ML19305E714
| ML19305E714 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1980 |
| From: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19305E706 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005200302 | |
| Download: ML19305E714 (16) | |
Text
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S005200 3db O# fung'o,,
UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
n WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 4,..... p
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-213 HADDAM NECK PLANT
' AMENDMENT 'TO ' FACILITY OPERATING ' LICENSE Amendment No. 33 License No. DPR-61 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Conunission (the Conunission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Connecticut Yank e Atomic Power Company (the licensee) dated January 3,1978, as supported by information transmitted by letters dated Septenber 3,1976, October 15, 1976, December 3,1976, March 1,1977, March 21, 1977, April 26,1977, June 1,1977, September 7,1977 November 30, 1977 and March 6,1978.
B.
The facility will operate in confonnity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable as.surance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirenents have been satisfied.
. 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attactinent to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.
DPR-61 is hereby amended to read as follows:
2.
Technical Specifications
- and B, as revised through Amendment No. 35,ppendices A The Technical Specifications contained in A are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M
ME i
Dennis L. Ziemann, hief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors Attactinent:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:r April 24, 1980 i
c ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 33 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-61 DOCKET NO. 50-213 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages described below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
REMOVE INSERT 3-3 3-3 3-4 3-4a 3-4b 3-8 3-8 3-9 3-9 3-10a 3-10a 3-10b 3-10b 4-2a 4-2a*
(Table 4.2-1) 4-2b 4-2b 4-2c 4-2c 4-3 4-3 4-4 4-4 4-4a 4-4a
- This page is included for numbering purposes only.
3.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS Applicabilitv:
Applies to the operating status of the reactor coolant system.
Objective:
To specify those limiting conditions for oneration of the reactor coolant system which must be met to insure safe reactor operation.
Specification:
A.
At least one pressurizer code safety valve shall be in service whenever the reactor is subcritical and the reactor coolant system is above 3750F or 350 psig except during hydrostatic tests.
B.
One or more reactor coolant pumps or the residual heat removal system shall be in operation when changes are made in the boron concentration of the reactor coolant.
C.
The reactor shall not be critical unless the following conditions have been satisfied:
(1) Three self-actuated, spring loaded safety valves, having a combined relieving capability _of 720,000 #/hr.
shall be in service and shall be in accordance with Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.
(2) Above 1 percent of Nominal Operating Power Level, at least one reactor coolant pump operating.
(3) Above 10 percent of Nominal Operating Power Level, at least three reactor coolant pumps operating.
(4) Above 65 percent of Nominal Operating Power Level.
Four reactor coolant pumps operating.
(5) One steam generator is capable of performing its heat transfer function.
D.
Each steam generator in a non-isolated reactor coolant loop shall be restored to operable status prior to increasing Tave above 200 F.
When starting a reactor coolant pump, and the reactor coolant cold leg temperature in any non-isolated loop is at or below 340 F, the secondary water temperature of each non-isolated steam generator shall not be more than 20 F higher than the water temperature of each of the non-isolated reactor l
coolant cold legs.
l E.
The RCS Overpressure Protection System (OPS) shall be in operation when the RCS temperature is below 340 F unless
)
the RCS is vented through a minimum opening of three (3) inches (nominal diareter) or its equivalent. If one or more of the relief trains is taken out of service and the RCS is not vented, the following actions shall be taken:
)
l 3-3 Amendment No. 20, 33
(1) With one relief train inoperable, either restore that train within 7 days, or depressurize and vent the RCS through a minimem 3 inch diameter or equivalent opening within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both relief trains have been restored to operable status.
(2) With both relief trains inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a minimum 3 inch diameter opening within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both relief trains have been restored to operable status.
(3) A 30 day report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission if either actions (1) or (2) are used to mitigate inoperability of one or both relief trains.
3 asis:
Each of the pressurizer code safety valves is designed to relieve 240,000 lbs per hr. of saturated steam at the valve set point. They are described more fully in FDSA Section 5.2.2.
Below 3750F and 350 psig in the reactor coolant system, the residual heat removal system can remove decay heat and thereby control system temperature and pressure.
If no decay heat were removed by any of the means available, the amount of steam which could be generated at safety valve relief pressure would be less than half the valves' capacity. One valve therefore provides adequate defense against over-pressurization.
When the boron concentration of the reactor coolant system is to be changed, the process must be uniform to prevent sudden reactivity changes in the reactor. Mixing of the reactor coolant will be sufficient to maintain a uniform boron concentration if at least one reactor coolant pump or one residual heat removal pump is running while the change is taking place. The residual heat removal pump will circulate the primary system volume in approximately one-half hour.
All pressurizer code safety valves are to be in service prior to criticality to permit the design relieving flow to occur j
if required.
1 l
Part C of the specification requires that a sufficitnt number of reactor coolant pumps be operating to provide core cooling in the event loss of flow occurs. The flow provided in each case will keep DNB well above 1.30 as discussed in FDSA Section 10.3.2.
Therefore, cladding damage release of fission products to the reactor coolant cannot occur.
By limiting the temperature differential between the primary and secondary sides to twenty (20) degrees in Part D, the resulting pressure transient will be prevented by the RCS OPS (See Reference 1) from exceeding the limits in Specification 3.4.
6 3-4a Amendment No. J, 33
Basis (Cont'd)
As described in Reference (1), the RCS OPS, in conjunction with administrative controls, prevents exceeding the
-temperature and pressure limits in Specification 3.4 while RCS temperature is under 340 F.
Considerations have been incorporated to provide for the inoperability of one or more relief trains (relief valve, motor operated isolation valve, and associated instrumentation) when the RCS OPS is required to-be operable.
Reference (1) D. C. Switzer letter to A. Schwencer, dated September 7, 1977 e
9 e
4 i
l 3-4b Amendme_nt No. 33 l
3.5 CHDiICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTDI Applicability:
Applies to the operational status of the chemical and volume control system.
Obj ec tive:
To specify those limiting conditions for operation of the chemical and volume control system which must be met in order to ensure safe reactor operation, fiecification:
A.
The reactor shall not be critical unless the following chemical and volume control system conditions are met:
(1) Either two charging pumps or the metering pump and one charging pump operable.
(2) Two boric acid pumps or one boric acid pump and gravity fill line to metering pump operable.
(3) The boric acid tank shall contain at least 12,000 gallons of solution whose concentration shall be at least 8 percent boric acid, but not greater than 13% boric acid.
The temperature shall be 140 F or higher.
(4) Maintenance, which requires draining of the boric acid mix tank, shall be allowed only when the plant is shut down and the reactor coolant system borated to 8%Ak shutdown.
(5) System piping and valves operable to the extent required to establish two flow paths for boric acid injection to the reactor coolant system.
(6) Valve BA-V-399 shall be locked open and shall not be closed except when the plant is shutdown and the reactor coolant system borated to a K f 0.92 or less.
eff B.
A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be operable whenever the temperature of one or more non-isolated RCS co)f legs is less than or equal to 340 F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of.a 3-inch diameter.
Basis:
The chemical and volume control system provides control of the reactor coolant system boron inventory.
Either a 360 gpm charging pump or a 30 gpm metering pump is capable of injection concentraced boric acid directly into the coolant system.
Approximately 10,000 gallons of the 8% solution boric acide are required to meet cold shutdown requirements.
Thus, a minimum of 12,000 gallons in the mix tank is spucified. An upper concentration limit of 13% boric acid in the mix tank is specified to maintain solution solubility at the specified low temperature limit of 140*F.
Limits on draining the tank are specified to afford opportunity for scheduled maintenance.
The eight percent Ak shutdown is specified before boric acid mix
(
tank maintenance is ur:dertaken to preclude a return to criticality under any circumstances, even fuel movement.
3-8 AmendmentNo.32',33
When boric acid blender and concentrated boric acid (20,000 ppm boron) are used to change the reactor coolant system boron concentration, a flow of 25 gpm can be realized which results in a change of 600 ppm /hr in the system.
If a blender is bypassed, a flow of 80 gpm can be realized which will change the reactor coolant system concentration at the rate of 2000 ppm per hour.
Reference to FDSA Figure 4.2-26 shows that at a reactor coolant system concentration of 2400 ppm and a burnup of 7000 MDWT, a change of 140 ppm is required to effect a 1% change in reactivity.
Specification B ensures that the assumptions of the Low Temperature RCS Overpressurization Analysis are met by allowing a maximum of one charging pump to be operable when low temperature over-pressurization protection is required.
References:
(1) FDSA Section 4.2 l
3-9
/mendment No. 33
i VALVE NO.
LOCATION ACTION RH-MOV-22 Containment Valve locked in Sump open position, Suction circuit breaker locked out during post-LOCA long term cooling phase.
SI-MOV-24 RWST line Valve locked in open position, circuit breaker locked out whenever reactor critical.
SI-FCV-875 HPSI mini-Valve blocked and flow line locked in open position whenever reactor critical RH-MOV-874 RHR Valve locked in recirculation closed position and circuit breaker locked open whenever reactor is critical.
and reactor coolant temperature is above 350 F C.
The following actions shall.be taken to disable the High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps whenever the RCS temperature is below'340 F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of three (3) inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent.
1.
De-energize the HPSI pumps by racking out the breakers and locking the cabinets.
2.
Close and lock the HPSI pump discharge valves (SI-V-855A & B).
D.
The following actions shall be taken to disable one centrifugal charging pump whenever the RCS temperature is below 340*F ar.d the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of three (3) inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent.
1.
Place the control switch in the trip pullout position.
2.
Red tag the switch "D0 NOT OPERATE".
Amendment No. )MI, 33
BASIS This specification assures that adequate emergency core cooling capacity is available whenever the reactor is critical.
Based on the loss of coolant analysis, melting of the cladding is prevented with only one high pressure safety injection pump and one low pressure safety injection (core deluge) pump in operation.
Each of the two trains of emergency core cooling equipment includes these two pumps. With the pumps associated with both trains of emergency core cooling equignent operable, substantial margin exists whenever normal power supplies or both diesel generators are avail-able. With only one diesel generator operating and the pumps associated with that diesel operable as required in Item (2) of Specification 3.12, the high pressure safety injection pump and the low pressure safety injec-tion pump would be started automatically.
When the safety injection pumps are operating on off-site power, the charging pump would be started auto-matically. The RHR pump would be available for manual start for long-term recirculation cooling.
As described in Reference 3, the RCS OPS, in conjunction with administrative controls, prevents exceeding the temperature and pressure limits in Specification 3.4 while RCS temperature is under 340 F or the RCS is not vented. Part C establishes limiting condition for operation regarding the disabling the HPSI pumps to further assure that a pressure transient is not initiated. Part D establishes requirements regarding the disabling of a charging pump to assure that a pressure transient is not inititated while retaining the flexibility to establish, under strict administrative controls, a redundant emergency boration path should such action be necessary.
REFERENCE:
(2) FDSA Section 5.2.8 (3)
D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO) Letter to D. L. Ziemann (NRC) dated May 22, 1978.
(4)
D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO) Letter to D. L. Ziemann (NRC) dated May 24, 1978.
(5)
D. C. Switzer (CYAFCO) Letter to A. Schwencer (NRC) dated September 7,1977.
3-10b Amenduent No. 36',33 i
Table 4,2-1 Minieum Frecuencies for Testine. Calibratine and/or_
Checking Instru-ent Ch anne ls Channels _
Action Minimum Frecuency 1.
Nuclear Pcvar Calibrate with Daily /except when plant is heat balance shut down.
calculation.
Check Each shift Test trip function Twice a month krier to each startup if 2.
Inter =ediate Range Test log level and startup rate not done in previous circuits
- week, Check Each shift when in service.
3.
Source Range Test Prior to startup if not perfor=ed within preceding veek.
Check Each shift when in service.
~
4 Reactor Coolant Calibrate Each refueling Check Each shift Tempe rature 5..
Reactor coolant flow Calibrate Each refueling Check Each shift Each scheduled shutdown if Test not tested or calibrated in j
preceding 6 months.
6.
Pressurizer Level Calibrate Each refueling Check Each anift Test Every 6 weeks 7.
Pressurizer Pressure Calibrate Each refueling Check Each shift Test Every 6 weeks i
i l
l l
4-2a Amendment No. 33
l l
Table 4,7-1 (continued)
Ch annels Action
.Minteun reeousnev 8.
Variable Low Pressure Calibrate Each re fueling trip set point calculator Check Each shif t 9.
Rod Positien Calibrate Each refuelint Digital Voltmeter check with Every six intnes of red counters motion when data lotter is out of service.
10 Rod Position Counters Test Each refueline Check with Every six inches of red i
Digital motion when data leerer Voltmeter
'io out of service,
11.
Steam generator level Calib rate Each refueling Check Each shift 12 Steam generator flow Calibrate Each refueling mismatch Check Each shif t 13.
Charging Flow Calibrate Each ref' eling u
14 Rasidual Heat Pump Flow Calibrate Each refueling 15. Boric Acid Tank Level Calibrate Each refueling Check Each week l
16 Rafueling Water Storage Calibrate Each refueling Tank Level Test 90 days 17 Volume control Tank Level Calibrate Each refueling Test 90 days 18 Reactor Containment Calibrate Each refueling Pressure Check Each day 19.
Radiation Monitoring Calibrate Each refueling System Test Each day 20 Soric Acid Centrol Calibrate Each refueling 21 Containment Sump Level Calibrate Each re fueling 22 Valve Teeparature Test Each refueling Interlocks 23.
Pump-Valve Interlock Che ck Each refueling
- 24. Reactor Coolant System Calibrate Each refueling OPS Test Each refueling 4-2b 33 Amendment No.
o Table 4.2-2 Minimum Equipment Check and Sampling Frequency Check Frequency 1.
Reactor Coolant Samples Radio-chemical analysis 5 days / week 2.
Reactor Coolant Boron Boron concentration 5 days / week 3.
Refueling Water Storage Boron concentration Weekly Tank Water Sample 4.
Control Rods Check rod drop times of Each Refueling all rods to be less than 2.5 seconds 5.
Control Rod Partial movement of Every 2 weeks all rods 6.
Pressurizer Safety Valves Check set point Each refueling 7.
Main Steam Safety Valves Check set point Each refueling 8.
Main Steam Isolation Valves Check Functioning Each refueling
)
9.
Reactor Containment Check Functioning Each refueling Trip Valves 10.
Refueling System Interlocks Check Functioning Each refueling 11.
Boric Acid Pumps Test Run Pumps Weekly 12.
RCS Overpressure Protection Check Functioning Once/ Cold Shutdown
' System Isolation Valve Interlocks and Alarms 13.
RCS Overpresaure Protection Verify valves are Once/72 hours when.
Isolation Valves open OPS is required overpressure protection 14.
RCS Vent (s)
Verify vents are
- 0nce /12 hours when open vent (s) is (are) required for over-pressure protection
^
- Except when the vent pathway is provided with a va1ve that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position.
4-2c Amendment No.)8, 33
4.3 CORE COOLING SYSTEMS - PERIODIC TESTING Applicability:
Applies to periodic testing requirements for the core cooling system.
Objective:
To verify the operability of the core cooling systems.
Specification:
A) During each refueling shutdown, a test shall be conducted to demonstrate proper automatic operation of the cece cooling systems. The test shall be performed in accordance with written procedure as summarized below:
- 1) The two independent core cooling systems will be tested separately. A test signal will be applied to initiate a loss of normal AC power to each of the emergency power systems while a coincident signal is applied which initiates operation of the emergency core cooling equipment associated with the systec being tested.
- 2) Verification shall be made that the diesel generator and its associated pumps have started in the proper sequence and that the high pressure safety injection, low pressure safety injection (core deluge) and charging pump attain required discharge heads of 1400 psig, 295 psig and 2150 psig, respectively. Following this check of the automatic sequence, either a charging or safety injection pump will be secured and the associated RHR pump will be started manually. Verification will be made that the RHR pump attains the required discharge head of 145 psig.
- 3) The test will be caasidered satisfactory if control board indication and visual observations indicate all components have operated and sequenced properly.
- 4) A prerequisite for this test shall be that either:
a) the RCS shall be vented by a 3" or larger opening and the RCS OPS shall be inservice, or b) a minimum of two three inch openings shall be used for venting if both trains of the RCS OPS are out of service.
4 -3 AmendmentNo.39',33
B) During normal operating periods, a manual test of all actuated components shall be conducted to demonstrate operability. The test shall be performed monthly in accordance with written procedure as summarized below:
- 1) Each of the high pressure safety injection pumps, each of the low pressure safety injection (core deluge) pumps, and each of the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps shall be individually test run on recirculation.
- 2) The charging pumps and metering pump shall be individually test run.
- 3) All safety injection and core deluge valves will be cycled under "no-flow" conditions.
C) If one of the high pressure safety injection pumps or one of the low pressure safety injection (Core deluge) or one of the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps is out of service, the remaining pump shall be tested within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and at subsequent intervals l\\
of not greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Di During each refueling shutdown, the remotely controlled, motor-operated containment spray water valve shall be operated under a "no-flow" condition. The test will be considered satisfactory if visual observation shows that the valve has operated satisfactorily-i E) One centrifugal charging pump and the HFSI pumps shc11 be demonstrated inoperable at least once por 31 days whenever the temperature of cne or more of the non-isolated RCS cold legs is less than of qqual to 340 F and. the RCS is not vented t
by e minimum opening of 3 inches, by verifying that the charging pump control switch is in the : rip pullout position and red tagged ar.d that the HPSI breaker cabinets are locked and tagged out 4td the HPSI pump discht rge valves are locked closed.
Basis:
The core cooling syste'ms are the principal plant safeguard.
They provide the means to insert negative raactivity and limit core damage in the event of a loss-of-coolant' incident.
Pre-operational performance tests of the ccmpuuents are performed in the manuf<cturer's shop. An iritial system flow test demonstrates proper dynamic functiening of the system. Thereafter, periodic tests demonec. rate that all compenents are functioning properly.
In order to assure that a pressure transient occurring during the testing of the HPSI pumps will not exceed the pressure and temperature limits of specification 3.4, there must be appropriate relief paths available; this is provided for in specification 4.3.A.4.
The separation of emergency power systems and associated core cooling equipment into two independent groupings permits complete' functional testing of the individual systems and equipment.
4-4 Amendment No. 33
The containment spray water 'is provided, if required, by the lo, pressure safety injection pumps, which are also part of the core deluge system.
It is not desirable to test the valve at monthly intervals since it requires closure of a manual valve in the spray header.
This valve must be closed to prevent initiation of spray when the motor-operated spray valve is open since the residual heat removal system will always be pressurized. Closure of the manual valve is not desirable at power and, therefore, dictates that the rotor-operated spray valve be tested at refueling intervals only.
The surveillance in Specification E) assures that the limiting conditions for operation required for low temperature overpressurization protection have been met.
REFERENCE:
(1) FDSA - Section 5.2.7 (2) FDSA - Section 9.5 b
I 4-4a Amendment No.
33
,