ML19284B783
| ML19284B783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/23/1980 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19284B784 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7, TASK-RIA, TASK-SE SECY-80-546, NUDOCS 8101060310 | |
| Download: ML19284B783 (58) | |
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December 23, 1980 SECY-80-546
.i RULEMAKING ISSUE i.
(Affirmation)
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For:
The Comissioners From:
Executive Director for Operations O
g
Subject:
FIRE PROTECTION RULE FOR FUTURE PLANTS
Purpose:
Discussion on alternative levels of detail to be included in a fire protection rule for future plants.
Category:
This paper covers minor policy questions.
Issue:
The desirable level of detail for an NRC fire protection rule for future plants Decision Criteria:
- 1. Will application of the alternative result in a fire protection rule which will assure a level of fire protection for new nuclear plants adequate to protect the public health and safety?
- 2. Will application of the alternative furnish an appli-cant sufficient criteria to permit adequate design and installation of fire protection features and permit efficient staff reviews?
- 3. Is it necessary or desirable to permit different solutions for specific fire protection problems at any given nuclear plant?
If yes, then does the alternative provide the proper balance of specific requirements and freedom to develop innovative solutions for plant specific problems?
- 4. Is the expenditure of NRC resources coninensurate with the benefit?
Alternatives:
- 1. Publish for comment a proposed fire protection rule for future plants which specifies the mininum fire protection requirements, in performance-goal oriented language.
- 2. Publish for cocinent a proposed fire protection rule that contains very precise and specific fire pro-tection criteria that, taken as a whole, conpletely define a total fire protection program of design, material, pr cedural, and administrative requirements.
83010603/O
Contact:
V. Benaroya
. 3.
Publish for coment a proposed fire protection nale covering generic items applicable to most plants in detail and fire protection features that are plant dependent in general terms.
Discussion:
On October 27, 1980, the Comission approved for publication in the Federal Register a new 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 delineating certain fire protection pro-visions for nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1,1979. The Comission also requested further discussion with staff on the " development of requirements and the level of detail to be included in the Rule for future plants," (see memo Chilk to Dircks, dated Nov. 3, 1980.)
Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 specifies that " Structures, systems, and co@onents imortant to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions."
To iglement GDC-3 in the licensing process for new plants, the staff currently relies on the guidance con-tained in Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" dated May 1976 (BTP 9.5-1), " Supplementary Guidance on Information Needed for Fire Protection Evaluation" dated October 21, 1976, and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, " Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1,1979" which was published in the Federal Register on November 19, 1980. Although the guidance contained in these documents is specific in some areas, application to plant unique situations requires eagineering judgment of the staff and its fire protection consultants.
Our review process includes, in addition to a detailed review and evaluation of the licensee's fire hazards analysis, a site visit by the staff to evaluate specific plant features.
(We currently plan to revise and update the Standard Review Plan Section 9.5-1, " Fire Protection" and its BTP 9.5-1 to incorporate the Appendix R requirements, to reflect the
. latest research information and our review experience to date, and to provide modifications necessary for clarification of current staff positions.) Since these reviews are performed prior to granting a license to construct or operate a nuclear power plant, the staff does not experience unwarranted difficulties in the inplementation of these fire protection guidelines for new plants.
The main purpose of issuing a fire protection rule for new plants at this time is to anplify in the regulations those fire protection features necessary for plant safety and to codify the NRC policy for the level of fire protection.
Further, such a rule would standardize the requirements, aid applicants early in the design stage, inprove the efficiency of regulatory review and maintain consistency.
These factors would likely enhance that level of safety provided by fire protection features.
A range of opinion exists among the staff, members of ACRS and industry representatives regarding the need for and level of detail in a new fire protection rule covering future plants. At one end of the spectrum of opinion is the belief that General Design Criterion 3 in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 (GDC-3) supplemented by existing guidance is sufficient for new plants and that no additional regu-lations are needed.
On the other end is the belief that codification in the regulations of all the details of the fire protection program including design, material, procedural, and administrative requirements is needed. The staff has generated the following alter-natives, all of which are viable, for consideration as a fire protection rule for future plants.
Alternative 1:
A fire protection rule which is an expansion of GDC-3 in performance-goal oriented language such as provided in Enclosure 1.
Pro:
(a) Since fire protection is not an exact science and is nere dependent on expert evaluation, such a rule would provide maximum fidgment and flexibility for plant unique situations.
. (b) Details of iglementation would be provided by a Regulatory Guide showing acceptable alternatives. Such guidance could be more readily changed if new test data should so dictate.
(c) Rule could be reacty for public coment within two months.
Con:
(a) Because the fire protection requirements would be general, acceptable methods to meet the
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requirements might vary from reviewer to reviewer.
(b) Licensees might ah, at a lower level of fire protection to achieve cogliance because of lack of specificity on the Rule.
(c) Staff review would require more resources because of greater emphasis on evaluation of plant specific circumstances.
Alternative 2: A fire protection rule which is a very detallea and cogrehensive statement of design, material, procedural, and administrative requirements.
Pro:
(a) Such a rule would codify all fire protection requirements allowing applicants a clear and
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concise path for NRC approval.
(b) Would allow broader public participation in the generation of fire protection requirements.
(c) Might minimize staff evaluation resources.
Con:
(a) Could not be written to cover all cases, so exegtions would be likely for specific items.
(b) Rigid approach might dagen innovative approaches which may provide more effective protection, such as dedicated shutdown systems.
(c) Preparation of rule would require significant staff resources and acre than two years to issue for public coment.
. Alternative 3: A fire protection rule which is a nyoria or anernatives 1 and 2, containing well defined requirements in those areas which are generic and applicable to most plants, while leaving plant dependent features to staff evaluation under generic requirements. reflecti a version of this alternative.
Pro:
(a)
It would take less staff resources to prepare than Altenative 2, while still providing sub-stantial guidance on generic items.
(b) Would replace the Branch Technical Position.
(c) Would reduce the dependence on individual designer and reviewer judgments to provide reasonable assurance that an adequate fire protection program is being inplemented.
Con:
(a) Such a rule might create confusion because some features will be delineated in detail while others will be handled in a general way.
(b) May restrict innovation in certain areas.
Recomendation: It is recomended that the Comission adopt Alternative 3 and direct the staff to issue a fire protection rule for public comment by July 1,1982. This date is consistent with the available staff resources, considering that the limited staff fire protection expertise can be better used in expeditiously upgrading existing facilities.
It should be noted that new applications are not expected to be numerous in the near future.
Y William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
Sanple Rule On Fire Protection for Future Plants (Performance-Goal Oriented) 2.
Sample Rule on Fire Protection For Future Plants (Hybrid Version)
. Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Tuesday, January 13, 1981.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT January 6,1981, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
This paper is tentatively scheduled for affirmation at an Open Meeting during the Week of January 19, 1981. Please refer to the appropriate Weekly Commission Schedule, when published, for a specific date and time.
DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations ACRS ASLBP Secretariat
ENCLOSURE 1 SAMPLE RULE ON FIRE PROTECTION FOR FUTURE PLANTS To satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, the following shall be met:
1.
A fire protection program shall be prepared, documented and maintained.
The fire protection program shall provide a defense-in-depth by providing for (1) prevention of fires, (2) rapid detection, control, and extinguish-ment of fires, (3) arrangements of structures, systems and components important to safety so that any fire that occurs cannot prevent safe shutdown of the plant, and release of radioactive material from the plant during and following a fire will be limited to small amounts. Respon-sibility for the overall fire protection program shall be assigned to a designated person in the upper level of management.
2.
A fire hazards analysis considering both stationary and exposure fires shall be performed and documented to show the adequacy of the fire protection program to ensure the ability (1) to safely shut down the plant during and after a fire, (2) to maintain the plant in safe shutdown condition during and after a fire, and (3) to minimize and control the release of radioactivity to the environment within safe limits.
3.
The design of nuclear power plants shall include the establishment of fire areas which are capable of preventing any postulated fire from spreading in a way that would jeopardize plant functions that are intended to assure public safety. Specifically, it shall be possible at all times including before, during, and after the occurrence of a fire, to safely shut down the reactor, to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition, and to prevent the release of unsafe amounts of radioactivity.
4.
Automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components to alert the operating staff to the existence of fires. The fire detectors shall actuate alarms which shall be annunciated in continuously manne, operational areas to indicate the location of the fire. These fire detection systems shall be capable of operating with or without offsite power.
4
. 5.
Preference shall be given to the use of water as the fire extinguish-ing agent. An underground yard fire main loop shall be installed to furnish anticipated fire water requirements. Two separate water supplies shall be provided to furnish necessary water volume and pressure to the fire main loop. Other extinguishing agents may be used if water is unacceptable, but if gaseous extinguishing agents are used to smother or retard combustion, their efficacy shall be established by tests that show effectiveness in control of fires under the conditions of the postulated fire. Special attention shall be given to distribution, dilution, out-leakage, or other factors that could detrimentally affect the fire extinguishing capability.
6.
A three-hour fire rated structural assembly is the preferred method of separating divisions of safety-related systems and of isolating safety-related systems from fire hazards in non-safety-related areas. As an alternative, either separation by distance or a one-hour fire barrier partition or enclosure and an automatic fire suppression system shall be used. The fire barrier partitions or enclosures shall be capable of resisting a fire for whatever length of time may be needed to provide effective supplemental firefighting capability to prevent the fire from affecting safe shutdown circuits.
Where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirements listed above, an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability, independent of cables, systems or components and their associated circuits in the area, room or zone under consideration shall be provided.
7.
Emergency lighting units shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.
8.
Standpipe and hose systems shall be installed so that at least one effective hose stream will be able to reach any location that contains or presents an exposure fire hazard to structures, systems or components important to safety.
. 9.
Penetration seal designs shall utilize only noncombustible materials, and shall be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate fire barriers.
- 10. A seismically induced oil fire shall not prevent a safety-related system from performing its safety function,
- 11. A site fire brigade trained and equipped for fire fighting shall be established to ensure adequate manual fire fighting capability for all areas of the plant containing structures, systems or components important to safety. The fire brigade training program shall ensure that the capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained.
- 12. Administrative procedures consistent with the need for maintaining the perfornance of the fire protection system and personnel in nuclear power plants shall be provided.
- 13. Documentation shall be established and maintained, including records of fire-fighting personnel training, operational testing of personnel, equipment, and procedures and any other records needed to verify that fire protection provisions are available for use whenever needed.
- 14. The fire protection program shall include periodic testing of fire-fighting equipment, fire detectors, alarm systems, and any other actions required to assure continuous operational availability of those systems.
When any fire detecting or fighting equipment or system is not operationally available, human surveillance and emergency standby equipment, as applicable, shall be provided.
- 15. A fire response analysis will be prepared showing how in-plant and external fire fighting resources respond to fires including personnel and equipment in order to demonstrate that the capability exists to handle fire con-tingencies affecting public health and safety.
ENCLOSURE 2 SAMPLE RULE ON FIRE PROTECTION FOR FUTURE PLANTS
(
)
I.
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE This Appendix applies to nuclear power electric generating stations whose construction permit. application were docket after January 1, 1982. With respect to certain generic issues for such facilities, it sets forth fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part.
Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that " Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions."
When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safety because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boiloff.
The phrases "important to safety," or " safety-related," will be used throughout this Appendix R as applying to all safety functions.
The phrase
" safe shutdown" will be used throughout this Appendix R as applying to both hot and cold shutdown fur.ctions.
. Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents under postfire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents. Three levels of fire damage limits are established according to the safety function of the structure, system, or component:
Safety Function Fire Damage Limits Hot Shutdown One train of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) must be maintained an exposure fire.!/ y a single fire, including free of fire damage b Cold Shutdown Both trains of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown may be damaged by a single fire, including an exposure fire, but damage must be limited so that at least one train can be repaired or made operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using onsite capability.
Design Basis Both trair.: of equipment necessary for mitiga-Accidents tion of consequences following design basis accidents may be damaged by a single exposure fire.
}/ExposureFire. An exposure fire is a fire in a given area that involves either in situ or transient combustibles and is external to any struc-tures, systems, or components located in or adjacent to that same area.
The effects of such fire (e.g., smoke,' heat,.or ignition) can adversely affect those structures, systems, or components important to safety.
Thus, a fire involving one train of safe shutdown equipment may consti-tute an exposure fire for the redundant train located in the same area, and a fire involving combustibles other than either redundant train may constitute an exposure fire to both reoundant trains located in the same area.
s The most stringent fire damage limit shall apply for those systems that fall into more than one category.
Redundant systems used to mitigate the consequences of other design basis accidents but not necessary for safe shutdown may be lost to a single exposure fire.
However, protec-tion shall be provided so that a fire within only one such system will not damage the redundant system.
II.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS A.
Fire Protection Program A fire protection program'shall be established at each nuclear power plant. The program shall establish the fire protection policy for the protectior,,f structures, systems, and components important to safety at each plant and the procedures, equipment, and personnel required to implement the program at the plant site.
The fire protection program shall be under the direction of an individual who has been delegated authority commen'surate with the respon-sibilities of the position and who has available staff personnel knowledge-able in both fire protection and nuclear safety.
The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in fire areas important to safety, with the following objectives:
to prevent fires from starting;'
to detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur; to provide protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extin-guished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the pitnt.
8.
Fire Hazards Analysis A fire hazards analysis shall be performed by qualified fire protection and reactor systems engineers to (1) consider potential in situ and transient fire hazards; (2) determine the consequences of fire in any location in the plant on the ability to safely shut down the reactor or on the ability to rinimize and control the release of radio-activity to the environment; and (3) specify measures for fire preven-tion, fire detection, f'ee suppression, and fire containment and alter-native shutdown capability as required for each fire area containing structures, systems, an,d components'important to safety in accordance with NRC guidelines and regulations.
C.
Fire Prevention Features Fire protection features shall meet the following general require-ments for all fire areas that contain or present a fire hazard to structures, Jystems, or components important to safety.
1.
In situ fire hazards shall be identified and suitable protec-tion provided.
2.
Transient fire hazards associated with normal operation, maintenance, repair, or modificati1n activities shall be identified and eliminated where possible. Those transient fire hazards that can not be eliminated shall be controlled and suitable protection provided.
3.
Fire detection systems, portable extinguishers, and stand-pipe and hose stations shall be installed.
4.
Fire barriers or automatic suppression systems or both shall be installed as necessary to protect redundant systems or components necessary for safe shutdown.
5-5.
A site fire brigade shall be established, Yrained, and equipped and shall be on site at all times.
6.
Fire detection and suppression systems shall be designed, installed, maintained, and tested by personnel properly qualified by experience and training in fire protection systems.
7.
Surveillance procedures shall be established to ensure that fire barriers are in place and that fire suppression systems and components are operable.
D.
Alternative or. Dedicated Shutdown Capability For areas where the fire protection features cannot ensure safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire in that area, alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability shall be provided.
F.
Quality Assurance Program The quality assurance (QA) programs of applicants and contractors shall ensure that the guidelines for design, procurement, installation and testing and the administrative controls for the fire protection systems for safety-related areas are satisfied. The QA program shall be under the management control of the QA organization. This control consists of (1) formulating a fire protection QA program that incorporates suit-able requirements and is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection or verifying that the program incorporates suitable requirements and is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection, and (2) verifying the effectiveness of the QA program for fire protection through review, surveillance and audits. Performance of other QA program functions for meeting the fire protection program
. requirements may be performed by personnel outside of the QA organization. The QA program for fire protection shall be part of the overall plant QA program.
III. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS A.
Fire Barriers with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours shall be provided, to:
a.
Isolate safety-related systems from any potential fires in nonsafety-related areas that could affect their ability to perform their safety function; b.
Separate redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard; and c.
Separate individual units on a multiple-unit site unless the requirements of General Design Criterion 5 are met with respect to fires.
2.
Appropriate fire barriers shall be provided within a single safety division to separate components that present a fire hazard to other safety-related components or high concentrations of safety-related cables within that division.
3.
Openings through fire barriers around conduit or piping shall be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that required of the barrier itself. The penetration quali-fication tests shall use the time-temperature exposure curve
- specified by ASTM E-119, " Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials." Openings inside conduit larger than four inches in diameter shall be sealed at the fire barrier penetration. Openings '
inside conduit four inches or less in diame'er shall be sealed at the fire barrier unless the conduit extends at least five feet on each sida of the fire barrier and is sealed either at both ends or at the fire barrier with noncombustible material to prevent the passage of smoke and hot gases. Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation or pressure differentials shall be qualified by test to maintain the barrier integrity under such conditions.
Penetration seal designs shall utilize only noncombustible materials and shall be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate fire barriers. The acceptance criteria for the test shall include:
a.
The cable fire barrier penetration seal has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to the fire resist-ance rating required of the barrier; b.
The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature is sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature; and c.
The fire barrier penetration seal remains intact and does not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose stream test.
4.
Openings through fire barrier for ventilation systems shall be protected by a " fire door damper" having a rating equivalent
, to that required of the barrier (see NFPA-80, " Fire Doors and Windows").
Flexible air duct coupling in ventilation and filter systems shall be noncombustible.
5.
Door openings shall be protected with equivalently rated doors, frames and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory.
Fire doors shall be self-closing or provided with closing mechanisms and shall be inspected semiannually to verify that automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are operable.
One of the following measures shall be provided to ensure they will protect the opening as required in case of fire:
a.
Fire doors shall be kept closed and electrically super-vised at a continuously manned location; b.
Fire doors shall be locked closed and inspected wiekly to verify that the doors are in the closed position; c.
Fire voors shall be provided with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions; or d.
Fire doors shall be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.
The fire brigade leader shall have ready access to keys for any locked fire doors.
Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems shall have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or shall satisfy option a.above.
.g.
B.
Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability 1.
Fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shuttiown. These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
a.
One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot mautdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station (s) is free of fire damage; and b.
Systems necessary to achiete and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
2.
Except as provided for paragraph B.3 of this section, where cables or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, or redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided:
a.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier; b.
Separat Sn of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards.
- In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or c.
Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression systems shall be installed in the fire area.
Inside noninerted containments one of the fire protection means specified above or one of the following fire protection means shall be provided:
d.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards; e.
Installation of fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area; or f.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a noncombustible radiant energy shield.
3.
Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associ-ated circuits, O ndependent of cables, systems or components in the i
area, room er zone under consideration, shall be provided:
MAlternativeshutdowncapabilityisprovidedbyrerouting, relocating or modification of existing systems; dedicated shutdown capability is provided by installing new structures and systems for the function of post-fire shutdown.
4 a.
Where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirement of para-graph B.2 of this section; or b.
Where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in the same fire area may be subjected to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems.
In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration.
C.
Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability 1.
Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability provided for a specific fire area shall be able to achieve and maintain sub-critical reactivity conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot standbyb conditions for a PWR
'I (hot shutdown / for a BWR) and achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and v.aintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. Dur-ing the postfire shutdown, the reactor coolant system process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c.
power, and the fission product boundary integrity shall not be affected; i.e., there shall be no fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary.
8/As defined in the Standard Technical Specifications.
t 2.
The performance goals for the shutdown functions shall be:
The reactivity control function shall be capable of achipv-a.
ing and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions.
b.
The reactor coolant makeup function shall be capable of
, maintaining the reactor coolant level above the top of the core for BWRs and be within the level indication in the pressurizer for PWRs.
c.
The reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining dech/ heat removal.
d.
The process monitoring function shall be capable of pro-viding direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.
The supporting functions shall be capable of providing e.
the process cooling, lubrication, etc., necessary to per-mit the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown functions.
3.
The shutdown capability for specific fire areas may be unique for each such area, or it may be one unique camb,ination of systems for all such areas.
In either case, the alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area (s) and shall accommodate postfire
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conditions where offsite power is available and where offsite power is
.7:t cvailable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Procedures shall be in effect to implement this croability.
4.
If the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown will not be available because of fire damage, the equipment and systems com-prising the means to achieve and maintain the hot standby or hot shut-down condition shall be capable of maintaining such conditions until cold shutdown can be achieved.
If such equipment and systems will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system shall be provided. The number of operating shift personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, required to operate such equipment and systems shall be on site at all times.
5.
Equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and main-tain cold shutdown conditions shall not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems shall be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Mate-rials for such repairs shall be readily available on site and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs.
If such equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the fire will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system shall be provided.
Equipment and systems used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power only.
Shutdown systems installed to e'nsure po,stfire shutdown capa-6.
bility need not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, or other design basis accident criteria, except where required for other reasons, e.g., because of interface with or impact on existing safety systems, or because of adverse valve actions due to fire damage.
7.
The safe shutdown equipment and systems for each fire area shall be known to be isolated from associated non-safety circuits in the fire area so that hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground in the associated circuits will not prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment. The separation and barriers between trays and conduits con-taining associated circuits of one safe shutdown division and trays and conduits containing associated circuits or safe shutdown cables from the redundant division, or the isolation of these associated circuits from the safe shutdown equipment, shall be such that a postulated fire invol-ving associated circuits will not prevent safe shutdown.3I D.
Fire Protection For Grouped Electrical Cables 1.
Safety-related cable trays of a single division that are separated from redundant divisions by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of three hours and are normally accessible for manual firefighting shall be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in the area where such a fire could occur. The number of equivalent 2/ standard 24-inch-widecable trays (both safety-related and nonsafety-related) in a given fire area is six or more.
2/ An acceptable method of complying with this alternative would be to meet Regulatory Guide 1.75 position 4 related to associated circuits and IEEE Std 384-1974 (Section 4.5) where trays from redundant safety divisions are so protected that postulated fires affect trays from only one safety division.
s/ Trays exceeding 24 inches should be counted as two trays; trays exceeding
~~ 48 inches should be counted as three trays, regardless of tray fill.
. 2.
Safety-related cable trays of a single division that are not accessible for manual fighting should be protected by a zoned automatic water system with open-head deluge or open direc-tional spray nozzles arranged so that adequate water coverage is pro-vided for each cable tray. Such cable trays should also be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in the area where such a fire could occur.
E.
Automatic Fire Detection Systems 1.
Automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. These fire detection systems shall be capable of operating with or without off-site power.
2.
Automatic fire detection systems shall, as a minimum, comply with the requirements of Class A systems as defined in NFPA 720, " Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems," and Class I circuits as defined in NFPA 70, " National Electrical Code."
3.
Fire detectors shall, as a minimum, be selected and installed in accordance with NFPA 72E, " Automatic Fire Detectors."
Prpoperational and periodic testing of pulsed line-type beat detectors should demonstrate that the frequencies used will not affect the actuation of protective relays.
. 4.
Fire detection systems shall give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in a continuously manned area, where zoned detection systems are used in a given fire area, local means shall be provided to identify which detector zone has actuated. Local audible alarms shall sound in the fire area.
5.
Fire alarms shall be distinctive and unique so they will not be confused with any other plant system alarms.
6.
Primary and secondary power supplies shall be provided for the fire detection system and for electrically operated control valves for automatic suppression systems. Such primary and secondary power supplies shall satisfy provisions of Section 2220 of NFPA 720.
This shall be accomplished by:
a.
Using nermal offsite power as the primary supply with a four-hour battery supply as secondary supply; and b.
Maving capability for manual connection to the Class 1E emergency power bus within four hours of loss of offsite power.
Such connection should follow the applicable guidelines in Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32 and 1.75.
F.
Standpipe and Hose Systems 1.
Standpipe and hose systems shall be installed so that at least one effective hose stream will be able to reach any location that contains or presents en exposure fire hazard to structures, systems, or components important to safety.
2.
Access to permit effective functioning of tho / ire brigade shall be provided to all areas that contain or p:esent an
. exposure fire hazard to 6tructures, systems, or components important to safety.
i 3.
Standpipe and hose stations shall be inside PWR contain-ments and BWR containments that are no^ inerted. Standpipe and hose stations inside containment may be connected to a high quality water supply of sufficient quantity and pressure other than the fire main loop if plant-specific features present extending the fire main supply inside containment. For BWR drywells, standpipe and hose stations shall be placed cutside the drywell with adequate legnths of hose to reach any location inside the drywell with an effective hose stream.
4.
Standpipes with hose connections equipped with a maximum of 100 feet of 1-12-inch woven-jacket, lined fire hose and suitable nozzles shall be provided in all buildings on all floors.
Individual standpipes shall be at least four inches in diameter ~for multiple hose connections and 2-1/2 inches in diameter for single hose connections.
These systems shall follow the requirements of NFPA 14. " Standpipe and Hose Systems," for sizing, spacing, and pipe support requirements.
5.
Hose stations shall be located as dictated by the fire hazard analysis to facilitate access and use for firefighting opera-tions. Alternative hose stations shall be provided for an area if the fire hazard could block access to a single hose station serving that area.
6.
Provisions shall be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual firefighting in areas
. containingequipmentrequiredforsafeplantshutdownintheehent of a safe shutdown earthquake. Thepipingsystemserhingsuchhose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be provided with supports to ensure system pressure integrity. The pipe and valves for the portion of hose standpipe system affected by this functional requirement shall, as a minimum, satisfy ANSI B31.1, " Power Piping." The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operatoractuationofhalhesinaconnectiontothehosestandpipe header from a normal seismic Category I water system such as the essential service water system. The cross connection shall be (a) capable of providing flow to at least two hose stations (approximately 75 gpm per hose station), and (b) designed to the same standards as the seismic Category I water system; it should not degrade the performance of the seismic Category I water system.
7.
The proper type of hose nozzle to be supplied to each area should be based on the fire hazard analysis. The usual combination spray /
straight-stream nozzle shall not be used in areas where the straight stream can cause unacceptable mechanical damage. Fixed fog nozzles shall be provided at locations where high-voltage shock hazards exist. All hose nozzles shall have shutoff capability.
(Guidance on safe distance for water application to live electrical equipment may be found in the "NFPA Fire Protection Handbook.")
8.
For fires involving flammable liquids, foam suppression systems shall be provided. These systems should comply with the require-ments of NFPA 11, NFPA 11A and NFPA llB as applicable.
. 9.
Outside manual hose installation shall be sufficient to provide an effective hose stream to any onsite location where fixed or transient combustibles could jeopardize safety-related equipment.
Hydrants shall be installed approximately every 250 feet on the yard main system. A hose house equipped with hose and combination nozzle and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Pro-tection," should be provided as needed, but at least every 1,000 feet.
Alternatively, mobile means of providing hose and associated equipment, such as hose carts or trucks, may be used. When provided, such mobile equipment shall be equivalent to the equipment supplied by three hose houses.
- 10. Thread compatible with those used by local fire depart-ments shall be provided on all hydrants, hose couplings, and standpipe risers or adapters shall be provided in the hose houses or on the hose carts.
G.
Water Suppression Systems 1.
Fixed water extinguishing systems shall, as a minimum, conformtorequirementsofappropriatestandardssuchasfiFPA13
" Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA 15,
" Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems."
2.
Automatic water systems and manual hose station stand-pipes shall have connections to the yard main such that no single active failure or crack in a moderate-energy line can impair both the automatic and manual fire suppression systems. Hose standpipe and automatic water suppression systems serving a single fire area
. shall have independent connections to the yard main systems.
Each automatic system and standpipe system shall be equipped with OSLY (outside screw and yoke) gate valve or other approved shutoff valve and water flow alarm. Sectional isolation valves such as post indicatorvalvesorkeyoperatedhalvesshallbeinstalledinthe fire main loop to permit isolation of portions of the fire main loop for maintenance or repair without interrrupting the entire water supply. Valves shall be installed to permit isolation of outside hydrants from the fire main for maintenance or repair without inter-rupting the water supply to automatic or manual fire suppression systems in any area containing or presenting a fire hazard to safety-related or safe shutdown equipment.
3.
Control and sectionalizing valves in the fire water systems shall be electrically supervised or administratively controlled.
The electrical supervision signal shall indicate in the control room.
All valves in the fire protection system shall be periodically checked to verify position (see NFPA 26, " Supervision of Valves").
4.
A yard fire main loop shall furnish the anticipated water requirements. Means for inspecting and flushing the systems shall be provided. Approved visually indicating sectional control valves such as post indicator valves should be provided to isolate portions of the main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the supply to primary and backup fire suppression systems serving areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment.
The fire main system piping shall be separate from service or sanitary water system piping.
. 5.
A comon yard fire main loop may serve multiunit nuclear power plant sites if cross-connected between units. Sec-tional control valves shall permit maintaining independent of the individual loop around each unit. For such installations, comon water supplies may also be utilized. For multiple-reactor sites with widely separated plants (approaching 1 mile or more), separate yard fire main loops snall be used.
6.
If pumps are required to meet system pressure or flow requirements, a sufficient number of pumps shall be provided to ensure that 100% capacity will be available assuming failure of the largest pump or loss of offsite power (e.g., three 50% pumps or two 100% pumps). This can be accomplished, for example, by providing aither:
a.
Electric motor-driven fire pump (s) and diesel-driven fire pump (s); or b.
Two or more seismic Category I Cisss IE electric motor-driven fire pumps connected to redundant Class IE emergency power buses (see Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32 and 1.75).
7.
Individual fire pump connections to the yard fire main loop shall be separated with sectionalizing valves between connections.
Each pump and its driver and controls shall. be located in a room separ-ated from the remaining fire pumps by a fire wall with a minimum rating of three hours. The fuel for the diesel fire pump (s) shall be separated so that it does not provide a fire source exposing safety-related equip-ment. Alarms indicating pump running, driver availability, failure to
. start, and low fire-main pressure shall be provided in the control room. The fire pump installation should, as a minimum, conform to NFPA 20, " Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps."
8.
Other water systems used as one of the two fire water supplies shall be permanently connected to the fire main system and shall be cap-able of automatic alignment to the fire main system.
Pumps, controls, and powar supplies in these systems shall satisfy the requirements for the main fire pumps. The use of other water systems for fire protection shall not be incompatible with their functions required for safe plant shutdown. Failure of the other system shall not degrade the fire main system.
9.
Two separate water supplies shall be provided to furnish neces-sary water volume and pressure to the fire main loop.
10.
Each supply shall consist of a storage tank, pump, piping, and appropriate isolation and control valves.
Two separate redundant suctions in one or more intake structures from a large body of water (river, lake, etc.) will satisfy the requirement for two separated water storage tanks.
These supplies shall be separated so that a failure of one supply will not result in a failure of the other supply.
- 11. Each supply of the fire water distribution system shall be capable of providing for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the maximum expected water demands as determined by the fire hazards analysis for safety-related areas or other areas that present a fire exposure hazard to safety-related areas.
i 12. When storage tanks are used for combined service-water /
fire-water uses the minimum volume for fire uses shall be ensured by means of dedicated tanks or by some physical means such as a vertical standpipeforotherwaterserhice. Administrative controls, including locks for tank outlet valves, are unacceptable as the only means to ensure minimum water volume.
- 13. If tanks are used, two 100% system capacity tanks shall be installed. They shall be so interconnected that pumps can take
~
suction from either or both. However, a leak in one tank or its piping shall be isolable so that it will not cause both tanks to drain. Water supply capacity shall be capable of refilling either tank in eight hours or less.
H.
Halon Suppression Systems Halon fire extinguishing systems shall comply with the requirement of NFPA 12A and NFPA 12B, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems -
Halon 1301 and Halon 1211." Only UL-listed or FM-approved agents should be used. Provisions for locally disarmic.g automatic Halon systems shall be key locked and under strict administrative control.
Preventive maintenance and testing of the systems shall include check-weighing of the Halon cylinders, at least quarterly.
I.
Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems Carbon dioxide extinguishing systems shall comply with the requirements of NFPA 12 " Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems." Where automatic carbon dioxide systems are used, they shall be equipped with
4 a predischarge alarm system and a discharge delay to permit personnel egress.
Provisions for locally disarming automatic carbon dioxide systems shall be key locked and under strict administrative control.
J.
Portable Extinguishers Fire extinguishers shall be provided in areas that contain, or could present a fire exposure hazard to, safety-related equipment in accordance with guidelines of NFPA 10 " Portable Fire Extinguishers.
Installation, Maintenance and Use."
K.
Ventilation 1.
The products of combustion and the means by which they will be removed from each fire area shall be established. Where necessary automatic suppression systems shall be provided as a means of limiting smoke and end heat generation. Smoke and corrosive gases shall be discharged directly to an area that will not affect safety-related plant areas. The normal plant ventilation system may be used for this purpose if capable and available. To facilitate manual firefighting, separate smoke and heat vents shall be provided in specific areas such as cable spreading rooms, diesel fuel oil storage areas, switchgear rooms, and other areas where the potential exists for heavy smoke conditions (see NFPA 204 for additional guidance on smoke control).
2.
Release of smoke and gases containing radioactive mater-ials to the environment shall be monitored in accordance with emergency plans as described in the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.101,
" Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants." Any ventilation system
. designedtoexhaustpotentiallyradioactihesmokeorgasesshall be ehaluatedtoensurethatinadhertentoperationorsinglefailures willnothiolatetheradiologicallycontrolledareasoftheplant design. This requirement includes containment functions for protect-ing the public and maintaining habitability for operations personnel.
3.
Specialprotectionforhentilationpowerandcontrol cablesshallbeprohidedasrequired to assure post fire control of the ventilation system. The power supply and controls for mechan-icalhentilationsystemsshallberunoutsidethefireareaserhedby the system.
4.
Engineered safety feature filters shall be protected in accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Any filter that includes combustible materials and is a potential exposure fire hazard that may affect safety-related components shall be protected as determined by the fire hazard analysis.
5.
The fresh air supply intakes to areas containing safety-related equipment or systems shall be located remote from the exhaust air outlets and smoke hents of other fire areas to minimize the possi-bility of contaminating the intake air with the products of combustion.
6.
Stairwells shall be designed to minimize smoke infil-tration during a fire.
7.
Self-contained breathing apparatus using full-face positihe-pressuremasksapprohedbyNIOSH(NationalInstitutefor Occupational Safety and Health--approhal formerly given by the U.S.
BureauofMines)shallbeprohidedforfirebrigade,damagecontrol,
and control room personnel. Control room personnel may be furnished breathingairbyamanifoldsystempipedfromastorageresrehoirif practical. Serhiceorratedoperatinglifeshouldbeaminimumof one-half hour for the self-contained units. At least two extra air bottles should be located on site for each self-contained breathing unit.
Inadditiori,anonsitesix-hoursupplyofreserheairshallbe prohided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned.
If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approhed for breath-ing air shall be used; compressors shall be operable assuming a loss of offsite power. The compressor shall be located in an area free of dust and contaminants.
8.
Where total flooding gas extinguishing systems are used, area intake and exhaust hentilation dampers shall be controlled in accordance with NFPA 12 " Carbon Dioxide Systems," and NFPA 12A, "Halon 1301 Systems, to maintain the necessary gas concentration.
9.
Ventilation systems in the battery rooms shall be capableofmaintainingthehydrogenconcentrationwellbelow2hol-%.
Lossofhentilationshall be alarmed in the control room.
L.
_ Lighting 1.
Fixed self-contained lighting consisting of fluorescent orsealed-beamunitswithindihidualeight-hourminimumbatterypower suppliedshallbeprohidedinareasthatmustbemannedforsafeshut-down and for access and egress routes to and from all fire areas. Safe shutdown areas include those required to be manned if the control room mustbeehacuated.
. 2.
Suitable sealed-beam battery-powered portable hand lights shall ~ be prohided for emergency use by the fire brigade and otheroperationspersonnelrequiredtoachiehesafeplantshutdown.
M.
Communication 1.
Eixed emergency communcations independent of the normal plant comunication system shall be installed at preselected stations.
2.
A portable radio communications system shall beprohided for use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achiehesafeplantshutdown. This system shall not interfere with the communcations capabilities of the plant security force. Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of portable radio communcations units shall be protected from exposure fire damage. Preoperational and periodic test-ing shall demonstrate that the frequencies used for portable radio comuncation will not affect the actuation of protectihe relays.
N.
Floor Drains Floordrainssizedtoremoheexpectedfirefightingwaterflow withoutfloodingsafety-relatedequipmentshallbeprohidedinthose areas where fixed water fire suppression systems are installed. Floor drainsshallalsobeprohidedinotherareaswherehandhoselinesmay be used if such firefighting water could cause unacceptable damage to safety-related equipment in the area (see NFPA-92, " Waterproofing and Draining of Floors"). Where gas suppression systems are installed, thedrainsshallbeprohidedwith.adequatesealsorthegassuppression system shall be sized to compensate for the loss of the suppression agent through the drains. Drains in areas containing combustible liquids
. shall hahe pro 01sions for preYenting the spread of the fire throughout the drain system. Water drainage from areas that may contain radio-actiYityshallbecollected,sampledandanalyzedbeforedischargeto theenhironment.
O.
Specific Plant Areas 1.
Control Room Complex a.
The control room complex (including galley, office spaces, etc.) shall be protected against disabling fire damage and shall be separated from other areas of the plant by floors, walls, and roof hahingminimumfireresistanceratingsofthreehours.
Peripheral rooms inthecontrolroomcomplexshallhaYeautomaticfiresuppressionandshall be separated from the control room by noncombustible construction with a fire resistance rating of one hour. Ventilation system openings between the control room and peripheral rooms shall haYe automatic smoke dampers that close on operation of the fire detection or suppression system.
If a carbon dioxide flooding system is used for fire suppression, these dampers shall be strong enough to support the pressure rise accompanying carbon di-oxide discharge and seal tighty against infiltration of carbon dioxide into the control room.
b.
ManualfirefightingcapabilityshallbeproYidadfor both a fire originating within a cabinet, console, or connecting cables; andanexposurefireinholhingcombustiblesinthegeneralroomarea.
c.
Portable Class A and Class C fire extinguishers shall be located in the control room. A hose station shall be installed immed-iately outside the control ro s.
. d.
Nozzles that are compatible with the hazards and equipmentinthecontrolroomshallbeprohidedforthemanualhose station. The nozzles shall satisfy actual firefighting needs, satisfy electrical safety, and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement.
Smokedetectorsshallbeprohidedinthecontrol e.
room, cabinets, and consoles.
If redundant safe-shutdown equipment is located in the same control room cabinet or console, automatic fire protec-tionshallbeprohided. Alarmandlocalindicationshallbeprohidedin the control room.
f.
Breathing apparatus for control room operators shallbereadilyaYailable.
g.
The outside air intake (s) for the control room hentilationsystemshallbeproYidedwithsmokedetectioncapabilityto alarm in the control room to enable manual isolation of the control room hentilationsystemandthuspreYentsmokefromenteringthecontrolroom.
h.
Venting of smoke produced by fire in the control roombymeansofthenormalEentilationsystemisacceptable;howeYer, proYisionshallbemadetopermitisolationoftherecirculatingportion ofthenormalYentilationsystem. ManuallyoperatedYentingofthecontrol roomshallbeaYailabletotheoperators.
1.
All cables that enter the control room shall terminate in the control room. That is, no cabling shall be routed through the control rocm from one area to another. Cables in the control room shall be kept to the minimum necessary for plant operation.
- j. Cables in underfloor and ceiling spaces shall meet theseparationrequirementsgiheninSectionIII.B. Air-handling functions shall be ducted separately from cable runs in such spaces; i.e., if cables are routed in underfloor or ceiling spaces, these spaced shall not be used as air plenums for hentilation of the control room. Fully enclosed elec-tricalracewaysinsuchunderfloorandceilingspaces,ifcharonesquare footincross-sectionalarea,shallhaYeautomaticfiresuppressioninside.
Area automatic fire suppression shall be provided for underfloor and ceil-ing spaces if used for cable runs unless all c b?e is run in 4-inch or similar steel conduit or the cables are in fully enclosed raceways internally protected by automatic fire suppression.
k.
Redundant safety-related panels remote from the control roomcomplexshallbeseparatedfromeachotherbybarriershahingaminimum fire rating of three hours. Panelsprohidingremoteshutdowncapability shall be separated from the control room complex by barriers hahing a minimum fire rating of three hours. The general areas housing remote safety-related panelsshallbeprohidedwithautomaticfiredetectorsthatalarmlocally and alarm and annunciate in the control room.
2.
General Plant Areas a.
Interior wall and structural components, thermal insulation materials, radiation shield materials, and soundproofing shall be noncombustible.
Interior finishes shall be noncombustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laborator" such as Factory Mutual or Underwriters Laboratory, Inc., for:
surface flamespread rating of 50 or less when tested
. under ASTM E-84, and potential heat release of 3500 Btu /lb or less when tested under ASTM D-3286 or NFPA 259.
b.
Metal deck roof construction shall be noncombust-ible, listed as " acceptable for fire" in the UL Building Materials Directory,orlistedasClassIintheFactoryMutualSystemApprohal
- Guide, c.
Suspended ceilings and their supports shall be of noncombustible construction.
d.
Electric cable shall, as a minimum, pass the flame test in the current IEEE Std 383.
e.
Cable raceways, trays, and conduits shall contain only cables, and shall be made of noncombustible material.
f.
Transformers installed inside fire areas containing safety-related systems shall be of the dry type or insulated and cooled with noncombustible liquid, g.
Outdooroil-filledtransformersshallbeprohidedwith oil spill confinement or drainage away from the buildings. Such transformers shall be located at least 50 feet distant from the buildings containing safety-related systems or building walls within 50 feet of oil-filled trans-formersshallbewithoutopeningsandhaheafireresistanceratingofat least three hours.
h.
Personnel access routes and escape routes shall be prohidedforeachfirearea. Stairwellsoutsideprimarycontainmentserh-ing as escape routes, access routes for firefighting, or access routes to
. areas containing equipment necessary for safe shutdown shall be enclosed in masonry or concrete towers with a minimum fire rating of two hours and self-closing Class B fire doors.
1.
Fire exit routes shall be clearly marked.
3.
Miscellaneous Areas Miscellaneous areas such as shops, warehouses, records storage, auxiliary boiler rooms, fuel oil tanks, and flamable and com-bustible liquid storage tan ks shall be so located and protected that a fireoreffectsofafire,includingsmoke,willnotadYerselyaffectany safety-related systemsor equipment.
4.
Diesel Oil Day Tank Areas Day tanks with total capacity up to 1100 gallons located within buildingsshall be located in a separate enclosure with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours, including doors or penetrations. These enclosures shall rbe capable of containing the entire contents of the day tanks and shal.l. be protected by an automatic fire suppression system, or the day tank shall be located inside the diesel generator room in a diked enclosure that has sufficient capacity to hold 110% of the contents of the day tank or is drained to a safe location.
5.
Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1,100 gallons shall not be located inside buildings containing safety-related equipment.
Ifabohe-ground tanks are used, they shall be located at least 50 feet from any
< building containing safety-related equipment or, if located within 50 feet, they shall be housed in a separate building with construction hahing a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. Potential oil spills shall be confined or directed away from buildings containing safety-related equipment. Totally buried tanks are acceptable outside or under buildings (see NFPA 30, " Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code,"
foradditionalguidance). Abohe-groundtanksshallbeprotectedbyan automatic fire suppression system.
6.
Turbine Area The turbine building shall be separated from adjacent structures containing safety-related equipment by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of three hours. Openings and penetrations in the fire barrier shall be minimized and shall not be located where the turbine oil system or generator hydrogen cooling system creates a direct fire exposure hazard through the barrier.
7.
Flammable / Combustible Material Areas a.
Miscellaneous storage or piping containing flam-
, able or combustible liquids or gases or combustible storage areas shall not create a potential exposure hazard to safety-related systems.
b.
Where such storage or piping is not separated from safety related systems by a three hour fire barrier, automatic fire suppression systemsshallbeproYided, c.
Gas cylinder storage locations shall not be in areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment or the fire protection systems that serve those safety-related areas. Storage and usage of flammable liquids
34-should, as a minimum, comply with the requirements of NFPA 30, " Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code."
Bulk storage of flammable gas shall be sufficiently remote from structures housing safety-related equipment that afireorexplosionwillnotadherselyaffectanysafety-relatedsystems orequipment(seeNFPA6."IndustrialFireLossPrehention"),
d.
Unused ion exchange resins shall not be stored in areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment.
e.
Hazardous chemicals shall not be sorted in areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment.
8.
Radwaste and Decontamination Areas Automaticfiresuppressionanddetection,andhentilation controlsshallbeprohided. Materialsthatcollectandcontainradioactihity such as spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, and NFPA filters shall be stored in closed metal tanks or containers that are located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles. These materials shall be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well.
9.
Transformer Areas Where transformers filled with combustible fluid are located in nonsafety-related areas, there shall be no openings in the fire barriersseparatir3suchtransformersfromareasco[tAiningsafety-related systems or equipment.
. 10. Oil Collection Reactor Coolant Pump Areas The reactor coolant pump shall be equipped with an oil collec-tion system if the containment is not inerted during normal operation.
The oil collection system shall be so designed, engineered, and' installed that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions and that there is reasonable,Jssurance that the system will withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.
Such collection systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and uncressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems.
Leakage shall be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire lube oil system inventory. A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the hazard of fire flash-back.
[
Leakage po~ints to be protected shall include lift pump and piping,
~
overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oil lines, and lube oil reservoirs where such fea-tures exist on the reactor coolant pumps.
The drain line shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil leak.
s/See Regulatory Guide 1.29
" Seismic Design Classification" Paragraph C.2.
. P.
Administrative Controls Administrative controls shall be established to minimize fire hazards in areas containing structures, systems, and components important to safety.
These controls shall establish procedures to:
1.
Govern the handling and limitation of the use of ordinary combustible materials, combustible and flammable gases and liquids, high efficiency particulate air and charcoal filters, dry fon exchange resins, or other combustible supplies in safety-related areas.
2.
Prohibit the storage of combustibles in safety-related areas or establish designated storage areas with appro-priate fire protection.
3.
Govern the handling of and limit transient fire loads such as combustible and flammable liquids, wood and plastic products, or other combustible materials in buildings con-taining safety-related systems or equipment during all phases of operating, and especially during maintenance, modification, or refueling operations.
4.
Designate the onsite staff member responsible for the in-plant fire protection review of proposed work activities to identify potential transient fire hazards and specify required additional fire protec' tion in the work activit9 procedure.
5.
Govern the use of ignition sources by use of a flame permit system to control welding, flame cutting, brazing, or soldering operations. A separate permit shall be issued for ea:h area where work is to be done.
If work continues over more than one shift, the permit shall be valid for not more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the plant is operating or for the duration of a particular job during plant shutdown.
6.
Control the removal from the area of all waste, debris, scrap, oil spflis, or other combustibles resulting from the work activity immediately following completion of the activity, or at the end of each work shift, whichever comes first.
7.
Maintain the periodic housekeeping inspections to ensure continued compliance with these administrative controls.
(
8.
Control the use of specific combustibles in safety-related areas. All wood used in safety-related areas during main-tenance, modification, or refueling operations (such as lay-down blocks or scaffolding) shall be treated with a flame retardant. Equipment or supplies (such as new fuel) shipped in untreated combustible packing containers may be unpacked in safety-related areas if required for valid operating reasons.
However, all combustible materials shall-be re' moved from tile area immediately following the unpacking. Such transient combustible material, unless stored in approved containers, shall not be left unatten-ded during lunch breaks, shift changes, or other similar periods.
Loose combustible packing material such as wood
~
. or paper excelsior, or polyethylene sheeting shall be placed in metal containers with tight-fitting self-closing metal covers.
9.
Control actions to be taken by an individual discovering a fire, for example, notification of control room, attempt to extinguish fire, and actuation of local fire suppression systems.
10.
Control actions to be taken by the control room operator to determine the need for brigade assistance upon report of a fire or receipt of alarm on control room annunciator panel, for example, announcing location of fire over PA system, sounding fire alarms, and notifying the shift super-visor and the fire brigade leader of the type, size, and location of the fire.
(
11.
Control actions to be taken by the fire brigade after noti-fication by the control room operator of a fire, for example, assembling in a designated location, receiving directions from the fire brigade leader, and discharging specific fire fighting responsibilities including selection and transportation of fire fighting equipment to fire location, selection of protective equipment, operating instructions for use of, fire suppression systems, and use of preplanned strategies for fighting fires in specific areas.
12.
Define the strategies for fighting fires in all safety-related areas and areas presenting a hazard to safety-related equipment.
These strategies shall designate:
1
- a.
Fire hazards in each area covered by the specific prefire plans.
b.
Fire extinguishants best suited for controlling the fires associated with the fire hazards in that area and the nearest location of these extinguishants.
c.
Most favorable direction from which to attack a fire in each area in view of the ventilation direction, access hallways, stairs, and doors that are most likely to be free of fire, and the best station or elevation for fighting the fire. All access and egress routes that involve locked doors should be specifically identified in the procedure with the appropriate precautions and methods for access specified.
(
d.
Plant systems that should be managed to reduce the damage potential during a local fire and the loca-tion of local and remote controls for such manage-ment (e.g., any hydraulic or electrical systems in the zone covered by the specific fire fighting pro-cedure that could increase the hazards in the area because of overpressurization or electrical hazards).
Vital heat-sensitive system, components that need to e.
be kipt cool while fighting a local fire.
Particu-larly hazardous combustibles that need cooling should be designated.
f.
Organization of fire fighting brigades and the assignment of special duties according to job title f
IL
, so that all fire fighting functions are covered by any complete shift personnel complement.
These duties include command control of the brigade, trans-porting fire suppression and support equipment to the fire scenes, applying the extinguishant to the fire, communication with the control room, and coordi-nation with outside fire departments.
g.
Potential radiological and toxic hazards in fire zones.
h.
Ventilation system operation that ensures desired plant air distribution when the vantilation flow is modified for fire containment or smoke clearing
' operations.
k i.
Operations requiring control room and shift engineer coordination or authorization.
j.
Instructions for plant operators and general plant personnel during fire.
Q, Fire Bricade A site fire brigade trained and eq'uipped for fire fighting shall be established to ensure adequate manual fire fi @ ting capability for all areas of the plant containing structures, systems, or components import-ant to safety. The fire brigade shall be at least five members on each shift.
The brigade leader and at least two brigade members shall have sufficient training in or knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown
. capability. The qualification of rire brigade members shall include an annual physical examination to determine their ability to perform stren-uous fire fighting activities. The shift supervisor shall not be a member of the fire brigade. The brigade leader shall be competent to assess the potential safety consequences of a fire and advise control room per-sonnel.
Such competence by the brigade leader may be evidenced by pos-session of an operator's. license or equivalent knowledge of plant safety-related systems.
The minimum equipment provided for the brigade shall consist of per-sonal protective equipment such as turnout coats, boots, gloves, hard hats, emergency communications equipment, portable lights, portable venti-1ation equipment, and portable extinguishers.
Self-contained breathing apparatus using full-face positive pressure masks approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health - approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) shall be provided for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel. At least 10 masks shall be available for fire brigade personnel.
Control room personnel may be fur-nished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical.
Service or rated operating life shall be a minimum of one-half hour for the self-contained units.
At least tso extra air bottles shall be located on site for each self-contained breathing unit.
In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air shall be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete
, replenishment ef exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned.
If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air shall be used; compressors shall be operable assuming a loss of offsite power.
Special care must be taken to locate the com-pressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.
R. Fire Bricade Training The fire brigade training program shall ensure that the capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained.
The program shall consist of an initial classroom instruction program followed by periodic classroom instruction, fire fighting practice, and fire drills:
1.
Instruction a.
The initial classroom instruction shall include:
(1) Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with specific identification of each individual's responsibilities.
(2) Identification of the type and location of fire hazards and associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.
(3) The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected products of combustion.
(4) Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment for each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the plant, including access and egress routes to each area.
. (5) The proper use of available fire fighting equip-ment and the correct method of fighting each type of fire. The types of fires covered should include fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, fires involving flamable and combustibi' liquids s
or hazardous process chemicals, fires resulting from construction or modifications (welding),
and record file fires.
(6) The proper use of comunication, lighting, ven-tilation, and emergency breathing equipment.
e (7) The proper method for fighting fires inside build-ings and confined spaces.
(8) The direction and coordination of the fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders only).
(9) Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.
(10) Review of the latest plant modifications and corresponding changes in fire fighting plans.
Note:
Items (9) and (10) may be deleted from the training of no more than two of the non-operations personnel who say be assigned to the fire brigade.
, b.
The instruction shall be provided by qualified indi-viduals who are knowledgeable, experienced, and suit-ably trained in fighting the types of fires that could occur in the plant and in using the types of equipment available in the nuclear power plant.
c.
Instruction shall be provided to all fire brigade members and fire brigade leaders.
d.
Regular planned meetings shall be held at least every 3 months for all brigade members to review changes in the fire protection program and other subjects as necessary.
e.
Periodic refresher training sessions shall be held to repeat the classroom instruction program for all brigade members over a two year period.
These e
sessions may be concurrent with the regular planned meetings.
2.
Practice Practice sessions shall be held for each shift fire brigade on the proper method of fighting the various types of fires that could occur in a nuclear power plant. These sessions shall provide brigade members with experience in actual
' fire extinguishment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus under strenuous conditions encountered in fire fighting. These practice sessions shall be provided at least once per year for each fire brigade member.
3.
Drills a.
Fire brigade drills shall be performed in the plant so that the fire brigade can practice as a team.
b.
Drills shall be performed at regular intervals not to exceed 3 months for each shift fire brigade.
Each fire brigade member should participate in each drill, but must participate in at least two drills per year.
A sufficient number of these drills, but not less than one for each shift fire brigade per year, shall be unannounced to determine the fire fighting readi-ness of the plant fire brigade, brigade leader, and fire protection systems and equipment.
Persons planning and authorizing an unannounced drill shall ensure that the responding shift fire brigade members are not aware that a drill is being planned until it d
is begun.
Unannounced drills shall not be scheduled closer than four week's.
At least one drill per year shall be performed on a "back shift" for each shift fire brigade.
c.
The drills shall be preplanned to establish the training objectives of the drill and shall be cri-tiqued to determine how well the training objectives
. have been met.
Unannounced drills shall be planned and critiqued by members of the management staff responsible for plant safety and fire protection.
Performance deficiencies of a fire brigade or of individual fire brigade members shall be remedied by scheduling additional training for the brigade or members.
Unsatisfactory drill performance shall be followed by a repeat drill within 30 days.
d.
At 3 year intervals, a randomly selected unannounced drill shall be critiqued by qualified individuals independent of the licensee's staff. A copy of the written report from such individuals shall be avail-able for NRC review.
e.
Drills shall as a minimum include the following:
(1) Assessment of fire alarm effectiveness, time required to notify and assemble fire brigade, and selection, placement and use of equipment, and fire fighting strategies.
(2) Assessment of each brigade member's knowledge of his or her role in the fire fighting strategy for the area assumed to contain the fire.
Assess-ment of the brigade member's conformance with established plant fire fighting procedures and use of fire fighting equipment, including self-contained emergency breathing apparatus, commu-nication equipment, and ventilation equipment, to the extent practicable.
l(
_ 4 (3) The simulated use of fire fighting equipment required to cope with the situation and type of fire selected for the drill. The area and type of fire chosen for the drill should differ from those used in the previous drill so that brigade members are trained in fighting fires in various plant areas.
The situation selected should simu-late the size and arrangement of a fire that could reasonably occur in the area selected, allowing for fire development due to the time required to respond, to obtain equipment, and organize for the fire, assuming loss of auto-matic suppression capability.
(4) Assessment of brigade leader's direction of the I
fire fighting effort as to thoroughness, accuracy, and effectiveness.
4.
Records Individual records of training provided to each fire bri-gade member, including drill critiques, shall be maintained for at least 3 years to ensure that each member receives training in all parts of the training program. These records of training shall'be avai.lable for NRC review.
Retraining or broadened training for fire fighting within buildings shall be scheduled for all those brigade members whose performance records show deficiencies.
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