ML19308D816
| ML19308D816 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1974 |
| From: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308D815 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003180755 | |
| Download: ML19308D816 (18) | |
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t 2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS 2.1 CEOGRAPHY & DEMOGRAPHY The Crystal River Unit 3 site is situated on a 4,738-acre tract of land lascated in Citrus County, Florida, on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Mexico. The nuclear facility and two fossil fired units (shown in Figure 2.2) are located approximately 7-1/2 miles northwest of Crystal River, Florida and 70 miles north of Tampa, Florida.
The Crystal River facility is characterized by mangrove swamps and marsh 1
lands along the coastal areas to gently rolling hills about 16 miles inland.
The minimum exclusion distance specified for Crystal River Unit 3 is 4,400 feet (1340 meters). The applicant has selected a low population t
i zone (LPZ) of 5 miles for this site. There are no residents at present l
within a 3-1/2 mile radius of the Unit 3 reactor.
Figure 2.1 shows the exclusion area for Crystal River Unit 3.
Figure 2.3 shows the present and projected year 2020 cumulative population i
f surrounding the Crystal River site. The 1970 resident population within 50 miles was 174,281. The applicant projects that this area will increase to 382,221 people by the year 2020. This corresponds to a 119% increase
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in 50 years, and is in substantial agreement with the population projections
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of the Bureau of Economic' Analysis' Economic Area No. 34, 35, and 37, (Figure 2.4).
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS General We and the applicants have evaluated the offsite radiological consequences for postulated deeign basis accidents. These accidents are the same as I
chose analyzed for previously licensed PWR plants and include a steam line break accident, a steam generator tube rupture accident, a loss-of-coolant accident, a fuel-handling accident, and a rupture of a radioactive gas storage tank in the gaseous radioactive waste treatment system.
The applicant has evaluated the loss-of-coolant accident, the fuel handling accident, the rod ejection accident, and the radioactive gas decay tank rupture. The offsite deses we calculated for these accidents are presented i
in Table 15.1 of this report, and the assumptions we used are listed in Section 15.2.1 of this report. All potential doses calculated by the i
applicants and by us for the postulated accidents are within the 10 CFR Part 100 guideline values.
1 On the basis of our experience with the evaluation of the steam l' ne break i
and the steam generator tube rupture accidents for FWR plants of similar l
j design, we have concluded that the consequences of these accidents can be i
controlled by limiting the permissible primary and secondary coolant system radioactivity concentrations so that potential offsite doses are small. We will include appropriate limits in the Technical Specifications
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on primary and secondary coolant activity concentrations. Similarly, we will include appropriate limits in the Technical Specifications on gas decay tank activity so that a single failure (such as sticking and lifting of a relief valve) does not result in doses that are more than a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 guidelines.
Hydrogen Purge Dose Analysis The applicant has calculated a hydrogen purge dose at the low population zone, using safety guide assumptions, of approximately 0.1 rem. Our independent calculations are in substantial agree =ent with this incremental dose.
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i sf TABLE 15.1 POTENTIAL GFFSITE DOSES DUE TO DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS Two Hour Course of Accidents Exclusion Boundary Low Population Zone i
(1340 Meters)
(8,047 Meters)
Thyroid Whole Body Thyroid Whole Body Accident (Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
Loss of Coolant 88 5
7
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Post-LOCA Hydrogen Purge Dose
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<1 Fuel Handling (with filters) 9
<1
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<1 Fuel Handling *
(without filters) 57
<1 3
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Gas Decay Tank hupture Negligible 1
Negligible
<1 Rod Ejection Case I 38
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Case II 43
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<1 15.2 Design Basis Accident Assumptions 15.2.1 Loss-of-Coolant Accident The assumptiona used by the Regulatory staff in calculations of offsite doses from a LOCA were:
l.
Power level of 2544 Mwt.
j 2.
Regulatory Guide No.14, " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential l
Radiological Consequences of a Loss-of-Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors," Revision 1, June 1973.
I ke concluda that the offsite thyroid dose due to a coincident failure of the non-seismic Class I filter train used in the spent fuel building ventila-tion system,to reduce the iodine activity released to the environment from a refueling accident is acceptable as this postulated dose is well within the guideline exposure indicated in 10 CFR Part 100.
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3.
Design containment leak rate of 0.25% for the first 24-hours and e
O.125%/ day thereafter.
4.
Iodine removal by the containment quench spray system was based on:
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Primary Containment Volume 2.0 x 10 ft Spray Fall Height 96 feet Spray Flow Rate 1500 gpm Elemental Mass Transfer Velocity 5.72 cm/sec Organic Mass Transfer Velocity 0.081 cm/sec Spray Drop Diaceter 1500 Spray Terminal Velocity 480 cm/sec 3
Factor of Conservatism 1.11 a
Spray Reduction Limits i
Elemental 1000 Organic 1000 Particulate 100 l
Spray Removal Rates
~1 Elemental 7.56 hrs Organic 0.107 hr
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Particulate 0.45 hr
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5.
Ground level release with Pasquill type "F" conditions with wind speed of 1.3 meters per second for short-term releases based on che meteorological data discussed in Section 2.3.4 of this report.
Our evaluation of the iodine removal effectiveness of the containment sprays is discussed further in Section 6.2.2 of this report.
15.2.2 Fuel Handling Accident The assumptions used to calculate offsite doses from a fuel handling accident (Safety Guide 25) are:
1.
Rupture of all fuel rods in one assembly.
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2.
All gap activity in the rods, assumed to be 10% of the noble gases and 10% of the iodine (with a peaking factor of 1.65), is released.
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The accident occurs 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after shutdown.
4.
99% or the iodine is retained. in the pool water i
5.
Iodine above the pool is,75% inorganic and 25% organic species.
6.
Standard ground release meteorology and dose conversion factors.
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Iodineremovalfactorof95%and70%forthecharcoalfilterfor 1
elemental and organic lodines respectively.
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t 15.2.3 Gas Decay Tank Rupture The assumptions used to calculate the offsite doses from a gas decay tank rupture were:
1.
Gas decay tank contains one complete primary coolant loop inventory of noble gases resulting from operation I
with 1% failed fuel (100,000 curies of noble gases).
2.
Standard ground level release meteorology and dose conversion factors.
15.2.2.3 Control Rod Ejection Accident The assumptions used to calculate offsite doses from a control rod t
ejection accident are:
Case I l.
Power level of 2544 Mwt.
2.
28% fuel failed in transient.'
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3.
10% of iodine and noble gas. inventory in gap of failed fuel.
1 4.
Release of total gap activity in failed fuel to containment building.
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50% plate-out of radioactive iodines.
6.
Containment building sprays are not initiated.
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Containment building leak rate of 0.25%/ day for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 4
and one-half this value thereaf ter.
8.
Standard ground level release meteorology and dose conversion factors.
Case II 1.
Power level of 2544 Mwt.
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28% fuel failed in transient.
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3.
10% of iodine and noble gas activity in gap of failed fuel.
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- 4. -Release of total gap activity in failed fuel to primary coolant.
5.
Primary to secondary coolant operational leakage is 1 gpm.
6.
Loss of off-site power so that steam is released from secondary side relief valve.
7.
Primary-secondary coolant equilibrium reached at 16 minutes af ter the accident.
8.
Standard ground level and dose conversion factors.
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15.2.2.4 Hydrogen Purge Dose f
The assumptions used to calculate the low population zone doses due to I
post-loss-of-coolant accident hydrogen purging are:
Power Level: 2544 Mwt 6
Containment Volume:
2.0 x 10 cu/ft Purge Time:
30 days Holdup Time Prior to Purging:
11 days Purge Rate:
32.5 cfm i
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Sodium Thiosulfate Spray Reducti'en Factor for Iodine:
1000 Charcoal filter efficiency of 90% and 70% for ele = ental and organic iodine, respectively 7
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X/Q Value: 4 - 30 days (4.3 x 10 sec/m )
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