ML19284A882
| ML19284A882 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/29/1980 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0657, NUREG-657, NUDOCS 8003120610 | |
| Download: ML19284A882 (62) | |
Text
NUREG-0657 Review and Evaluation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Safety Research Program for Fiscal Year 1981 A Report to the Congress of the United States of America w
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards US uclear Regulatory pa ascoq Nfh
's
'l I 80031206lO
Available from GP0 Sales Program Division of Technical Information and Document Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.
20555 and National Technical Information Service Springfield, Virginia 22161 b
ik_
NUREG-0657 2.:_.-_____-.-_.-___-_-_.
Review and Evaluation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Safety Research Program for Fiscal Year 1981 A Report to the Congress of the United States of America z _ _ z _
z z :-
2 : : _--_- _- : 2 _ :
ate u shed e u ry 19 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 s.....-
/
UNITED STATES g
NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION
!1 s
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS I.L.d$def f ki WASWNGTON. D C. 205L5 w *..**
February 15, 1980 The Honorable Walter F. Mondale he President of the Senate The Honorable Womas P. O'Neill, Jr.
We Speaker of the House Gentlemen:
I am pleased to transmit herewith the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards' repo rt to the Congress on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's safety research program for fiscal year 1981.
This report is required by Section 29 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended by Section 5 of Public Law 95-209.
Chapter 1 is intended to serve as the Executive Summary.
A copy of this report is being sent to the mairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission.
Respectfully submitted, Milton S. Plesset Gairman
PREFACE This report has been prepared in response to the requirement by the Cowjress that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) "under-take a study of reactor safety research and prepare and submit annually a report containing the results of such study."
Previous reports have been submitted in Decenber 1977 and December 1978.*
As requested by the Congress, subnittal of this repart has been delayed until the Administration's budget for FY 1981 has been submitted to the Congress and reviewed by the ACRS.
As in previous reports, the ACRS has interpreted the words " reactor safety research" to include safety-related research in all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle end p3wer plant operation, and excluding only that having to do with non-safety-related environmental concerns.
Chapter 1 includes an introduction and a summary of the principal recommen-dations of the ACRS regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety research program and the proposed levels of funding. It is intended to serve as an Executive Summary.
Chapter 2 discusses briefly the implications of the accident at ihree Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2), as they relate to the research program, and lists several areas comprising new directions in research.
A more detailed discussion of these implications and new directions is given in Chapter 1 of the ACRS rep 3rt to the NRC on its budget request for FY 1981 and its supplemental request for FY 1980 **
The remaining chapters of this reprt present specific comments on the individual decision units of the research program, and include some assessments of priorities, where this was possible, and recommendations regarding new directions and levels of funding.
All references to funding in this report relate to funds budgeted for program suppo r t.
Funds allocated for NRC personnel, administrative support, and equipnent have not been included.
- Review and Evaluation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission _ Safety Research
_ Program, NURm-0392, December 1977.
1978 Review and Evaluation of the Nuclear _ Regulatory Comission Safety _
R,es,carch Program, NUREG-0496, December 1978
- Comments on the Nuclear Regulatory _ Commission TafetLResearch Program Bu_dget, NUREG-0603, July 1979.
i
TABLE OF CO W ERPS CHAPTER PAGE_
mEFACE.
i 1.
INTRODUCTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-1 2.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT AND NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH 2-1 3.
SYSTEMS EWINEERING.
3-1 4.
IDFT 4-1 5.
CODE DEVELOPMENT 5-1 6.
FUEL BEfW/IOR.
6 -1 7.
MIMARY SYSTEM INTEGRITY 7-1 8.
SEISMIC, ENGINEERING, AND SITE SAFETY.
8-1 9.
ADVANCED REACTORS.
9-1 10.
REACTOR ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS.
10-1 11.
EVEL CYCLE 11-1 12.
WASTE MANAGEMENT 12-1 13.
SAFEGUARDS 13-1 14.
RISK ASSESSMENT.
14-1 15.
IMPROVED REACKR SAFETY.
15-1 APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY.
A-1 APPENDIX B - EXCERPT FROM NUREX3-0603 B-1 APPENDIX C - ACRS CHARTER AND MEMBERSHIP C-1 111
1.
INTRODUCTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1.1 Introduction 1.1.l_ Implications of_ the_ Acciden_t _at,T_M_I_-2 In its repo rt to the NRC Commissionere in July 1979 (NURm-0603), the ACRS stated its belief that the accident at '1NI-2 had major implications for the safety research program and that both more and different research would be required in W 1980 and in the future to answer the questions that had been raised by the accident and to improve reactor safety.
In that report, the ACRS recommended and discussed in some detail several new directions in research resulting from the accident at WI-2 and requir-ing early implmentation in W 1980 and W 1981.*
These recommendations are listed in 01 apter 2 of this report.
Many are being implemented in W 1980 and more are planned for W 1981.
Nevertheless, the ACRS believes that research in three areas warrants greater emphasis than is now planned by the NRC Staff; these are:
Studies of the courses of serious accidents Studies of molten core retention and steam explosions Studies of plant operations and of systems behavior, particularly in various shutdown-heat-removal modes he ACRS believes that additional funding, as recommended below and else-where in this report, is required in order for these areas to be studied with the depth and timeliness they deserve.
1.1.2 Priorities In its December 1978 report to the Congress (NURm-0496), the ACRS stated that it might be pssible to develop a hierarchy of priorities within the various program areas and perhaps even across the entire safety research program.
%e ACRS attempted to do this for this report with but limited success.
Nevertheless, priorities have been suggested in several areas, as indicated below.
(a)
Generally high priorities have been assigned to most, but not all, of the research inspired by the accident at WI-2, and especially to research in the new directions indicated above and in Chapter 2.
- The pertinent material from NUREG-0603 is included herein as Appendix B.
1-1
(b)
Within each program area (Chapters 3-15), high or low priorities have been indicated where possible.
(c)
Priorities among program areas have been indicated by the changes in levels of funding recommended by the ACRS in Section 1.2 and Table 1.
A reduced level of effort has been accepted for the LOFT program, a moderate increase has been recommended for the program in Probabilistic Risk Assess-ment, and a relatively large increase has been proposed for research on Improved Reactor Safety. These programs all relate closely to the accident at T4I-2.
In addition, the ACRS has recommended a significant increase above the Administration's proposal for research on Advanced Reactor Safety.
l_.1 f Relation to FY_1980 Bu_dget
%e recommendations made herein, especially those relating to funding levels, are based on the assumption that the NRC budget for safety research programs will be supplemented for FY 1980 by all or a substantial portion of the $27 million requested for additional research related to the accident at BiI-2.
1.2 Recomendatio_n_s The principal recommendations of the ACRS are summarized briefly in this section, with references to the appropriate chapters in which more detailed recommendations, discussions, and justifications are provided.
1.2.1 General Recommendations We proposed budget for research program support is shown in Table 1.
We numbers at the left of the table refer to the chapters in this report in which each budget decision unit is afscussed.
The ACRS recommendations regarding funding levels for FY 1981 are shown in the table.
We ACRS believes that a safety research program addressing the questions raised by the accident at PiI-2, together with the continua-tion of essential ongoing programs, cannot be carried out within the limits of the proposed budget and that an increase of at least $20.9 million is needed.
We increase recommended by the ACRS is proposed for the following three areas:
Mvanced Reactors, including Fast Reactors and Mvanced Converters...............
$13.0 million Risk Assessment.
2.4 Improved Reacto r Sa fety.............
-5.5 T203 million 1-2
Reductions in other program areas to offset these increases were considered b* the ACRS but were found to be undesirable in view of the increased e_ forts in most of those areas required to study the implications of the accident at 'NI-2.
Nevertheless, the ACRS believes that the recom-mended increases in the programs on Risk Assessment and Improved Reactor Safety should be provided even if this requires a reduction in other portions of the overall safety research program.
Specific comr:ents supporting the recommended increases, and other major recommendations of this report, are given in the following sections:
1.2.2 Ad_vanced Reactor Safety Research (Chapter 9)
The proposed budget provides only $5 million for this program, an amount not sufficient to bring the current program to an orderly conclusion.
In its previous reports to the Congress (NUREG-0392 and NUREG-0496), and in its report to the Commission in July 1979 (NUREG-0603), the ACRS has consistently supported an NRC research program related to the safety of advanced reactors.
his recommendation has been based on the perception that many of the current safety problems associated with light-water reacto'rs (LWRs) have resulted from the fact that safety research lagged behind reactor development. We Administration has presented a proposal to defer indefinitely the develognent of liquid metal fast breeder reactors (LMFBR), and to provide for no work at all related to other concepts.
If the Congress agrees with this indefinite deferral, the ACRS would agree that there is no need to maintain an advanced reactor safety research program. On the other hand, if the deferral is to be short term, or if the developnent program in FY 1981 is to continue at a pace similar to that of the last few years, then the arguments presented earlier for an NRC program are still valid. Finally, if the expectation is that a move to exercise the D4FBR option in the next 10-20 years will be accommodated by importing foreign technology, it is important that the NRC program of safety research on advanced reactors be maintained to ensure an adequate technical basis for U.S. regulatory standards, guides, and criteria.
If it is decided that the develognent of advanced reactors is to be con-tinued, the ACRS considers it essential that a conccxnitant safety research program be carried out by the NRC at a funding level of at least $18 million for FY 1981.
Specific comments regarding the content of such a program are presented in Chapter 9.
1.2.3 Risk Assessr. ant (Chapter 14)
This program already includes many projects relating to the questions raised by the accident at 'mI-2; it is being expanded in FY 1980, and the ACRS considers further expansion in FY 1981 to be highly desirable.
We importance of probabilistic risk assessment as a guide to, or as a basis for, licensing requirements and decisions is recognized by the ACRS, and its use by the NRC Sta" is dependent to a significant degree on the efforts of the Probabilistic Analysis Staff.
1-3
%e ACRS considers this prog ram to be of high priority and recommends that it be funded at a level of at least $15 million in FY 1981.
1.2.4 Improved Reactor Safety (Chapter 15)
This program was initiated at the request of the Congress but has been funded at a grossly inadequate level for the past three years. The current programs and those proposed for FY 1981 relate directly to improvements in safety that have become even more prominent as a result of the acci-dent at 'IT4I-2.
The ACRS recommends that funding of this program for FY 1981 be at a level sufficient to permit aggressive programs on alternate decay heat removal concepts, vented and filtered containments, and improved in-plant accident response.
In addition, scoping studies of other likely projects should be undertaken as a basis for planning future programs of similar nature and import.
Funding at a level of at least $10 million for FY 1981 is recommended.
1.2.5 LOFT Facility (Chapter 4)
The proposed level of funding of $43 million for IDFT is $6.3 million less than the ACRS commented on favorably in its report to the NRC Commissioners in July 1979 (NURM-0603).
Since the LOFT program for FY 1980 and FY 1981 has been reoriented almost completely toward research relating to small loss-of-coolant accidents and transients in response to the accident at 'lT4I-2, the ACRS believes that the higher level of $49.3 million could be used to good technical effect in FY 1981; and also, in view of the large unavoidable expenses required for the upkeep and operation of this facility, that the higher level would be more cost-effective.
Nevertheless, the ACRS can accept the reduced level of funding in this area in view of the needs for the increases recommended above in Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4, and for increases already incorporated in other areas to address the matters mentioned in Chapter 2.
1.2.6 New Directions in Research (Chapter 2)
The accident at 'IT4I-2 has indicated clearly the need for new directions in the NRC safety research program, and the programs for FY 1980 and FY 1981 have been reoriented to various degrees in those new directions.
We ACRS has indicated in most of the following chapters of this report how and where these new directions have been or should be incorporated into the proposed research program.
In most areas, the ACRS believes that 1-4
these new directions can be
~;commodated by reallocation of resources without additional funding beyond that proposed.
We exceptions are Risk Assessment and Improved Reactor Safety, for which additional funds have been recommended above.
1.2.7 Increaced Personnel _f_or Waste _ManagementJCh_ apter 12j All of the fo regoing recommendations have related to funding for program support and have not addressed other portions of the research budget or manpower requirements.
However, the research program in Waste Manage-ment is growing at such a rate (supported by the ACRS) that there is no, reason to be concerned about the ability of the current staff to manage the program ef fectively.
For this reason, the ACRS recommends that the NRC be authorized and funded to expand the technical staff for this program by at least five people above the fifteen now proposed.
1.2.8_ Confirmatory Research vs. Research to Improve _ Rea_ct_o_r Safety, (Chapter 15)
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which effected the separation of the Atomic Energy Commission (Afr) into the separate entities of the NRC and Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), established within the NM an Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES).
In view of the legislative history (Conference Report), the role of R5 was accepted by the NRC as being limited to " confirmatory research,"
presumably as opposed to the "developnental research" that had dominated the AEC program.
Several attempts were made by RES to define " confirmatory research." he need for definition, however, was in effect obviated by the issuance of a directive that the research must be responsive to and, except in special circumstances, initiated by " user" needs.
Users were considered to be principally the other NRC program offices but to include also the Commis-sion, Atomic Sa fety and Licensing Boards, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, ECRS, Congress, the technical community, and the public.
%e limited ature of "confinnatory research" was recognized implicitly by the Congress when, in its Budget Authorization Act for NRC for FY 1978 (PL 95-209), it amended the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to require the NRC to develop a long-range plan for the "developnent of ned or improved safety systems" for nuclear power plants.
Such a plan was devel-oped and submitted to the Congress in April 1978 (NURm-0438).
In its reviews of the NRC safety research program during the past three years, the ACRS has found it increasingly difficult to distinguish between
" confirmatory research" and "research to improve reactor safety."
As a result of the accident at 'IMI-2, the distinction has become even less obvious and, clearly, less important.
Several of the proposals by NRC and 1-5
others resulting from the accident at 'INI-2, which will now become matters for licensing decisions, were previously relegated to the category of "research to improve reactor sa fety" and were inadequately funded as a separate program area (See Chapter 15).
'Ihe ACRS believes that the distinction that has been nade between "research to improve reactor safety" and " confirmatory research" is no longer useful.
The ACRS suggests, therefo re, that the Congress review the legislative charter of the NRC research program and eliminate this distinction.
Inasmuch as the purpose of the NRC is to ensure cafe design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants, it should follow that any research is legitimate that contributes to that purpose without compromising the credibility or independence of the NRC.
'Ihe ACRS urges consideration of this matter by the Congress.
1-6
TABLE 1 PROPOSED FY 1981 BUrraET (In millions)
ACRS CHAPTER DECISION UNIT PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION 3.
Systems Engineering 38.0 38.0 4.
U3FT 43.0 43.0 5.
Code Development 14.2 14.2 6.
Fuel Behavior 27.9 27.9 7.
Primary System Integrity 14.3 14.3 8.
Seismic, Engineering, and Site 16.9 16.9 Sa fety
- 5. 0 }>
9.
Fast Breeder Reactors 18.0 9
Advanced Converters 0.0 10.
Reactor Environmental Effects 12.2 12.2 11.
Fuel Cycle 12.
W ste Management 13.6 13.6 a
13.
Safeguards 4.9 4.9 14.
Risk Assessment 12.6 15.0 15.
Improved Reactor Safety
__ _ 4. 5
_ _10._0 Total Program Support
$207.1
$228.0 1-7
2.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE MILE 19fAND ACCIDEBir AND NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH In Chapter 1 of NUR!E-0603, the ACRS discussed the need for new directions in research and identified about a dozen areas which required either a much greater emphasis, a major change in orientation, or early initiation.
(See Appendix B). The ACRS also identified several areas warranting a new research emphasis ir its " Interim Report No. 3 on tree Nile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2," May 15, 1979 and its report entitled " Studies to Improve Reactor Safety," August 14, 1979. %e areas recommended for new directions in research include the following:
Anomalous transients and small loss-of-coolant accidents Studies of the courses of serious accidents Molten core retention Steam explosions Siting Plant operations Transient simulation Systems behavior Inadequacies in the single-failure criterion Water chemistry and crack growth Disturbance analysis We ACRS believes that these and other new directions in research are of major importance.
The ACRS supported the general levels of funding proposed by RES in July 1979 with the expectation that a large-scale reorientation of the previously planned program would ensue.
Although some reorientation has resulted, the ACRS does not believe that the pace or the extent of redirection of the research program has been adequate in all cases. In particular, of the matters identified above, the following warrant considerably greater emphasis than is planned by the NRC Staff and/or is called for in the proposed budget:
Studies of the courses of serious accidents Studies of molten core retention and steam explosions Studies of plant operations and of systems behavior, particularly in various shutdown-heat-removal modes We ACRS believes that additional effort and funding should be devoted to these areas in FY 1981 and that, together with the programs on proba-bilistic risk assessment and on research to improve reactor safety, these efforts in new directions should receive first priority in the NRC research program.
2-1
3.
SYSTCiS ENGINEERING 3.1 S, cope _
Research in this area includes experimental studies of transients initiated by small breaks in the primary coolant system and studies of transients originating in the main secondary steam system.
Research includes the study of thermal-hydraulic effects, steam-water interactions, reactor core flow blockage, and multi-dimensional flow phenomena.
Rese studies aid in the developnent of computer code models and in the review of operating reactor requirements and experience.
3.2 General The proposed budget includes items of large financial commitment of a long-range nature.
Nevertheless, the research program in the costly facilities involved has been very effectively adapted to changing views regarding the imp 3rtant problems in LOCA-ECCS.
In the past, the greatest emphasis in loss-of-coolant accidents was placed on the large break in the primary reactor loop.
It is now perceived that small breaks are not only more probable but their consequences require additional experimental study and analysis. We small break is prototypical of transients, most of which arise in the secondary loop, which could lead to core uncovery.
Core uncovery can occur also without the occurrence of an actual " break."
Current proposals to use " feed and bleed" as a means of emergency cooling involve a controlled loss of coolant through the p wer-operated relief valve and/or the safety valves.
The planned program addresses these problems and may be expected to make impo rtant contributions to their resolution.
3.3 Come_nt_s 3.3.1 Semiscale The NRC budget supplement request for FY 1980 included funds which would provide a significant and useful upgrade of this facility.
We upgrade included improved heat insulation, improved pump performance, and an improved secon cy loop configuration.
It has been possible to simulate the Westinghouse loop configuration and the upgrade will make possible the simulation of the secondary loop in the Babcock and Wilcox type of pressurized water reactor (PWR).
Improvements in the representation of the secondary side of a PdR and in the height relationships in primary and secon-dary loops which will be provided are decisive for Illysically acceptable studies of small breaks and natural circulation.
3-1
The FY 1981 budget covers the experimental studies on transients in Westinghouse type loops begun in FY 1980 and will initiate the same kind of experimental studies on the Babcock and Wilcox type loops.
We Semiscale program will include studies of transients induced by small breaks, and a survey of transients initiated on the secordary side.
%e transients initiated on the secondary side are the most common sources of challenges to the ECCS, he ACRS recognizes the value of these programs in Semiscale.
Semiscale is an integrated test facility, but not in the sense that Semi-scale data can be translated directly to full-size PdRs.
If so translated, the Semiscale data can be misleading, and for this reason the ACRS urges that Semiscale be separated from the licensing path.
%e imp 3rtant con-tributions of Semiscale are of two kinds; first, Semiscale tests contrib-ute to the general understanding of the pertinent physical phenomena; and, second, these tests make an impartant contribution to reactor code develop-ment.
3.3.2 Blowdown and Reflood lleat Transfer (BDHT)
A significant facility in this program is the Two Loop Test Appa ratus (TLTA) which is an integ rated test facility that is presumed to do fo r boiling water reactors (BWRs) Wat Semiscale does for FWRs.
Test results from TLTA have been translated directly to prediction of the behavior of full-scale IMRs.
%e ACRS believes that this translation to full-scale IMRs is unfortunate and a misuse of the results.
%e scaling behavior in TLTA has not been adequately analyzed and using it to predict the perfor-mance of full-scale systems can be quite misleading.
The ACRS urges strongly that results from this facility not be injected into the licensing path. We ACRS objects, in particular, to the series of small break tests proposed to answer questions raised by the accident at 'IT4I-2.
The limits of applicability of TLTA test results to full scale plants should be con-sidered carefully in advance of any such tests, and the test results them selves should be used as recommended above for Semiscale test results --
fo r their contributions to code developnent and to the understanding of the essential physical phenomena.
While TLTA has received some upgrade, the ACRS believes that an extensive, further upgrade is necessary and urges that this be pursued.
Another program in this category is the spray test facility a t Lynn, Massachusetts, which is a 30-degree sector of the spray installation in a IMR.
Steam-water interaction ef fects will be studied in this facility and the results will be of imp 3rtance.
3.3.3 3-D Flow Distribution Wis large and continuing item is being modified to relate more effectively to present perceptions of some of the most significant problems in reactor 3-2
safety. The ACRS concurs in its continuation, since the results will be useful and a strong commitment has been in place for several years to participate in this international (FrG,Ja panese-U.S. ) study of reactor se aty features.
3.3.4 Mo_ del Development Program his program consists of small projects in various university laboratories.
We ACRS encourages this kind of program as being useful and productive; at the same time the program provides an interaction with an important part of the engineering and scientific comunity.
3.3.5 Operational Safety The past and current research program in Operational Safety was initiated on an ad hoc basis a a result of operating experience or particular regulatory requirements.
We ACRS believes that the program to date has been useful.
However, in NUREG-0603, the ACRS recom"1 ended that the NRC develop a systematic research program on the safety implications of proce-dures for operation, maintenance, testing and surveillance.
In addition, the ACRS recommended that an NRC safety research program on systems behavior should be developed.
We ACRS believes that priority should be given to the initiation of a broad research program on operational aspects of reactor safety.
3.3.6 Natural Circula_ tion Capability of PWR Systems Heat removal by natural circulation is a critically important safety consideration during some shutdown transients. During loss of all AC power transients in some PWRs it is the only means of transferring fission product decay heat from the reactor core to the heat rmoval system, short of coolant boiling in the core.
Transition from natucal circulation to boiling may be necessary during such transients.
An experimental program is needed to establish a better understanding of this process.
It might utilize a combination of facilities such as nuclear power stations operated at low power levels, LOFT, separate-effects facilities (U.S. and foreign),
and some visualization-type, bench scale experiments.
A list of variables to be investigated should be established and an experimental program should be planned for this purpse. %is wrk should have high priority.
3.4 Recommendations The research in this area should be funded at the level requested.
At least some of the studies included in the program on Operational Safety will contribute (or can be adapted to contribute) to the objectives called out in Chapter 2; and, as detailed plans are developed for the work to be undertaken, them should be directed as far as possible to contribute further to those objectives.
3-3
- 4. LOFT 4.1 Scom WFT is an integral test facility designed to sttriy the effects of large and small breaks on a scaled PdR.
The research budget includes funds for the LOFT experimental program as well as for the continued upkeep and operation of the facility.
4.2 General The redirection of the LOFT program to small break tests, begun in FY 1980, will extend through FY 1981.
In addition, one large break test may be conducted.
4.3 Comments Previous remarks have indicated that the Semiscale facility does not provide results suitable for direct translation to full scale; although LOFT is appreciably larger than Semiscale, it has other limitations which likewise inhibit direct translation to full scale.
LOFT has a short core, and height relationships are not preserved in the rest of the system. Such features limit the use of this facility to the study of basic physical effects and to contributions to code developnent and verification.
It should be pointed out also that some extreme transients cannot ce studied in LOFT because of its nuclear core with its decay heat.
Semiscale, with its electric power source, need not be so limited in studies of extreme transients.
wFT should be a useful facility if used with good physical and engineering judgment.
However, the ACRS believes that care must be exercised in translating the results from LOFT to commercial reactors.
4.4 Recommendations The support level of $43.0 million for LOFT is $6.3 million less than the ACRS commented on favorably in NUREG-0603. 'Ihe ACRS believes that the LOFT program could use the higher figure of $49.3 million effectively in FY 1981; and also, in view of the large unavoidable expenses reqaired for the upkeep and operation of this facility, that the higher level would be more cost-effective.
However, the ACRS can accept the proposed support level of
$43.0 million for wFT on the basis that the $6.3 million reduction is restored to the total reactor safety research program and is used to support greatly accelerated programs in research to improve reactor safety and to initiate, or substantially augment, the new directions in research recommended in NUREG-0603 and discussed in Chapter 2 of this report.
4-1
- 5. CODE DEVELOPMEVP 5.1
_S cop _e_
The objective of this program is the developnent, for predictive purpases, of computer codes fo r the quantitative analyses of reactor transients and accidents.
5.2 General while the objective of the program has not yet been achieved, the program has made some progress.
5_._3_Comm_e_nts_
The principal computer code of choice, TRAC, suffers so far from incomplete knowlMge mf some of the necessary physical parameters.
It should be
- p61nted out that a fairly complete description of the possible physical situations in a reactor transient is required for the microscopic descrip-tion used in TRAC. This microscopic description leads to long running times and thereby limits a rapid survey of the many possible transients.
While an effort is under way to develop a fast running version of TRAC, the ACRS believes the RELAP-5 computer code, which is already somewhat faster than TRAC, also should be developed to provide a second fast running code.
The ACRS believes that the program is progressing reasonably well in view of the difficulty of the task.
We ACRS supports the code develognent program.
5.4 Recommendations The ACRS recommends the continued development of RELAP-5 as another general code of potential value.
We ACRS recommends also that a strorg program be initiated for the developnent of methodology and techniques that would facilitate the implementation of more sophisticated reactor simulators, not necessarily limited to real-time analysis.
his wauld enable a more detailed understanding of the course of events in complex transients that include multiple failures and operator intervention.
%e ACRS believes that the proposed budget is adequate to include these devel-opnents without additional funds.
5-1
6.
FUEL BEHAVIOR 6.1_ Scope This research program provides experimental data for independent assess-ment of reactor fuel behavior during accidents.
Be approach used is to develop analytical models through basic experiments on fuel rods conducted out-of-reactor, to assess these models with in-reactor tests, and to better quantify fission product release and transport from fuel under accident conditions.
6_. 2 _ p,e_ne r_al The 74I-2 accident provided a unique test of fuel behavior under novel and extreme conditions.
It is essential that the important results of this
' test" be understood by examining the fuel and core from D4I-2.
Plans for this must be coordinated with NRC, Department of Energy (DOE), and indus-try. We priority is high.
6.3 Comments 6.3.1 Clad and Fuel; Fuel Codes his work is of substantial aid in providing an NRC capability in fuel behavior analysis, and should continue at current levels.
HowcVer, a greater breadth of input into the physical modeling would be desirable.
Work on modeling of severe overheating, which occurred at TMI-2, is encouraged.
6.3.2 In-Pile Testing at Power Burst Facility (PBF)
PBF represents about 60 percent of the total fuel behavior research bud-get.
We information on fuel behavior during reactivity insertion acci-dents (RIA) is still believed by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to be inadequate.
It is not clear that this experimental program has provided information of quantity and significance in proportion to its level of support.
If these accidents are of sufficiently low risk (low probability and/or low energy insertions), such research is not necessary.
The NRC Staff has not provided the ACRS with a convincing argument in favor of the need for the experiments on fuel behavior during RIA, or for inost of the other experiments planned for PBF in FY 1980 and FY 1981.
%e ACRS believes that PBF probably can be used for experiments related to flow starvation and fuel melting accidents and urges an early and complete evaluation of the currently proposed PBF program.
In the meantime, the ACRS believes that flexibility in reprogramming some PBF funds to other high priority work on steam explosions and core melt should be provided.
6-1
5.3.3 Other In-P_ile__Tes_ti_n_q hese are confirmatory programs related to core behavior following a large LOCA.
We priority is probably low.
We joint U.S.-Canadian research program at the NRU reactor in Canada should be terminated in FY 1983 as planned.
Before committing to the multi-national research program at the ESSOR reactor complex in Ispra, Italy, the NRC Staff should be convinced that there are not higher priority NRC research needs.
6.3.4 Fuel Melt This work currently includes staam explosions and interactions of molten core material with concrete.
In NURm-0495, the ACRS reaanmended that work on phenomena impo rtant to the course of postulated core melt accidents should continue to receive high priority.
In Sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.6 of NURm-0603 (See Appendix B), the ACRS reconmended an augmented research program on qteam explosions and a conceptual study to examine the practi-cality of molten core retention within containment.
We ACRS reconmends that the existing program be reoriented and strengthened accordingly, and furthermore, that it be closely coordinated with work being done on the cause of severe accidents.
6_. 4 __Recommenda t_i_o_ns he ACRS recommends that research in the area of fuel behavior be funded at the level requested, but that some funds be redirected from work on transients to vark on more severe accidents, including fuel melt.
6-2
7.
PRIMARY SYSTEM INTEGRITY 7.1 Scope _
Wis program is concerned with maintaining the integrity of the primary system. It is concerned with detecting incipient cracks, predicting their growth, and inhibiting cracking through the control of coolant chemistry.
7.2 General _
Design procedures and inspection techniques are amply funded, but the important problem of degradation of system integrity by the plant coolant is not addressed. Cracks have developed in several piping systems, but the worst degradation is clearly in the PdR steam generator.
A costly postmortem examination is planned for a decommissioned steam generator to improve future inspection techniques.
We inspection and replacement of steam generators is a major contributor to occupational radiation exposure.
We rupture of steam generator tubing is a disconcer-ting challenge to the safety system.
A program should be started to provide a firm basis for establishing and judging adequate systems for coolant chemistry control.
Several of the recent incidents of pipe and nozzle cracking occurred at locations not subject to routine in-service examination.
his suggests a need fo r a systematic review of current thinking about system behavior and degradation and an evaluation of the possible need for redirecting research in order to anticipate or prevent similar cracking incidents in the future.
7.3 Comments 7.3.1 Fracture Mechani_cs his orgoing program addresses important questions.
It should continue as planned.
7.3.2 Operating Effects his program consists of two areas:
Irradiation Ef fects and Dosimetry, a valuable well organized program; and Steam Generators, a program about which the ACRS has reservations. We main effort of this latter program involves a detailed, destructive examination of one of the steam genera-tors removed from the Surry Power Station.
A careful study must be made to determine if a positive contribution can be made by the steam generator study before performing work in addition to that needed to determine the corre21 tion between non-destructive examination indications and tube integrity.
7-1
7.3.3 Non-Destructive Examination his is an expanding program on an important topic. The coherence, as well as coordination with regulatory needs, leaves something to be desired.
We program should be funded, but the ACRS urges that the NRR and RES managements improve the coordination of the programs on Primary System Integrity with respect to regulatory needs.
Also, emphasis should be placed on how program developnents will influence design and practice in plants.
7.3.4 Corrosion a_nd_ Cra_ck_in_q A series of problems in operating reactors are related to the control of primary and secondary coolant chemistry.
Examples are steam generato r degradation culminating in replacement, cracking in primary piping, and cracking in stagnant water lines.
We NRC has very limited capability to develop procedures to prevent such problems.
We new program on cracking in BVR piping should be broadened to consider the corrosion-accelerated problems found in P4R pressure boundaries. The criteria for water chemistry limits, plant design, and operating procedures required to approach more trouble-free operating conditions should be addressed.
7_.4__ Recommendations
%e ACRS believes that the proposed funding level for this prog ram is adequate. A strong program is needed on improved coolant chemistry control.
7-2
8.
SEISMIC, ENGINEERING, AND SITE SAFETY 8_.1 Scope _
This prog ram includes research on extreme external phenomena, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes; on site corylitions such as seismology, geology, hydrology and meteorology; on seismic design of nuclear facilities; and on other mechanical and structural engineering aspects of nuclear safety.
8.2 General The work on extreme external phenomena is well established and is for the most part directed toward seismology and geology.
Se Seismic Sa fety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) and the organizational area whose efforts are directed toward mechanical and structural problems have been in exis-tence, for about two years.
8.3 Comme _n_ts h3.1 Seismology, Geology, and SSMRP The research program on seismology and geology and the SSMRP are amory) the high priority NRC programs.
It is imp >rtant that the SSMRP program be structured to provide input as early as is feasible into the broad safety policy considerations concerning the seismic design bases of nuclear power plants. Wis should include a timely preliminary evaluation of the seismic contribution to the probability of serious accidents and the principal contributors to uncertainty in such probability estimates.
8.3.2 Hydroloy he program on hydrology should be kept under continuing evaluation to see if the current low level effort is adequate to support possible informa-tional needs arising from the consideration in future siting policy of liquid pathways effects from serious accidents.
8.3.3 Structural and Mechanical Engineering We programs in structural and mechanical engineering are relatively new.
Effort should be devoted to the formulation by FY 1981 of a broad research program responsive to the NRC needs arising from operating reactors and from reacto rs to be constructed.
We research program should include 8-1
efforts devoted to provide the NRC with an improved capability for design audit and to evalua te the significance of of f-design conditions during potential accidents or other severe loading conditions such as a la rge earthquake, as well as an improved basis of experimental verification of seismic design.
8.4 R,ecommendations
'Ihe ACRS favors lorrJ-term growth in the areas included in this program and supports funding at the proposed level.
8-2
9.
ADVANCEO REACTORS 9.1 Scope This chapter dealr with research needed for licensing advanced reactor types, specifically Fast Breeder Reactors and Advanced Converters.
9.2 General The proposed budget provides $5 million for closing out Fast Breeder Reactor Safety Research in FY 1981 and rn funds for Advanced Converter Safety Research.
In earlier reports, including NUREG-0603 and NUREG-0496,, the ACRS has consistently supported an NRC research program related to the safety of advanced reactor types.
Ris recommendation has been based on the perception that many of the current safety problems associated with LWRs have resulted from the fact that safety research lagged behind reactor developnent.
We Administration has proposed to defer indefinitely LMFBR developnent and to provide fo r rn work related to other concepts.
If CorxJress agrees with this indefinite deferral, the ACRS would agree that there is no need to maintain an Advanced Reactor Safety Research Program.
On the other hand, if the deferral is to be short-term, or if the develop-ment program in FY 1981 is to continue at a pace similar to that of the last few years, then the arguments presented earlier for an NRC program are still valid.
Finally, if the expectation is that a move to exercise the LMFBR option in the next 10-20 years will be accommodated by imprting foreign technology, it is important that the NRC program of safety research on advanced reactors be maintained to ensure an adequate technical basis for U.S. regulatory standards, guides, and criteria.
9.3 Coments As in its 1978 report (NUREG-0496) to the Congress, the ACRS recommends that, if the research program is continued, a broader spectrum of possible fast breeder reactor accidents be examined.
We Advanced Reactors Safety Research Program proposed for FY 1981 moves very slightly in that direc-tion. We movement should be accelerated as soon as feasible.
It is noted that a significant portion of the work that is being carried out and planned in the Fast Breeder Reactor program will provide benefits to the IMR programs, especially in the area of core melt phenomena.
If the Fast Breeder Reactor work is terminated, the IMR programs should be re-viewed and the funding augmented as necessary.
9-1
If it is decided to support research on advanced reactors, the ACRS has the following comments based on the programs proposed for Fast Breeder Reactors and for Advanced Converters:
9.3.1 Analysis This is primarily code development and qualification, but includes some work on accident delineation which purports to be responsive to the ACRS recommendations of 1978 that "NRC undertake a comprehensive study of the safety questions that are likely to arise for commercial LMFBRs.
The ACRS believes that there is a high-priority need to review all possible. sources of serious accidents (e.g., loss of shutdown-heat-removal capability),
their probabilities, and their level of seriousness in plants of commercial size.
Considerable use of probabilistic analysis techniques should be made. Preliminary conceptual des *gns should be utilized in the studies as a means for focusing on an integrated approach to the solution of problems such as post-accident heat removal."
However, the ACRS also commented concerning the SIMMER computer code.
"...it is doubtful that the code can ever be validated in the sense of precise calculations of such parameters as pressure, temperature, energy release, etc.
Rather, the ACRS believes that the primary value of the code will lead to increased understanding of the event....
The ACRS expects that reduction of the code development goals will lead to more modest experimental needs and lower costs than previously anticipated." The intent was that additional emphasis be given to investi-gation of a broad spectrum of accidents.
The ACRS does not believe that the proposed FY 1981 allocation provides enough emphasis on other than core disruptive accidents.
Attention is directed again to the recommendation quoted in part above.
It is believed that both accident delineation and accident prevention should receive greater attention than now seems indi-cated.
In addition, the accWnt delineation work that is proposed seems to put too much emphasis on the Clinch River Breeder Reactor.
However, the SIMMER computer code and the other analytical activities are viewed as important and valuable, and need to be continued at a level adequate to sustain them.
9_.3_._2_Aer_o_ sol _R_elease and_ Tr,ansprt This is a combination of analyses and experiments aimed at an impartant problem area. The work seems well planned and is producing results.
9.3.3 Materials Interaction This item includes funds for loop design and fabrication and for a series of fuel tests.
It is clear that fuel research needs to be done.
While the NRC needs to do work on problems crucial to licensing concerns, more de-termined effort should be made to have the fuel developers assume a larger part of the investigative burden.
In addition, more effort is needed to obtain a more precise formulation of the questions to be asked and how the answers are to be obtained with these facilities.
9-2
9.3.4 _ S m em Integri_ty We proposed program involves testing of the CONTAIN computer code and carrying out a set of experiments associated with molten core retention, core debris coolability, and container cell liner response to accident loads. Some of the work on molten core retention is also useful in connec-tion with licensing concerns of the Floating Nuclear Plant and in consider-ation of problems associated with severely damaged cores in water reactors generally. We work associated with this item seems appropriate to future needs in the development and licensing of fast breeder reactors.
- However, the ACRS believes, as recommended in NURm-0496, that specific attention should be given to the study of alternate containment systems and to conceptual studies of systems for retaining a molten core in containment.
9.4 Recommendations Funding at a level of $18.0 million is recommended for support of research on Fast Breeder Reactors and Advanced Converters.
9-3
10.
REACTOR ENVIRONME m L EFFECT3
- 1).1 S_ cop _
R3 search in this program area includes studies of the buildup of radionu-clides within nuclear power plants, the assessment and control of associ-ated occupational radiation exposures, the behavior, transinrt and control o f radionuclides discharged into the environment, and the evaluation and control of associated population exposures.
We last two areas apply to both routine and emergency situations.
10.2 General on the basis of this review, the ACRS has concluded that three areas of research within this subject area are still essentially not addressed br the current program. Wese are:
(a)
Research to determine the basic factors that govern radionuclide buildup in reactor coolant systems, including the influence of operating practices on such buildups.
(b)
Research to develop methods for evaluating the ef fectiveness of measures for removing radionuclides from the primary coolant circuits of operating reactors.
(c)
Research on emergency planning.
TFese needs were comented on in the ACRS report of July 1979 (NURFX3-0603).
Ir. the case of (a), a research program needs to be developed and funded.
Ir. cases (b) and (c), some work is underway but more attention needs to be directed to problems associated with the decontamination of operating reactors and the recovery and reentry phase following an accident.
10.3 Comm_ents With respect to the level of effort on specific items, the ACRS offers the following coments:
10.3.1 Priority Items Within _th_e_ Program as_ Plan _ne_d Of the individual projects outlined in the program as planned, the follow-ing are considered by the ACRS to have priority:
10-1
Development of Mathematical Models for the Transport of Radionuclides in Water and Sediment.
Portions of this work that should be emnhasized include evalua tions of the liquid pa thway, particularly as it pertains to radionuclide releases from a nuclear power plant under conditions of a severe accident.
Development of Mathematical Models for the Atmospheric Transyort of Airborne Radionuclides.
Although nodels fo r tha transport of airborne radionuclides over short distances are reasonably adequate, there continues to be a need for an improved capability to assess the behavior of airborne releases at moderate (5 to 15 kilometers) and greater distances (16 to 30 kilometers) from nuclear power plants.
This is especially important relative to emergency planning, where models are needed to provide projec-tions on a real-time basis.
Occupational R: 'tation Assessment and Protection.
In addition to the work described in Section 10.2 above, there is a neod for research on developing better methods for assessing neutron exposures in nuclear power plants. This work should include the application on a routine basis of the newer techniques now available. The ACRS also endorses the program for the incorporation of newer data on the biological behavior of radionuclides into the NRC internal dosimetric models, and encourages the application of probabilistic assessment techniques in the establishment of internal dose limits.
In addition, the ACRS strongly supports the efforts to develop better means fo r providing respiratory protection to radiation wo rke rs, such as those involved in decontamination and post-accident recovery opera tions.
10.3.2 Priority Programs Not Within the Pro _qram as Planned Key items of research relative to emergency planning include:
Accident Source Terms.
Better definition of accident source terms is needed. Emphasis should be placed on requirements for instrument systems to provide the definitive types of data necessary for real-time projections of the nature and consequences of a release.
Interdictive Measures.
Studies of the full range of interdictive measures with emphasis on their suitability for given sites and means for their improvement are needed.
Accompanying this research should be a reevalu-ation of Protective Action Guides and the initiation of research to develop a better scientific basis for their establishment.
Recovery and Reentry Phases Following Accidents._ Further investigations of improved measures that mfght be implemented in the recovery and reentry phase following an accident must be made. This program should include evaluations of designs and procedures to facilitate the decontamination and recovery of major nuclear power plant systems.
It should also include re-search on procedures to aid decisions by medical and other authorities concerning the affected offsite population; methods for decontaminating and 10-2
reclaiming of fsite land, buildings, and equipnent; and the establishment of dose limits or guides for - population groups desiring to return to areas that have been evacuated.
10.3.3 Items Within the Research Program that are Considered of Low 50? 5.
The ACRS does not believe that there is an urgent need for emphasis on research to improve the models for describing low level airborne or liquid radionuclide releases from nuclear power plants under routine conditions.
This is especially true relative to refinements in the calculations that support 10 CFR 50, Appendix I.
10.4 Re_commenda_t_i_on_s Overall, the ACRS considers programs within this area to be important and believes that they are adequately funded.
However, the ACRS urges that consideration be given to the developnent < f new programs and the re-orientation of existing programs as outlined in Sections 10.2 and 10.3 above.
Because related research on many of these topics is underway in other Federal agencies, such as the DOS and the Envirormental Protection Agency (EPA), the ACRS urges the NRC Staff to keep abreast of such work and to take full advantage of the findings in helping to meet its own research needs.
10-3 e
11.
FUEL CYCU:
11.1 Scop The fuel cycle sa fety research prog ram relates to :
effluent control, safety system performance, occupational expsure and health, environmental impacts, transp rtation of radioactive materials, and decommissioning.
Some of the projects contained in these six categories concern requirements related to NEPA and are, thus, outside the scope of this review.
Some of the other projects pertain principally to regulatory and licensing problems associated with the use of radionuclides in medicine, industry, and research and are thus also outside the scope of this review.
11.2 General This research program comprises a relatively small percentage, about two percent, of the total NRC research budget.
Funds budgeted were $2.8 million in FY 1979, and $3.1 million in FY 1980; $4.4 million has been proposed for FY 1981. The program includes a broad mix of research topics of moderate to high priority.
11.3 _Co_mme_nts Decommissioning. he ACRS believes that the research on decommissioning of fuel cycle facilities is imprtant and should be funded above the level planned by the NRC.
tre emphasis should be given to research on the problems of decommissioning or long-term care of shallow land burial sites.
Effluent Control.
The ACRS believes that the research effort on effluent control should be augmented.
Increased emphasis is needed on the problem of radioactive gaseous wastes with respect to their removal, confinement, and loryJ-term storage or disp 3 sal.
Safety System Performance.
%e ACRS believes that more work is needed to assure adequate performance of safety systems when they are called upon.
For example, more information is needed on conditions that adversely affect air filter system capability and on testing methods to confirm that satisfactory performance capability exists.
11.4 Recommend _ations
%e ACRS recommends that more emphasis be given to the research areas cited in Section 11.3; this can be accommodated by decreased effort on transp rtation research.
11-1
- 12. WASTS MANAGEMENT 12_._1
- Scope,
%e NRC waste management research program is directed to the public health and safety problems that result from the handling and ultimate disposal of high and low level radioactive wastes and uranium mill tailings.
The potential risk from these activities is an important fraction of the total risk from all operations in the nuclear fuel cycle.
12.2 General In its 1973 report (NUREG-0496 ) to the CoryJress, the ACRS criticized the NRC for the poo r formulation and management of research work on waste management problems and fo r the inadequate rate of progress.
Similar criticism was expressed by the ACRS to the NRC in the July 1979 report (NURE-0603 ).
In N'JRM-0603 the ACRS added that upgrading was needed in the NRC research staff capability.
%e ACRS believes that the NRC has taken positive steps to improve this situation.
Staff capability has improved; however, more is needed.
Commendable progress is also being made toward improved assessment and selection of research; further attention, however, is needed on this matter, especially the ordering of priorities.
It is also apparent that there is now more interaction and review of research programs by the various groups within the NRC. Further, it appears that the managers of this work in NRC have initiated more effective communication and interac-tion with DOS, EPA, USGS and other organizatior.s.
12.3 Comments 12.3.1 High Level Waste _ _(H_LW)
The ACRS believes that work in this area, including that related to the ultimate disposal of spent fuel, has high priority and that adequate funding is necessary for its timely completion.
It is therefore urgent that the NRC develop detailed criteria and procedures needed to evaluate (1) the suitability of a HIM package for ultimate disposal and (2) the licensability of a geologic site as a repository for HIM packages. Some of the unique technical problems with respect to the latter task may require further augmentation of Staff capability, for example, added expertise in geological sciences and engineering.
12-1
12.3.2 Low Level Waste (LLW).
The ACRS considers this a high priority item.
Although the planned FY 1981 funding by NRC for LLW research once might have been considered to be adequate, certain recent events suggest this may no longer be true.
Experience has shown the need for better bases to enhance the guidance of LLW management, such as in recovery operations after a reactor accident.
We ACRS believes also that more research is needed to provide better rationale and wider technical bases for the development of detailed site selection criteria and better procedures to assess the suitability of sites and site practices in the licensing and operation of corxnercial shallow land burial facilities for LLW.
%is information is urgently needed in order that additional acceptable sites can be expeditiously selected, evaluated, and licensed.
Sites that are acceptable for this purpose can provide the needed flexibilly to accommodate large waste volumes and shipping route alternatives. Specific areas of research needed relative to LLW management include:
(a)
Techniques for reducing the volume of low level waste as well as the exploration of alternatives to shallow land burial as a method fo r disposal.
(b)
Field monitoring equipment to evaluate the acceptability of LLW packages as received at a disposal site, including their content of free standing liquids.
(c)
Methods for negating the influence of chelating agents, commonly used in radionuclide decontamination operations, in terms of later migra-tion of radionuclides within and from a disposal site.
(d)
Criteria for permitting public access to facilities formerly used in nuclear work, and developnent of associated field monitoring equipnent to assure compliance with the criteria.
12.3.3 Uranium Mill Tailings Good progress has been reported by DOE and NRC in resolving problems associated with the control of mill tailings.
Techniques have been devel-oped that decrease significantly the amount of radioactive releases from the uranium tailings piles.
The results of studies to stabilize the tailings from erosion also appear promising. We NRC is developing methods to evaluate the long term effectiveness of these techniques.
%e ACRS believes that this work warrants the amount of funding requested and that it should have high priority.
12.4 Recomendations In view of the growth rate of NRC's research in this area (from $4.5 million in FY 1979 to $8.6 million proposed for FY 1980 to S13.6 million 12-2
requested in FI 1981), the ACRS is still corcerned about the adequacy of manpower and exoertise available in RES and in the Of fice of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) to manage the program effectively and yet stay abreast of impartant developnents that occur ide the NRC, for exainple, in DOS and in foreign countries.
The ACRS believes that addi-tional staff capabilities and technical expertise are urgently needed in this area and, therefore, recommends that the NRC be authorized and funded to expand the technical staf f for this program by at least five people above the fiEteen now proposed.
All segments of the waste management research program are of high priority, particularly those on HU4 and LU4. The ACRS believes that the requested FY 1981 funding, which represents a substantial increase above that fo r FY further increase for Ltu may be justified.
1980, is warranted; even some 12-3
13.
SAFEmlARDS 13.1 Scope his prugram is concerned with both safeguards and security.
Safeguards refers to means of preventing the theft of special nuclear materials (StN) from fixed sites or during transportation, and also to means of detecting loss or diversion of SNM.
Security refers to the protection of nuclear facilities from sabotage or seizure.
13.2 _ General is difficult to compare the urgency of work in this area with that of It work in other reactor research areas.
We other programs mainly involve the operational safety of reactors, and it is at least possible in principle to assess their relative importance by comparing their pssible contribu-tions to reductions in risk.
We imprtance of the safeguards progran, on the other hand, is a direct function of the threat level which may be assumed to characterize attempts at theft or sabotage.
One way of compar-ing these projects is to ask how long it would take, with some specified relative funding, to complete the projects now seen to be necessary in the various fields.
If these times are not too different, then the relative funding could be said to be in acceptable balance.
At the proposed level of funding ($4.9 million), work on some projects will (sucn as safeguards needs for some possible alternative fuel cycles) have to be deferred; but work on some of the more immediate needs (such as evaluation of the physical security provisions for reactors) can be com-pleted in two or three years.
We proposed level of funding would seem to be close to the minimum acceptable level; but, on the basis of the compari-son criterion suggested above, the ACRS considers the proposed funding to be reasonable.
Recently the NRC has moved to consolidate the planning of safeguards work.
We Safeguards Technical Assistance and Research (STAR) group, with repre-sentatives of the various NRC offices, has been established to monitor all In proposals for research or technical assistance projects on safeguards.
addition, responsibility for all safeguards operational activities has been transferred to NMSS.
W ese changes have improved the coherence of the research program.
13.3 Comments 13.3.1 Evaluation Methods This includes evaluation of the eff activeness of physical protection materials control provicions for fixed sites and for mi t.erial in transit; 13-1
and accounting methods (MC&A) for SNM; security force selection and train--
ing; and support of the development of regulatory guides and standards.
Upgraded rul es concerning physical security provisions and guard fo rce requirements have already been issued, and a rule for MC&A is about to appear.
Following a trial period to ascertain if modifications are neces-sary these rules will be turned over to the user offices.
All major projects in this program elment are expected to be completed by about FY 1983.
In FY 1981, the program will include research on:
automated MC&A systems; vital areas in power reacter plants; transprt of high level waste; spent--
fuel storage and shipment; and assessing the new upgraded rules on the basis of experience with their imp 1 mentation.
13.3.2 I_nsp etion Methods t
This covers work intended to help inspectors evaluate the safeguards provisions in effect; to assess the implementation of the upgraded rules for guards; to develop the methods and tools required for monitoring MC&A performance; and to review and evaluate safeguards contingency plans. Major projects in this program element are expected to be completed by about FY 1983.
In FY 1981, one or more of the new rules will be tested and transferred to the regional inspection staff for operational use.
13.3.3 Alternative Strategies his program consists of lorger tr;u vojects.
%ese include:
plant design alternatives and damage co.r, ol meau es; vulnerability of spent fuel storage pools; methods fo r snalyzing and dealing with communicated threats; and safeguards requirements for alternative fuel cycles and new enrichment or semration technologies.
In FY 1981, the work proposed will include:
techniques for MC&A in process systems; response to communicate i threats; source terms resulting from attack on shipping casks in trcnsit; and safeguards requirements for proliferation-resistant fuel cycles.
13.4 Recommendations All of the projects proposed are needed to meet safeguards requirements.
In many instances more rapid progress would be desirable; whereas slower progress would scarcely seem to be acceptable.
We TRS considers the proposed level of funding to be marginal, but adeqaate.
13-2
It is recommended that possible confl ict3 between desirable sa fegua rds requirements and essential operational safety requirements be identified and resolved, and that human respanse in the context of proposed mechanical and procedural sa feguards provisions should be studied.
Work in these areas probably could oe accommodated within the proposed budget by some curtailment of that presently planned fo r other projects under Alter-native Strategies (Section 13.3.3).
13-3
14.
RISK ASSESSMEVT 14.1_ Scope This prog ram includes research on probabilistic methodology and so f t-ware, equipnent and human failure rates, nuclear fuel cycle risk, and risk acceptance criteria.
In addition, it includes a program of probabi-listic analysis in support of licensing and the integ rated reliability evaluation program. Furthermore, this program provides risk-based guidance for various other activities in the NRC as well as training in probabilis-tic methods to the NRC Staff.
14.2 General he ACRS strongly supports the planned growth in this research program.
Furthermore, in its recommendations for new directions in research (Chapter 2), the ACRS identified several additional areas which can logically be located in this program.
Rese matters include studies of the courses of serious accidents, inadequacies in the single failure criterion, and the effects of the considerations of serious accidents on siting criteria. We ACRS therefore believes that this research program should receive some of the funding which can be reallocated from the proposed reduction in the support of LOFT.
14.3 Comments (a)
The Integrated Reliability Evaluation Program has considerable potential for an important contribution to the improvement of the satety of existing reactors and should receive high priority.
The nuclear indus-try should initiate and place emphasis on its own concurrent program in order to more quickly evaluate reactor design aspects which can and should be impro/ed in a timely fashion.
(b)
Priority should be given to an evaluation of flood models and to a more realistic examination of potential on-site and off-site effects of a large release of radioactive material, including possible decontamination measures.
(c)
The topics relating to reactor systems analysis and licensing support should include the early development of an improved alternative to the single-failure criterion.
(d)
The work on nuclear fuel cycle risk should include a focus that will provide the NRC with improved bases for the promulgation of criteria for ultimate disposal of high level wastes.
14-1
(e)
Other matters which should be addressed include projects to provide information needs outlined in the " Report of the Siting Policy Task Force" (NUREri-0625), and to provide data for assessing the advantages and disad-vantages of multi-unit versus single-unit sites.
(f)
The ACRS has previously recommended that the imC attempt to develop quantitative risk acceptance criteria for public comment and for review by the Congress itself.
Die ACRS believes that this ef fort should be given high priority, well beyond that afforded it thus far by the tac.
14_d_ Recommend _ati_ons
'Ihe research and applications program in Risk Assessment is of high prior-ity and should be funded at a level of $15.0 million.
14-2
15.
IMPROVED REACTOR SAFETY 15.1 Scope The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which effected the separation of the AEC into the NRC and ERDA, established within the NRC an Of fice of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES).
In view of the legislative histo ry (Conference Report), the role of RES was accepted by the NRC as being limited to " confirmatory research", presumably as opposed to the " develop-mental research" that had dominated the Am program.
Several attempts were made by RES to define " confirmatory research".
We need for definition, however, was in effect obviated by the issuance of a directive that the research must be responsive to and, except in special circumstances, initiated by " user" needs.
Users were considered to be principally the other NRC program offices but to include also the Commission, Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, ACRS, Congress, the technical community, and the public.
We limited nature of " confirmatory research" was recognized implicitly by the Congress when, in its Budget Authorization Act for NRC for W 1978 (PL 95-209), it amended the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to require the NRC to develop a long-range plan for the " development of new or improved safety systems" for nuclear power plants.
Such a plan was devel-oped and submitted to the Congress in April 1978 in NURE-0438, in which 16 research topics were evaluated and 7 of them were proposed for a three-year program estimated in 1978 to cost about $15 million.
The recommendations of that report were endorsed by the ACRS in a March 13, 1979 report to the NRC Chairman, and in its reports to the Congress in 1977 and 1978 (NURM-0392 and NURE-0496).
We recommendations prestrnably were endorsed also by the Commission and by the other NRC Program Offices.
15.2 General No funds were available for this program in W 1978.
For W 1979, the Congress authorized $1.5 million but did not appropriate funds speci-fically for this purpose.
In spite of a lack of appropriated funds, work was begun at various times in W 1979 using funds from three sources:
W 1978 unobligated carryover funds
$0.40 million W 1979 reprogrammed RES funds
$0.40 million W 1979 confirmatory research funds
$0.15 million 15-1
Wese programs address four of the seven proposed areas of research to improve reactor safety.
For FY 1980, the NRC requested $4.3 million for research in this area but this was reduced by the Of fice of Management and Budget (OMB) to $1.0 million.
In addition, CMB stipulated that no funds in this category could be used by NRC to support experimental work, presumably on the assumption that a very limited program of strictly analytical and conceptual research by the NRC would be supplemented by research carried out or funded by the DOE.
(The Congress has followed the Crib recommendations in its appropri-ation for FY 1980.)
Following the accident at P1I-2, the NRC requested a supplemental appropriation for FY 1980 to provide for research and other activities related to it.
'Ihis request included $27.2 million for research program support.
Although RES had requested $3.4 million for research to improve reactor safety, and this level of support had been endorsed strory-ly by the ACRS in its " Comments on the NRC Safety Research Program Budget" submitted to the Commission in July 1979 (NUREG-0603 ), the Commission did not include any additional funding for research on improved reactor safety in its request for a supplemental appropriation for FY 1980.
At this time, the funds available for this program in FY 1980 amount only to the $1.0 million to which it was restricted by the OMB.
For FY 1981, RES requested So.6 million, a level also supported by the ACRS in NUREG-0603.
In view of the fact that the FY 1980 Supplemental Request for Improved Reactor Safety had not been approved by the Commission, the FY 1981 request was reduced to $4.5 million, presumably to be compatible with the $1.0 million level available for FY 1980.
The budget request now before the Congress includes $4.5 million for this pro) ram.
As a result, the funds available specifically for the three-year period, FY 1979 through FY 1981, will be only $6.45 million, far below the 1978 estimate of $15 million for a three-year initial program of research to improve reactor safety.
15.3_Conrnents he ACRS has indicated repectedly its strory support for a vigorous and well-funded program of research to improve reactor safety.
It offered this view on several occasions prior to the D1I-2 accident and has repeated it since.
We importance of two of the projects in the proposed program, those relating to vented and filtered containments and to improved in-plant accident response (human-interactions) have received widespread recognition ri a result of the viI-2 accident; others may prove to be equally impor nt.
15.4 Recommendations The ACRS repeats its recommendation that a vigorous and well-funded program of research to improve reactor safety be started, on a crash 15-2
basis if necessary, and assigns it the highest possible priority. he ACRS recommends that funding for the program for FY 1981 should be at a level sufficient to permit aggressive programs on alternate decay heat removal concepts, vented and filtered containments, and improved in-plant accident response, all of which are closely related to the TMI-2 accident. Scoping studies of other likely projects also should be undertaken as a basis for planning future programs.
Funding at a level of $10 million is recommended.
We ACRS considers it necessary to call attention to the rather unfortunate distinction that has been made between " confirmatory research" and "re-search to improve reactor sa fety".
Although the latter has consis-tently been assigned a high priority by RES in its requests for ' funds, it has been difficult to provide funds for "research to improve reactor safety" under circumstances where this might have resulted in some redoc-tion of funds for an item of " confirmatory researc!
believed by one of the
" user offices" to be directly related to their own real or perceived needs. It must be noted, however, that this attitude may be changing, and may be expected to change further in the aftermath of the 'IMI-2 accident.
Research on alternate decay heat removal concepts (one of the projects identified in NURED-0438 as "research to improve reactor sa fety") has already been started, using " confirmatory research" funds, in response to a request from a " user office".
In addition, the concept of a vented and filtered containment has received prominent mention in the "'IMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report" (NUREG-0585), so that research in this area might also be the subject of a " user request" and, qualify for support f rom " confirmatory research" funds.
We foregoing comments indicate that the distinction between " confirmatory research" and "research to improve reactor safety", is neither very clear nor useful, if indeed there ever was a legitimate distinction.
It is similiarly artificial to stipulate that in its research to improve reactor safety tha NRC should not make use of experimental studies where those would seem to be the most advantageous means to follow. % e ACRS suggests that the Congress review the legislative charter of the NRC research program and eliminate this distinction.
Inasmuch as the purpose of the NRC is to ensure safe design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants, it should follow that any research is legitimate that contri-butes to that purpose without compromising the credibility or independence of the NRC.
The ACRS urges consideration of this matter by the Congress.
15-3
Appendix A GLOSSARY ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards AEC Atomic Energy Commission BDHT Blowdown and Reflood Heat Transfer BWR Boiling Water Reactor CFR Code of Federal Regulations DOE Department of Energy ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EPA Environmental Protection Agency UUR Energy Research and Developnent Administration PRG Federal Republic of Germa7y FY Fiscal Year HLW High Level Waste LIN Inw Level Waste LMFBR Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor LOCA Inss-of-Coolant Accident IDFT Inss of Fluiri Test IMR Light Water Reactor MC&A Materials Control and Accounting Methods NEPA National Environmental Policy Act NMSS Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Ofric's of Nuclear Reactor Regulation A-1
JMB Of fice of Management and Budget PBF Power Burst Facility PWR Pressurized Water Reactor RES Office of Nuclear Rejulatory Research RIA Reactivity Insertion Accident SNM Special Nuclear Material SSMRP Seismic Safety Margins Research Pr&3 ram TLTA TWo Loop Test Apparatus T'4I-2 Three Mile Island, Unit 2 USGS United States Geological Survey A-2
APPENDLX B EXCERFr FROM NGEG-0603 SECfl0N 1.2 OF CHAPTER 1, ENflTLED "D'PLICATIONS OF THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, UNIT 2" 1.2 Recommendations for New Directions in Research In its review of the budget proposals in Parts 2 and 3 of this report, the ACRS has identified a number of areas in which the programs are not yet completely defined in content, but for which the need for research and funding is clear.
The following recommendations for new directions in the NRC Safety Research Program are intended to provide guidance to the Commission, to the RES Staff, and to the user offices, that can be utilized in the detailed formulation of research programs for FY 1980, to the extent practicable and for FY 1981, and for the development of requests and plans for FY 1982 and beyond.
The ACRS recognizes that research has already begun in many of these areas, and expects that others will be considered and implemented in a timely fashion.
The ACRS believes that this can and tinould be done without delaying the ongoing budgetary process.
1.2.1 Priorities and Focus The ACRS believes that the research and regulatory staff of the NRC should, in the reasonably near future, reevaluate the overall priorities, levels of expenditure, and focus of the safety research program.
The ongoing program to a large extent reflerts priorities that were estab-lished several years ago and has been strongly influenced by the single failure concept and research needs arisirg frcm detailed studies of design basis accidents.
While useful results are being obtained from most ongoing research tasks, it is important that the Staff take a new broad look at the existing and recently proposed levels of support e-i research directions to evaluate the potential need for major change in emphasis.
The ACRS suggests that the existing structure of the safety research program, which was developed to manage a research program plan estab-lished a few years ago, be reviewed to determine whether modifications are appropriate to meet the requirements of the coming years.
Also, the ACRS notes that the focus of the research program has reflected the needs of the NRC regulatory staff as perceived in past years. Here, too, early attention should be given to an evaluation of the priorities of the detailed existing requests as well as requests arising from changed perceptions in safety research priorities.
1.2.2 Anomalous Transients and Small U)CAs The need for greater emphasis on transients and small LOCAs has been recognized.
The ACRS recocunended increased effort on transients in its 1977 and 1978 reports to Congress, and anphasized the study of ancmalous transients in its Interim Report No. 3 on mI dated May 16, 1979.
B-1
A research program on anomalous transients should have as its focus the need for greater understanding f the probable course of a wide rarge of pcssible events leading to severely degraded conditions, in order to provide a better basis for operator training, for improved instrumenta-tion, and for possible on-line computer-diagnostic procedures to aid the operator.
Equally, such studies should provide insight into the signifi-cance of possible design modifications and into areas of research warrant-ing further study in order to have an appropriate degree of preparednee,s and background knowledge.
Such a program should receive coordinated guidance by a group including representatives from both licensing and research.
1.2.3 Accident Studies The NRC should initiate a series of analytical studies to explore the probable course of events and possible potential consequences of a broad spectrum of accidents which go well beyond the current design bases in terms of the damage to the core and the release of radioactivity to the environment via both atanspheric and liquid pathways.
In particular, specific studies should be carried out to scope scenarios of serious accidents beginning from the initiating event through to the eventual resting place of a melted core for some of the sequences.
Preliminary guidance for the choice of scenarios to study can be provided by WASH-1400, although the mI experience showed that many sequences must be considered altered by human intervention at some point.
For each scenario, sufficient technical detail should be provided to obtain insight into such matters as the following:
en uhat extent can the probability and consequences of the sequence be quantified; what are the intermediate stages in the sequence, and to what extent may they be af fected by htsnan intervention; how serious is the sequence in terms of its effects on human health; where are the trigger points for emergency action, and what are the criteria therefor; etc.?
It is especially important that these studies concern themselves with the identification of significant sequences that have not received sufficient research attention, s) that one can develop in advance significant safety procedures, and equipnent, and mitigating actions to avoid surprises of the sort that occurred at mI.
It is expected that such studies would be useful in the specification of instruments to help diagnose and follow the course of an accident, in the identification - f new research and developnent needs, in siting consid-erations, in.nodification of containment, etc.
An ef fort on the order of ten man-years is envisioned.
11 - 2
1.2.4 Molten Core Retention The NRC should undertake a conceptual study to examine the practicality of retaining a molten core within containment or significantly reducing the release of radioactivity via liquid pathways following penetration of the containment foundation, in order to help provide insight into the practicality, benefits and costs of such a safety feature.
1.2.5 Power Burst Facilip The PBF program should be reoriented to emphasize primarily the study of the processes leading to medium and severe core damage in postulated accidents, the possible consequences of considerable molten fuel in the core, and possible measures to mitigate large scale core melt.
1.2.6 Steam Explosions The ongoing research program on steam explosions should be substantially augmented to gain a better assessment of their potential role in various postulated accident scenarios, as well as possible insight into measures which could reduce the probability of a large scale thermal reaction, if such a reaction is possible.
1.2.7 Siting A more extensive evaluation should be made of possible offsite conse-quences via liquid pathways for postulated accidents involving core melt for a broad range of land-based sites whose characteristics are reason-ably representative of reactor sites in use, projected for use, or of potential interest in long-term planning.
Such an effort has already been initiated as part of the MIC research program.
%e depth of the program should be sufficient to provide the background information needed for the possible developnent of hydrologic siting criteria which allow for the possibility and probability of accidents beyond those currently designed for.
A study should be made of the relative and absolute accident risks, with uncertainties, for a wide range of potentially suitable sites. The study should examine the costs and benefits associated with different types of sites and should include the possible interaction of a serious accident in one reactor on other reactors at the site.
The intent of the study should be to provide insight into the relative advantages and disadvan-tages of more remote siting and power parks.
B-3
1.2.8 Plant Operations A systematic effort should be made to identify research needs relating to the safety implications of procedures for operation, maintenance, testing and surveillance.
Operating experience should be reviewed to identify existing problems in these areas and to determine problems important to sa fety.
1.2.9 Transient Simulation in Research and Licensing Early consideration should be given to atgmentation of the range of NRC capability to simulate various postulated transient and accident sequen-ces to varyirg degrees of sophistication, including but not limited to real time analysis and permitting a simulation of operator action and intervention.
Develognent of such simulation capability should enable a more detailed understanding of the course of events for various tran-sients, and would be useful in the developnent of improved operator procedures and trainig, diagnostic instrumentation, and compter-aided guidance to the operator.
1.2.10 Systems Behavior and Interaction A new research program should be established it systems behavior and interaction which includes an interdisciplir.ary approach to safety research includig electrical, thermal-hydraulic, mechanical, control, and heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems, under operational, transient and accident conditions.
Such a program should provide in-creased insight into the suitability of existing operational limits, the effect of system arrangement on its ability to withstand abnormal tran-sient conditions, and the degree to which system design changes can be made to improve safety in one way without adversely influencing safety or reliability under other sets of conditions.
1.2.11 Application of Probabilistic Methodology The ACRS recocrnends emphasis on the application of probabilistic and other methodology to an evaluation of the adequacy of the single failure criterion and to studies of alternate design approaches to systems and groups of systens important to safety in order to provide a better basis for decision making concerning the optimization of plant design for safety.
1.2.12 Water Specification and Crack Growth
'Ihe Comittee recomends that programs be initiated to develop appropriate water chemistry specifications, particularly in the BWR primary coolant B-4
and PWR secondary coolant, and to establish the effect of envirorsnental, fabrication, and operating variables on crack growth rates in the coolant system boundary.
Cracking is a recurring problem and the NRC lacks a basis for establishing conservative practices to prevent it.
1.2.13 Disturbance Analysis The ACRS recommends that both the licensing and research arms of the NRC Staff place considerable priority on the developnent of methods for real-time analysis of system disturbances, in an ef fort to provide improved diagnostic information to the operator concerning abnormal sequences and, as possible, to suggest favored courses of action.
Die ACRS anticipates that the efforts devoted to the developnent of such disturbance analysis systems will, of themselves, provide considerable insight into reactor behavior which will be useful in design and in operator training.
B-5
APPENDIX C THE ADVISORY COMMITPEE ON REACTO~1 SAFEGUARDS he Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was established as a statutory committee in 1957 by revision of the Atomic Energy Act. The ACRS was charged with the responsibility for review of safety studies and facility license applications submitted to it, and to make reports thereon, advising the Commission with regard to the hazards of proposed or existing reactor facilities and the adequacy of proposed reactor safety standards, and to perform such other duties as the Commission might request. Section 182b of the Atomic Energy Act requires ACPC review of the construction permit and operating license applications for power and testing reactors and spent fuel reprocessing facilities licensed under Sections 103, and 104b or c of the Atomic Energy Act; any application for a research, develop-mental or medical facility licensed under Section 104a or e of the Act and which is specifically referred to it by the Commission; and any request for an amendment to a construction permit or operating license under Sections 103 or 104a, b, or c which is specifically referred to it by the Commission. We Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred operation of the ACRS from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
In 1977, Public Law 95-209 added to its other duties a requirement fo r the ACRS to undertake a study of reactor safety research and ta prepare and submit annually to the United States Congress a report containing the results of this study.
The first of these rep)rts was submitted to the Congress in December of 1977.
C-1
ACRS MEMBERSHIP - JANUARY 1, 1980 CHAIRMAN:
Milton S.
Plesset, Professor of Engineering Science -
Emeritus, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California VICE-CHAIRMAN:
J. Carson Mark, Division Leader, Ios Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (retired)
Myer Bender, Director of Engineering Division, Oak Ridge National Labor-atory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee Max N. Carbon, Professor and Chairman of Nuclear Engineering Department, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Nisconsin Jesse Ebersole, Head Nuclear Engineer, Division of Engineering Design, Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, Tennessee (retired)
Harold Etherington, Consulting Engineer (Mechanical Reactor Engineer-ing), Jupiter, Florida William Kerr, Professor of Nuclear Engineering and Directo r, Michigan Memorial-Phoenix Project, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan Stephen Lawroski, Senior Engineer, Chemical Engineering Division, Ar-gonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois Harold W.
Lewis, Professor of Physics, Department of Physics, Univer-sity of California, Santa Barbara, California William M. Mathis, Director of Planning, United Nuclear Industries, Inc.,
Richland, Washington (retired)
Dade W. Moeller, Professor and Chairman, Department of Envitonmental Health Sciences, School of Public Health, Harvard University, Boston,. Massachusetts David Okrent, Professor, School of Engineering and Applied Science, University of California, Los Angeles, California Jeremiah J.
Ray, Chief Electrical Engineer, Philadelphia Electric Com-pany, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (retired)
Paul G. Shewmon, Professor and Chairman, Department of Metallurgical Engineering, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio Chester P.
Siess, Professor Emeritus, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois C-2
SUBCOMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS _
Reactor Safety Research Subcomittee D. Okrent, G airman C. P. Siess, Editor M. Bender H. Etherington W. Kerr H. Lewis J. C. Mark D. W. Moeller M. S. Plesset P. G. Shewmon T. G. tCreless, Staff D. J. Zukor, Fellow CHAPTER SUBC_OMMITTEE, 2.
Implications of 7NI Accident TMI-2 Accident Imp _lications and New Directions in Research D. Okrent, Chafrman M. Carbon W. Kerr W. H3this M. S. Plesset C. P. Siess R. K. Major, btaf f 3.
Systems Engineering ECCS_
4.
I.DFT M. S. P1esset, Gairman 5.
Code Developnent J. Ebersole H. Etherington D. Okrent A. Bates, Staf f React _o r_Operat_i_o_n H. Etherington, Gairman J. Ebersole W. Mathis D. W. Moeller D. Okrent J. Ray R. K. Major, Staff 6.
Ebel Behavior Reactor Fuel P. G. Shewmon, Gairman H. Etherington S. Lawroski J. C. Mark W. Mathis D. Okrent P. Doehnert, Staff C-3 4
C_ME,R_
S_U_BCOM_MI_TT_E_E, 7
Primary System Integrity Metal Components P. G. Shewmon, @ airman M. Bender H. Etherington D. Okrent E. Igne, Staff 8.
Seismic, Engineering, and Site Safety Extreme External Phenomena li.-~6krent, Gairman
~-
M. Carbon H. Lewis J. C. m rk D. W. Moeller C. P. Siess R. Savio, Staff 9.
Advanced Reactors Advanced Reastors W. Kerr, Chairman M. Bender M. Carbon H. Lewis J. C. Mark M. S. Plesset P. G. Shewmon R. Savio, Staff 10 Reactor Envirornental Ef fects Reactor Radiological Effects D. W. Moeller, Chafrman J. Ebersole S. Lawroski J. Ray R. Mller, Staff 11.
Ebel Cycle Fuel _ Cycl _e, S. Lawroski, Chairman M.
Carbon W. Kerr J. C. Mark W. m this D. W. Fbeller M. S. Plesset J. Ray P. Tam, Staff C-4
CHAPTER SUB_C0MMITTEE 12.
Waste Management Was_te Mana,qement
_S. Lawroski, Gairman M. Carbon W. Kerr J. C. Mark W. Ma this D. W. Moeller M. S. Plesset J. Ray P. Tam, Sta ff 13.
Sa feguards Safeguards and Secur_ity J. C. 43rk, G airman M. Bender M. Carbon
- 11. Etherington S. Lawroski W. Hathis P. G. Shewmon C. P. Siess R. K. 41jor, Staf f 14.
Risk Assessmemt Reliability and Probabilistic Assessment D. Okrent, ChaFrman M. Bender J. Ebersole W. Kerr M. Lewis J. C. Mark C.P. Siess G. Quittschreiber, Staff Site Evaluation D.W. Moeller, Gairmann J. Ebersole S. Lawroski D. Okrent J. Ray R. Miller, Staf f 15.
Improved Reactor Safety Improved Safety _ Systems C.P. Siess, Chairman H. Etherington S. Lawroski D. W. Maeller D. Okrent M. S. Plesset S. Duraiswamy, Staff C-5
'U" U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION (7 77)
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEFT fiUREG-0657 4 TITLE AND SUBTITLE (Add volume No., d eprope,are)
- 2. (Leave blank)
Review and Evaluation of the fluclear Regulatory Commission Safety Research Program for Fiscal Year 1981 3 RE CIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.
- 7. AUTHOR (S) 5 DATE REPORT COMPLETED l YEAR MONTH February 1980
DATE REPORT ISSUED
[vEAR Advisory Conriittee on Reactor Safeguards Februa ry 1980
- NT" 1717 H Street, fiW, Room 1016-H Washington, DC 20555 6 a e, e wen * /
8 (Leave Nank)
- 12. SPONSORING ORGANIZ ATION N AME AND MAILING ADD RE SS (incluor Iro Codel 10 PROJE CT T ASK/ WORK UNIT NO
- 11. CONTR ACT NO 13 TYPE OF REPORT PE RIOD COVE RE D //nclus.ve defes)
Report to Congress CY 1979
- 15. SUPPL 5. MEN TARY NOTE S 14 (Leave o/an*/
I 16 ABSTR ACT (200 words or less)
Public Law 95-209 includes a requirement that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards submit an annual report to Congress on the safety research program of the fiuclear Regulatory Commission. This report presents +he results of the ACRS review and evaluation of the fiRC safety research program for Fiscal Year 1981.
The report contains a number of comments and recommendations.
- 21. NO OF P AGE S unclassified public availability 20 SE CU RITY.C' ASS (Th,s papf
- 22. PRICE UnClassifled s
NRC FORM 335 (7 77)
UNITf n 3TATES NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMisslON f
]
W ASHIN G TON, D. C. 20S55 postage AND FEES P AID OFFICI AL DUSINESS u s. NUCLE An mEGUL AYony PEN ALTY FOR PRIVATE USE,5300 couusssion L
J 1205$$J.31637 2 ANR1 I<djb US NRC o
SECY PudLil LLLUMEN T HOGM t:R A N L H C n l Li-hST LLday nt.SHANJILN OC 205S5 a,
_s 4
e