ML19308D117
| ML19308D117 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1977 |
| From: | Stewart W FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308D100 | List: |
| References | |
| CS-77-38, NUDOCS 8002270604 | |
| Download: ML19308D117 (3) | |
Text
LICENSEE EVENi Ht ' ")H f bm.)
CONTROL BLL.a l
l l
l l
l (pLgast PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMAT*O*J) 1 6
(xjlPltIclalPl31 AME LCINSE NUM9tR TYPt' I ol ol-l ol ol olo 101-1 o 101 1411111111l lol31 7 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 "rN sES cartoony occ<tf NUMeta EVENT oATE AfpoAT oAIE E CONT I 1 Lt_]
UJ l o f s i 01-1 ol 31 of 21 lo 121o 171717 l 1013101117171 7 0 57 58 59 60 61 60 69 74 75 U0 EVENT OESCnipflON DE l In Mode S, while preparing to enter Mode 4, DilR in recirculation, Na0ll was introduced l 7 89 80 EE l into the RCS due to cycling BSV-36 with valves DHV-41, DilV-4, and DRV-3 open.
Re-l 7 n9 eo Ql dundant systems were available. This was not a repetitive occurrence.
Surveillance l 7 89 80 hl Procedures have been revised to prevent introduction of NaOH into the DH System.
l 7 Ou eo o
l (77-17) l 7 89 pm, 80
- Nt
- "o[
MAN # W R co coupoNENT CooE S
R v0LATCN O
l Cl Bl @
lV l A lL l Vl El Xl l Al lZ lZ lZ lZ l lY l 7 00 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTION
~
~-
DE l Procedural inadequacy in that no precautions were listed in SP-342 to caution l
7 HH 80 30 i nyninat cycline BSV-36 with DHR System lined up 'for RCS recirculation.
SP's have 1
7 00 80 l
been revised.
l
- [Ns' o!sEovrp[
s s Powan ofsta status oiscovEnv orscpipfion 3
d lol ol ol l N/A l
lB l l
Boron Analysis l
7 8 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 ACTivil t COs1ENT MLt#4tO oF hELEASF AMOUNT oF AcTMTV LoCATON oF AELEASE H
lZ J L7J l
N/A I
I I
7 0 0
10 11 44 45 60 PEHSONNEL EXPOSURES NUM06 A TYPt ofSCRipiCN H I olo lo I LZ_J l
N/A 1
7 00 11 12 13 00 PERSONNEL INJURtES NUMLtH ot SCfhPTON 8 I olo lo i I
N/A l
7 09 11 12 co OFFSITE CONSEQUENL'ES gg l N/A
]
7 00 60 LOSS On OAMAGE TO FACiUTY t y rf o(SCRtpf04 Q] U l
N/A
]
7 89 10 tstJ s'UULIClIY
{
N/A 1
l 7 09 na ADDITIONAL FACTOnS 2 270
\\
)I Raa M npn l aman e n rv Tnfnrmnrion Artached.
I Won 8I g
- a.. l 7 au NAMf: Lf_
P.
Staunre nioNc (81])__86_6-4159 s
f
<.a
A C%
I
)
Supplementary Information gv 1.
Report No.:
50-302/77-17 2.
Facility:
Crystal River Unit 3 3a.
Report Date:
1 March 1977 3h.
Occurrence Date:
7 February 1977 4.
Identification of Occurrence:
In Mode 5, while preparing to enter Mode 4, Decay Heat Removal in recircu-lation, sodium hydroxide was introduced into the Reactor Coolant System due to cycling BSV-36 with valves DHV-41, DHV-4, and DHV-3 open.
5.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
On 7 February 1977, during routine operations while in' Mode 5 (Cold Shut-f' down), Train "A" of the Decay Heat Removal System was being used to recircu-late the Reactor Coolant System and the Reactor Coolant System was being filled from the "C" Bleed Tank.
6.
Description of Occurrence:
In preparation to enter Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), Reactor Coolant System filling and recirculation was discontinued by closing DHV-5, and "A" Decay Heat Pump was lef t on recirculation, in order to cycle valves BSV-36 and BSV-37 as re-quired by SP-342, Building Spray System Valve Check.
When BSV-36 was cycled. sodium bydroxide was iatroduced into the Reactor Coolant System from the sodium ha aroxide tank via open valves DHV-41, DHV-4, and DHV-3.
Recirculation and filling were resumed and a Boron analysis indicated a con-centration of 305 ppmB. Actual' Boron concentration (approximately 1500 ppm) was masked by sodium hydroxide.
Filling was immediately terminated and source range instrumentation was closely monitored with no inersase in count rate.
After a second Boron analysis, it was realized that sodium hydroxide had been introduced into the Reactor Coolant. System.
7.
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
The cause of this occurrence was procedural inadequacy in that no precautions in the Surveillance Procedure noted that BSV-36 should not be cycled with the Decay Heat Removal System in Reactor Coolant System recirculation mode.
,_s V
I
's s
8.
Ana]ysis:
Initial concern that a Boron dilution had occurred was found to be un-justified. The alkaline sodium hydroxide masked the Boric Acid in the titration analysis. Boron concentration remained at approximately 1500 ppm. There are no specifications for sodium hydroxide content in the Reactor Coolant System below 2500 F.
The system temperature was approximately ambient. The chloride and fluoride content of the water in the sodium hydroxide tank were sufficiently high to.cause a violation of Technical Specification 3.4.7.
Engineecing evaluation indicates that, because of the low system temperature and the pH remaining above 7, chloride contamination in the range of 1.0 ppm which was experienced is not of significant concern. The level.was returned to less than.05 ppa using the makeup and purification demineralizers.
Redundant systems (both Decay Heat and Boron addition) were available and operable. No hazard was presented to the Plant or public as a result of this occurrence.
9.
Corrective Action:
i Cleanup was initiated via the cation demineralizer system. Procedures have been revised to preclude recurrence.
Final sodium content after 7-cleanup was less than.1 ppm.
10.
Failure Data:
J No previous failures of this type have occurred.
7
\\
4
-r---
g g
,g m
,,