ML19260E054

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Technical Evaluation of Electrical,Instrumentation & Control Aspects of Overpressure Mitigating Sys.
ML19260E054
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 12/26/1979
From:
EG&G, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML19260E049 List:
References
NUDOCS 8002130217
Download: ML19260E054 (10)


Text

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1 TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF TriE ELECTRICAL, !NSULPENTATION, AND CCNTRCL ASPECTS CF 'HE OVERPRE55;;RE w1TIGATING sys EM FCR SURRY, UNITS 1 AND 2 (Cccket Nes. 50-230, -281)

EC4G Idaho, Inc.

8002130 2/f '

CCNTENTS 1.0 INTROCUCT!CN . . . . . . . .................. 1 2.0 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . ................... 1 2.1 System Electrical and Centrol Cescristien . . . . . . . . 2 2.1.1 !sclation Valve Alarm .............. 3 2.1.2 :CRV Channel Separacility ............ 4 2.1.3 DCR Y Co er a t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2 System Testability ................... 5 2.3 Rressure Transient Reperting and Recceding R ecui remen ts ...................... 5 2.4 Disabli19 of Ccmocnents Curing Cc!d ibutdcwn ...... 5 2.3 Tec?n1 cal Scecifications ................ 5 3.0 CCNCLUSIONS ......................... 7 2.0 R EF ER E N C E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 t

TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF N E ELECTRICAL. INSTRt.PENTATICN, Ario CONTROL ASPECTS OF NE OVERPRESSURE MITIGAT!NG SYSTEM FCR SURRY, UNITS 1 AND 2 (Occk et Nos. Ed-280, -231)

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Sy letter dated Oct:ber 14, 1977 (Refe ence 1) Virginia Electric and Pcwer Comcany (VEPCO) submitted to the NRC a plant specific analy-sis in supper: cf the preccsed reacter vessel everpressure mitigating system (CMS) fer Sur*y Nuclear P:wer Statien, Units 1 and 2. This infermation sue:1ements etner cccumantaticn sucmitted by VEPCO during 1976 and 1977 (Re'erences 2 :hrcugn 31 The electrical, instrumenta-tien, and c:ntrol system aspects of the pro:csed design have been reviewed fer thds Technical Evaluatien Re cet.

The Or0cesed CMS includes senscrs, ICtuating mecnanisms, sitems, and vaives to prevent a reacter coolant system transient fr:m exceed'ng the :ressure/ tem:erature limits included in the Surry, Units 1 and 2 Technical Scecificatiens as recuirec by Accendix 3 to Chacter 10, Code of Fede*al Reguistiens, Part 50 (10 CFR 50).

2.0 EVALUAT!CN The procesec cvera11 a:Orcacn to elimnating ove*:ressure eve %

f ec:r: crates acministrative, pr:cedural, and hardware ::ctr:Is 41:n re'iance uc:n :Pe :T ant coe-ster f:r :*e Oriccica? !!ne Of dafanse.

Preventive acm'nistrative/:rececural measures irclude (a) :rocedural precauticns, (b) deenergi:stien cf essential ccmcenents not recuired during the ccid shutdcwn mcde of cperation, and (c) maintaining a ncn-water solid reacter coolant system condition whenever pcssible.

  • he basic esign criteria :na: neae 10:iiec in deteWning tre acecuacy Of ;re eiec *ica?, instrumentat*:n, Inc 00ntr07 as;ects cf 09e

'w: tamce*1 u-e Over;* essure :rctecti:n system tre:

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(1) Coerator Action - no credit can be taken for coerator action until ten minutes af ter the coer-ator is aware, through an action alarm, that a pressure transient is in pecgress.

(2) Sincie Failure Criterien - the cressure protec-tien system shall be designed to protect the re-actor vessel given a single failure in additien to the f ailure that initiated the pressure transient.

(3) Testability - the system design shai! inciuce provisiens f:r testing en a schedule ::nsistent with the frecuency that tne system is relied u en for pressure protection.

(A) Seismir and !!EE 279 Criteria - ideatly, the system shcuid teet seismic Categcry I and IE.~I 279 criteria. The basic cbjec:ive is that the system shculd not be vuinerable to a c:rnmen f ailure that wculd bcth initiate a pressure transient and dis-able the CMS. Suen events as 1:ss Of instrument air and less Of offsite Dcwer must be c:nsidered.

In adc1 icn to C mplyiag witn these criteria, the licensee has agreed to covice a variety of alaras to alea .9e cperat:r : (a) liaru-alIy enacle the :ressure 3r0:ecticn system curing c c'd:wn. (b) inci-ca:e the cccur ence Of a :ressure transient, and (c) irc'cate ciesure

f eitNer Ocwer ::e-atec relief valve /?CRV1 isc'aticn vaive wnich ensures a ::mciete ca:Pway fr:m the sressurf:er :: tre ressurizer reiief tank.

2.1 System Ef ectrical and Centrel Cescri:tien

?*e c:nt-ni cir:uitry f:r :*e CMS 9as been :esigned :: :: :'y niin

!!!I-5:: 273-1971, ex:ect f:r tae rno varia:icns discussec in 2

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Section 2.1.2. The ceroliance of the design with !EEE 279-!971, including the exceptions described by VEPCC (Reference 5) is adequate.

The CMS has two channels that are c: 7 etely 1 independent except that the channels share an alarn to snow that the CMS shculd be enabled and an alarnt to indicate the aCDecach to a ;:cssible overpressure event. The alarms are isolated '.m the channels they serve so that a failure in the alar 7 circuitry 4111 not incacacitate either channel.

Each channel of the CMS is en.oled by transferring the key coerated ENABLE /DI9 ELE switch for the channel frem the CI92LE to the ENABLE position (two switches nust be transferred to c:moletely enable the CMS). Each channel has two pressure set;eints. Set;oint #1 has a value of 200 asig fer both chanrels. 'ahen the CMS is enabled the NOT PRESSL'RE HISH annunciat:r will be activated if the pressure exceecs Set:oint di fer either :Mannel, thus alerting the coerater of t*e need for actiens to remedy t3e cause of the increasing cressure. Set-

oint d2 has a value of 410 psig fer Charnel #1 and a value of 42E psig for Channel 42. 'ahen the CMS is enabled and the
:ressure exceeds Set-point #2 fcr a channel, the pressurizer (PCRV) fer that channel is coened t: Or0 Vide a cathway fr:m the pressuri:er to the cressurizer relief tank.

Curing scwer c; era:icn the ENASLE/0!92LE swit:nes for both : nan-nels cf the CMS are in he OI92LE :: sitten, and the pressure is ateve Set:cint d2 for Octn enannels sc that the NOT PCESSURE SYS~EM REQUIRD annunciater is off. as the reacter is ::clec d:wn the :-essu e de-creases and, anen it reac9es 4C0 astg. the NCT PRESSURE SYS~EM RECU* RED annunciat:r c:mes en, tNs ale-ttog the ::e-ater of tre 9eed : manu-ally enable the CMS by eransferring toth key-contro!'ed EN4SLE/::93LE switenes to the ENABLE positicn. If both isciatien valves between the

ressurizer and the ::ressurizer relief tank are coen, the NOT PRES-SURIZER SYSTEM RECU' RED anruncist:r will se eff, indicating that the CMS is enacled. These resign features are acecuate.

2.1.1 !sclatienVaha at ar t. *he recu' red isciati:n vaise ailr t is :r: viced by tre 'CT ?C.ESSLRE SYS EM RECU!s O arnur f at: . Wea the o [3 '

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CMS is teing enabled, the annunciater will not clear unless both isc-lation valves have been ccened. This ensures that a path frorn the pressuri:er to the onessurizer relief tank is maintained. With the CMS ena led, the annunciater will alarm uc'on the closing of either iso-lation valve. The two channels share a single alarm. These design f eatures are adequate.

2.1.2 PCRV Channel Seearability. Each of the two PCRVs has its own independent instrumentation and centrol channels, except that the two channels snan a c ctnen annunciat r. A Failure Mcce and Effects Ana'ysis 'Refe-erce 3) has shewn that no singie frilure can disabie both cnannels, and VEPCC has stated tnat tne design meets all of the

'inal criteeia except the follcwing twc ra:uiremeats f em EEE 279 fer electrical c:meenents:

(1) The "tcuirement of automatic removal Of a typass (Section 4.12)

The bypass functicn will be served by two key icek swiches, One for eacn pcwer coerated relie# valve, under a ministrative c:ctr:1. The switch wili be enabled at the Dr: pee Octn (tem erature veesus Dressure) en the c:oldcwr curve and disabled at the Dr0cer ;oint On the hettuo curve. The Ocsitien of the switch versus system recuirements will be aanurci ated t: indicate iT0r 9" system SIigrment.

I2) The -e uirement of idertifying ::rr:crents as :

3"Stec t'On grade ( $ect t :n 4.22 )

The existing ccmcenents are mounted and wired in con t-0! 030inets and ni eways. Mcweve", chiame'

  • ndeceaceace c nditicns are tet, as the channeis are ::tay se:arate ind t'e aew system a f i' al so be irstalled se:arate'y. 70 isruCO t.*e ex* sting i

syste- :: Ove tae ccm: Ore-ts 3rd ='res **:: :-:-

tec*icr. "'!rk ed areas d"4s FCt **0Vi de a suf ## i eat advantage :: te werth the risk involvec tc the aes:

of the statice.

The exceptiens to IEEE 279 are justifiable and the design is adequate.

2.1.3 PCRV Ooeratica. The pressurizer ccwer ccerated relief valves (P775) are scring-Icaded, ncrmaf fy-sN;t valves that are c;ened by motive air c ntrolled ty sciencid coerated valves (!CV5', ere f r each PCRV hea t"e CMS is enablec. Tre mctive ai- is ner na!!y sue:'ied by the ::atainment instrutvnt air system. To e-sure c:e-ability ucca

? css of :*e nc-mal air suco?y, etc.9 PCPV has as iedece-tent back;: air sucoly. One 30PV c: ens a: 310 csig ane resets at 400 :sig, tra etre-coens at 425 351g and resets at d'.F :sig. Eac" t ack u: si- s;c:!y wi'l have fcur hi;n

  • essure tettles w't't each 50ttle caca0!e c' Opening a PTV 31 times so that t.me sys tem ca:ac'ty is 125 :ycies.
  • bis sizi.ag c:nsiders :*at the f astest system -es:ense tt le is six sec:nds pe-cycle and *st 0:e at:- -es: cse et t' cc: tak e :! ace f: *en trirvies.

On this tasis, t e recutred :a:3 city *:r tae hectu: !!r s.::'i es is ,

100 cycles. Check valves ise' ate : e ccrmal 1-d the *e tactu: ad-sue: lies s: :Ma: a failu*e ia :ne s.:: y wit! cc: disable tae :rer su::1'es. 'is ces';n is a:ecuate.

2.2 Systar' es t !'i v Testa:ilitj ' :e :-:vi:ec :r':r :: estatiisa're a sclid system y .se :# tre ~ec te'y ::e-nec t s:'a:icn ea'<e, EVELE/CI 93LE sw tc', i and ec-ma' e'ect :nics surveil t aate :-: cec. e n 9ec0 ?c;y. The testing

  • e:uiments will be ince-:cested in t*e Technical Specificati:ns. 'he Or vis':as f:r testa:il:tv a-e a:ecuate.

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2.3 Pressure T' ansient Ae:cetinc and Recordine Recuiraments The staff 00sitien en a pressure transient ant **1 causes the overpressure protection system to function, thereby indicating the ccCurrence of a sericus Dressure transient, is that it is a 30-day reDertable event. In additien, pressure and terce"Sture instrumenta-ti0n are ecuired to Orovice 3 permanent rec:rd of the pressure tran-sient. The resDense times of the temcerature/;ressure rec rders snail be C0maatible with 3 3ressure transient ircreasing at a r1te of aCDr0X-imately 100 :si see second. This instrumentation shall be ccerable wneaever the CMS is enacled.

2.4 0*sabliec o' Essertiti C:meccents Not Recui-ed Durinc Coid Shutdcwn Except 3s racuired ':r trief interv31s by Oce-sting ;r cedures cr Technical Scecifications, tre stiff ;csition reuu i -es that essential c:mocnents net recuirec curing cold shutdcwn that c:uic croduce an Ovee:ressu-1:ation event, be disabled Or isclated fr:m tre RCS during cold shutdown and tnat the :nt cis to disa:1e or isolate :nese cen-Ocnents be inc:r: crated in the Technical Scecifications. In :arti-cular, tne safety inf ectien accumulat:rs and the nigh pressure safety injecticn :umes are included in the c:mcenents t3 be disabled Or isc-I3ted. 'ahile the systam is aate" sclid, two Of tre tnree Charging DumDs d'II be cis 35Iec by remcv3I of the 3cwe* to them. Vaives and tre3kers used t0 disatie ecui: ment curing c Id shutdewn aill be tagged er Icckad t: 3reveat inadvertert Cntrges Of state.

2.~ Te:ar':31 5:eci'icatices To ensure :cers:icn Of the 0,"5, the licensee is to submit for staff review Technical Scecifications to be incerocrated into the license f:r Sur y, Units 1 and 2. These s:ecificatiens are to te cen-sistaat nd:N :ne intent of Fe statements bei:w. The licensee sncuic ersu-e tnat : e ~echnicai S:ecificati:ns ;-::csed are ::m=atiete ith ne- Ii;!Nsee recui-eme'its.

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(1) Whenever the RCS temcerature is less than the mini-mum cressurf:ation temcerature, the CMS shall be enacled with botn PORVs coerable, excect one PCRV may be incperable for teven" days. If these condi-tiens are not met, the crimary system must be de-Oressurized and vented to the atmes:hore er to the pressurizer relief tank within eignt hcurs.

(2) Enablement of the overpressure mitigating system requires that the Icw pressure setacint will te selected, the costream isciatien valves coem, and the :ackuc air succly charged.

(3) No mere than ene hign head SI :ume injecticn vaive may te tae gi:ed at RCS terceratures telew 280 CF untess the vessei head is removed.

(4) A reactor c:cian: pumo may te 5:arted fjogged' cniy if there is a steam buc0le in the cressuri:er cr the IG/RC3 teecerature difference is less than e0ce.

(5) The CMS must te testec :n a :eriedic basis censis-ter: d'th the reed f:r its use.

f5) When tre : Tant is in a coid scutdcwn ::nciti:n, *he safety inf ecti:n ac:umula: rs shali :e isciated f*:m the 405 ty verifying tha: One ac: mulat:r .

isciatten vaives are in :Me ciesec :csiticn and Ocwe* :o :ne vaise Ocerators is removed.

3.0 CCNC'.U $!CN!

I'"e elec**i0al, i r s !**; men

  • s t ' On , 3rd ::nte:I as eC:s Of One ILP*y, Un i 's *. a re 2 CM S :e S ' gr a r? aCecuate On !re t as ds *ha! ( a) *Ne :mcIi-acc e n'
  • N **e *IEE 27; :es*gn critseien is ac !::stie, it) *Me syste9 7

D FD LP 'D'ALTMh J =

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is redundant and Peets the singie f 311ure criterien, Ic) the design requires no operatcr action fcr ten minutes af ter the coerator receives an overpressure action alarm, (0) the system is testable on a periodic basis, and (e) the crepcsed changes to- the Technical "D ec i fi c ati cns reduce the arcbacility of overtressurization event to an acceptable level. Hewever, it is reccanended that final acceptance by the NRC be contingent uoen the licensee inccrocrating Technical Scecificatiens that ccmoly with the list in Section 2.5.

2.0 REFER ENCE S

1. VE:C01ette- (Stallings) :s 'EC (Rusche) dated Cc ccer 14, '973. .
2. VEPCC Te: er (Stallings) c ?GC lRuscnel dated Sectemter 7,1975.
3. VEPCO letter (Sta111rgs) to NRC (Ruscne) Cated Never::er 2,1975,
d. VE3C0 letter fStallirgs) M ?.R (Ruschel datec Decener 17, 1975.
5. VE?CO letter (Stailings) to NRC (Rusche) dated February 25, 1977.
5. VEFCC letter (Stallings) :: NRC (Ruscnei datec February 25, 1977.
7. VEFCC letter (Stallings) to NRC (Rusche) cated April 22, 1977.
3. VEPC: letter (Stailings) to NRC 'Rusche) catecca ril 1,1977.
9. Vemcrancum, R. 3aer te <. Sciler, Cecember 29, 1977, Review cf Sucy, Units 1 and 2 Cve-;nssure Mittgating System.

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