ML20151C508
| ML20151C508 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/12/1981 |
| From: | Vollmer R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19284B784 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8103160925 | |
| Download: ML20151C508 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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82 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 0 % ***** /
FEB 121981 MEMORANDUM FOR: - Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
FROM:
Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering SULJECT:
RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION OF' DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION ON FIRE PROTECTION RULE
Reference:
- 1) Memorandum to V. Benaraya, Chief, Chemical Engineering Branch, DE from Robert L. Ferguson, Section Leader, Chemical Engineering Branch dtd January 5, 1981
- 2) Memorandum to V. Benaraya, Chief, Chemical Engineering Branch, DE from R. Ferguson, Chemical Engineering Branch, DE dated January 26, 1981
- 3) Memorandum to R. Ferguson, Chemical Engineering Branch, DE from V. Benaroya, Chief, Chemical Engineering Branch, DE dated January 26, 1981
- 4) Memorandum to R. H. Vollmer, Director, Division of Engineering from Vincent S. Neonan, Assistant Director, Materials &
Qualifications Engineering, DE dated February 2, 1981
- 5) Memorandum to R. Ferguson, Chemical Engineering Branch, DE from Richard H. Vollmer, Director, Division of Engineering dated February 4, 1981
- 6) Memorandum to Richard Vollmer, Director, Divison of Engineering i
from R. Ferguson, Chemical Engineering Branch, DE dated February 6, 1981 Robert L. Ferguson, Section Leader of the Fire Protection Section, Division of and 26,1981 (references 1 and 2) professional opinion by his memoranda of January Engineering tendered a differing These memoranda were answered by memoranda from the Branch Chief, Assistant Director, and Director in Mr. Ferguson's imediate chain of command dated January 26, February 2, and February 4, 1981 respectively (references 3, 4, and 5).
Finally, by a memorandum dated February 6, 1981, Mr. Ferguson restated his proposed course of action.
I have completed my evaluation of this differing professional opinion and the purpose of this memo is to give you my recommendation for resolution. The differing opinion is not of a technical nature.
It concerns policy, specifically, the development, l
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l FEB 121981 Harold R. Denton timing,.and application of a new fire protection rule which would contain the elements of the Branch Technical Postion (BTP) and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix R).
During its consideration of Appendix R, the Comission decided not to apply Appendix.R to future plants pending development of a new fire protection rule i
and requested the staff's timely proposal of a fire protection rule for future plants. The staff responded with SECY 80-546. The staff recomended alternative in'this Comission paner concerning the technical content was prepared and strongly endorsed by Mr. Ferguson throughout its development. Mr. Ferguson did not partici-pate in preparing the recomended schedule for development and implementation of the proposed rule however.
In the coume of.the Comission's consideration of Appendix R, the staff informed the Comission that current and future OL's would meet the backfit items contained in Appendix R.
This, along with the previous practice of conducting the staff review in accordance with the BTP criteria, assures that the OL review is already in accord-ance with the recently' published rule. The staff has been implementing this comit-ment on current OL's.
Mr. Ferguson would, based on his latest memo:
1.
Require all plants licensed to operate after January 1,1979, to meet Appendix R on the same basis as those licensed before that date.
2.
Require all plants licensed to operate to meet a new ' rule which would be issued for public coment on or about July 1981. This would be applied.to new CP applications and OL applications on a reasonable schedule. The new rule would consist of the present BTP and Appendix R criteria.
- 3. - Add other requirements to the new rule annually or as they are developed,
. hichever is longer.
w In attempting to resolve this differing opinion, I have considered the objectives of the fire protection review, the criteria currently being applied, and available staff resources.
I also had a discussion with Mr. Ferguson on this matter. As a result, I proposed in reference 5 that:
1.
The staff require licensees to identify and describe differences from the BTP and Appendix R for those OL's scheduled to be issued beyond September 30, 1981.
2.
The staff take the necessary time to develop a new rule which would implement both generic and plant-specific fire portection requirements as discussed in SECY 80-546 with a target date of July 1982.
4 FEB i 21981 Harold R. Denton' i 3.
The new rule be applied to future CP's and OL's on a reasonable schedule and consideration be given to backfitting on all plants.
I believe that this.would assure that no oversight of important deviations from staff fire protection criteria would occur for future OL's and that appropriate backfitting consideration would be given to any new important features of a new fire protection rule.
It would also allow that deliberate consideration be given to the development of a new rule.
Based on the current level of, and criteria for, the staff's fire protection review on OL's, I do not believe that it would be productive or an enhancement of plant safety to alter the methods of conducting our review except as identified in item 1 immediately above.
Therefore, I recommend that the steps 1-3 above be adopted as a suitable resolution J
of the differing professional opinion.
If you concur with this resolution, we need to so inform Mr. Ferguson.
In addition, I will prepare an addendum to SECY 80-546 to inform the Comission of our intent to apply the forthcoming rule to OL applications on a reasonable schedule in addition to all CP applications and that consideration will be given to backfitting selected issues on all plants.
I will also forward Mr. Ferguson's dissent and resolution thereof to the Comission for their information.
If you wish additional information or discussion on tbH matter, I would be happy to set up a meeting between you and any or all of the pc.'cicipants.
Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
Enclosures:
1.
Memo to V. Benaroya fr R. Ferguson dtd 1/5/81 l
2.
Memo to V. Benaroya from R. Ferguson dtd 1/26/81 3.
Meme to R. Ferguson fr V. Benaroya dtd 1/26/81 4.
Memo to R. Vollmer l
fr V. Noonan dtd 2/2/81 5.
Memo to R. Ferguson fr R. Vollmer dtd 2/4/81 6.
Memo to R. Vollmer l
fr R. Ferguson dtd 2/6/81 cc:
E. Case V. Noonan V. Benaroya R. Ferguson
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MEMORNIDUM FOR:
Victor Benaroya, Chief Chemical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering 4
FROM:
Robert L. Ferguson, Section Leader Fire Protection Section Chemical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION - FIRE PROTECTION RULE 1.
Present Manaaement Position Fire protection requirements for plants licensed to operate after January 1,1979 should not be specified by regulation other than Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
Guidelines for the implementation of Criterion 3 are provided in other staff documents.
2.
Originator's Opinion Fire protection requirements for plants licensed to operate af ter January 1,1979 should be specified by regulation.
This position differs from the present management position in that it places most of the burden of providing an adequate fire protection program on the licensee rather than on the staff reviewer.
At present, the licensee describes his fire protection program to meet NRC guidelines, and the staff reviewer reviews this description and visits the plant to determine whether NRC guidelines will be met and whether the features provided to meet the guidelines provide an adequate fire protection program. Our site visit is after the plant is 80-90".
complete so that the actual configurations of protection can be exam-ined. Usually our multi-discipline review teams find that the licensees have not established adequate programs in spite of all the guidance given in Branch Technical Positions, Regulatory Guides and Staff Positions for-warded by letter.
In those instances if the staff reviewer is not thorough and persuasive, the fire protection for systems important to safety may not meet NRC requirecents.
The fire protection features that' protect public health and safety, and the safety margin in such protection, are detennined by HRC policy decisions.
These decisions detemine the systems important to safety that must survive a fire and the fire protection features are necessary to assure that such 7 L 93ais9 4796 6
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M Victor Benaroya JAN 0 L 1%1 systems survive.
These features include post-fire capability for
. reactor coolant injection, reactivity and inventory control, decay heat removal, and process monitoring as well as the fire barriers or
-physical' separation which assures'this post-fire capability. These features will not be' detemined by the designers using general criteria.
Regulations'are required to assure that appropriate design features are installed to assure post-fire shutdown capability in a timely manner.
The requirements which implement NRC policy on fire protection must be stated in the Regulations so that the designers and operators are aware of the requirements early in the design and throughout the life of the plant.
If new infomation dictates a change in requirements, such a change could be implemented at all operating plants in a timely, efficient manner by an amendment to the Regulations. All concerned parties: Licensees, Applicants, Designers, Reviewers. Inspectors and the public would have a clear understanding of our requirements.
It is important to have an efficient method for determining if modifications are necessary in operating plants 4
and, if so, to implement them within a reasonable time.
The statement of the requirement in the Regulations must be specific enough to preclude inadequate fire protection without restricting the range of acceptable alternatives.
For example, the level of specification such as "It shall be possible to safely shutdown the reactor" does not assure that adequate reactor coolant makeup capability survives fire. One licensee may provide only 20 gpm to accomodate nomal leakage, another may provide 150 gpm to accommodate leakage-of a power operated relief valve that fails to reclose completely, and another may provide a complete train of high and low pressure injection to accomodate open relief valves. Obviously, the margin of protection to the public afforded by these alternatives are very different.
One or more of these alternatives may not be acceptable to the Comission; and must be precluded by specific language of the requirement.
This opinion does not take issue with NRC technical requirements.
It only recomends that such requirements cover all plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979, be specified by Regulations,and be made effective as soon as. possible after the SRP Section 9.5-1 is revised.
3.
Oricinators Assessment of Non-Adoption Fire protection programs in operating plants will vary significantly because of the strong dependence on the staff review and the audit nature of such review.
Plant modifications will continue to be required late in the licensing process. Such modifications will pro /ide acceptable configurations but will
JE.N 0 5 W Victor Benaroya -
-not have the same margin of safety of designs which have 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier separation between all safety systems in all areas of the plant.
Conside-able industry and staff resources'will be wasted on repetitive
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discussions of generic issues that should be resolved by NRC policy Considerable industry and staff resources will be consured decisions.
in developing criteria which do not define NRC fire protection policy sufficiently to improve the licensing process.
The NRC policy for fire protection programs will not be defined by an appropriate level of specification to assure adequate fire protecticn programs in operating plants.
The ultimate consequence of an inadequate fire protection in an operatir.;
plant could be sufficient fire induced damage to systems important to safety such that significant core damage occurs and fission products are released from the containment.
4.. Status of Related Efforts At'present the Comission is considering:
(1) the need for a fire protection rule, (2) the plants to be covered by the rule, (3) the level of ' specification in the rule, and (4) the schedule for completing such a rule.
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wo Robert L. Fero oq, Section Leader Fire Pretection Section Chemical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering l
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