ML19274C661
| ML19274C661 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/01/2019 |
| From: | Adelaide Giantelli NRC/NMSS/DMSST |
| To: | |
| RAKOVAN L/NMSS/MSST | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19274C654 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML19274C661 (5) | |
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Risk-Informed Source Security Requirements Adelaide Giantelli Source Management & Protection Branch Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
General Thoughts on Risk What can go wrong? How likely is it? What would be the consequences?
Low Probability, High Consequence.
High Probability, A skydiving accident, in Low Consequence. which the parachute fails A unicyclist has a relatively high to open, can also have probability of falling. However, the severe consequences High Probability, consequences of such an accident (including fatality). High Consequence.
are relatively However, the risk is acceptable to An expedition to Mount Everest minor. The unicyclist many people because using has a high probability of serious usually lands on his or the proper safety precautions consequences, such her feet or, at worst, can adequately reduce the as a fatal fall, frozen tumbles forward. probability of an accident. As a extremities, or illness Thus, even though the probability result, the overall risk is related to the altitude.
of falling is high, the considered to be moderate. As a result, the overall consequences are so minor that risk is considered to be the overall risk is low. very high.
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Development of Risk-Informed Security Requirements What can go wrong? How likely is it? What would be the consequences?
if used maliciously in a radiological dispersal device or a radiological exposure Category 2 device?
and what should/can we do to prevent it?
A. Reasonable assurance of adequate protection B. Absolute protection (zero risk)
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Examples of Risk-Informed Security Requirements
- Source security requirements are an optimized mix of risk-informed and prescriptive requirements.
- Part 20 establishes radiation protection standards for all radioactive materials o § 20.1801 Security of stored material. The licensee shall secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas.
o § 20.1802 Control of material not in storage. The licensee shall control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is in a controlled or unrestricted area and that is not in storage.
- Part 37, establishes requirements for the physical protection of Category 1 and Category 2 quantities of radioactive material o § 37.49 Monitoring, detection, and assessment. a) Monitoring and detection. (1) Licensees shall establish and maintain the capability to continuously monitor and detect without delay all unauthorized entries into its security zones. Licensees shall provide the means to maintain continuous monitoring and detection capability in the event of a loss of the primary power source, or provide for an alarm and response in the event of a loss of this capability to continuously monitor and detect unauthorized entries.
o § 37.53 Requirements for mobile devices. Each licensee that possesses mobile devices containing category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material must: (a) Have two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure the material from unauthorized removal when the device is not under direct control and constant surveillance by the licensee; and (b)
For devices in or on a vehicle or trailer, unless the health and safety requirements for a site prohibit the disabling of the vehicle, the licensee shall utilize a method to disable the vehicle or trailer when not under direct control and constant surveillance by the licensee. Licensees shall not rely on the removal of an ignition key to meet this requirement.
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Thank you!
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