ML19289G314

Requests Addl Info for First Round Questions for Branch Review of Applicant FSAR Through Amend 38

ML19289G314
Person / Time
Site:	Crane, Midland
Issue date:	03/08/1978
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19289G307	List: ML19289G306 ML19289G308 ML19289G309 ML19289G311 ML19289G312 ML19289G313 ML19289G314 ML19289G315 ML19289G316 ML19289G317 ML19289G318 ML19289G319 ML19289G320 ML19289G321 ML19289G322 ML19289G323 ML19289G324
References
NUDOCS 7908220460
Download: ML19289G314 (17)

Text

.

211-1 211.0 REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH 211.16 What is the basis for limiting the missile selection criteria (3.5.1.1) to hich energy systams? Provide justification to shew :nat missiles with lower energy levels would not fail any safety-related ecuipment.

211.17 Section 4.6.3.1 of the Midland FSAR states that the CRCM's to (4.5.3.1) be used in the design are "essentiall '" identical to that supplied on previously reviewed plants. Discuss any modifica-tions and the justification for each. Include relevance to previous prototype testing.

211.18 Provide a discussion and bases for relief valve setpoints and (5.2.2.4) capacities.

211.19 Since it is assumed that pressurizer and steam safety valve (5.2.2) accumulation is 35 or less, how is this verified?

211.20 Review of Section 5.2.2.2a and 5.2.2.2g shews that increments (5.2.2) for flux measurement uncertainties and safety valve set:oint tolerances are not included. Add these items or prcvide justification for their emission.

211.21 Cces the cressuri:er safety valve ca:acity reflect the capacity (5.2.2.4) as installed (i.e., has the effec: cf assccia:ad piping been included)?

211.22 Check valves in the discharge side c# the high pressure injecticn, (5.2.2) icw cressure injection, and CHR systems perform an isciaticn function in -hat they protect icw pressure systems fr:a #ull reactor pressure. The staff will recuire that these check valves be classified AS:4E I'.iV-2CCO Category AC, with the leak testing for this class cf valve being perfer ed c c:ce s;ecifica:icns.

It shcuid be ncted that a es ing :rcgram wnich sicoly draws a sucticn en One icw pressure site of the cu:ar es: check valves will no: ::e ac:ectacle. This cnly verifies that cne of ne series cneck valves is fulfillinc an isolation func icn. The necessary esting 'recuency will'be tha 5:ecified in the AS:4E Ccce, excec: in cases.vnere cnly cne cr

.vo check valves secarate hign :: Icw :ressure systems.

n these cases, leak tasting will be ;erfor ec a: each refueling aftar the valves have been exercised.

Identify all ECOS check valves wnich should be classified Catagcry 2C as :er -he :csi:icn tiscussac above. Viri'y :na; ycu will cae tne recuired leak esting scnedule, anc :na; ycu nave the necessary as l'nes :0 leak Cas eaCn va?ie.

havice

-he :eak detecti:n cri: aria :ba wit te ;r::csed f:r -he ec nica; specifica:icns.

21;.22 teguia cry Guice 1.c5 ::atas -ha: idan:i"ed inc uni:en-i'iec

5.2.5.2:

enage shcule :e c:: ec:ac s:eara al.i.

-.e

iscussi:n 'n D""2D "2D'k d 9

e.

m 79082204g0 g 3 ()()9 6

211-2

~

(5.2.5.2)

Section 5.2.5.2 indicates that all leakage, identified and unidentified, will be collected in the reactor building sump. Provide a discussion of the method used to distinguish unidentified rrem identified leakage.

211.24 provide a discussion of the method of detecting intersystem (5.2.5)'

leakage; specifically leakage to the core flood, decay heat removal, HPI, nitrogen, and vent and drain system as required by Regulatory Guide 1.45.

211.25 Regulatory Guide 1.45 requires charts and graphs to convert (5.2.5.3) containment air monitor signals to equivalent spm leak rates to assist the operator in interpreting signals. Address this capability for Midland Units 1 and 2.

Alarm set points and their correlation to leak rate shcuid also be prcvided.

211.25 Discuss the capability to take a grab saccie of the containmen:

(5.2.5.7) atmosphere en a periodic basis and to manually analy:e these samples for particulate activity and to correlate the data to primary system leakage.

.211.27 Regulatory Guide 1.t5 requires -hat the three methods used in (5.2.5) unidentified leak detection be able to derset a cne gpm leak in ene hcur. Discuss hcw you intend to meet this recuirement, particularly with regard to the gasecus radioactivity monitor.

Also, the FIAR dces not crevide a clear ex lanation of hcw the sump level and flew conitor'ng systr: can detect a One gym leak in ene hour. Discuss in scme detati the operation of this system with regard to leak detect.cn sensitivity.

211.23 State the ex:ected rance of -he variables coni : red for unican-(5.2.5)

-ified leak detec fon inc the limi s ::.vnich he ins:rumen a-icn can cover this range and still detect and alarm a cne gym leax in One hour.

211.29 Curing plan: star u: or after an ax: ended cu: age, c:cian:

(5.2.5) activity may be icw encugn suca -ha c:n ainmen: ac-ivi y cue

Me presence of small leaks may be belcw the -hresncid sensitivity of the radiaticn m0ni :rs used fer leak cetection.

Cescribe hcw you intend to moniter RC?S leakage withcu: -he use of -his ecui: ment until containment activity has increasec to a ~detec:able level.

211.30 Once an unicen:1'ied leak has been :e ected, wna: :r:cecures (5.2.5) will be used :: iccate the scurce :f leakare?

2 '.1. 3 '.

The FIAR d:es not s a e tha: -he 1eik de:ac-icn systems can

'5.2.5',

erf:r :neir func-icns f: lcwing a seismic even: -: a-dces recuire ;1an shu-cwn as recuitec M eguia :ry Lide.._5.

a.c:

3h W tr.a !r.e Mi0lanC plan: Tee:s.his reCuiremen:.

0 - ]D Dw

?043 070 e

aoju ch 1 1 m

6 m O

231 3 211.32 Describe the previsions for detecting Ic t' =ce fr m the primary

~

s (5.2.5) c:alant system to the RHR and 5CCS thret, in3ection and return lines during normal pcwer aceration. Cascribe the indications,.

alarms, and procedures for isolation to limit releases and shew conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.t5.

Discuss the procedures usad by the c; erat:r to conver all leak deta: tion indicatiens in the centrol reem to a c mmen leakage ecuivalent, e.g., c;m to spm.

211.33 Discuss the basis for determining the alarm set;cints for all fsc.2.3)

Onree un1 dent,..ied leakage detec icn systems.

211.3a

escribe the crecedures used to calibrata -he radiatten (5.2.5) meni:crs and suma level anc ficw monitors :c a.C.. leakage.

.- s 211.3E Should the 24fdland plants ex:erdenca an event tha will recuire (5.'.7) eventual c:aldewn :: ;ermi either icng-term c: cling with -he CHR systam cr going c cole shu-dcwn for inspecti:n anc re airs (extanced loss of c#fsite ; wer, staam ganera :r : ce ru::ure, failure of steam ;enera:Or reif ef vai ses :: recicse,er:.),it is desiracie that cualifisc sys:ams te available :: ;erf:rm the ::eraticn saf=iy and in an creerly manner. Ciscuss -he c.=.a.- i ' i.v - f

..".a..'4 f c 'a.= n o - 1.= n a-

.. - =..= k.= 9..-.=.- - l.-

d shut:cwn c:ncitien using cnly safety-gr$de acui: men, ass ming enly ensite er cffsite :cwer is available, anc ::nsideri g a a i r ; 1

4. 2. ' l u.-=... c -. $..e - =. = c.".. #.

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.=." a. = s - #.

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in ycur res; nse:

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211-4 (5.4.7)

(b) Justify the viability of -he manual acticns required after a suction valve failure (i.e.. coening cross-c:nnects

~

Og3,Oga). Address times recuired, deses expec ad, and pctential for inadvertant cpening of cross-connects during high primary side pressure conditions. Ccmpare the Midland cross-connec: design c Davis-Eesse Uni: 1.

Provide a reif acility analysis for the manuai action cutside the centrol recm and discuss the incremental increase in reliability expec:ad for varicus selected design modifications.

(2) Previde safaty-grade sta=m genera:ce duma valves, 0: era:ces, air and power sucolies wnica mee :ne single failure critarion.

(3) Previce the cacacility Oc c:cl dcwn te caid shutdcwn assuming the acs: limiting single failure in less than 26 hcurs cr show tha: manuai actions inside or cu:sica centainment er return to het stancby until -he manuai acticns er maintananca can be performed ;rovides an ac:actacle al araative.

(1)

Provide ne ca: ability t: decressuri:s -he reac::r c:ciant systam with cnly safety-grace sys ams assuming a single..,aliure, or shcw that manua. ac::cns Tns;ce er i

cursice c:ntainmen cr remaining at hc: s:Incby until 4

manuai act.cns or recairs are c:m:,.a:a provides an ac:actacia al arna:ive.

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nci icns with and wi-hcu: a singia failure cf a staam

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211-5 211.33 Table 5.4.10 should be expanded to include sizing criteria

~

(Table and backpressure c:nsiderations. This table also indicates 5.4.10) 1005 accumulation. This errer shculd be c rrected and the (6.3.2.2) value selected should be justified. Hcw will this value be c nfirmed throughout plant 1*fe?

211.27 On.rigures 5.4-10 and 5.4-11, the high pressure line designatiens (5.4.7) are "0 A."

Per Figure 1.1-2, this c:rrespends to a 1500 ;cund pressure rating. It would appear that the line designatiens or the cedes en Figure 1.12 are in error. 'lerify that the letdcwn lines and infection lines inside the c:ntair.=ent isolation valves are rated at primary plant pressure.

211,38 Secticn 5.1.7.1.1.3 states that the OHR suction relief valve (5.4.7) is si:ed for the " cst rapid rate of pressure increase."

Pro. vide the c:malete. quantitative basis for the si:ing of this valve..-revide anaiyses er tn.e c:m:enent railures cr : era:Or errerr whien could initiate an ever;ressure transien; during plant cooldewn. Discuss all assump:icns and ycur analysis echnicues.

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/:s 2 '. "., e. a ' 1,

...i 12, a..."

.*)

s..-.

(5.3) he ex;anced t: sacw 50 inject'en and recircula:icn valve

csi-icnr in accition to nereal ;csitiens. ?revice or reference

iping identifica-icn diagrams wnich shcw all Of -he 5C 5 incibcing the 5'WST.

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Ill. I'l 3iscuss One Or visi:ns anc Orecautions #0r issuri g r er s.......\\

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j h a....=. r.

s f..

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.=.a. c u....

asing ventir.g ;r visions, accessibility, anc surveillance frequencies.

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. d... = e.

a. r =.. - =..e.=.d...=.=

.=.-.'s...=.

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".e... ~. = *.' ' '. =. ".

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a: ender.cy..

2043 073 o

o WC C

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211-6 211.44 Explain the.elevance cf Table 5.2.1 to the E005 analyses.

(Table Also, address the felicwing:

o.3.1)

(1) Justify the use of normal values rather than the worst-case minimum or maximum) values.

(2) Why is a maximum baron value specif'ed for the core ficed tanks and not for the barated water storage tank?

(3) or care flood tanks, units shculd be added to level alarm set;cints; alsc, ecuivalent fta shcule be lis ed.

(a)

Same c:==ent as ateve for 3WST.

(5) No.c.leanliness level is given for the SWST. Why are..

g di-erent c0m;cnents in -he same system ass.gnec ci ?arent cleanliness levels (i.e., L?! :tm:s are level 5, w' ile n

decay heat removal c:ciers are C)?

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=.#. #. = e... n... a ra. =. r..-.

w. a.e n c.. 4 =.2 r 1. /

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2. # # =.r... n r i = r... - e r =.. '. w..,

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211-7 (Tabl c.3,e Our recuirements for letkage de action cf ECCS ecuf; cent e) passive failures such as valve stem ;acking and ;umo seals)

(c.3) are stated belcw.

(5.2.7)

Cetection and alarms must be provided to alert the cperator to passive ECCS failures during icng-term c: cling which allcw sufficient time to identify anc isolata the faultad ECCS line.

The leak detection sys:am should meet the fcilcwing recuirements:

(1)

Identification and justification of maximum leak rata shculd be provided.

(2) Maxi =um allcwable time fer ccerator action shculd be

revided and justified.

(3) Cemenstra:icn shculd be provided that the leak detacti:n system will be sensitive encugn :: initia:a (by alarm) c;eratcr acticn, cermi: iden:ificaticn of the faultec P..' ?, and isolation of the line price 0 -he leak creating undesirable c:nsecuences sucn as ficccing of recundant ecui; ment.

ine 1n1=um :::e :: be c:nsicered is 20 minutas.

(2)

It shcule be shewn -ha the leak da acci:n system can icentify -he faul ad EC 5 train anc tha-ne leak is isolable.

(5) The leak de:acticn systam shculd se: -he feilcwing requirements :

(a) Control r:cm alarm (b)

IIII-279, exca : single fail;re -ecuireman s.

2 '. '. 2 3

aguia ry eide 1.79 s:eci'icai'.' rac:=mer.cs ne f:i':wic?

'5.2.2.1, as:s be :erf:rmac:

t-

.a.

..$.a " i '4 '. '.y..d.

.. ". =.'.: < *.. u... s..-

..C.< = =

.c u c.d.

n a

the L.:SI ;um:s shoulc be demens:ra ac; (2) yuma fic. test shculd be initiated by -he safe y injecticn signal.

y..,

.a..

a. g. a..,,.:

.......a

.- o. r.y s.,... 2 4._,.. n.

2. c u r i.. =.... '... =...= n. =. =.....=.=.

recacure :r a-dres: eenc:nf:rmance.

an-iey s:ecie<-

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.=.d.u..3

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a

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4.

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M" 2043 075 h

211-8 (5.3.4.1)

Assurance must be prcvided that the icw pressure injecticn system can take suction fr:m the recircula:icn sump, verifying vertax centrol and acceptable pressure dro s across screening and stction lines anc valves. Submit a test plan wnich satisfies this pcrtion of the Regulatory Guida 1.79 requirement.

211.49 In Taole 6.3-6, isolation for an HPI line break is stated as (6.3) being ensured by closure of ef tter iscla:icn valve ?a6 cr 199 for Unit 2 (346 or 399 for Unit 1). Valve 499 (or 399) is no:

presently shewn en the respective makeu; and purification diagrams in Section 9.

211.50 In Table 5.t-12, s;uricus closure of the "HR reactor building (5.3) isolation valve 112CA, 3 is c:nsiderec fer normal CHR c;eration.

In...iacie o..,-6, spuricus :!csure of this valve is c:nsicere,.

as not being credible for ECCS cueraticn since the valve is lecked c;en. The valve accears :: be iccked :;en f:r ei-her

.cde of coer.atien. Resolve -his discrepancy between :ne two rai.ture anai.vses.

c.3..:3 ice r...e rce :te.stid,ianc pla.'.s c:nta,.ns manual as we,s. as i

(5.3)

=ct:r-ccerated valves. Ccr. :ceratien must be given : tne essibili:V. :na: manual valves mi;n: be left in ne wrene.

e pcsition and remain uncatectec when in ac:fden cccurs.

revide a lis: cf essential man ally c era:ed valves in tne EC'S anc a

a. t. e... e s. c n w. :..u..,

.u e. s.. s ee..,

a a....

m.. <..a.,

..+.1

.e.-..., n c.a :.e

.w..

u 2

each valve.

T'r.e lis: shcula als incluce ali manual valves in -he

..... r.nien./,~i.t,., c s.. a.. n..

e.n..

a.

a

. a c... s. a.n

...a

- n,:,

.,.c....

a w

2.

Accress ne recuirements of 7.eguia:Ory Guice 1.1~ 'n j:ur es:cnse.

.la.c. t. s. /.. s.a....e. e s.

s

~e e.n.

c.e.u.,.

,/.,,ii.

n..a e...Jie. a....e......

.. a.

a -

/.,

...n.:...z..,a..s.

..v

.i.

-9<

.... s

.., u...a. :.- ~

p--

e

~

.a..i. wn.. srs.

...a

a..., 't

. i.1.e..

a

.-. d.. e. s e.n e. :~..

,. a

.' :...,s v a..9 3.r,

.......C.e....

.e.

.s 3..

a

.s e..= c..... = a. :.....1. a.

~e

...a..a

~

a..-

,X. 2.2 a. q...

a e.. e =.e...s e.

2. ~. a. s a..:e.

.w

..3.a..-

2 ; ].w m..e.

...s e.. 3..n a.v a 'i.. =.a. n ' e s.o.

. m.e. a. a a..

7*-....T O. 'i. -. *. s d. ~ *. #...'.*.".*2w'....-

... s 2

sncui" Oe large encugn ;- r.sur* Iagibili ty Of vai'.'e *esi nati ns,~3

- '.:..:.t

.g i.1 -*.":a r".

'.e-

..".a,

.n s c.eva.d..e...

• #. ".F'"

.$ 1.J 's a.d. n s,.. *.

.n s

12.. 3,',

e. s.e., a. ro.p n.1r.c' na.e wi..sM.ea.n 4..aaa...a.s.

.as

.a

a. X.s A.

S v....ue.e s.e n:-

J M

4 i

a.

. 7. f. s..ad w./,. k. a.

s p..w. a.. s e.

m..e. a... o. o..r.

.w.

.~s.q.. : s.r....e..r-

.w

• *.. C.s s c / s.e.,. 9

.~a.6-ds aX.-.

.. -..,.. ".... =.. a.

-s. e.

a..e.e. ".

C. *.a.3...-

-i a

~

a a.

.. m...w.,..e 4

.. e. e.

..s.e-3. : a. r..

3 a

a.. s a.

a,..y

..3.,. a., 2.,......,

a.c a.

4. s.

a.e... s.e..se.

..x.

..t a. n. 9.s.e.

.a.y.

g

.s p.

. e.a..y a

a.

a1 a..e

..a

. 2

. a

. j n. e... -. a.

.es. e.. 4.. s.e.

n. p t.'c q. z.e. a..s.e..a... s e.

a.. s..,.:$.a.e,..y e..,. '. a -

.. s. a......

s

......s.e.....e, : F

.3

..-........e 2.rc..a.

2 s. a... 2..= e.

. e..

i v a.* d. 8. d. *. #..,/."*..4*..".s"'.'.'.'.."."-*....-'.

?

-*.. d..? -..t.: #..* *.

... w..~ w.

• a.. A c..-..., e. *. 3. s.

3-.

a.e..s e... 9.:.n... 2. ( - c e. s..e.. :

.s s a..s.e.. a c as. e.

.s..e... e..s '.

a

.s... a. - ;.a

z..e, a a..,.:

.. a.......e

7

,......s.e

.w.

-.-. h. e.

. -. =.. s.e. -.

a..

., F, ; ;....

, e.n. a.~ e.

A.

s**

.3.

..y... s. e.....

.3.3. :..

• a =..a-s

• ~....

• a 4

m........

d

211-9 (6.3)

(including Operational testing) and c:mpare :c the c:ntinued puce ccerational time recuired during the short and icng term of a LCCA. Submit infer:.ation in the form of tests or ocerating experience. Verify that these pumps will satisfy 1cng-term requirements.

211.55 So that we may evaluate the depencence of the ECCS ecui; ment (6.3}

en the plant auxiliaries, provice, er reference in the F3AR, the following:

(1) A list of all of the primary auxiliary systams required to directly sup;cr: each ECCS c:ccenent.

(2) A brief descriotion of -he sup;cr.ing func icn performed-by tne primary auxiliary.

(3) Tne methed of initiating the.crimary auxiliary c pr vide suc:cr: tc the ECC3.

(') 'he additional sac:ndary auxiliaries recuired :: directly st;; ort the primary auxiliary specified in (1).

(5) A brief descri;; ion of this su;;cr ing func icn ;erfor ed by the sac:ndary auxiliary.

. e,,. -.ine methcc c. in,.:,.ating tnis sec:ncary auxiilary.

2,1.* 5,5

'.'he.Mi:lanc F5AP references 3AW-101:3, "ECCS.:nalysis :f 35W's

.. i - c.-..... :wered ' :c:. 52" ::r preven: ng excessi te ter:n 1

.:.2,

reci:i 2:icn curing 1:ng-te-m c:ciing.

revai :f nis

cr icn cf 3AW.10 03 was deferrec :y ne s:afe : a : an.

s:aci'ic basis.

.nerer:re, ;r:v :e :r re erence inf:r a-icn f:r the.icianc Oiants addressing ne f:;1cwing :esi:n M

4...i. es.

.4

.,. n....,

e.... c. '. n e.. a ",.. c. - =. v u '. - a.. '..- t =.. - =

singia 'ai'.ure.

- single active

'a'* urr ::r uia ec :

u r g. g...... e.., n...

..;<....,.. g. a.. e.,.,, g..

g,..

.......... a b ever t.1is failure wcul:

........~....'.'au:? E sir.gie

9en he ir s,. 4 4...,

t.a.,

4...

...4..,..e

. ~.

r' 4.

./a,...n.

..,,.,.4...

,1..,

.._4.,..,

........w..,,....,

e...

4...,

3,.-

4..

.4....,

s..

..,......,,... 4;,..,..

,..4.

2,.....

s..

....,..,4...,:...

,,,,.4

......g

.,..4..,_...........

.. n. ;,.,.,.z..,...... -

s u

_d U 'i )

U,/ /,

21.1.1.0 (fi.3)

(*) Tne ;rizary cca for maintaini g accac acia Ieveis c' beren in =e vassai saculd be es:ablisnee. Sheuic 1 single fatiure disable ce aricacy =cca, car:2in manual acticas cutsida de cen:rci rcem would be alicwec, da::encing' en :ne nature of -he acticn and de time avaiiaola Oc es:ablish backup =cde.

(3) The average beric acid cencan:ratien in any.egien of :ne reac:ce vesse4 shcuid not excaed de level of fcur weign-percant beicw tna solubill:y lisi:s a:

e.accerature of the solutien. - -

.es.....c e.

.u. ne..%.

ner ally ccera:as

,.n :.-,c.

.e i f,e....e... sy.a i.

cces:

=e ini tia > cc.ic.

6eg

'. n.' a...d. e,. ~~ c =, f-I 'x cwa.d. -]-

.e Ts u -'. n

.~c.a.

W,..

ac ual ccerating time in..e cid leg in'actica. cce wili

-,g.*:d en -Tan. ".aa'.

=.n c s..' = = - i..." *. n ",...n s '.. a -'..'..~ n s, *

'u, in,e..e.=.1,

,a. swi.....v.r.-

..a - ' ~i u.'..n.. e

.- s sncuid be maca te:waen 12 anc 21 hcurs aftar '.:CA.

( p>

h a. ~. '. I u.1 n ;.. c a r..* n

~.e 2....-.... 'n '. s n' a.d. '.y 2.n.v

.a

,c.,cwing means:

. ti

r. s. '!....u ;.,,,., 5..,; e.,.,,

<..,4,

.a.

... c... ;,, g.... a..

.....a

'.. ) e s...u ;.,..n.o. s. c., n... i. '.,.e, z,,. a,-.a... s

(.

....,s

.;;.,..a..=.. ~.

2.~..

- '..-. =. ', :....i =. e.... n s.

r :- 1 r

.. e g s.. n... z.,....,.,n

..:a.

<,,...,a,.a....

.~.s.

s.

.~.....

...,. a.

e.

.a...,.s..,..,.

t.

,,. _ a..., 2 c..".

.,. : 4 2. 8..

n. i. j 2 c _ ~....,i,..,..,x._.,., a. 4...,

,,.4..

2.

,.)

....,.2.~...,. r.. _ c.,

.~...

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..a

.4.

4.......................

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........~

..n...

J

. e t - d.. *.,.

..r..2.,

...4.-

, q. _, 4.

_,.q.

4. i........

.4..,._._.,._.=,.

., 4....a.,,,. s... 7.., 4 3... a s : _ 4.,..,.......a.

. ~,......

...3..

.......r.v,,,-:...e..,......

4

.......c.

..4.-.

.,n..,.. -

s.........

ii s..-s

-.j.u.a. 1 ~cas e..at.'.

.a 4....$ t q..= e...'.- d. i ',.]...... a.- =. c 'i.

a a

....,3

....e..,

m, :.v..g 7

~....

.....4.,.

2..,..

4.1..,.

.s.e,.4... :........

.r...,,.7.,....

u...=s....... __.

.s s..'

,.. g e,..,.. 5. ~..,. e.

.,.,g,

.:.. e. :. a. n a.

~ -.. c.. 4. e..t..

~....

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..,...a...

...c.,...

M O

2s t.1.t 211.57 Discuss the ;ctantial fer, and the ;recautions taken, to (5.3) prevent crystallization of beric acid in the safety injection system. For 'axamsle, ccerating experience has shewn instancas where the hign head safety injection pume was able to achieve only about ene half of the puma dis:harge ;ressure becausa the suction elbow and the eye cf the ; ump were found to be plugged with solidified boric acid crystals.

211.58 5ecause of freezing weather conditions, ciccking of the vent (6.3) line on the 5WST has cc:urred on a: least one operating plant.

Cescribe design basis and faatures that praciude this c:nditien frem oc:urring in the Midland plant.

211.59 Table 15.0.2 gives a pressure / tam:ers ure tric dalay of 0.7 (15.0)

.s ec:nd.

Since one of the inputs to this trip is the ho:

ceg tamcera:ure, which.as a delay or.. sec:ncs, the 0..

n a

i sec:nc delay wculd appear :c be in erece. Frevide the correc trip celay and veri #y that this value has been used in the analyses.

0 ertvice a c:nr,.rmation, wit:

bases, that a.. transient events c...:

ii (15.0) wcuid nc axceed ne accaptanca cri aria 7:r acncrmal c:eraticnal cc:urrences wnen creci: J.s no: :skan for ncnsafety-grade sys:ams (turbine trip, urtine by: ass, ;iic:-oceratac

-a.i d. e'. va l va.e, a. r.. ). r....a.d '..e - J.e '... "...... e

.".r a i n e '.". d..

w 2

analysis in Section 15.2 gives ne im:ression -ha: ne analysis

.<as

".a r.d.u c..=. 2 s 2"

'.1"3

• • a

1. ..='.'..-a.

. 9 a.

c n e.' #. =. v -. "..=. a m

system a: 1 time. Olarify this ciscussion t* show tha F.o C. =. ". i ".

1. ..* ". "C.1 s c- #. :..y*

'3". $ ".a.-......".a.q..-

.C.< 2.9 '. n '..". a.

.s n a 'i,/ s #. s*.

2

.... E. t.

g. j.g pe.r.s pa.

m.

...

• 6. j n. a...4..

... 3 i y e. e..,

...y.s..

..L. e s-.

a. g s d

2

. a. -. 3

e..,

..w..... ". *. '..". e s..' ". 'l. '6 V a.

." '.. s *w. =. 2 riw" '/ ". ". #. #. 't ~.."..'.'...a.

2

^ **

.s p.. i..f g 4. a-

. J.

. e C. #. "..".

...7.7

'~

~2 w.1 e. c~."'.'.S. d. '/ G '. #

"..".a i..

4

../. n. P......, s. 3..r.

4. a. 2..

.l.3 :- /.. :. e....

--.. 2 3

,/.w.

i

423 3.ic. a.s. r.u:g./.rsus a... 4..r

w. i., s. o r

.1. m. r..

4.,., *.

ea

' C., c s.r. s. r..... a...

' t. :.. ;. 0 ',

i

..i.

.4.

.., n s 4 2.n..

......... r

.e - - :-

i.tg.o.y

.e. e..4.

4. 3 ~ %...= -..s r.

,a c

e. r.

..-. e. e. r.......e

... e. s.,... a-

.... = '-

.. 4.

s. e..g.s

'I <.4.. :. e.

... g.., e..e d. s. e.....n=..,

a a

e

.e.e..ne,...,

-e. J.1..e3

..m I

......I 0 =. a.yd..s

=..=.o.s.==r.

r

.s..a 4

a s...,

. s.a. g e.... e.. n s.e. C '.s.e s =..= 2 -. a..

...J.

..a e d.. d. w. a..

2.

e c

-.s.

.a.ce

.' J.

.- - a. - s e. e..s *.l. r....-.. s..a. e. '. :. *.. -...s..s e.

'.* */

.O s..-. d.- a

9 :

.u.... z.....s..s.

.4.

.s.e.s '.. p. a.e..

.. e. G.. e. s.,.

u.,,,

2

.. e.. a. s.

a.

1

..e=.

..... s..e...,y

..a..e s..e...s e,

.s

.s.a. s '. f e. d. e z..e.e.. s e....s..

=.. =. =.. a. a..m.e.. s..e

.-.e...=.r.

.e. m..s d a..e

....,....s..

w.... :

.2

...,.,e.

.,a,,....

.e.

.e=....=,.

,4...-..-

....- <-...e...

T D**lD D'At como a

2043 079 1

211-12 211.55 Frovide your justification for classification of the icss of (15.2.5)

AC pcwer as an infrecuen: even:. This 'ustificatien should include an actual ccera:icnal da:a base.

211.56 Section 15.2.6.2 states that for a icss of nonemergency AC (15.2.5) pcwer, "It is assumed that the cperator further cpens the atmoscheric duma valves 10 minutes after the Icss of ;cwer."

To take credit for opera:cr action after 10 minutas, a ecmolete descripticn of each action and accropriate justifica:icn must be provided, or the assu=ction of no c; erat:r action for at least 20 minutas must be used.

211.5 7 It is nctad that many incidents of mcderata frequency in (15.0)

Chacter 15 reference 10 C.~R 100 for the dese limit. This is not in itself an ac;ectable referenca. All analyses of even:s of moderata "requency must shcw tha no fuel camage ~ ~

resul:s (MON 5R<l.30) and :ha: -he peak pressures of the reac::r c:clant and main staam systems do not excaed 11'% cf design 3ressure. Revisa ce resubmi your analyses :: shcw hcw Midland meets these critaria.

2,11.,55.,

Frevice a pic shewing 235R as a func icn cf time for -he

..:.../;

less of normal faecwatar transient.

211. 59 The feedwa:ar piping break analysis infers :na: no fuel

( *.5. 2. 5 )

failure cc:urs. C nfirm -ha: his is c:rrec: anc :r: vide a 31c: cf DN5R versus time to justify :his c:cciusi:n.

...,/ e.

s e r....n r.

=,/.c.r..

..,.s.

.....n.....:..

..s.

s, 4

.....u..

..,wei e.s<.=n..

i..,..,

.4.

211.71 Frevide -he minimum f'5R and the maximum linear heat ;aneraticn g....2.,.

4.w.7 c. e -...... s......

.,4.u.-.,w,3 4..,q.

. s

..w..

.,.y.

=.

.d.

...J g.

.. g.. 4.......

• 4. s. 3. '.c a.

=.e. s..e s.. d..a.

1.. 2 # a..e...s

..........i.A.

........... /s.........f g.

2.

• * *g n. e

.w.t..e.C. S. M -

..q.....

3 d

.w 2-~.... -

. a..

...: - s.s.: a../ a. r. g....a..: 27..,

a..,.,....

.y.a

.. a., u. ;./,.

s.

. g z C..... C. 2.e... u.... s.

. '. '..~:

,.; a...

. a. e.s

.s.e a.g s., s.e..n.e...

.a.e.1 4..

e

....... -. -... e. n.

...t s. e

.. e r. s.. d..,...

.O s e.. 4.. e. *: : *

.?

2. 32...

.s.=..

..e.,

.. s..s.-.3.

D**D

• ]Df@

J oJdM1A"o oo; 2043 080 e

211-13 (15.5.1) the oper'ator teminates HPI flow.

Is this action necessary for plant safety? Provide a sequence of events uble which includes the time frame for operator action. Also, provide figures showing appropriate plant parameters as a function of time (pressure, CNBR, pres;urizer level, etc.).

211.75 Section 15.6.1 states that the inadvertent opening of a (15.5.1) pressurizer' safety valve is limited by the small t.CCA analysis and thus is not specifically analyzed. This transient is defined as an incident of moderate frequency and thus the acceptance criteria for a LOCA do not apply. Previde an analysis for this transient evaluating the c:nsecuences with respect to the minimum DNSR limit of 1.30 or demonstrate that the small LOCA analysis results meet the acceptance repuire-ments for an incident of moderate frecuency.

211.75 With regard to a break in an instrument line or line from a (15.5.2) primary system that penetrates containment, discuss the effects of an additional single active failure resulting in the failure of the letdown isolation valve to close.

211.77 With regard to the dilution event, verify that the maximum

(*5.2.5) dilution ra es given in Table 15.2-11 are c nservative, especially for lower react:r vessel pressures.

(See Figure 5.3-3 which shews a ficw rate fren one pump of acproximately 350 gpm it*2CCO psi and increasing to 500 gpm at runout.) provide Diots of appropriate plant parameters versus time for the dilution accident at pcwer (e.g., pcwer level, RC pressure DNSR, etc.).

211. 75 Recently, an Ocera-ing pWR ex:erienced a boren diluticn

( *.5. 2. 5 )

incident due to inadvertent injecticn of laCH into -he reac::r c clan: system while the reac:Or was in a c id snutd:wn condi-icn. Discuss the otantial for a bcron dilu:icn inciden caused cy dilutien scurces ::her -han the C'!CS.

2 *_ *. 7 3 Taole 15.1-5 gives a time for auxiliary feecwater ficw

(*5.1.5) initiation of 15.3 sec:ncs, or 15 sec ncs after the initiating se: point. This is inconsisten: with the value of 10 sec:nds given in Secticn 10.l.9.2.3.

Correct this discr ancy and verify that the procer delay was assumed in the weim line break analysis.

2 *_ *. 3 0 With regard o a icss Of AC ;cwer, Sec ica '.5.2.5-2.a infers

' '. 5. 2. 5 )

tha: the Ocera :r initiates the C'!CS :r ac: ::cn : : Ort:

acic :: maintain snu:down argin. :1scuss ne : me rame associatec wi-h this :cera r acticn and shcw tha: i-is aC:e abi9.

i 211-14 211.31 The response to question 211.2 does not provide sufficient (15.1.4) infomation to justify using the steam pressure regulator malfunction as the bounding analysis for the inadvertent opening of steam generator atmospheric dump or safety valve.

Provide the appropriate steam flows resulting frem the turbine throttle valve valve wide open condition, the safety valve and duma valve ficws and shew that ycur analysis assumptions representing these steam ficws are justified.

211.82 The response to question 211.15 does not provide sufficient (15.0) information for the staff to make an acequate evaluation.

Provide a discussion of the loss of instrument air event for the Midland plant. Recently, a loss of instr' ment air at an operating plant caused a loss of reactor c:clant pump (RCP) seal water injection flow and component c oling water to the RCP thermal barrier and a resultant need for cooldcwn with natural circulation. Please provide a complete discussion addressing all systems important to plant operation (CVCS, cocoonent cooling water, auxiliary systems, etc.) which are affected by a loss of instrument air. Shcw that the loss of air would not intrccuce a failure made which would :revent safe shutdown of the plant and address ali ;otential system interactions. Discuss any actions which would have to be taken by -he Opera:Or.

21". 3 3 With respect to a break in a high cr moderne energy aiping (15.C) system Outside containment (CHR, CVCS, le down, e::.) provice tne folicwing:

(') Cetermine tne maximum discharge rate from the systems basec en its classification as a hign or cderate energy line.

(2) Cetermine the time frame available fcr esc:very basec on the discharge ra:es calcula:ec accve and Oneir effect on core c: cling.

(3) Discuss the alams that are available := aler: ne crera::r to the event, the rec very ;rocecures :: be usec, and the time available for tne required 0: erat:r actions.

(1)

In evaluating the recovery :recacures, -he single #ailure criterien shculc be ac: lied ::nsisten; with Stancart leview lan 3.5.*. anc 3 ranch Tecnnical :csition '?C55 2-1, 2 *.~. 3 2 Secti:n 15.1.2.3.2 infers that severai r.cn' safe y ; race systems

' '. 5. '. 2 }

(i.e., steam genera::r level c:ntrol, ::ndenser cum:, anc

a. cs: ceric ven:) are assumed := c: era:e cur ng the 'secwa er sys em i

malfunc icn ransient.

se of -hese systems wcu:: a:: ear : recuce One effects Of ne ransien:. Justi'y ne ase :f : ese sys ems is being c nservative *r :revice an anal sis v.iCa d:ES.0; : ansi er f

!aei" : era *#:n (see I'.es.i n 2* *,52).

I 2043 082

.