ML19274D936
| ML19274D936 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1979 |
| From: | Daltroff S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902270255 | |
| Download: ML19274D936 (55) | |
Text
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PHILADELPHI A ELECTRIC COM PANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHI A. PA.19101 SHIELDS L. D ALTROFF Ettcraic Pn ouCTioN February 16, 1979 Re: Docket Mos. 50-277 50-278 Mr. Thomas A.
Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch J3 Division of Operating Reactors U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Ippolito:
Enclosed is the 90-day response to the NRC staff positions stated in your letter of November 17, 1978, regarding the Fire Protection Program at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power /
Station.
Specifically, this submittal includes:
I. -
Contair' our response to the NRC staff positions not addressed in the 30-day subaittal of December 20, 1973.
Additionally, this submittal revises our previous commitments on staff positions PF-3 and PF-20 based on a re-evaluation and additional information.
II. Enclosure 2.
contains our response to NRC positions rec.eived by telephone on January 16, 1979 regarding the PECo submittal of December 20, 1978.
III Attachments PF 18-1 and PF 18-2.
These contain the requested information on electrical penetrations seals used at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, and the results of fire tests associated with these penetrations.
We have been unable to complete some of the responses to the NRC staff posisions within the 90-day period.
These few items and our proposals for dealing with them are addressed below.
7 \\
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7902270255 k
T.
A.
Ippolito, Chief Page 2 In your letter of November 17, 1978, you requested in staff positions 21d, 26, 34a, and 43, a re-evaluation of the safe shutdown analysis based on detailed criteria identified for the first time.
The criteria are different than the criteria applied in our previous analysis.
We are in the process of repeating the analysis based on the criteria stated in our response to PF-26 presented in Enclosure 1.
This analysis will be in conformance with the MRC criteria, except with regards to the assumptions concerning loss of offsite power.
It is our intent to upgrade the existing installations, as identified by the analysis, to insure a safe shutdown of the facility.
The results of this investigation, as well as any appropriate additional proposed modificiations, will be sent to the Commission on or before April 27, 1979.
'de a r e investigating the feasibility of using a fire resistant fluid in the "G set fluid drives.
Consequently, the planning for additional fire protection in this area is presently under revieu.
This matter will be pursued in a timely manner in an effort to resolve HRC concerns.
The coua:i tme nt s in this subulittal, as well as previous commitments, will provide for early warning detection in nost of the areas requested by the Commission.
In our evaiuation of the need for detectors in each area of the plant, we consider in addition to the presence of safety related equipment and cable.
such features as coabustible loadi'g, fire resistance of cable, and methods available for safe shutdown.
Therefore, we have presented rationale for not installin6 smoke detectors in several areas of the plant.
Another uatter concerning the installation cf sucke detectors involves the design standards to be impleuented.
A review of the cable and conduit installation has revealed that strict compliance with HFFA smoke detector location is not feasible in every area of the plant.
It is our intention to install smoke detectors per NFPA guidelines as closely as practicable.
It is our intention to implement all coamitments made to date regarding fire protection on the following time scheduled.
1.
Implement within 18 months froa the date of final MRC approval of the Peach Botton Fire Protection Program, all equipuent additions or uodifications involving permanent installations.
2.
Implement within one year from the date of final NRC approval of the Peach Bottom Fire Protection Progran, the installation of additional portable fire fighting equipment.
T. A.
Ippolito Chief Page 3 3
Implement within 9 nonths frota the date of final I!HC approval of the Peach Bottoa Fire Protection Program, additional administrative controls, procedures, training, and testing requirements with the exception of the following previous commitments: (1) additional revisions will be completed within 3 nonths of flRC approval of the fire protection program for fire fighting procedures, and (2) within 6 months for control of combustibles and ignition sources.
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours,
,/
n.l '[ if'(
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Attachment
ENCLOSURE 1 90 Day Responses to NRC Staff Positions Peach Bottom Fire Protection Program Submitted with Letter of February 16, 1979 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278
Reference:
1.
Letter from Thomas A. Ippolito, Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Edward Bauer, Philadelphia Electric Company; dated November 17, 1978.
2.
Letter from S.
L. Daltroff, Philadelphia Electric Company to T.
A.
Ippolito, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; dated December 20, 1978 Sta f f Position PF-8 Refueling Floor Smoke detectors should be installed at the ceiling of the 234 foot elevation of the reactor building.
Response
We have re-evaluated our position relative to refueling floor smoke detection.
As shown in the fire loading analysis presented in the Fire Protection Program Report, the combustible loading is minimal.
Recent improvements in administrative procedures for housekeeping has reduced the quantity of transient combustibles.
In addition, should all equipment in this area be lost, all methods of safe shutdown are available.
T he re f ore, we no longer proposed to provide early warning smoke detection.
Sta f f Positions PF-16a (1) Cables above Control Room Ceiling All exposed cables above the suspended ceiling should be covered with a fire retardant material which has been demonstrated ef fective by testing or install smoke detectors in this space which are located in accordance with the applicable NFPA standards.
Response
There are twenty-six (26) cable trays located above the suspended ceiling in the control room.
None of the cables in these trays are assoc!.ted with either a safe sh tdown method or a safety system fuistion.
There fore, the loss of these cables would not af fect the ability to safely shutdown the plant.
Twenty-t hree (23) of these cable trays contain only cable that is of flame retardant construction.
Fire tests performed by PECo,
Page 2 the manufacturer, and Sandia laboratories have proven the adequacy of flame retardant cables involved in electrical fires.
We are unable to identify a technical bases to provide additional flame retardant coatings for these 23 tray sections.
The other three trays contain instrumentation cables for the meteorological system, the recombiner system, and the LPRM and APRM systems.
The absence of power cables in these 3 trays make the possibility of a fire very remote.
Additionally these trays contain the f ollowing cable construction:
a.
30 linear feet of polyethelene insulated shielded cable with an overal PVC jacket, b.
260 linear feet of two conductor PVC insula ted/ PVC jacketed cable c.
390 linear feet of multiconductor PVC insulated /PVC jacketed cable d.
650 linear feet of multiconductor XLPE (cross-linked polyethylene) insulated - neopreme jacketed cable.
We will cover these three cable tray sections with a fire retardant material which has been demonstrated effective by testing.
S ta f f Position PF-16b (1) - Control Room Panels and Consoles Propc se modifications as necessary to assure that no redundant equipment (including cables) required for safe shutdown is located in a single panel without a solid fire barrier between compartments containing the redundant equipment.
The functional requirements for a safe shutdown are discussed in staf f position PF-26.
Response
The design of the control room cabinets and consoles were examined and it was determined that the following panels are safety-related (Q-listed) and contain controls from more than one Safeguards Channel:
ooc 123 - Emergency Cooling Water:
This panel contains controls for the Emergency Cooling Tower and the HPSW/ESW pump bay sluice gates The HPSW and ESW pumps are not controlled from this panel.
Shutdown methods which do not require HPSW/ESW (Methods 1,
4, 18, 20, 22) would be available for reactor shutdown if this panel were damaged.
With operations outside the control room (operation of the sluice gates from their MCC's), all methods would be available.
2 (3) oC10 - Process Radiation Monitoring:
This panel contains controls for the Main Steam Line, Air Ejector Of fgas Stack,
Page 3 Liquid Process, and Ventilation System Radiation Monitoring Systems.
The Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors are part of the scram circuit and the Group I Isolation circuit.
The Air Ejector Offgas Radiation Monitors shutdown the Air Ejectors after a time delay.
The shutdown could af fect the vacuum in the main condenser; however, many safety-related shutdown methods would still be available.
The Stack and Liquid Process Radiation Monitors do not initiate automatic actions.
The ventilation systems which are monitored for radiation are not necessary for plant shutdown.
Therefore, a fire in this panel would not prevent safe shutdown.
2(3)oC12 - Plant Services: - This panel contains controls for service water, instrument air and RBCW (plus controls for other equipment not utilized in any Safe Shutdown Analysis Method).
Shutdown methods which do not require this equipment (Me thods 8, 11, 14, 17) would be available for reactor shutdown if this panel was damaged.
2 (3) oCO3 - ECCS:
This panel contains controls for Core spray, R HR, and the Relief Valves (plus controls for other equipment not utilized in any Safe Ehutdown Analysis Method).
The panel is sectionalized into several compartments with physical barriers between the compartments.
The two methods of safe shutdown analyzed in Section 4.4 of the Fire Protection Program Report were examined for separation in the Control Room.
Refer to our position concerning the functional requirements for performing a safe shutdown analysis in the response to position PF-26.
Method 17 is controlled from Panels 2(3) OC04B (HPCI), and 2 (3) oC0 3 (ECCS).
Method 2? in controlled from Panel 2 (3) OCO3 (Core Spray, Relief Valses, end rioSW/RHR).
Method 17 controls on Panel 2(3)oC03 are located in the CHR Division II section of the pa nel.
The controls for Method 23 ace located in the Core spray Division I, RHR Division I, and PCIS/halief Valve sections of this panel.
These four sections are ali separated from each other so that a fire in any one section would not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor.
Therefore, due to the sectionalization of this panel, at least one safety-related method of safe shutdown would be available if a section of this panel were damaged.
Additionally, methods which do not utilize equipment controlled from this panel would also be available.
The remaining Control Room panels are either not Q-listed, or do not contain controls for redundant equipment.
Based on the foregoing, it is our conclusion that there are redundant methods available, following a fire in any single control room or console compartment, insuring the safe shutdown of the plant.
The existing installation meets the staff posiion, therefore, no modifications are necessary.
Page 4 Staf f Position PF-16b (2)
All enclosed panels containing redundant safety-related equipment should be provided with an early warning smcke detection system.
Response
As stated in our response to PF 16.b(1), the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown condition following a fire in any control room panel or console.
The control room is continually occupied by a miminum, of three operators, ensuring that a fire in any pane although highly unlikely, would be promptly detected and extinguished.
It is our considered opinion that there would be little, if any, benefit derived by the installation of smoke detectors in the control room panels.
Sta f f Position PF-16c (4) Enclosed Rooms Within Control Room Complex All doors to enclosed rooms should be automatically closed in the event of a fire or maintained closed at all times by administrative procedures.
Ventilation ducts and openings in the walls and doors between these enclosed rooms and the main control room should be fitted with dampers that are equipped with either a manual or automatic closing device to prevent smoke and heat from entering the main control room.
If a manual closing device is used it should be capable of being operated from within the main control room at the opening to the room and a permanent sign should be posted at the device stating that it should be operated in the event of a fire in an adjacent area.
Pesponse The ventilation ducts do not pass through the subject walls per-se.
All ducts enter the room through the dropped ceiling.
The utility room and the toilet room exhaust through their own vent outside the control area.
The Control HVAC can be changed over to 100% exhaust to the outside.
Any smoke originating in the control area from other than the toilet and utility rooms will be exhausted.
Considering the low combustible loading, and the fact that early warning fire detectors are being provided in the peripheral rooms, we do not plan to install smoke dampers in any exha ust ducts.
Openings in walls will be closed and self-closing mechanisas will be installed on all doors identified in this staff position.
Page 5 Staf f Position PF-18 Fire Barrier Electrical and Mechanical Penetration Seal Qualification As stated in the initial NRC staf f position PF-16, all electrical penetrations in fire barriers surrounding fire zones and fire areas containing safety-related equipment (including cables) should be sealed by methods demonstrated effective by testing.
In addition, mechanical penetrations in these fire zones and fire areas should also be sealed when significant quantities of combustible material are present in the vicinity of the penetratration on both sides, or whern the barrier separates safety-related equipment from fire zones or areas with a heavy combustible loading (e.g., cable spreading rooms, control room, zones or areas containing combustible liquids, HPCI and RCIC rooms and MG set rooms).
The licensee should provide a detailed description (including drawings and materials lists) for each of the types of electrical and mechanical penetration seals that are used at the plant.
A description of the test procedure and test results which are relied upon as proof of each type of seal's qualification should be provided.
Any new penetration seals that are installed in the f uture or existing seals which must be replaced, should be qualified by an independent testing laboratory in accordance with ASTM E-119 and the following conditions.
1.
The cables used in the test should include the cable insulation materials used in the facility.
2.
The test sample should be representative of the worst case cc.afiguration of cable tray arrangement, anchoring, and penetration fire barrier size and design.
The test sample should also be representative of the cable sizes in the facility.
Testing of the penetration fire barrier in the floor configuration will qualify the fire stop for use in the wall configuration also.
3.
Cables penetrating the fire barrier should extend at least three feet on the unexposed size and at least one foot on the exposed side.
4.
The fire barrier should be tested in both directions unless the fire barrier is symmetrical.
5.
The fire barrier should be tested with a pressure differential across it that is equivalent to the maximum pressure differential a fire barrier in the plant is expected to experience.
Page 6 6.
The temperature levels of the cable insulation, cable conductor, cable tray, conduit, and fire stop material should be recorded for the unexposed side of the fire barrier.
7.
Acceptance Criteria - The test is successful if:
a.
The cable penetration fire barrier has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period of three
- hours, b.
The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature is sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature, and c.
The fire barrier remains intact and does not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surf ace during the hose stream test.
Fesponse Excerpts from Drawing E-1315, conduit and Cable Trays - Symbols Notes, and Details, are presented in Attachment PF 1.
These are the installation details for the various types of electrical penetration seals used at Peach Bottom.
The materials used for the seals are identified on these details with the exception of the polyurethane.
The polyurethane used is Instra-Foam sold by Instra-F oan Products, Inc.
This information will be added to a future revision of Drawing E-1315.
Attachment PF-18-2 is the test report for the testing performed April 3, 1975 on a typical electrical penetration seal of the type used at Peach Bottom.
The test was not performed on the cellular concrete because that construction is not presently being used and the materials used in the seals tested (polyurethan, e tc. ) were considered potentially more vulnerable to fire damage.
The materials and cables used in this test were identical to those use in the plant.
In our 30-day response we stated that we would make use of the penetration seal being designed and tested by the Architect Engineer for our Limerick Station when it becomes available.
The test program was established prior to the adoption of IEEE 634-1978-IEEE Standard Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification Test, and does not incorporate all of the requirements of the standard, nor all of the requirements of tb; Staff Position PF-18.
In their letter to Philadelphia me;_-ic Company of June 17, 1977, The Architect Engineer stated tuat American Nuclear Insurers, Nuclear Mutual Limited and the NRC had all reviewed the test procedures and were satisfied with the testing program.
The program met the standards existing at the time of its inception.
Page 7 If a new test program is developed in the future, it will meet all the requirements cf IEEE634-1978 and will also consider the test conditions listed in the Staff Position PF-18.
The following is a list of the dif ferences between the Architect Engineer developed test program and the Staff Positions, plus a basis for meeting the Staff Position with the existing test program.
1.
PF-18.2 "The test sample should be representative of the worst case configuration." The worst case configuration cannot be identified prior to the tests.
The test will utilize various representative configurations in accordance with the recommendation of IEEE 634, and will identify the worst case configuration.
2.
PF-18.3 " Cables penetrating the fire barrier should extend at least three feet on the unexposed side and at least one foot on the exposed side." The test cables were not extended to these lengtns.
The three foot extension allows the temperature sensors to be placed more remotel y frem the source of heat.
The shorter lengths of cables will give higher temperature readings and represents a more stringent, and, a more conservative test.
3.
PF-18.5 "The fire barrier should be tested with a pressure differential across it..." The FOREWORD to IEEE-634-1978 discusses pressure seals and testing of pressure seals at great length.
Their conclusion is that "There has been no standard method yet proposed and accepted for checking this seal during a fire test." The hose stream test following the burn represents a more severe pressure transient than the slight differential pressure (less the 0.5" water) normally maintained across the seal.
The differential pressure across the seal would not alter the test results unless the seal broke down from the fire.
If the seal broke down from the fire, the seal would fail the hose stream test.
The differential pressure requirement does not appear to provide any additional information.
All mechanical penetrations in areas surrounding safety related equipment and cable will be reviewed for adequacy.
Adequacy will be based on the combustible loading in the areas of the penetrations.
Mechanical penetraticns requiring upgrading will be upgraded using seal details conforming to ASTM E-119 requirements.
Adequacy of existing mechanical penetrations for which no test data is available will be reviewed and their suitability will be based on combustible loading in the area, similarity of seals ' 7 " tested" seals and engineering judgement.
Page 8 Staf f Position PE-20 Fire Barrier Rating Cable Spreading Poom Upgrade the ventilation fire dampers aL ave the door at the cable spreading room.
Response
Curing a meeting with NRC on June 16, 1977, PEco commatted to upgrading the ventilation openings above the doors to the cable spreading room.
This was based on an erroneous conclusion that the ventilation system lacked dampers with a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating.
A subsequent review by our Engineering Department confirmed the presence of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire dampers at these locations.
Therefore, we no longer plan to make any modifications to the existing installation.
Staf f Position PF-21a Cable Spreading Room The licensee should proceed with its plan to upgrade the existing fire detection system.
The upgraded system should be demonstrated effective by testing as discussed in NRC staf f position PF-27.
Response
Increased early warning detection will be provided in the Cable Spreading Room.
A review of the cable and conduit innta11ation has revealed that strict compliance with NFPA detecti location is not feasible.
(Specifically, pertaining to pocketo formed by exposed structural members).
Detectors will be installed per NFPA guidelines as closely as practical.
In the unlikely event that an exposure fire ignited cables, the considerable amount of smoke generated should be quickly detected.
Staff Position PF-21b The existing manually-initiated total flooding CO system should be converted to an automatically-initiated system.
Response
The CO system will be converted to an automatically-initiated system as requested.
Staff Position PF 21d Provide modifications as necessary (e. g., relocate one redundant division of safe shutdown equipment to outside of the room) to assure that both plants can be safely shutdown regardless of
Page 9 damage to any equipment (including cables) located in the cable spreading room.
The following functions should be considered required for safe shutuown:
1.
Placing the reactor in a subcritical condition and maintaining the reactor subcritical indefinitely.
2.
Bringing the reactor to hot shutdown conditions and maintaining it at hot shutdown for an extended period of time (i.e.,
longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) using only normal sources of cooling water.
3.
Maintaining the reactor coolant system inventory indefinitely using only normal sources of makeup water.
4.
Bringing the reactor to cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
No credit should be taken for actions by plant personnel to repair damage to equipment required for functions
- 1.,
2.,
and 3.
The capability to perform all control actions necessary for functions 1.,
2.,
and 3. must be maintained in the control room or at the remote shutdown panels, and all power requirements for these functions must be satisfied by onsite sources.
In lieu of assuming that redundant equipment required for safe shutdown will be damaged by a single fire in the cable spreading room, the licensee may elect to demonstrate by test or analysis that the separation of redundant equipment is (or can be made to be) sufficient to prevent such an occurrence.
Any assumptions used in an analysis must be verified by test data for materials and equipment arranged in a configuration similar to that installed in the plant.
The possible deleterious effects of combustion products and water or other fire suppression agents must be considered.
External ignition sources and transient combustibles must also be considered.
Response
The safe shutdown analysis will be repeated for the Cable Spreading Room in accordance with the criteria developed in our response to PF-26.
The results of this evaluation will be provided at a later date.
Refer to our response to PF-26.
Staf f Position PF-24a Radwaste Building: Fire Zones 4B 4C,
- 12B, t
and 12C - Fire Protection The licensee should provide sprinkler protection in fire zones 4C and 12C.
Page 10 Pesponse The MG set manufacturer will examine the use of a fire resistant fluid in the MG set fluid drive.
Based on the results of this investigation, we will determine the extent to which additienal fire protection is necessary.
The description of the proposed fire protection modifications will be submitted to the NRC following completion of this investigation.
Sta f f Position PF-24b The open pipe penetrations through the floor slabs separating zones 4B and 4C from 12B and 12C should be sealed with a water tight, 3-hour fire rated sealant method (See PF-34).
Response
The open pipe penetrations thrc gh the floor slabs separating zones 4B and 4C from 12B and 12C will be sealed with a water tight 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated sealant.
Staff Position PF-24c Curbing should be provided within the rooms (fire zones 4B, 4C, 12B and 12C) to contain the oil from a leak at the oil reservoir or oil lines to the room of origin.
Response
Refer to our response on 24a for zones 4c and 12c. Curbing has been installed in areas 4B and 12B.
Sta f f Position PF-26 Sa fe Shutdown Analysis The licensee should reconsider its safe shutdown analysis assuming that offsite electrical power is not available in the event of a fire in any area of the plants.
The following should be considered f unctional requirements for a safe shutdown:
1.
Placing the reactor in a subcritical condition and maintaining the reactor subcritical indefinitely.
2.
Bringing the reactor to hot shutdown conditions and maintaining it as hot shutdown for an extended period of time (i.e.,
longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) using only normal sources of cooling water.
3.
Maintaining the reactor coolant system inventory indefinitely using only normal sources of makeup water.
Page 11 4.
Bringing the reactor to cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
If all of the redundant equipment (including cable in conduit) available to perform any of the above functions (assuming a loss of o f fsite electrical power) is located in a single fire area, the specific separation that exists and any combustible material between the redundant equipment should be identified.
No credit should be taken for actions by plant personnel to repair damage to equipment required for functions 1.,
2.,
and 3.
The capability to perform all control actions necessary for functions
- 1.,
2.,
and 3.,
must be maintained in the control room or at the remote shutdown panels and all power requirements for these functions must be satisfied by onsite sources.
The specific results of the above reanalysis should be reported separately for each area in each unit.
Response
The safe shutdown analysis will be reconsidered with the following functional requirements and assumptions:
1.
Placing the reactor in a subcritical condition and maintaining the reactor subcritical indefinitely.
2.
Bringing the reactor to hot shutdown and maintaining it there for an extended period of time.
3.
Maintaining reactor coolant system inventory indefinitely.
4.
Bringing the reactor to cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
5.
The capability to perform all control actions necessary for functions 1,
2, 6 3 will be performed from the control room or the remote shutdown panel.
6.
If all safe shutdown equipment (including cable in conduits) available to perform functions 1,
2, 3,
S 4 is located in a single fire zones, the specific separation that exists, any combustible material between equipment and other specific design features will be identified and analyzed.
7.
Loss of of fsite power will be considered in fire zones which contain equipment, controls or cables where it can be demonstrated that a fire may disable the of fsite supplies.
If there is no direct link between the fire and the of fsite supply, the supply is assumed to be available.
The staf f is insisting that the Safe Shutdown Analysis be reconsidered using only equipment supplied from onsite power supplies.
We fail to grasp the need for this requirement for the Peach Bottom Units.
Regulatory Guide 1.120 (Draft 1, Revision 1, April 7, 1977) Section C.1.d (1) states: " Fires need not be postulated concurrent with non-fire-related failures in safety
Page 12 systems, other plant accidents, or the most severe natural phenomena." The loss of offsite power, not related to the fire, is classified as an "other plant accident" and therefore, need not be "posulated concurrent" with the fire.
We see no problem in accepting the loss of of fsite power concurrent with a fire if the fire affects the power or control cables to the of fsite power buses.
The staff previously indicated in a meeting that the loss of of fsite power could result from the instability caused when both Units are tripped because of a fire in a zone shared between Units.
We briefly addressed this concern in our response to queution 72a in our letter of August 12, 1977.
We stated that the tripping of one or both Peach Bottom Units f rom full load will not result in power grid instability such that loss of of fsite power occurs.
We also stated that we had experienced near simultaneous trippings without loss of the grid.
Power grid stability has always been a design criteria.
Studies were made early in the design to verify that both Units could be tripped without the grid becoming unstable.
In order to update the previous study and account for changes to the transmission network, we restudied the ef fects of the simultaneous tripping of both Peach Bottom Units.
For this study, programs were used that consider transient stability and load flow.
The studies show that there will be no transient instability or circuit overloads.
The transient stability study simulates the dynanic power and voltage variations of the system after a disturbance, in this case the tripping of the Peach Bottom Units.
The system representation used is a bus system with a complete representation of the PJM transmission system, a complete representation of the adjacent systems, and an equivalent representation of more remote s ystems.
More than 130) parameters were considered in this study.
PJM units have a complete representation of their electrical machines, voltage regulators, and governors; producing an accurate simulation of the system transients.
The conditions studied are the worst possible from a stability standpoint - light load coupled with the existing system case.
Increasing load, with the increased generation required to supply the load, or projecting into the future with a system equal to or expanded from the present system, can only reduce any transient problems.
This study confirmed that there are no transient power and voltage changes in the transmission system that would cause protective relay operation and loss of additional f acilities of the electric system.
The load flow study gives a snapshot picture of the system at a particular condition.
The system is never completely static, but
Page 13 if changes are small and the system has time to slowly follow the changes, the load flow results are an accurate representation of system conditions.
The load flow runs for this study simulated the post transient system, after the dynamics of the disturbance damped out but before the generators could be redispatched to a new operating condition.
The system representation used is a bus representation of the 1979 system.
More than 1300 parameters were considered in this study.
The PJM area is completely modeled and the surrounding system are equivalentized.
Three dif farent load, conditions:
100% or peak load, 75% or normal daily load, and 45% or a light night load, indicate that the tripping of both Peach Bottom Units would not cause any overloads that could result in thermal overheating of network elements and protective relay operation.
The power that replaces the Peach Bottom output comes from the other generators on line at the time of the tripping.
The interconnected system would have at least 100,000 MW of generation on line at all times so the loss of 2,086 MW of Peach Bottom generation would be replaced without dif ficulty.
As shown by these studies the of fsite supplies to the Peach Bottom station are immune to the loss of generation at the plant.
Therefore, we do not share the Staf f concern on this issue.
Our reconsidered safe shutdown Analysis will be pctformed in accordance with our indicated functional requirements and assumptions.
This position applies to PF-21d, PF-34a, PF-43, and PF-45.
Staff Position PF-28(b) Supervision of Fire Doors Fire doors should be provided with electrical supervision from the control room or maintained closed by one of the following:
(1) Locked closed and inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the closed position.
The fire brigade commander should have ready access to keys for all locked doors.
(2) Provide with automatic release mechanisms and inspected monthly to verify that doorways are free of obstructions.
(3) Provide with self-closing mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.
Page 14
Response
All fire doors protecting safety related areas are provided with electrical empervision from the control room except for 29 doors listed in Table 1.
Electrical supervision is provided under the security, high radiation areas, and secondary containment monitoring systems.
The present status of these 29 doors are as follows.
a) 2 doors will be provided with supervision under the security system (door No. 217 and 256) b)
16 doors are fire doors equipped with self closing mechanism c) 4 doors are conventional fire doors without self closing mechanism d) 7 doors are water tight doors We are proposing the following action to upgrade the status of those fire doors without electrical supervieion:
a)
Install self closing mechanism on che 4 conventional fire doors lacking this equipment b)
Our administrative controls are successful in maintaining water tight doors in the closed position with the exception of doors (no. 230 and 233) between the turbine building and the radwaste building.
These two doors will be provided with electrical supervision, or doors with self closing mechanisms will be installed.
c) all 29 fire doors listed will be posted with signs stating: " Fire Door - Keep Closed".
d) instructions to maintain fire doors in the closed position except when required to accommodate the movement of personnel and equipnent, will be provided in the General Employee Training program and administrative procedures.
e)
Fire doors will be inspected semi-annually to verify that self closing mechanism and latches are in good working order. (Previous commitment to PF-28a),
Sta f f Position PF-28 (c)
Areas protected by automatic total flooding, gas suppression systems should have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors.
Page 15
Response
This response supersedes our response to PF-28c in the 30-day reply.
The doors to all the areas protected by gas suppression systems (diesel generator building, cable spreading room, and HPCI room) will be electrically supervised by the security system from the control room, except for one water tight door associated with the HPCI area.
Administrative controls have been ef fective in maintaining this door in a closed position.
Refer to our response to PF-28b, concerning additional controls to be implemented for ensuring closure of fire doors.
All doors subject to this requirement have self-closing devices except for the water tight doors.
The security supervisory system, or administrative controls will ensure closure of these doors.
Sta f f Position PF-2 9 (c) Emergency Switchgear Pooms The supervision of the fire dcors between adjacent switchgear rooms should be in accordance with PF-28.
Response
The supervision of these doors will be in accordance with the program described in our response to PF-28b.
Sta f f Position PF-30 (c) Staticn Battery Rooms The supervision of the fire doors between adjacent battery rooms should be in accordance with PF-28.
Response
Electrical supervision will be installed on these doors under the security surveillance program.
Refer to our response to 28b.
Sta f f Position PF-32 Emergency Lighting Fixed emergency lighting consisting of fixed sealed beam units with individual battery power supplies should be provided for access to and egress from the control room, the cable spreading room, the emergency switchgear and battery rooms, and the ground floor below via stairway No.
9.
Page 16 Fesponse The following description, including the indicated modification, of the existing lighting system will provide a basis by which the installation can meet the staf f's concern.
The existing lighting system consists of three separate systems.
The normal lighting system is supplied from conventional plant power supplies.
This lighting should be available following a fire in most fire zones, except in the event of f site power is lost.
The Emergency AC Lighting System is normally supplied from the Normal lighting system.
Upon loss of the Normal supply these lights are automatically transferred to an emergency ac source, which is backed up by the diesel generators.
The Emergency DC Lighting System is normally supplied from an emergency ac source (one that is backed up by the diesel generators).
Upon loss of this ac supply the Emergency DC lights are automatically transferred to a battery supplied source.
The exit signs and fire alarm stations are illuminated by Emergency DC supplied fixtures.
The combination of lighting systems meet the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry -- Fire and Panic Code requirements.
The following section will discuss the lighting specifics for each area of concern.
Control Foom -The design illumination level (Normal Lighting S ystem) is 100 footcandle (fc).
There are two separate Emergency AC systems in the room that supply 20 fc.
The distribution panels for these lights are both located in the Control Room, however, they are eighty feet apart.
The access and egress level is 3 fc and is supplied from the Emergency DC System.
This distribution panel is located in Fire Zone 123 (turbine building - 135'elev)
A fire in the control room wculd not result in damage to all lighting systems; therefore, we conclude that the present design is satisfactory.
Cable Spreading Room - The Normal lighting system supplies 30 fc.
There are two separate emergency AC systems in the room that supply 10 fc.
The distribution panels for these lights are located in fire Zone 123 and 121.
The access and egress level is 0. 5 fc and is supplied from the Emergency DC Lighting system.
This distribution panel is located in fire Zone 123.
Page 17 A fire in the cable spreading room would not result in damage to all lighting systems ; therefore, the present design is s atis f a ct ory.
Stairway #9 1 Corridor to Yard (elev. 116) - The normal lighting system supplies 20 fc.
There are three separate emergency AC systems along the stairway (all elevations) and the corridor.
The distribution panels for these lights are located in Fire Zones 108, 123, and 78B.
The access and egress level throughout this area is 0.5 fc and is supplied from the Emergency DC Lighting system.
This distribution panel is located in Fire Zone 123.
A fire in the stairway area would not result in damage to all lighting systems; therefore, the present design is s atis factory.
Unit 2 Switchgea r Rooms - The nornal lighting system supplies 30 fc.
Each room is supplied with 10 fc from the Emergency AC lighting system.
The distribution panel for these lights is located in room 123.
The access and egress level is 0.5 fc and supplied from an Emergency DC panel.
This distribution panel is located in Fire Zone 123.
A fire in switchgear room 123 could disable all lights in this room.
Modifications will be made to provide an alternate source for access and egress lights in this fire zone.
A fire in any of the other three fire zones would not result in damage to their lighting systems; therefore, no modifications will be made in these rooms.
Unit 3 Switchgear Roomo - These rooms are identical to the Unit 2 Switchgear Rooms except the Emergency AC distribution panel is located in switchgear room 121.
A fire in any of these fire zones would not result in damage to all lighting systems in the rooms; therefore no modifications will be made to the lighting systema in these rooms.
Battery Rooms - The normal lighting system supplies 30 fc.
The Emergency AC lighting system supplies 0.5 fc inside the rooms for egress.
The distribution panels for these lights are located in Fire Zone 121 (Unit 3 rooms) and 123 (Unit 2 rooms).
The Emergency DC lighting system supplies 0.5 fc outside the rooms for access.
The distribution panel for these lights is located in fire Zone 123.
A fire in any of these areas would not result in damage to all lighting systems; therefore, no modifications,ill be made to the present design.
Page 18 Sta ff Position PF-34a Safe Shutdown Requirements The licensee should re-evaluate the effects on safe shutdown of a fire in the primary containment.
This re-evaluation should be made in accordance with NRC staff position PF-26.
Fesponse The safe shutdown analysis will be repeated for the primary containment (Drywell) in accordance with the criteria developed in our response to PF-26.
The results of this evaluation will be provided at a later date.
Refer to our response to PF-26.
Sta f f Position PF-34b The existing fire detection system should be demonstrated to be effective as an early warning system in accordance with NRC staff position PF-27.
Response
Refer to our response to PF-27 in this reply, and our letter of December 20, 1978.
Staf f Position PF-37(a) Turbine Building Early warning fire detectors should be provided in all areas of the turbine building where safety-related cables or cables for safe shutdown equipment are routed.
Pesponse In our submittal of December 20, 1978, we committed to installing smoke detectors in fire zone 78A (corridor between the emergency switchgear rooms and the radwaste building).
Additionally, we will install smoke detectors in zone 78B below the emergency switchgear rooms in the vicinity of the saf ety-related cable.
Staf f Position PF-39a Torus Compartments.- Fire Protection Early warning fire detectors should be provided in the torus compartments.
Response
The torus compartment has a single cable tray which runs approximately 100 feet of the room circumference adjacent to the catwa lk.
All other cables are in conduit.
The total combustible
Page 19 loading of only 233 BTU per sq. ft. consists primarily of IEEE 383 qualified cable.
As an added fire protection measure, flame retardant blankets will be placed in the single cable tray.
Considering the extremely low levels of combustibles in that area, and the proposed modification to the cable tray, the installation of an early warning fire detection system would not be appropriate.
Sta f f Position P1-39b In each torus compartment, the ladders to the catwalk should be relocated so that there are four ladders with each one adjacent to a different door from the pump rcoms to the torus compartment.
The ladders should be designed to permit access to the catwalk by fire brigade members wearing emergency breathing units.
Fesponse The ground floor of the torus compartment is accessible from each of the four pump rooms located 900 a pa rt.
Access to the catwalk is provided by two ladders spaced more than 900 apart.
Both ladders will always be accessible from any of the pump rooms due to the absence of combustibles en the ground floor of the torus compartment.
Considering the accessibility of the catwalk, and the low combustiole levels the installation of additional ladders does not appear to be necessary.
Sta f f Position PF-39c In each torus compartment, four fire hose stations should be provided on the catwalk, one at the head of each ladder.
Because the catwalk is in close proximity to the cable trays, a cable fire could render a hose station inaccessible even with early detection of the fire.
Therefore, sufficient hose should be provided at each hose station such that all parts of the cable tray system are accessible from two hose stations.
The fire hose stations should have 1-1/2-inch hose equipped with combination spray / straight stream nozzles.
Response
Portable fire extinguishers are mounted in the torus compartment and adjacent pump rooms.
Considering the low combustible levels, accessibility of the cables, and additional fire protection proposed for the cable trays, we believe that more than sufficient fire fighting capabilities presently exist.
Page 20 Sta f f Position PF-42 Fire Hazards Analysis The potential for an unmitigated fire in the Recombiner Building to cause an unacceptable release of radioactivity to the site boundary should be evaluated.
The evaluation should be performed in accordance with guidelines in Fegulatory Guide 1.98.
The releases from both of f gas recombiner trains as well as the ventilation system charcoal filters should be used in the evaluation unless it can be demonstrated that an unmitigated fire would not involve all of this equipment.
The potential for gas explosions and the spread of fire via cables and other combustibles should be considered.
Pesponse The liklihood of an explosion in the Recombiner Building has been addressed in our response to I.E. Bulletin No. 78-03.
In addition, the conclusion of NUREG-0442 reads "...no credible offgas system malf unction or explosion would result in radiation exposures to members of the public above a small fraction of the e::posure guidelines for accidents given in 10 CFR Part 100 of the Commission's regulations. "
The probability of an external fire affecting the Recombiner Building ventilating equipment (charcoal filters and exhaust fans) is remote.
The filters and fans are located in a room surrounded by 12" masonary walls, the floor slab is between 18" and 24" thick.
No combustibles are located in the room.
Ductwork passing through these walls is fitted with fire dampers.
Elsewhere on the same elevation the combustible load is minimal.
In the event a fire should start, the charcoal beds are provided with heat detectors and automatic deluge systems.
A hose station and portable extinguishers are also provided in the area.
Irrespective of the above should the Recombiner Building ventilation exhaust monitor, or stack exhaust monitor indicate a high radiation condition, an alarm in the control room will annunciate.
The cause will be immediately investigated, and the source isolated.
Based on the above hazard analysis, we feel that additional fire protection is unnecessary.
Staff Position PF-43 The licensee should make whatever mcdifications are necessary (e.g., relocate one redundant division of safe shutdown equipment to outside of the area) to demonstrate by analysis that both plants can be safely shutdown regardless of damage to any equipment (including cables) located in fire zones SH, SJ, 13H or 13J.
In determining what modifications are necessary, the
Page 21 following functions should be considered required for safe shutdown:
1.
Placing the reactor in a subcritical condition and maintaining the reactor subcritical indefinitely.
2.
Bringing the reactor to hot shutdown conditions and maintaining it at hot shutdown for an extended period of time (i. e., lenger than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) using only normal sources of cooling water.
3.
Maintaining the reactor coolant system inventory indefinitely using only normal sources of makeup water.
4.
Bring the reactor to cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
No credit should be taken for actions by plant personnel to repair damage to equipment required for functions 1,2, and 3.
The capability to perform all control actions necessary for functions 1,
2, and 3 must be maintained in the control room or at the remote shutdown panels, and all power requirements for functions 1, 2, and 3 must be satisfied by onsite sources.
In lieu of assuming that redundan* equipment required for safe shutdown will be damage by a singte fire in fire zones SH, SJ, 13H or 13J, the licensee may elect to demonstrate by test or analysis that the separation of redundant equipment is (or can be made to be) suf ficient to prevent such an occurrence.
Any assumptions used in an analysis must be verified by test data for materials and equipment arranged in a configuration similar to that installed at the plant.
The possible deleterious effects of combustion products and water or other fire suppression agents must be considered External ignition sources and transient combustibles must also be considered.
Response
We are repeating the safe shutdown analysis in accordance with the criteria specified in our response to staf f position PF-26.
As part of this evaluation, we will re-examine ffre zones SH, SJ, 13H, and 13J (135' and 165' elev. Reactor Building), and determine what modifications, if any, must be performed to provide a method of safe shutdown.
Page 22 S ta f f Position PF-44a Reactor Buildings Early warning fire detection should be provided in the following reactor building fire zones:
Unit 2 fire zones: SH, SJ, SK, 19, 20, 21, 23 Unit 3 fire zones: 13 H, 13J, 13K, 27, 29, 30, 31 Fennonse The Fire Protection Program Report erroneously assumed the CRD's were driven by a combustible fluid rather than water.
The correct combustible loading on the 135 feet elevation of the Reactor Building (zone 5H, 13H) is significantly lower than previously reported.
The fire loading consists of cable, and anti-contamination clothing at the control station to the drywell.
Smoke detectors will be installed in areas where significant quantities of anti C's are maintained in fire zones SH and 13H.
The 165' elev. of the Reactor Building contains minimal quantities of combustibles other than flame resistant cables.
Smoke detectors will be installed on the 16 5 ' ele v. to provide detection in areas where miscellaenous combustibles are generally found.
The remaining zones have a negligible fire load, and numerous methods of safe shutdown.
The re f ore,
detectors are not required in these areas.
Sta f f Position PF-46 (a) Radwaste Building Fire Zone 72A The doors to stairway number 34 in the radwaste building should be supervised in accordance withPF-28, Supervision of Fire Doors
Response
The doors to stairway number 34 in the radwaste building are doors numbered 26, 135, and 230.
The supervision of these doors will be in accordance with the program described in our response to PF-28b.
Staf f Position PF-4 6 (c)
Early warning fire detection should be prov sad throughout all areas of fire zone 72A which contain or expose safety-related cabling or equipment to a fire.
Page 23
Response
we address to all rooms within fire zone 72A in our reply of December 20, 1978 with the exception of room 381 (location of Emergency Shutdown Control Pnel).
The existing early warning system in room 381 will be upgraded with the installation of additional smoke detectors in the vicinity of the Emergency Shutdown Control Panel.
Sta f f Position PF-46d The licensee should verify that the presently installed detection system in room 381 (fan room 165-foot elevation) provides effective early warning indication of a fire.
The procedure for determining this should follow the guidelines outlined in PF-27, Smoke Detection Systems Tests.
Fesponse Refer to our response to PF-27 and PF-460 in this submittal, and to our response to PF-27 in our letter of December 20, 1978.
Staff Position PF-50e Change the words and phrases such as "may", "should", "should be",
"would", "would be", noted throughout in the Fire Protection Plan and August 11, 1978 letter to "shall", "will", or "shall be", or "will be", as appropriate to the subject under discussion.
Fesponse Most of the words such as "may",
"s hould", noted throughout in the Fire Protection Plan and the August 11, 1978 letter have been changed to "shall" and "will".
The revised FPP is presently being reviewed by PECO Guality Assurance Division, and a copy will be sent to the Commission within two months.
TABLE 1 Fire Doors Without Electrical Supervision Door Beam Proposed Elev.
No.
Coordinates Unit Location Action 91'6" 9
18-H 2
Core Spray rm V
sump pp. rm.
48 23-H 3
V 7
19-G 2
50 22-G 3
V 23 20-C Chem. waste III tk. rm.
26 20-C Stairwell to II radwaste Turb. bldg to VI 32 20-J radwaste b1dg.
116' 65 8-B 2
RER to RHR III 142 33-B 3
III 130 20-C Stairwell to II radwaste 134 20-J Turb. bldg to VI radwaste bldg.
135 20-F Cond. tk to II cond. pp 136 20-J II 135' 230 20-C Stairwell to II radwaste 233 20-J Turb. gldg to II radwaste bldg.
228 21-J Decontam. to III filter rm.
229 21-H II 217 19-L 2
Batt. rm. to I
Batt. rm.
256 22-L 3
I 216 19-L 2
E bus to E II bus rm.
223 20-L 2
II 258 20-L 3
II 135' 262 21-L 3
E bus to E II bus rom.
165' 305 18-G 2
MG fan rm.
II 356 23-G 3
II 116' 9
Pump structure IV 1278 31 D-G Bldg.
II 32 II 33 II
5 Page 2 Proposed Action I.
Electrical supervision under security system.
II.
Self closing mechanism presently installed.
Establish additional adninistrative controls (see notel)
III.
Self closing mechanism will be installed.
Establish additional administrative controls (see note 1)
IV.
Water tight doors.
Present administrative controls ef fective in maintaining dcor in closed position V.
Water tight doors.
Install electrical supervision, or provide fire door with self closing mechanism.
Note 1:
Procedural controls, GET training, label doors, semi-annual inspection program.
ENCLOSURE 2 (Submitted with letter of February 16, 1979)
Response to NRC concerns received by telephone on January 16, 1979 regarding the PECO submittal of December 20, 1978.
The specified references pertain to the NRC staf f positions and PECO responses contained in the submittal of December 20, 1978.
1.
Reference PF-18 a.
Provide a description of mechanical penetrations utilized for which documentation is not available Respor se All descriptive information available regarding mechanical penetration seals has previously been forwarded to the Commiss ion.
The adequacy of these penetrations will be reviewed and upgraded as necessary in accordance with our response to PF-18, enclosure 1.
b.
Evaluate all plant barriers tha c have a fire rating less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, to determine if the barrier needs to be upgraded.
Response
All barriers, surrounding fire zones containing safety related equipment, that have a fire rating of less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, will be investigated to determine if the barrier needs to be upgraded (see Enclosure 1, response to PF-18) c.
Addrese to all the criteria specified by the NRC in their letter of November 18, 1978 for qualifying new penetration seals.
Response
Penetration seals will te tested and qualified to the requested criteria, except as noted in our response to PF-18, Enclosure 1.
2.
Reference PF-27 Smoke detectors should be bench tested prior to installation.
Reaponse The smoke detectors are tested at the manufacturer prior to shipnent to the site.
An on site bench test would be redundant and of marginal value, since the detector may be damaged during installation.
An operational and calibration pre-op test will be
Page 2 performed on each detector following installation to ensure its design sensitivity.
3.
Reference Pf-34c Provide sufficient hose length cn the hose stations in the secondary containment to ensure nozzle contact with areas where oil from the recirculation pumps would flow.
Response
Extra fire hose will be provided on the 135 ft. elevation of the Reactor Building, in order to satisfy this criteria.
4.
Reference Pf-37a Confirm that early warning fire detectors will be provided in all areas of the Turbine Building where saf ety-related cables or cables for safe shutdown equipment are routed.
Pesponse The only areas of the Turbine Building containing safety related cables or cables for safe shutdown equipment are (1) fire zone 78A (corridor between emergency switchgear rooms and the Radwaste Building) ; and, (2) portion of 78B beneath the emergency switchgear rooms.
Smoke detectors will be installed in these areas.
5.
Reference PF-39 Is there physical access to the top of the torus compartment to permit smoke removal using portable air handling units.
Fesponse Grating covered openings are located on the southwest and west areas of the 135 ft. elevation of the Reactor Building providing access to the torus compartment below.
Modifications to the grating will be made, if necessary, to accommodate the use of the portable air handling units in this respect.
6.
Reference PF-40b Confirm that oil from a leak in the diesel fire pump room will not spread to other sa fety related areas.
4 Page 3 Fesponse A curb will be added at the door of the diesel fire pump room to contain the volume of the day tank and a suitable sprinkler flow.
7.
Reference PF-47 Exterior hose shall be hydrostatically tested annually.
Fesponse All exterior hose at the Peach Bottom f acility are protected by appropriate enclosures.
Our experience over many years has substantiated the durability of our exterior hoses over at least a three year period.
To further enhance the safety margin associated with fire protection, we propose to hydrostatically test or replace all exterior hoses on a two year interval.
8.
Reference Pf-48q con firm that a forcible entry tool will be provided with each hose cart.
Response
As expressed our response of Deceriter 20, 1978, the availabilite forcible entry tools on site may present a potential L'
_rnal security problem.
In order to minimize the potential security problem, we propose to provide a forcible entry tool to be stored in the guard structure, under the control of security personnel.
9.
Reference Pf-48h Set up the north and southeast exterior hose carts in a standby condition by leaving the hose connected to the fire hydra nt.
Response
As previously requested, an additional hose cart station, and equipment will be installed in the outside yard adjacent to the plant.
However, to connect the hose cart stations to a fire hydrant woulc ceduce the mobility of the hose equipment resulting in potential delays in its application during emergency situations.
We believe that the disadvantage of this policy would out weigh the possible advantages.
Page 4
- 10. Reference PF-49 Consider, in lieu of a change over to a 1 1/2 inch variable gallonage fog nozzles at the hose stations, the installation of 1 inch hose and variable nozzle for hose stations in the vicinity of the control room, cable spreading room and emergency switchgear room.
Response
All of the Peach Bottom hose stations are equipped with 1 1/2 inch Alfco fog nozzle.
Many years of experience with this nozzle has demonstrated it to te very effective in fighting electrical fires.
Futher, the installation of the s:aaller one inch hose stations would reduce our fire fighting effectiveness.
We will replace our nozzles with an Underwriters Laboratory approved fog nozzle that has a fixed non-straight stream setting.
This type of nozzle will further enhance the personnel safety factor without compromising fire fighting effectiveness.
The nozzle will be installed on at least the two closest hose stations near each area of concern; i.e.,
control room, cable spreadina area, and emergency switchgear rooms.
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An alternative to spraying the inner side of a thick wall E
penetration is to add a fire ntep in s ta lla tion o'-
the Marinite-Ly 36, l'aowool and Flamemastic on e ich ride of the will, and j k 'sI coating only the outside surfar.m of the installations with 1/ J+
a
,h, i
E inch of Flamemahtic.
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Flamemastic 71 A 'Mstic Type used with a trowel application x
5.,
where it is not feasible to apply the liquid sprayable type.
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For example the !bstic works well in covering screw heads or p
other exposed metal that is usert to encure the marinite panels
, gj f
i to the wall or floor sleeves.
The apulication of the fire l j proofing flamemas tic over the re ta l-necuri ng par ts will insure c.3,'
that those parts do not melt in t he
.? vent of a fire, and thus
, $ a will not allow the marinite parels to slip and endanger the integrety ef the fire stop and vontilation sea 1 i ns titl J a tion.
p p
4.
The materials and application method for cellular concrete shall be "a
as follows:
T l
a.
Mix one sack of portland type III cement with approx. Sh gallons b, -(;
3 i
of water, Mix until smooth slurry.
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Mix 1-pint of clastizell foaming agent with 40 pints of water e
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c.
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is blonded.
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final density.
r Density of light mix shoulri be 45 + 5 lbs./CU. Foot.
8 Density of heaby mix should be 147~+ 5 lbs./CU. Foot.
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Cellular concrete may be applsed by grout pump, caulking gun, or y
E
; g poured.
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B u M 6 a NOTE b. /, foot cr2w/ws. AROLWO 7EAY f' CABLC k//7M 2' E7MMOMI TEMFtWAk 5 g SUFFORTED W/7/f /JA')O AS NEGESSAKC F/LL VO/DS ARQUND C4BLE 2, FNL OPEWING W/7M CELLULAR &*ONc/'Ere Ligy7 pjix sy Bisco c2 t E4UAL. USS HEAVY MIX kJHERE EAD/A7MW sw/GLO /S REQUIRED CCNCRETE GROU1YFIVE STAR OR EQUWAlusT)o M TH ' CC/LCOTE HT648 " a } AR004O CABLES 70 71LL VOIDS.MN bh 05!D IN PLACc drCRLt)LAK CorcRET 3 APPROX 2" ES. cDNoutT SLEEVE NAY BE in3MllfD 7HNUOH o n Nit h FD R F C T'U R G t CABLES 7HKEAD $ CV coNOu!T Fill WITH LEAU JHoT ws/fft R4tVATt0N n N 3 .4 ItUGCT10H OF"CEILCOTE 15 M8'5HOULD BE LIMITED 10 CENTRAL PQR Tion of ~f ,\\ PENETRATIM 70 M010 Of950RE.AT 00TER SURFACES. .... - - -- -' ' '" ~ .5 N 5 a S.WHEN CABLE IS INSTALLED IN SPARE R.S. PtPE FILL PIPE WITH FOL'fURET 3 AND COAT ENDS WRH '/ ' FLAMEMASTic 71A MASTIC OR SPPMABLE TYPE. 4 3 ' 6.CELLUL AR CONCRE.TE REMOVED TO INSTALL ADDITIONAL \\ " E \\ REPLACED wnTW POL'f URETH ANE FOAM. C0AT ENDS WITH 'A" FLAMEMASTic. q \\ 7l A MASTIC OR SPRA'i ABLE TVPE, ' ~ 5 - ~ _ _ _ _.. _ - ~ OPEA//NG SEE ADIE 4 ~'5'. / I: cable TRAY 'y [ ~- - ~ = 1 . -. -- -- _.- -- f 4 e a ,v.1..;iy.. Q ',*' J,. 'I w - o I '.. z ,3 ... o a, g " ?.. ' [ l7 0 O 3 ~ o g o' % ina srae foe asas meouen wu reiva '! E NIM /VA 7E' ME~THOD [a l0 N = L' ' y, e tenw. (gypypy 4 (pg(5 ygg yS JOS No 6280 b; SYM60(.S NOTES V DETAll.S asv. i n, PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
- 9' " * *~131 i
M.M po,c,... PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION '2 p '"jjjj;p UNITS 2 & 3 Sh. 109A
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Ourstos THe ,t c? y - n WQ., l t ' 'y' .ELec.cseig.S .y-sleeve TO THEMAGN/T, hu. u 8 FocM AND Antx/ND TM-W 'D'. CABL ES. _ g s m CABLE TRAY O,.-. l ti - / CABLE. 724Y u ;- 4'.,,,, = e W-El.EEVE n _./_ a i, g _.-..L.- Q, l(/, 9 g 3..,. 4
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x k .f lSE /NORGAN/C 7,t/ECMAL' C/MbHAHCHQCS AuD' 5 I' 0 ul47/N G Wo:2L. 43 r f/ -20 MACH /N2 SCREV 4 s'.. s. \\ f EQL//RBO TO F/l4 LARGE k,. [!lMOtos ARtJUNO CABLES 9 - ; y, '(7YP/ CAL),So p4ygL5 ~ l h,y W ARE REMOVABLE. - {.'.?? QTNGOLGH MAR /M'72 R3C'M Appl y fa*FLAMEM457, t Yb, { h l h4LL V0/DS VP 70 f4' " 7/A MAS 7*/C O. ER kB V q a
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- THROUGH WML SLEEVE 5'6
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- * /, FOEM EA'DS OF JLEEVE h//7h 2ETMA/~0AM. SEAL VO/DS 4Klt/ND CABLS
\\. ] W/TH DUX. SEAL. 3 2,'TEMPCKAN/LY Suff0K7 IJ/7H WOOD AS NECESSAW NLL JLEEV5 W/7M l CELL!JL A, MCRETE LIGHT MIX SY 8/SCO OK SQUAT.. USE / DAW M/X Y l WHERf.E RA0IAT/ch/ SHIEL0 /4 2 EQUI?ED C%CETE GKOT(F/YE 8?MN CA LCtUIVN.hk Y),WeTWCEILCOTC HT G&B'lMKLTeo ARouND LADLES TO F7LL. DIOG s g WY M USEO !&' PLACE Of CELLUL 4R CCNCREfg $3 SME ME TH0b (AN E@ UHu 1OV VEy Ty $(gygg g ' f. IMcTION (f "CEILC01E HT 64 8" 5/1010 BE LIHiltu TD CENTRAL PORI /ON Of y g' PGNCTRA TION Td MOIO E%POSURE AT 00fuK 50RfACas. 5S APPEdX. 2* R.S. ONDUIT SLEEVES NAY BE INSTALLEP THRu OPENING MR RITUA n U CABLES.7MADf CAP CCHDUT f/LL wnTH LEAD Supt WHEl'E R/M41109 SINELO 15 fB 4 ( c -~ ~ s m,5 r 4-SLEEVE-CA%E TRAY k l SW NO TE 4 m = = b ~-6 o o-b - h h'_ _ _ _. o L J'; ~- ~" u - ~-6 #M#W CARE q WALL 4 4-r _ ~.. l(o. WHED C ABLE IS l/JSTALLED IU SPA RE R.S. PIPG, FILL PIPE (UlTM POLYURfTHAdE FORM AMD C0ATEUDS LUITH '/.* FLA MEMASTic 71A MA STlc OR. SPAAYABLE T)'PE 4 b CELLULAR COMCRETE REMOVED To IMSTALt. ADDITIOUAL CABLEG)MAY BE 7. 1 REPLACED LUITH POLYURGTHbME FOAM. COAT GUDS lulTH!4*FLAMEMA 9)A IDASTic OR SPR AYABLG TYPE. m w - -.. _ _ ~. _ _. 'V C 2 P o e c q .eeo e g l FIRE STOP FOR C4BLE Tl4YS TMROUG-H 4/4f.L:SLEEVF5 r 1 5 A L TE/!NA 7C METHOD w w ot ; ,i.4 N,i;'I I N
- M M-CONDV/7 f'CA6LE TEAYS r
Joe No 6M0 SYMBOLS NOTES d der 4/t.S RW ,q, go, g 3315 y, PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY Su, 110A 1 },g - p PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER S1 ATION "E 64 UNITS 2 & 3 s i n ou s t n i i. eivision
b .,,..: QS.l5 l ':'? f& ' ' 'Ol e,. d, m; f.,,,l - &g J 'l 1 y - APPL Y FLAMEMAST/C 7f A n c. Ufg l.: rln l m ; w.p . & : n ". w TO MNT AMD BACM .:W. N% y t' t or resyAv.o CABLE O.4 nq pss u g r 3 ng: c $~, YOP AMD BOTTOM 0"' Qy.rM.,i 'l'q%w.
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y E i ;h' boren, si RdW NEA i O..l l !.,20. 771. 02,$ER. TCdl 7 RAYS. s"F'. .. WASHER',$.,%OT wi.T.h i ...R4SS TH2t?OGN~ @'THCK FlAMEMA$7H 1R ? %PMpD2 NOT 7/A MAST /C;f.TYP/ cab) ) )$ [.L > h; Q2. A.lT..EC. NATE ,' / M 4 70PS.- o c.u ;; FICE s7*0P' 1 ~ ~ ~ ' b,. - p$.,, ,15i_ {$UPFC,R7,"' WWHTRAf /3 /4".02: >J. w 4 y ; $.tg ?.u.lChEQU 7"d WAL.4a' ] e, C s i ? ? O t p' is . ~ n.; Mi. o w
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/ 'A s go, o pwitm ' t,thd ' p,;]. p Y a, / Tu. -rua P:rcrn o r. !) C UTCUT MARit ti % px;; J TL B C,s,,q p ' W I g 1%/ep To Ft i y g,c.. ,, a, q u, f g f.y (r CAE LE's T1C)N TL N, $p ON EITHER lop 0 w;. 5 M , it ( N ect t i}- ' ' [G,i-BOTTOM CF ;$LLEVE.. p o. .k \\ h-N 'J T E ') *. ~ S k 'd. MN O 'AC TURLD.$Y >' b . l. FLA ME V. A nTIC.C C RT '. 76 A'. M/., %. A!' 't.. 4 z m t?.Y t J AT H E R M s ' Ag .i g dQ 1,f k' h C WQ '.' L - 6 N c ; P. u. - : li. T li f F I.'1 A L: i N W L,6
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Y h tk(vsGr N*N-1 M,,* M.,' ..e 3. lhiladelphia. l e t,r i c i?i. ; a n,f L.- Test 1 >rt on Cable Tray Fi re Glop with n I S 1 fu re th:.e in '!c n t i l a t i on :. tl l l' 1 CU: 2' Air / { On April 3, 19'/S at Peach P.ottom Ornerat i n.,' U f.n t ion. te :tc viere l } conducted on a representat.ive fire ; top ocert t o neal uall pen.rtrations I of cables in alumi.num tray. The test fire tcp in nade in accordance a { f with e'.echtel Corp. Drawi n : M-131b, Sheet LO'/A,Gich >:ac uned in the actual j I. construct, ion of feach Bottom Unita 2 and 3 i e I t j t, 'lhe one cample fire stop rac cub.jected to a ceries of cix firec i using oil-coaked burlap ragc and a prcrane torci: cc co.:rced of fire. The burlap was the came ac crecified for the Tr;, cam e Fire Tec', in g I Cable !'}:cci fication E-23, which van thn p::re. ace of ceification for i ) Peach Bottom 2 and 3 tray cable. The cil u: diecel all. e l' a 7he rag tests simulated firec that r.;rb-c;; r d -i . _ r f :c ion or operation of a ctatior.: the intei.ce : n' fr-- h tested i.he withstar.d capability of the fire or . ; r ; r.e - ::, w:r 9.L. 3 <it-reir l .) urethane ac the ventilation ceal. p 1 The following are the recultc and concl.ci - :.~
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l. The fire clop in more than adequat- - - ; fire. 6 2. The fire ctop ic a pecitiu cal a 71 ::
- 2 ;cm ic c i.r cmoke and air thru 'he 1.nll.
/ 3 'Ihe polyurethane fce.m uced at Fed- ::::cr,.ill not a : i t. blachenc and charrc vithcut acran.:!cn. Fo!.:,mrethane wi thout g the I'.arinite (an :stoc) t<.ird ::ler E.- ear; to te adec. ate I i t for the fire etcp. b',4 h. Polyurethane feam ucad at Fee. h 2M *e ; le : c noi, intra hee a ) f fire hazard whe aced durin.; initial p'. ant ecnctrue:icr or i for cable additiens in an Opera;ir nlant. I 'I. S. Flamemantic ablative coaci.7 perrcr:m as expected: it effec-( tive.ly chields the cablec and fire r.cp from the fla r.m. j 6. 1 d; The cables in the tray did.ct - rn r.or coritribute t o the energy of the fire cource. f j,' '/. The intence propane torch flame c f 1379 7 produced. o cigni-0 I 6 ficant temperature rlce ci. thin i.c y ; tration. ir 8. The internal heat generated by th e er rin:; pol /urethane ic not [ [ hir;h enough or of lon6 enough duratio i to be detrirr. ental t.o i h the cablec. 4 s Ii i ' li a ? f.L .q.SnA 5 l /. nann. v (_ b, /. i .14 l ~ -n j$e e*" o .. f. ,V, '. fM ' i
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s IhiJadelphin i e c t r i e 0 r.p r.y Tec t ! ! ort on Calyle Tray Fire Stop with l ot;/urutbre '/ erd.i lation. mal A. Te';t Leeati on Peach Hottom AlG, April 3, Irf/S B. Pa rt i c i po.nts J. J. Ferenecik El ectri. cal %'inceri nr; W. !!. Van Fuckirk ' Electrical.'wineeri ng J. /.alloz Electrical field. 3,;ineering T. J. Scull (Part) Electrical Encir.eerini-D. Gemmill Conctruction B. R. Powen Constructic: R. C. Orndorff Construccir J. A. '..'a r n oe k Conctructi;r C. T. fowell ConctrucC - R. P. Charidan Conctru: '.c E. W. Edge Constructic D. Kemper (Part) Electrical ..ai r :nr cs F. Turner Bechtel M. Croule Bechtel C. Purpoce 1. To verify that the cable tray fi re -tcyc contair.in ; polyut ethane ventilation coals meet the decicn ir tt.t, i. e., .a i:c. ain the wall seal. 2. To establich the decree of fire expccure thn e: icu in usin:; polyurethane during ccnctruction cf the plant as. 211 as later when cable changes are tade in an creratinc; facility. 3 To observe the deGradatien of the fire etcp when at.jected to various fires. D. Tect Cet-Up (Photos 1 to 11 apply) 1. One tect model was built to cor. form. tith the Peach Eattom Station conctruction detail Drawin,; C-1315, Cheet 10'7A, Cable Tray Fire Stops with Ventilation Scalc (copy attached). Sketch 1 113uctratec the construction of the tect fi.re ntop ar.d the location of imbedded thermocouplec. A vacuum pump (not shown on the sketch) was used to cinulate a preccure differential between the incide and outcide of the fire stop. 2. Planumactie, a fire proofing compound, m c applied to the Marinite board for a thicknecc of approximately 1/16". 3 Vacuum pump and thermocouple connections were made at the rear of.the penetration.
e a D. Test "et-l'p ( Cont ' <l) I. 'lhe Flanemantic and polyui ethane ex.- .ad cured for approxi-t l mately 2i hourr prior to the fire 5 Gketch 2 choua the arrarmement and _" "ation of cablen. 'Ihe cablea were placed in the tray r
- , rejn ' unM e, a mixture vf control and instrumentat l'
i natall e'l at Peach Ecttom 2 and 3 6. Gince this tent ma priraril-com vi fi co nep a d ventilation :: cal. the cablea were r.;- c- .ored in. to elreui t integrity. The cables were previous;;. f.re 'ac le t pro en and documented. 7. The fire cource consisted of c feu: 2: >*. et p i - cf burlap ceaked in light dienel oil. '?n ic f i r e
- ~2-C e:ted to make it cimi1ar to the one uced i:. :: _ c. :.
- . r 1. '.e fi r e tent 3.
A propane burner was also . =. 2; - _. P i'.-' city fire cource. 8. Gince there van but one model fire :.;;
- 1. 2 -
2. 2. - 3' :tG on it were arranged in cequence ct1r:1: -._' t ' '- -w-covere (oil rag) and progressi.ng to the m::: (prepar ':rne ?). -r 1 9 I);rin,i all the tec to an alrroat con... - - d - 'e<
- c :.- the front to the rear of the tect fu e :..
10. Polyurethane identification: It cts-F : L.
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I" 11-Foam Products, Inc., 2050 Ucrth Ercadwa;. , IL. C -f. _s. 11. Thunemactic 71A identification: c ; n L. e : :: c..-.e l :J thermal plastic recinous bir.derc. fla:ce ret s: 1.. che:.i cab 1:.d inorganic inecmbustible fibers. cc1d bf Flavrac:ar o. E. T2st I (Fhotoa 5 thru 8 apply) The oil-coaked burlap was placed c::.. _ 11:les prot-ding from the front of the fire ctop. Enen the b 11; .ca n ignited the eacuum pump was started and maintained 25 inches e; a cum. The loocely folded burlap hurned fi.;r _. lacting 2 min 115 cec. The smoke was heavy but appeared to 1e u.3 .e burning oil. 'lh e thermocouplec on the interior cide of the ::. - Marinite pnnel indicated a rice from 600F to 15SOF; the en:.- the *:ide rail of the tray just above the cables remained ne..c,24 at 6SOF: the third thermocouple located in the center of _ - polyurethane foam chowed a rice from 60 to 650F. Test I Penults and Observationc The fire ntop showed no visible degrada _.. There van some soot deponit but no indication that heat. I _ __. or cmoke had pene-trated the fire ctop.
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e F. Tent I f (l'hotoa () t hru 11 appl A Approximately five minute:-. af ter empleti on of ']< ct I unother tightly folded oil-coaked burlap nr placul on the cablo, and fired. A ctream of ccmprecaed air was pl.ayed on the burning 1,urlap to simu. late an air 1ine break in the fire ntop area. The flame burned oui, after two minutes. 'ihe inni de co r t'o eu temperature of the 14arintte front panel roce to lW OF. the ci<le rai) of the cable tray rone to 7')0F, and the interior terp"rature of the polyurethane was 63 F. Tent 1I Peaults and Obcervations The fire :: top was a little core diceclared. AN licters chowed in the Flamemantic coatinc en t! A fr r.: W eir.ite Ycard. The PVC jacketed cablen chowed cli,'; :t tel. 'f.c a:.2 t 'r a t a layer of cables contained cen.e cokinc. T;.ere, ;re .e...dicaY c.c that the heat, flames, or cmcke had per.etrate:
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G. Tent III (Ihotos 12 thru lh apply) Approximately, fi /c minutec after ccr el;:.a c Ten .t n.n oil-ceaked rag was ignited under the tray. 7 m rn le .1 " = v.: _a e r.mok e, come due to charrinr; of the cat 1-2 t/r 'a'.'.etc c-i ve nilon cabic tica. The fire lanted for nire d r.. r.
- .7ert'ure on the interior of the l'arinite ccard au;rnc,._ rr - l'.U F ' o 1600F.
'lhe tray cide rail temperature loce to 170-. _-re ir.'.cri;r tempera-ture of the polyurethane rer. air.ed at 63CF. Tect III Recults and Cacertationc 'Ihe neoprene,iaeketed ca'cles c..elle 2 a li.tcle ar.1 ci,..:-d more coking. The Martnite front cheet parted a little en the ces.3, probably due to cable swellir:g and tray erransion. nere '3re no indications that heat, flame, er cmoke had penetrated to the rear of the fire stop. II. Tent IV (Photoc 15 thru 18 apply) This test was performed to see the effect an intence flame from a propane torch has on the fire stop. 'lhe propane torch simu-lated a cource of fire with a high enercy content. Approximately five minutes after thc end of Tent 1Tf a propan<: torch flame was played on the front of the fire stop". Torch nozr.le identification: h64 type IC 4A. '1he f1mne had a 33 blue cone and a spread of about four inches at the cable impingement point. Eight f.nches out from the notzle the temperature was 13750F. The flame was aimed at the juncture of the cables and the liarinite board.
a 8 apr 1_ }]. Tent iV (Cont'd) During the heating, the Flamemantic conpound and the.jacketc of the cablen glowed red but there was ne :11gible cmoke. The flame scan applied for five minuten. 'ih e interior of the front Marinite board race to.20 F. Mhen the torch Clarie wat removed there van no lingering f1wr.e of any kind. Tent IV Recultc and Obcervations The area covered by the flame nhowed a gray to white ach color. The cable jackets chowed considerably *.ere coking. Ther" were no indications that heat, f. lame or cmoke hai penetrated thru to the tack of the fire stop. After Test IV the fire ctop wac ; e.~.itted to ecol. 2.e front and rear Marinite panela were removed co cr.at P.e polp;rcitane ceal could be inspected. There wac no indi nt.:e cf. :.t da.E;;. Photo 19 was taken during thic inspecticn. I. Tent V (Fhotos 20 thru 26 apply) This tent cinulated a ficu occurri: : c.rt ; iM rep.ir er installation of a new cable in an existir : fir; clep. An irregular hole approxic.itel. twc _...;c 1r li cet'r was put thru the polyurethane fcam ani a rs w pie:2 cf flw a ~ tarda.t crono-linked pol:/ ethylene (ZL;t') inculated. Tr s ;e :acketed cable wuc placed loosely In the hole. Fc.oto 19 ch::: the cect cet-up. Oil-coaked, tir,htl; folded arla; w placed on the ea':lec two inches frem the polyarethane. T.e rag nc ignited c.nd the prevali-ing breeze carried the fle.e irtc the rol.;rethane. Smoke emerged from the back side of the hele e.r.d. ac en2 an i a 'nal f min'ctec into the burn, one momentary fla:r.e lie? was etcerved on the rear side. Tnis vac the only flere penetration in any of the tect. The front thermocouple indicated 1120')?. At the five minu W mark the thermo-couple inside the polyurethane ir.dicated 65 F. At the six n'inute nark an air atream was used to drive the ' turning burlap into the foam seal. The total burn tir.e was 10 minuten. Tne maximum tempera-ture indicated on the front thermocouple nn ll200F, and in the polyurethane, 115 F. Test V P,ecults and Obcervations It wac noted that initially the polyurethane curface burned in a low flame but quickly coated, charred, and extinguiched. Pro-longed application of flame merely increaced the coking. Ihoto 25 chows the charring effect on the Thoto 26 chowa cohingextendingapproximately3}polyurethane. " in the ten minute test. The Jacket or the newly installed cable van cuollen and charred.
4 J. TeuL V E _(l'hoton 2'( aral 30 appl"T Thia test wac made to study the effecta of a fire on a rej alt ed and newly reccated polyurethane fi.re stop, i.e., before the Varinite board and Flamamantic coatinr; are applied. The charred pol:/urethane was removed frem the front of the penetration and the area was recealedwithfreshpolyurethaneandcuredfor]hhours. An oil-ncaked burlap rag was ignited at the front of the pene-tration, allowed to burn until almont extin:;uiched uhen a recond oil-coaked burlap rag was applied. This multiple fire lasted for 13 minutes. Tent VI Results and Observations The effect of the heat and flame on a.c.ewl:, installed poly-urethane seal wac no di frerent than or t.c lor.;er r red p;1 prethane. They both flamed cli htly on initial app m atic' cf firn c.it oon C charred and flamed out. Further applica:i r cf f:re ere: - caused more cokinC. There were no indicatienc ::.n ", e-i" c m or smoke had penetrated to the rear of the :ir+ :_:r u rir- :.in test. At the conclusion of Test VI the tc; ':1rir.;:e panel.c.c removed and inspected. There were no indicaticr cf drce to +te in' erior of the polyurethane. (See photos 29 ar.d 30. ' K. Tect Vif Thic tect wac made to ecmpare the fler.icilhy of c red and newly compounded polyurethane. I:ew compound wac discharged from the dicpensin; no::le to a pair of crocced sticks. Enile still plastic, the foam n; ignited from below. It burned slowly, covering the surface r;th :Isck soot, then extinguished. Tne flane wac cr'eping rather than instantaneously flashing. A piece of polyurethane that nad bc n cured for 2h
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Tne came flamind, cooting, ar.d extir.;uiching took place. Tent VII Results and Obcervations There were no visible differences in the burning and celf-extinguiching action of frech and cured polyurethane compounds. It was concluded that freshly compounded polyurethane is not more flammable than cured polyurethane.
s e I,. Tect VI][ This tent measured the internal ten.perature rise that taken place when a mass of polyurethane caren. Part 1 A 10 quart bucket van set up with a thermocouple aucpended in its center. In a 75 F ambient, polyuret hane van diccharged into 0 the bucket. Fifteen minutes after the bucket 5:ac filled, the temp-erature roce to a maximum of 205 F and held for 8 minuten. 3 hen the temperature declined at a rate of one dedree per minute. The test was terminated after 25 minuten. Part 2 A 4" x 12" x 12" box was set up with a ther.ma:cuple c;rpended in the center. In a 72 :' ambient, pol. :re-Jc. ne,mc diccr.ar ;ed into the box and a cover was applied. De nterier t erperature reached a maximum of 115 F in 3 ni.nutes, held fcr w2 c.inu ec. the started to decline. Test VIII I?csults and Observations The polyurethane ecapound generates he1 u terr.111 t zinc, the short curing time, however, thece temi.er1. c2: are eat hiv. er.ou gh or of lont; enough duratien to be inj zic;c :c 152 cabl es a:-:1 at Peach Bottom. M. Conclusions and Peccamendatienc 1. The cable tray fire steps with pol 7:rethar.e ventilaticn ceals installed at Feach Bottcm Ur.it 2 will pre cent prepai:ation of fire, cmoke, and heat thru a wall per.etration. 2. Knen an existing seal is to be repaired after the addition of a cable, polyurethane compour.d ider.tical to the crisinal ccm-pound shall be uced. 3 Tne cable tray fire etcp with centilation coals detailed cn Drawing E-1315, Sheet 107A can be used for new conctruction at Peach Ecttom and at any other Ihiladelphi.a Electric Con.pany nuclear plant which utilizes flame retardant cables equal to thoce used at Peach Bottom. 9 4 !c r , [ e ' -4 2' JJF:hmi
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