ML19262C203

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Changes to Tech Spec Table 3.7-1 Re Primary Containment Isolation.Related Safety Evaluation Encl
ML19262C203
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/02/1980
From:
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
Shared Package
ML19262C201 List:
References
NUDOCS 8002070253
Download: ML19262C203 (9)
v • d • e


Text

// -

ATTACHMENT I PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES RELATED TO CONTAIhMENT ISOLATION POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR P0'elER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 FEBRUARY 2, 1980 1945 042

,on 3s7 8002 07 0 S b

r ~

?

JA F MT?

TA312 1.?-l (Coct*d)

Pn Y19 9 PT FTT f *rt Pt hTT e a tt e; PS T19 tY rM A f =es NT 0%nbers la parentteses are hered to cus'cre on fallwing pegeen elgral co.:ee are listed on followirg pages) ra e s Location Foao r Drynll valve Tyg,e Clostra t o Cten Esf. to to Clm Isoletten Time Dereal Ramerke and it e tool.ted ren tretten ts) (5)<s) crm, Dr. veil (3)<s) sie .I (7) s ec e race,itec.

Core Sprer Mantes = t-2104.8 to Cate as s outsid. Ae ax w t applical,le Clee.4 Fw riew Core Spray to I 16A,9, to Cete Ac A Outelde Ac Not applicable Open

.ector EM ute (10) l Core sprar to 1-16 A , a to Cate Ac p

A outende Ac aM Raector hot arplicatile Closed vote (10) * (r J Core 8 prey to -ISA,s ao neck (1) A In sde Reacter note O) aav. flow Not applicable Closed Testable aeck valve wie (1,te)

Core 8 peer Test to I-!!ca,a toclde Ac 3 Outelde Ac G,De 43 Sec 8.ppreestce tool Closed Care Spray F w 1 217A,3 PO Cate Ac 5 Outelde Ac R;1 Eactism hot applicable Open CC Drywe ll Equip =s a.t Z-19 ho Flug Ac 3 Insida

  1. Ac A.F.EM 33 Sec Opea Drat o Swas, Discta rge Dryvsil Equireent 1-19 A0 Flug Air /Ac 3 Outelde 8prira A.F,aN Nct a;plicable Closed (17)

Dreta Samp Ctecharge Cr C

Drywell Floor D sfo I-18 ed Flug So., ci e c t.. r s e Ac 3 lastie As A F,tM 33 sec Open b g

CD -

A Drywell Floor Crato I-14 AO Flug Air /Ac 3 Outelde Sprics A .F.Dt Niat epplic able Open Sway Elect.arge Note (18) i Travoltog Incore I-35A,3,C,0 Implosive Dc & Outelde De Probe thest De Not applicable Open One valve se sach line Travette-a locore I-351,B,C,D 80 tall Ac & Outelde Ac A,F,EV Pr et e Nt applicable Opea One valve on each llae Mte (14) f Travoltog incore I-35B Check Fud flow & Outelde Process tev, tiew Not applicable Closed Frobe Furge EPCI - Turbine I-Il M0 Cate Ac & Inside Ac Staae 9 pply L.EM 20 Sec Opea ) Sigral "G" opeas velve.

  • 81gnal "L" oversides and

)

EPCI - Turbine I-Il M0 Cete ) closes valve, Dc & Outelde Dc l tM 20 sec closeJ)

Steam Supply

x. ens ne No. es , jd 201 Drywell Floor Manual Drain Sump X-18 Gate Manual B Outside Manual NA Note (18) Closed Note (18)

Discharge Drywell Floor.

Drain Sump X-18 M0 Gate AC B Outside AC A,F 30 Sec Open Note (18) 1

' Discharge

.. i *g JAFNPP ,.

r

~* NOTES FOR T*GLE 3.7.1 (CONT'D)

9. ,
10. Coincident signals "C' and "T" open valves. Special fnterlocks permit testing these valves by manual switch except when automatic signals are present.
11. Normal status position of valve (open or closed) is the

. - position during normal power operation of the reactor (see " Normal Status" colura) .

j.f.g.cf -

"c.--

12. The specified closure rates are as required for containment isolation only.
13. Minimum closing time is' based on valve and line size.
14. Signal "A" or "F" causes automatic withdrawals of TIP probe. When probe is withdrawn, the valve automatically clo::es by mechanical action.
15. Reactor building ventilation exhaust high radiation m signal "Z" is generated by two trip untis. This 8 required one unit at high trip or both units at down O* ; scale (instrument failure) trip, in order to initiate isolation.

(l

16. Leak testing shall be accomplished in accordance with section ,

4.7.A.2.d.

~

17. The valve opens during pir p out-of the drywell equipment sump.

Automatic isolaticn signals A and F override an open signal that might be present for su=p pts;p out.

8!

18. From Feb'ruary 2, 1980 until manual isolation valve RDW-77 is modified by installation of a power actuator (or until a power '

actuated valve is installed in place of RDN-77) the valve shall be maintained in the closed position except when pumping of the drywell floor drain sump is required.

Following modification of RDN-77 by installation of a power actuator (or replacement of the valve with a power operated valve) which utilizes the controls provided for isolation valve 20-MOV-82, the valve may be operated in the.same mode as that permitted for isolation valve 20-MOV-82 when that valve is fully operable.

From February 2,1980 until valve 20-MOV-82 is repaired and restored to a fully operable status it is exempted from the requirements of this Table.

1945 044 Amendment No. fD, /$ 4 of 4 d

ATTACHMENT II SAFETY EVALUATION CONTAINMENT ISOLATION MODIFICATION 1

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 FEBRUARY 2, 1980 1945 045 M

NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION INTERIM OPERATION WITH VALVE 20-MOV-82 INOPERABLE Interim modification to primary containment boundary location to allow continued plant operation with the drywell floor drain sump discharge inboard isolation valve (20-MOV-82) electrically inoperable.

Plant Modification: F1 80-10 QA Category: I System Number: 20 (Radioactive Waste System)

Component: Pipe Designation 3"-WL-151-2 (Reference Figure 1)

Component

Description:

Piping Downstream of Outboard Primary Contain-ment Isolation Valve 20-A0V-83 Op to and Including Manual Isolation Valve RDW-77 Containment Penetration: X-18 A. DESCRIPTION

1) Background Drywell floor drain sump inboard isolation valve 20-MOV-82 has failed electrically in the open position during normal plant.

power operations. Valve 20-MOV-82 is located inside reactor containment, which is inerted with nitrogen and inaccessible during power operations. Section 3.7.D.2 of the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications states that in the event any isolation valve specified in Table 3.7-1 (Process Pipeline Penetrating Primary Containment) becomes in-operable, reactor power operation may continue, provided at least one (1) valve in the pipe line having the inoperable valve is in the mode corresponding to the isolation condition. Upon determining that the inboard isolation valve 20-MOV-82 was electrically inoperable in the open position, the outboard air-operated isolation valve 20-A0V-83 was shut.

Technical Specification Section 3.7.3 further states that if the requirements of Section 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly plant shutdown is to be initiated and the reactor placed in the cold condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

2) Problem Definition Because the contents of the drywell floor drain sump must be periodically pumped out of primary containment during normal plant operations, it is necessary to open the outboard isolation valve 20-A0V-83 for approximately 3 minutes out of every 100 minutes for the current sump accumulation rate.

1945 046

NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION INTERIM OPERATION WITH VALVE 20-MOV-82 IN0PERABLE Page A. DESCRIPTION

2) Problem Definition - Continued This is undesirable from the standpoint of primary containment isolation because a single active component failure of the operable isolation valve (20-A0V-83) could prevent its closing, thereby resulting in a loss of primary containment integrity.

Technical Specification requirement 3.7.D.1-3 allows the opening of outboard isolation valve 20-A0V-83 if the inboard isolation valve 20-MOV-82 is inoperable, provided it is reclosed or the reactor is in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3) Interim Modification (Phase I)

The Phase I interim solution upgrades the quality classification of the piping downstream of outboard isolation valve 20-A0V-83 up to and including the first manual isolation valve RDW-77 (approximately 8 feet of piping) and implements special operating procedures in order to provide a redundant isolation feature.

A design review was conducted of the piping and manual valve (RDW-77) downstream of 20-A0V-83 and it was determined that the design criteria, installation procedures, and NDE requirements were identical to those utilized for the piping between the existing drywell isolation valves (20-MOV-82 and 20-A0V-83). In addition, seismic analysis of the piping up to and including the supports downstream of manual valve RDW-77 has been performed and satisfies the requirement that this piping would be operable following a seismic event. '

A Type "C" Local Leak Rate Test has been performed on the downstream piping in order to confirm that the addition of the piping to the containment boundary would not cause an unacceptable containment leak rate which could exceed 10CFR100 requirements as implemented by Technical Specifications. The results of this Type "C" test have been analyzed and confirm that the additional measured leakage is within the acceptance criteria established by the existing plant Technical Specifications for the combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type "B" and Type "C" tests.

Special operating procedures implemented as part of the Phase I interim modification includes the following:

a) The new isolation boundary established at manual isolation valve RDW-77 will remain isolated at all times except when the drywell floor drain sump is being pumped out (approximately 3 minutes out of every 100 minutes.)

b) An operator equipped with a dedicated communications ;ircuit is stationed at the manual valve during the pump out period. If containment iso'ation should be required during these short periods, the operator is instructed from the Control Room to immediately shut the manual isolation valve RDW-77.

The closing time of RDW-77 is approximately 16 seconds.

. . 1945 047

NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION INTERIM OPERATION WITH VALVE 20-MOV-82 IN0PERABLE Page A. DESCRIPTION

4) Interim Modification (Phase II)

The Phase II solution upgrades the Phase I solution in that a motor-operator /or a new motor operated valve, is to be installed in place of manual valve RDW-77. The design on Phase II is in progress and will include additional seismic analysis to include the additional mass of a motor operator.

Electrical circuits and wiring included as part of the motor operator installation will be in accordance with the require-ments for Class 1E electrical systems.

B. JAFNPP FSAR REVIEW Section 5 (Containment System) of the JAFNPP Final Safety Analysis Report was reviewed to determine those areas affected by the implementation of this modification. There are no changes required to the assumptions used in the FSAR or other safety analysis reports by the implementation of this modification. Because the second isolation boundary during the interim pericd is provided by a valve external in location to the existing outboard isolation valve, Doth isolation boundaries are external to the primary containment. This is cnsidered acceptable as long as the piping external to the out-boaro isolation valve has an integrity at least equal to the contain-ment. From a piping design and support point of view, the sump pump discharge pipe (3"-WL-151-2) has an integrity at least equal to the '

containment. This change on an interim t' asis for the case of the sump pump discharge line does not change assumptions stated in FSAR.

It is further noted that a similar arrangement of primary containment isolation valves exists in other JAF systems.

JAFNPP Technical Specifications, Section 3.7 was reviewed. The safety aargins defined in the bases of the Technical Specifications are not reduced by the implementation of this modification.

C. SAFETY ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS

1) The implementation of this interim modification does not increase the probability of occurence or consequences of an accident evaluated in the JAFNPP Final Safety Analysis Report or other safety analysis reports.
2) The implementation of this interim modification does not create the probability of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.
3) The implementation of this interim modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases of the JAFNPP Technical Specifications.

1945 048

NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION INTERIM OPERATION WITH VALVE 20-MOV-82 INOPERABLE Page C. SAFETY ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS

4) The implementation of this interim modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.

Prepared by: Date YAc'~d m A'1 tf a lA 20 VictorM.Walz,'Electrig Maintenance Engineer Reviewed by: Date e %~?\ \.r.\u e 'lfk?O Robert Baker, Maintenance Superintendent 1945 049

p2Y WELL 12pcrorz BuwW4r x_is 20 AOV-89 20 Mov-e2 ,

i

? r,

)*'y >,t'

, I , 3"WL-191-2

' ] ];

$ ~ PW a n ELEMENT To %Dicr4Tl4 Y w L -I rpi.l A y j- 3" wL - 191 - l@

X 1 /i ,

A A j' p '

p -.t e- a p_ia i

I o o {

l D W E_LL TWl_blWS  !

suMa dFuMPs TV -lo4 1945 050 FIGtJ25 1

.

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML19262C203&oldid=2381552"