frank Lind neral Manager FL:FD:af 800214 6 lTfffE5 Roca'm c@
f Enclosure o
cc:
J. G. Keppler, Reg. Dir., NRC-DRO III (2gpggg g
c ENCLOSURE 1 IMPLEMENTATION DATES FOR MODIFICATIONS DPC NRC DPC Estimated Completion Completed Completion Item Dates Dates Dates 3.1.1 Exterior Hose Houses.........
8-1-80 See attached report.
3.1.2 Fire Fighting Equipment......
7-31-79 See attached report.
3.1.3*
Interior Hose Stations.......
10-1-79 See attached report.
3.1.4*
Fixed Suppression Systems....
6-1-80 See attached report.
3.1.5*
Heat Detector Circuit Super-vision.......................
9-1-79 See attached report.
3.1.6*
Breathing Air................
9-1-79 10-1-79 NA 3.1.7 Diesel Oil Shutoff...........
10-1-79 See attached 3-1-80 report.
3.1.8 Flame Retardant Coating......
9-1-79 10-18-79 NA 3.1.9 Piping Penetration Seal......
10-1-79 See Att.Rpt.
4-1-80 3.1.10 Emergency Lighting...........
1-1-80 1-24-90 NA 3.1.11 Hydrogen Detectors...........
Completed 3.1.12 Exposed Steel Protect.on.....
9-1-79 See Att.Rpt.
6-1-80 4
3.1.13*
Protection of Service Water Piping................. Completed 3.1.14*
Neutron Shields..............
3-1-80 See Att.Rpt.
9-1-80 3.1.15 Diesel Tank Filler Cap.......
Completed 3.1.16 Relocation of Cascade System.......................
9-1-79 l-80 NA 3.1.17 Fire Door Replacement........
12-1-79 l-80 NA 3.1.18 Fire Door Supervision........
12-1-79 3.1.19 Fire Dampers.................
12-1-79 See Att.Rpt.
4-1-80 3.1.20*
Unrated Barrier..............
12-1-79 See Att.Rpt.
6-1-80 3.1.21 Relocation of Chemicals......
10-1-79 3.1.22*
Protection for the Electrical Equipment and the Control Rooms........................
12-1-79 See attached report.
3.1.23 Interior Hoses...............
10-1-79 3.1.24*
Fire Hazards in the Waste Handling Building............
9-1-79 See attached report.
3.1.25*
Gas Suppression System Actuation....................
10-1-79 See Att.Rpt.
6-1-80 3.1.26 Drains and Curbs.............
10-1-79 3.1.27*
Combined Water Demand........
10-1-79 See Att.Rpt.
2-15-80 3.1.28 Cable Penetration Seal.......
1-30-80 See attached report.
3.1.29*
Signaling System.............
3-1-80 i
s ENCLOSURE 1 COMPLETION SCHEDULE FOR INCOMPLETE ITEMS DPC NRC DPC Estimated Completion Completed Completion Item Dates Dates Dates 3.2.1 Safe Shutdown Analysis....
Deferred to See attached report.
SEP 3.2.2 Fire Water System.........
9-1-79 See Att.Rpt.
2-15-80 3.2.3 Fire Pump Performance.....
9-1-79 3.2.4 Exposed Structural Steel in Turbine Building.......
10-1-79 3.2.5 Security Modification on Fire Doors................
Completed 3.2.6 In-Situ Detector Testing..
Completed 3.2.7 Circuit Interaction Study.....................
9-1-79 l-17-80 3.2.8 Diesel Fire Pump Reliability...............
6-30-80 See attached report.
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s ENCLOSURE 1 3.1.1 Exterior Hose Houses (1) Two additional exterior hose houses will be provided on the yard fire loop, one accessible to the "B" diesel generator area and one accessible to the northwest entrance to the turbine building.
Each exterior hose house will include the following equipment:
(a)
Sufficient lengths of 21" hose to reach from the hydrant location to the building entrance, (b) 200' - I t" hose, (c) 2 - li" fog nozzles with ball type shutoff valves, (d) 2 - 2i" gate va lves, (e) 1 - 23" x 11" gated wye, (f) 1 - Universal type hydrant wrench, (g) 2 - 2i" hose spanners, universal type, (h) 2 - 14" hose spanners, universal type, (i) 2 - li" coupling gaskets, and (J) 2 - 2i" coupling gaskets.
DPC RESPONSE:
Equipment required for additional hose houses was ordered on November 19, 1979 and has been received with the exception of the two exterior hose houses and legs for the hose houses.
It is expected that the hose houses will be received by February 21 and in-stalled 30-60 days thereafter.
(2) Administrative control procedures will be established to provide for the clearing and removal of snow in the area of the exterior hose houses to ensure accessibility.
DPC RESPONSE:
LACBWR Administrative Control Procedure 40.1 issued on February 19, 1979 requires that fire fighting equipment be maintained readily accessible.
In addition, ACP 40.1 requires a written weekly safety and fire prevention inspection report which includes accessibility of outside fire fighting equipment including hose houses.
ENCLOSURE 1-(Cont'd)
(4) Administrative control procedures will be established to provide a ra monthly inspection of each hose house to ensure that the fire fighting equipment is in good working condition and properly stored.
DPC RESPONSE:
LACBWR Administrative Control Procedure 40.1 issued on February 19, 1979, requires a weekly inspection of each hose house to ensure that the fire fighting equipment is in good working condition and properly stored.
(5) Administrative control procedures will be established to provide annual hydrostatic testing of hose stored in exterior hydrant hose houses.
DPC RESPONSE:
ACP 40.1 will be revised to identify need for annual hydro testing of hoses stored in exterior hydrant hose houses and the inspection form will contain an entry blank for report of cenpletion of inspection - by February 15th for ACP and by June 1st for annual test completion.
31.2 Fire Fighting Eaufpment The equipment listed below will be added to the existing inventory of manual fire fighting equipment. This equipment will be stored in a central location and be readily accessible to the brigade at all times.
(1)
One fire fighting type, cxplosion proof, smoke ejector rated for 5000 CFM.
(2)
Protective clothing (coats, boots, gloves and fire fighters helmet) for a minimum of eight men.
(3)
Two double female adaptors - 2i".
(4)
Six automatic sprinkler stopper wedges.
(5)
Six spare sprinkler heads.
(6)
One sprinkler head wrench.
(7)
Spare hose gaskets.
(8)
One spare hose nozzle 1 ".
DPC RESPONSE:
The equipment arrived at LACBWR in August 1979 with the exception of gloves and spare hose gaskees.
The spare hose gaskets were received in November 1979 and the gloves were received in January 1980.
+
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.3 Interior Hose Stations (1) Hose reach tests will be performed and additional hose staticns provided as necessary to assure that all points in safety-related areas (including those areas protected by automatic suppression systems) and other plant areas which contain major fire hazards, can be effectively reached by at least one hose strean.
DPC RESPONSE:
Hose reach tests were accomplished on December 15, 1978.
(2) Tests and/or calculations will be performed that will confirm that the (flowing) pressure at each fire hose statico outlet is greater than or equal to 65 psig at 100 gpm flow rate.
DPC RESPONSE:
The required calculations below shows that the flowing pressure at 100 gpm for any fire hose station at LACBWR will exceed 65 psi.
The calculation was performed for the fire hose station on the 701 ft. level of contaimnent because it is at the highest elevation and furthest distance from the diesel pumps.
The calculations are based on only one (1) diesel pump running with all flow being supplied to the hose station.
Problem:
To determine if the flowing pressure at the fire hose station located on the 701' level of the Containment Building is greater than 65 psig @ 100 GPM flow rate.
6" Piping,Sch. 40 III L/D (Per Item)
Equiv. Length 6" Pipe - 365 ft.
NA 365' 18 6"
90 L.R.
els 20 1902 8
6" 45 els 16 65' 1
6" check valve 135 65' 2
6" gate valves 13 13' TOTAL.....
600' SAY.....
700' (1)
Reference Crane Technical Paper No. 410, " Flow of Fluids Through Valves, Fittings and Pipe", Copyright 1969, Crane Co.
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3" Piping, Sch. 40 L/D (Per Item)
Equiv. Length 3"
Pipe - 100 Ft.
NA 100' 9
3" 900 L.R. els 20 45' 3
3" 450 els 16 13' 2
3" Check Valves 135 68' 2
3" Gate Valves 13 7'
1 3" Globe Valve 340 85' TOTAL......
318 SAY...... 320' (1) 2h" Piping, Sch. 80 L/D (Per Item)
Equiv. Length 2 " Pipe - 130' NA 132' 5
2" 90 S.R.
els 30 30' 5
2" 450 els 16 16' TOTAL....
176' SAY...... 180' 1 " Piping, Sch. 80 L/D (Per Item)
Ecuiv. Lenetth (2)1 " Pipe - 60' NA 60' 3
1" 90 S.R.
els 30 12' 1
1 " Gate valve 13 2'
TOTAL......
74' SAY......
75' Elev. Hd. Loss Elev. of hose station - 705' = Z2 River elevation
- 620' =Zi 705' - 620' = 85 ft.
Elev. head
=
(1)
All 2 " pipe assumed Sch. 80, although some 2 " pipe is Sch. 40.
(2)
Fire hose treated as 1 " pipe.
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd)
Friction Loss = 6" Pipe at 100 GPM 1.11 ft/sec. x 6.065/12 ft.
Re" V
7 x 10 6 ge2/sec 8 x 104
=
where V = water velocity D = inside pipe diameter v = Kinematic viscosity of water 0 85 F Re = Reynolds No.
f (friction factor) =.02 ft /gec2 2
2 (1.11) 7 /2g =.02 (700'/6.005'/12) ht=f (L/D) 64.4 ft/sec2
.53 ft.
=
Friction Loss - 3" Pipe at 100 GPM 4.34 x 3.068/12 7 x 10-6 f =.018 3.068/12)(4.34)2 320 hn =.018 (
64.4 6.6 ft.
=
Friction Loss - 2 " Pipe @ 100 GPM
, 7.57 x 2.323/12 p
2.1 x 105 9
=
7 x 10-6 f =.02 h3=.02 (
180
) (7.57)2 64.4 2.323/12 h
= 16.5 ft.
n ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd)
Friction Loss - 1 " Pipe at 100 GPM R* = 18.2 x 1.5/12 = 3.2 x 105 7 x 10-6 f =.021 75 (18.2)2 hn =.021 (1.5/12) 64.4 h3 = 64.8 ft.
Total Pipe Friction Losses 0.53' + 6.6' + 16.5' + 64.8' = 88.4 ft.
Total Friction Losses (hL)
Pipe Prictica 88.4 ft 10 ft.
Strainer Loss 98.4 ft
.....SAY 100 ft.
Total h
=
3 Dynamic or Flowing Pressure @ Hose Reel At Pump At Hose Reel 1/ g +
1=P2/y +V2 2
2/ g + Z2*hL Bernoulli Eq. P1/v + V 2
2
+ V2 Flowing pressure at hose reel = P27 2/ g = Pp 2
2 p=[1+V 1/
+Z1-Z2-hn P
v V2
= Flowing pressure or tatal dynamic head (TDH)
P1/y +
1/29 at pump discharge.
From diesel HPSW pump curve, TDH @ 100 GPM > 360 ft.
Pp> 360 ft + (620 - 705) - 100 = 175 ft.
Pp > 75.8 psi @ 100 GPM The hose station on the 701' level of containment is at the highest elevation and farthest from the pumps.
Since the flowing pressure at this hose station is greater than 65 psi @ 100 GPM, it can be concluded that the flowing pressure will be greater than 65 psi
@ 100 GPM at all other hose stations.
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ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd)
(3) Administrative controls will be established to prevent access to manual fire fighting equipment from being restricted by temporary storage of materials within the plant.
DPC RESPONSE:
LACBWR Administrative Control Procedure 40.1 issued on February 19, 1979 requires that fire fighting equipment be maintained readily accessible.
ACP 40.1 also requires a written weekly safety and fire prevention inspection report which includes the accessibility of manual fire fighting equipment.
3.1.4 Fixed Suppression Systems (1) The catomatic sprinkler system protecting the turbine oil reservoir will be extended to also protect the associated piping.
DPC RESPONSE:
The automatic sprinkler system over the turbine oil reservoir was extended to protect the associated piping on May 8, 1979.
(2) An automatic water fire suppression system, or an oil shield and collection system, will be provided to protect or prevent an oil fire at the reactor coolant recirculation pumps.
DPC R"SPONSE:
The installation is 50% complete.
Plant shutdown is required for access to the recirculation pump cubicles and completion will be accomplished during next refueling outage or other outage of sufficient duration in early 1980 to perm!.t work to be done.
A copy of the Facility Change drawing is enclosed to permit the NRC staff to assess the acceptability of the design.
(3) An automatic fire suppression system will be provided to protect the "A" diesel-generator room.
DPC RESPONSE:
LALSWR anticipates placing order with sprinkler contractor prior to February 22, 1980 with installation to be accomplished prior to June 1, 1980.
Systems have beca designed by contractor for proposal to DPC.
Design details as presented in the proposal will be available prior to March 31, 1980.
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ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd)
(4) A fixed dry pipe sprinkler system capable of quick connection to a manual hose will be provided at the exterior side of the cable penetration of containment.
DPC RESPONSE:
LACBWR anticipates placing order with sprinkler contractor prior to February 22, 1980 with installation to be accomplished prior to June 1, 1980.
Systems have been designed by contractor for proposal to DPC.
Design details as presented in the.>roposal will be available prior to March 31, 1980.
(5) An automatic water fire suppression syste.' will be provided to protect against a fire at outside transforiners.
DPC RESPONSE:
LACBWR anticipates placing order with sprinkler contractor prior to February 22, 1980 with installation to be accomplished prior to June 1, 1980.
Systems have been designed by contractor for proposal to DPC.
Design details as presented in the proposal will be available prior to March 31, 1980.
Plant shutdown is required for installation.
Estimate one week insta;lation time.
3.1 5 Heat Detector circuit suoe. vision The circuits of heat detectors which actuate the carbon dioxide suppres-sien system protecting the "B" diesel generator room will be electrically supervised for power failure, ground faults or circuit breaks to alarm and annunciate in the control room these abnormal conditions.
DPC RESPONSE:
Installation of the meter relay at the "end of line" thermal switch "C"
(Attachment A) will monitor the voltage along the detector string for short circuit, open circuit, and grounds.
Any of these fault conditions will cause the meter to read low.
This fail safe unit will have a remote annunciator in the Control Room.
Installation of this meter relay is expected to be complete approximately thirty days following NRC approval.
10 -
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.6 Breathing Air A 6-hour onsite breathing air reserve will be provided for each of the existing eight breathing units based on 20 minutes of air per bottles.
Two spare bottles will be provided for each unit.
DPC RESPONSE:
Present onsite breathing air units consist of an MSA pressure demar.d air mask and an MSA 45-cubic foot air cylinder.
The location and the number of breathing units and spare bottles are listed in the following table:
Spare Air Location Breathing Air Units Bottles North Evacuation Point 2
2 South Evacuation Point 2
2 Turbine Building 4
2 Change Room 2
0 Maintenance Shop 3
2 Genoa Plant No. 3 4
4 TOTAL........................
17 12 The 29 breathing air bottles presently onsite are more than the 24 requested.
The total amount of onsite breathing air reserve requested in cubic feet was computed as follows:
45 cubic feet / breathing air bottle x 18 breathing air bottle changes in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> / breathing air unit x 8 breathing air units =
6480 cubic feet.
The amount of air contained in the 29 breathing air bottles is 1305 cubic feet.
LACBWR also has onsite a 5-cylinder cascade recharging system.
This system has a maximum usable amount of air of 1250 cubic feet.(1)
In addition, there are 16 spare breathing air cylinders con-taining 4000 cubic feet of air onsite for the cascade recharging system.
These cylinders are located in LACBWR Warehouse No.
2.
The combined air reserve presently onsit is 6555 cubic feet.
This is 75 cubic feet in excess of the required a ount.
(1)
It was estimated by our breathing air supplier that each cylinder in a cascade recharging system can deliver a maximum of 250 cubic feet.
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.7 Diesel Oil Shutoff Capability to shut off oil transfer to "A" diesel day tank from outside the room will be provided.
DPC RESPONSE:
The oil transfer pump operates only when the diesel is operating, however, an outside switch will be provided to de-energize the transfer pump.
3.1.8 Flame Retardant Coating The IIcensee will spot check the thickness of the flame retardant coating on the cables in each safety-related ar a, where such coating is applied, and repair as necessary, to ensure that the coating thickness is in accordance with the manufacturer's spect fIcatlon.
DPC RESPONSE:
Spot check was completed on October 17, 1979.
3.1.9 Piping Penetratien Seal The licensee will close all unsealed pipe penetrations with a non-combustible material to provide fire resistance required of the barriers.
DPC RESPONSE:
Sealing of all piping penetrations with one exception was completed on January 17, 1980.
The remaining unsealed penetratior is located in a high radiation area through the 1A/6 fire barrier between the turbine building and the electrical penetration room.
It is planned to seal this penetration during the next plant shutdown of greater than one week, prior to April 1, 1980.
3.1.10 Emergency Lighting Fixed, sealed beam, 8-hour rated battery powered emerger.cy lights will be provided in all safey-related areas, and their access and egress, to facilitate emergency shutdown operation and fire fighting.
DPC RESPONSE:
Installation of required emergency lights was completed on January 24, 1980.
12 -
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.12 Exposed Steel Protection Three-hour protection will be provided for the exposed steel structure supporting the ceiling of the machine shop.
DPC RESPONSE:
A local contractor has inspected the exposed steel suppordng the ceiling of the machine shop and is preparing a bid to provide 3-hour protection.
The estimated completion date for this job is June 1, 1980.
3.1.13 Protection of Service Water Piping The licensee has provided protection for the service water pipes and their supports in the oil storage room against a fire in the room.
DPC RESPONSE:
High Pressure Service Water and Low Pressu'e Service Water piping and hangers in the oil storage room have teen insulated with a 2" layer of Owens/ Corning Kaylo 10 pipe insulation and covered with metal.
Kaylo 10 is an asbestos free, hydrous calcium silicate pipe insul-ation.
It is estimated that a 2" layer of Kaylor 10 would provide a fire rating of at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> based on comparision with similar materials.
Kaylo 10 has a fire hazard classification (ASTM E-84) of flame spread - 0, smoke developed - 0, and fuel contributed - 0.
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- Y ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd)
A plav P4 e g..qp p y o:x,.
Kaylo 10 Asbestos Free
[LN!!!!L@l##',
Pipe Insulation Rigid hydrous calcium silicate pipe insulation for heated piping up to 1200F
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field tested msutahon has the physical properties most desirable for ettcent. duraofe work for indoor and neate d pmmq up to 1200F-incocrs ana cut These outdoor. power and process pioina priviucts.ve precision molded in sections Cr segments trom,, chemically reactec matenal benefits Lower operating costs-Kaylo 10 Ashestns Free (m.uiativn had enceDhonal thermal ethCsency. Thef low k No asbestos-Kaylo 10 A".br stoe. Free P,e insutabon is T
I f ac:or of 20,.t 200 mean temperature rneans inwer 100 asbestos free and can be '.af*:ly usad and apphed m contnrrnanur with OSHA rcgulations.
operating cost. better temperature control for process operations Unattected by moisture-Kaylo can be compicN:y saturated in water without ap;,reciable loss of strength Rugged-day;o !0 45 strong and rigid to re;ist mechansCal dH'l f eg.iins its strength and thr*rmal value atter drpng abuse in shipping, handhng and in service out Versatste-K aylo s ester'ded temperature rangre envers a tv nad number of uses with one m.itr. rial All heated Clean, neat installation-Kay!n c uts cleanly ! caving a p'Dirg requirements to 120')F Jnd m sites from ')" to 30" snara square edge for neater appearance cn tittings IPS can be met with Kaylo Aigid manuticturmg toierances ase,ure unstnrm. strooth unbrok en joints Witt not cause stress corrosion cracking-K.iyto IO Nestmg sites-Kaylo 10 Asbettns F ree P.O. Ineuiation s Ast.ee.tos Free wili nct cause stra enrrnwn crackmq c.t man..t ecturel to Simphried Dimensinnit clandarcs to sta,nte.u teet beaus, it anta.n...i tisiemm. at,....n pa,r:1.t i,c.hng s m tot douni. nan r a;ps.:.thons snhebitor nr.d has a very law th'n's fe onr1*ent I
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- p. m NU ncLosuas 1 - (cont'd)
, $.. s formance characteristics inermal a.~umir Il a Density (approa )
12 5 pcf r.
Modulus of rupture (ASTM C-440) 751bs 'sq in
/
37 Compression strength (ASTM C-165).
a,m 10,
,'D[, $'[
at 5*. delormation, flat board.
- 00 psi
,[
pg Resistance to abrasion (ASTf.10-421).
06 convent:onal tumthng test-er i
toss in weight af ter 10 minutes. 20*. max.
[
i before heatinJ af ter 20 minutes. 45% ma E 0 r,
/
Corrosion resistance: coes not cause or accelerate corrosion of A
steel, aluminum. or stainless steet 04 e
i Dimensional stability (ASTM C-356).
I knear shrinkage after heat:ng for 03 2 'ours in a muffle ". tength loss 1.4 (at 1200F) 200 800 uM dGO Haronass (ASTM C-569) 35 Mean temperature. F Fire hazard classification ( ASTM E-94).
Flame spread 0 Smob e developed 0 Fuet contributed 0 AS TM E-34 is used solety to measure and describe the prop *:rties of the products in response to heat and frame under controlled laboratory conditions. This numerical flame spraad rating is not intended to reflect hazards pre.
sented by tNs or any other matenal under actual fire Cond:t ons sizes Thickness-Maylo 10 Asbestes Free Pme insulation is available in single or doublelayer thicknesses from 1"in 3" depending upon pipe size.
Pipe sizes-l'aylo Pipe insulation is available to fit ncminal pipe sizes from %" to 39" in diameter Forms-Kaylo Pipe Insu'ation is available in sectionat or multtsegmental forrn depending upon pipe size All insulation is furnished in 3 f t sections specification compliance application recommendations HH-t-523c-insulation Block and Pme Covering Thermal Pipe-Kaylo Prpe losulation.s mechanically f agened by (Calcium eihCate for temperatures up to 1200F) Type 11 w.nng in place using 16 gauge.wre on 9" cenh;rs.ind C! ass A througt1 F subsertuently co.cred mth a suit.ible jacist.t. rig for indoor M:L-l-27810-Irnulation P:pe Covenng. Tnermat Grade or outdoor apphcations I. Class b. Grado 11. Class d. Grade lit. Class e Type i and Fittings-Fitt.ngs are msulated eth mitered segment; of 11 Kaylo wired in place and finished mth a %" layer of
.1ll-i-24244 ( Amend 3)(Ships)-Insulation Materials insulahng cement Fianges and valves are msulated n th Thermal, mth Special Corrosicn Chloride' Requirements, oversized papo insulation. They are finished Mth.i Tpe 1 A. IC.10. IE suitatte tachet for indoor or outdoor apphcation AS TM G533-67 O
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.14 Neutron Shields Polyethylene neutron shield b 7cks around the control rod drive system below the reactor will be repicced with those of noncombustible material.
DPC RESPONSE:
LACBWR plans to replace neutron shield blocks around the control rod drive system with Type 277 shielding.
Properties of Type 277 shie'd-ing are described in Reactor Experiments, Inc. Bulletin S-73N, a copy of which is attached.
Because of high levels of radiation in this area, cutage is required to permit designer to obtain necessary field information to develop installation drawings.
Furthermore, extended outage is necessary to complete installation once design is approved.
Estimated completion date is Septereber 1,1980.
I ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd)
.h w.sv. A v 1:H C i
REACTOR EXPERIMENTS, INC X3 TERMIN A L W AY. S AN C AHLOS, CALIF 0H NI A 940 70 h
Phoew l4156 5J2 335 C.dre A>Jees> H E AC T E X
'e f'l TELEX: 345 LOS IHE ACTE X SCLS)
Bulletin S-73N July 1978 TYPE 277 SHIELDING Heat Resistant e Boroted e Hydrogenoted Type 277 is available as a costable dry mix or precast blocks.
TECHNICAL DATA PROPERTIES 22 otoms/cc Hydrogen: 3.38 x 10 Boron: 1.49 x 1021 otoms/cc Weight Percent Boron: 1. 5%
Macroscopic Thermal Neutron Cross Section, I = 1.06cm-I Density = 1.68 g/cc = 105 !b/cu ft Recommended Temperature Limit = 350 F = 177oC Machinobility: Fair. Con be sowcut and drilled.
Thermal Conductivity, k = 0.3 BTU-ft/(hr)(ft)2(op)
= 1. 24 x 10-3 col-cm/(sec)(cm)2( C)
Specific Heat = 0.22 col /g C o
Coefficient of Thermal Expansion = 8 x 10-6 inches per inch per F
= 1. 4 x 10-5 cm per cm per C Compressive Strength = 1500 psi Tensile Strength = 100 psi Radiation Resistance, gammos: 1 x 10II Rods Radiation Resistance, neutrons: 1 x 1020 n/cm2 Typical Elemental Analysis Element Weight Percent Oxysen
- 58. 62 %
Aluminum 23.91 Colcium 8.83 Hydrogen 3.37 Silicon 2.13 Boron 1.59 Sodium O.59 Magnesium 0.50 Iron 0.27 Sulfur 0.19 17 -
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont' d)
~
THERMAL TESTS AND CHARACTERISTICS 1)
Effect of Excessive Temperature A 2" cube of Type 277 washeld at 19000F (1040 C) for two hours. At the
~
end of this period, it had maintained its physical integrity. It stillretoined a compressive strength of 300 psi, reduced from the original of 1000 psi.
2)
Hydrogen Content as a Function of Temperature Figure I shows the percent of hydrogen remaining in Type 277 after con-tinuousheating of successivelyhigher temperatures. The materialwasheld at each temperature until it reached constant weight--this generally re-quired 24 to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The resultsshowthat 82%of the hydrogen remained up to300 F (1500C). Above this temperature, the hydrogen content drop-ped from 82% to 15%ot 550 F (290 C). At this point, the percentage of hydrogen again leveled off until 650 F (345 C) was reached. From here to 1000 F (540 C), the hydrogenlevelgradually dropped from 14% to zero.
lt is interesting to note that Type 277, because of its high initial content of hydrogen, even at a temperature of 460 F (238 C), still contains as much hydrogen as normal concrete at room temperature.
3)
Extended Haating in Air et 310 F (155 C)
To test the effect of extended heating periods, Type 277 washeated in air at a temperature of 310 F (155 C) for a period of 32 days. Figure 2 shows that the hydrogen content dropped to about 80% of the original within 5 days. After on additional 15 days, it had lost only on cdditional 2%, or which point it leveled off.
After the heating test was completed, the samples were left in air or room temperature to see whether they would reabsorb ony moisture. They c vred to gain weight immediately and regained 3.5% within 13 days. The ma-terial continued to slowly gain additional weight ofter this period.
4)
Simulation of Loss of Coolont Accident (LOCA) in the event of a LOCA, it is presumed that the material could be sub-merged in ohigh concentrationboric acid solution. It i: also assumed that the solution could be pressurized as high as 67 psia which would permit a maximum temperature of 300 F (150 C) for o p,.riod as long as 30 days.
This situation was therefore simulated by placing Type 277sompleiin water containing 2500 ppm of boron as boric acid odiusted to o pH of 10. This solution was containedin test " bombs"and heatedto 300 F (150 C) which would produce 67 psia for o period of 30 days. At the end of 30 days, the blocks showed slight surface pitting. There were no hairline cracks or other indications of demoge. The compressive strength of the blocks i
was still 70% of that before the test.
5)
Effects of Submersion in Water i
Samples of Type 277 were submerged in 70CF (21 C) water for 7) months and inboiline water for 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. There were no significant effects on the blocks in eith. r cose.
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."ERCENT HYDROGEN REMAINING VS. TIME AT TEMPERATURE FOR TYPE 277 SHIELDING i
Heating test 310 F (154 C) for 32 days l
l followed by air exposure for 77 days.
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ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.16**
Relocation of Cascade System The licensee will relocate the cascade system, which is currently located in the southweast corner of the turbine building basement, to an area where a fire in the area will not require its use.
DPC RESPONSE:
The cascade system was relocated to the No. 1 Warehouse in January 1980.
3.1.17 Fire Door Replacement The licensee will replace the li-hour rated fire doors from the "A" diesel room to the machine shop and from the machine shop to the penetration room with 3-hour rated fire doors.
DPC RESPONSE:
1-1/2 hour rated fire doors from the "A" diesel room to the machine shop and from the machine shop to the electrical penetration room were replaced with 3-hour rated fire doors in January 1980.
3.1.19**
Fire Dampers The ventilation duct penetrations of fire barriers between the instrument repair shop and the electrical equipment rcom will be protected by fusible link actuated fire dampers with appropriate fire resistance rating.
DPC RESPONSE:
Facility Change 79-17 has been written and approved to install fire dampers between the instrument repair shop and the electrical equip-ment room.
Fire dampers have been ordered and will be installed by 17ril 1, 1980.
21 -
t
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.20**
Unrated Barrier The licensee will upgrade the unrated barrier between the "A" diesel room and the machine shop to provide the fire resistance commensurate with hazards on both sides of the barrier.
DPC RESPONSE:
The door between the "A" diesel room and the machine shop has been replaced by a door with a 3-hour fire rating.
Calculations show that after replacement of the door, the barrier between the "A" diesel room and the machine shop has a 2.3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating.
CALCULATION:
The wall consists of concrete block 15" long x 7 " high x 6" thick.
The block dimensions are combined with an esti-mate of 58% solids provided by the American Insurance Association to utilize the
" equivalent thickness" formula:
solid volume length x height The equivalent thickness of this block is 3.48 inches and yields a 2.3-hour fire rating per Table 2 of " Factory Mutual System 1-21 Fire Resistance of Building Assembly".
. A local contractor has inspected this barrier and is preparing a bid to upgrade the barrier to a 2.8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> rating.
Expected completion date is June 1, 1980. 9
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.22**
Protection for the Electrical Equipment and the Control Rooms The licensee will:
(1)
Relocate record file cabinets stored in the electrical equipment room out of safety-related areas.
DPC RESPONSE:
The record file cabinet which had been stored in the electrical equipment room was relocated out of safety-related areas on January 21, 1980.
(3)
Provide additional protection, such as enclosure, coating, or automatic suppression for cables in the concealed space above the control room.
DPC RESPONSE:
Wiring located above the control room ceiling consists of normal lighting, emergency lighting, three paging system speakers, and security system signal wiring.
All of this wiring is in conduit mounted above a "see-through" grid ceiling.
Three exposed cables are also located above this ceiling.
Two are used for remote alarm and reset for a high radiation entry alarm.
The third is used during refueling outages for a closed circuit television signal cable to the Containment Building.
'All lighting cables are G.E.
polyethylene-flamenol cable.
Paging speakers are 2 conductor PVC.
Security wiring is 24 pair, 3 cables polyethylene.
High radiation alarm and reset is 2 conductor 2 cables PVC.
Closed circuit TV is one conductor, one cable COAX polyethylene.
The wiring layout is shown in the attached figure.
There are few cables above the control room and none of these cables are safety related.
Therefore, as discussed in Reference 1, no further protection is required in this area.
ATTACHMENT 1 - (Cont'd)
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-1 ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.24 Fire Hazard in the Waste Handling Building The licensee will provide the results of an analysis which demonstrate that a fire in the warte handling building, including the off-gas system, will not cause the release of a significant amount of radio-active materials.
DPC RESPONSE:
In the event of a fire in the off-gas stream, 0.125 Curies of particulate matter would be released to the environment via the stack.
This release would represent no significant increase in the dose rate at the site boundary.
Assuming worst conditions (i.e., stability Class F and a surface release), the dose rate at the site boundary would be 3.4 mrad /hr.
New resins used at LACBWR contain between 50% and 60% moisture.
After use, the resin is discharged to the Spent Resin Tank where it is dewatered prior to shipment off-site.
The supplier states that moisture content after dewatering is between 50% and 60%
unless heat is used to dry the resin.
Furthermore, the supplier states that the type of resin used at LACBWR is non-flammable due to sulfonic acid content.
In addition, there are no combustible materials in the in:nediate vicinity of the spent resin tak and an insignificant amount of combustible material in the Waste Disposal Building.
The building is of incombustible construction with concrete on steel roof and masonry walls.
3.1.25**
Gas Suppression System Actuation The Ilcensee will (1) provide the actuation power for the carbon dioxide system that protects the "B" diesel room from the essential service bus which derives the onsite backup power from the "A" diesel generator, and (2) modify the emrgency manual release of the carbon dioxide system to conform to the provisions of NFPA 12-1977, Section 1-8.3.5 DPC RESPONSE:
(1)
Facility Change 79-19 has been written and approved to rewire actuation power for the 1B Diesel Generator Room CO2 system to the lA Diesel, TB MCC 1A Circuit 10.
This is expected to be complete by June 1, 1980.
(2)
Emergency manual release of the carbon dioxide system in the 1B Diesel Generator Room will be modified by adding two remote manual releases to be located outside the door to the 1B Diesel Generator Room, in the electrical equipment room.
Diagrams showing the modified system are provided as Attachment B.
Installation of the emergency manual release is expected to be complete by June 1, 1980.
+
9
- -,,. ENCI.OSURE 1 - (Con t' d)
TYPICAL CARDOX HIGH-PRESSURE SYSTEEI '
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l ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.1.27** combined water Demand The licensee will provide the results of an analysis to demonstrate that the combined water demand for fire fighting and for safety-related functions can be satisfied under any fire emergency or accident.
DPC RESPONSE:
Nuclear Energy Services has completed a study of the LACBWR fire water system and combined water demand.
A draft of this study has been reviewed by LACBWR staff and is presently being revised to incorporate minor changes.
It is anticipated that a final draft of the fire water system and combined water demand study will be submitted to the NRC by February 15, 1980.
3.1.28** Cable Penetration Seal The licensee will modify the existing electrical cable penetration seal to a design with established adequate fire resistance.
DPC RESPONSE:
LACBWR intends to modify existing electrical cable penetration seals to a design with established adeguate fire resistance by the appli-cation of Flamemastic 77.
Flamemaster Co. has been contacted and stated that the presently installed Flamemastic 71 has been tested and given a 2-hour rating, while properly installed Flamemastic 77 has been tested and given a 3-hour rating.
Flamemaster Co. has
-sent Flamemastic 77 application information to LACBWR with docu-mentation that this method has been tested in accordance with ASTM E-119 and given a 3-hour rating.
This test documentation and specific design details for sealing cable penetrations at LACBWR will be submitted to the NRC under separate cover by February 15, 1980.
3.1.29** Signaling System (3)
Install a timer for each cetector zone to provide warning when a detector zone has been bypassed for a certain period of time.
DPC RESPONSE:
A timer is being installed in each detector zone in accordance with Attachment C and the operational description below.
Installation will be completed by August 1, 1980.
If a fire zone is to be placed in bypass, the operator will place the proper zone switch to the Bypass position.
In the Bypass position, a neon red lamp will light, an audible alarm will sounc' on the fire panel, a second audible alarm will sound for the timer circuit.
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd)
The operator can acknowledge or silence the fire panel alarm by use of its reset switch.
The timer can be moved to the proper time setting which will acknowledge or silence the timer audible alarm circuit.
After the elapsed time is completed for the circuit bypassed, an audible alarm will sound on the timing circuit which will alert the operator in the Control Room.
28 -
ENCLOSURE 1 - (Cont'd) 3.2.1 Safe Shutdown Analysis DPC RESPONSE:
NES Report 81A0097,Rev. 1, " Analysis of the Ability of LACBWR to Achieve Cold Shutdown in the Event of a Fire" was subnitted by DPC letter LAC-6740, Linder to Ziemann, dated January 17, 1980.
Items 8f, 8g, 8h, and 81 of Reference 3 will be submitted under separate cover by June 1, 1980.
3.2.2 Fire Water System The licensee will provida the resulta of a study of the arrangement of fire pumps and the yard main piping which will assure that a sufficient number of pumps are available to meet the fire water demand at all times, taking into account the possibility of a fire involving both diesel driven fire pumps, failure of i fire ptrnp, or failure of a section of the fire water piping syst:n. The study will !nclude the consideration for (1) separate pump feeds to the yard main, (2) additional sectional valves, and (3) Interconnection with the fire water system at adjacent fossil units.
D?C RESPONSE:
Nuclear Energy Services has completed a study of the LACBWR fire water system and combined water demand.
A draft of this study has been reviewed by LACBWR staff and is presently being revised to incorporate minor changes.
It is anticipated that a final draft of the fire water system and combined water demand study will be submitted to the NRC by February 15, 1980.
3.2.8**
Fire Water Supolv Reliability The licensee is studying the feasibility of Interconnecting the fire water system with that of Unit 3 to improve the reliability of the fire water supply. The diesel-driven fire pump and relevant portion of the fire water piping in Unit 3 will be included in the surveillance program of f Crosse Boiling Water Reactor.
DPC RESPONSE:
A study has been performed to evaluate the adaquacy and reliability of the existing fire water supply.
This study, which will be submitted to the NRC under separate cover, concludes that by making certain mod-iiications, the existing fire water system is adequate.
Due to procedural problems in maintaining the diesel-driven fire pump at Genoa No. 3 in the LACBWK surveillance program, DPC will, pending Ca concurrence, implement the recommended modifications to the existing fire water supply system rather than interconnect the system with Genoa No.
- 3.
9 8
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ATTAC M e a
e,
'Dimp w " Rugged Seal" Controllers and Meter Relay a
e ABOUT SIMPSON'S 33 SERIES " RUGGED SEAL" e
CONTROLLERS AND METER RELAYS s
o The 33 Series instruments on these two pages offer a wide variety of applications in control, alarm and limit use. Photo conductor sensmg el.minates allinterference with the indicating meter. Metal cased " Rug-
/
ged Seal" construction withstands rigorous environmental conditions.
High-gain transistor switch circuit provides accurate switching with a "derd band" of no more than 0.5% of full scale. Fail safe circuitry FOR A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTROL, opens output relays in the event of power failure. Botli single and dou-ALARM, LIMIT APPLICATIONS ble setpoint types have DPDT output relays with 10 ampere contacts.
SPECIFICATIONS Models 3323XA, 3324XA,3326XA,3344XA Calibration Accuracy: 2 2% of full scale Contacts / Output Relay: OPDT relay contacts for each con-Control Point (s) Adjustment:
trol point. Each set of contacts rated at 10 amps.,115 V Single: 0-100% of arc AC.
Double: Low limit: 0 95% of arc. High limit: 5100% of Movement: Self shielding annular arc. Adjustable to within 4' of each other.
Power: 115 V AC, 50-500 Hz Switching: Within 1 % of indication Case: Seated metal case, glass window Oifferential: "On," "Off" dif ference is within 0.5% of full scale t
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A!! the features described above in meter relays with current and voltage input. Available in 3 %", 4% " or 4 x 6" case styles, with 33 SERIES METER RELAYS WITH single or double setpoint. Att metal cased " Rugged Seal" type to CURRENT AND VOLTAGE INPUT withstand rigorous humidity and dust environments.
Apprus.
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Control Posit (High Urnett Contros Poht 00gh Lknitt Control Poht DC MiCACAMPE.REs 3 4
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