ML19296A133
| ML19296A133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/27/1978 |
| From: | Pollock R Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project |
| To: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261A855 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902080256 | |
| Download: ML19296A133 (2) | |
Text
'
CRITICAL MASS ENERGY PROJECT P0. Bcx 1535. ',','asne; c1. D. C. 20013 Pnone: (202) 546-4790 December 27, 1978 Commissioner Joseph Hendrie, Chaircan U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Commissioner Hendrie:
On December 1,1978 the NRC issued a Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence for construction at the Wolf Creek Unit No. 1, licensed to the Kansas Gas & Electric Company.
The PN0 in effect indicates that the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment believes that there are deficiencies in the strength of the cement now being utilized for the reactor building. We are advised that a special hearing on the matter will be convened on January 4 in Washington, D.C. to examine the matter.
According to the chronology of events spelled out by I&E, the licensee first learned of deficiencies in the foundation strengtn as estly as March 15, 1978 but failed to fully report the event until October 26, 1978. A most recent PN0 dated December 15, 1978 also indicates that a " void" was discovered in the reactor contain=ent vall of the Wolf Creek Facility.
In our estimation, these two ins'tances raise serious questions about the quality assurance and quality control program at the Wolf Creek reactor and suggests that there are also significant weaknesses in NRC's inspection program.
Clearly, several salient points need to be addressed and satisfactorily explained by both the licensee and NRC Region IV:
1.
Are there deficiencies in the Daniel Construction Company's (the subcontractor) QA and QC program which permitted understrength concrete to be installed?
2.
Why did KG&E vait over six months before notifying NRC that they believed the understrength concrete was a reportable event?
3.
Why did KG&E continue construction at the site for six months while its management knew they might have deficient cement strength?
4.
If KG&E believed that there were no problems with continued construction despite reportage of foundation strength problems, why did KG&E suspend construction in December, 1978?
5.
Why did Region IV's Inspection and Enforcement personnel allow construction to continue in light of evidence that concrete in the reactor building might be understrength?
7902080256