ML19259A602
| ML19259A602 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1979 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Boyd R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PVNGS199JMA-DBK, NUDOCS 7901080200 | |
| Download: ML19259A602 (16) | |
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4 s P. O. B O X 216 6 6 PHOENIX, ARIZON A 85036 January 3, 1979 PVNGS-199-JMA/DBK Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attn:
Roger Boyd, Director Division of Project Management Re:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 4 & 5 Docket Nos. STN-50-592/593
Dear Mr. Boyd:
Per request of your staff, submitted herewith are (6) six copies of the following infonnation:
(1) Applicants response to NRC Question on Instrumentation and Control - Question 3A.9.
(2) Applicants response to NRC Question on Instrumentation and Control - Question 7A.l.
(3)
Revised PVNGS 1, 2 & 3 PSAR page 3.11-11.
(4) Revised PVNGS 1, 2 & 3 PSAR page 8.3-32A.
(5)
Revised PVNGS 1, 2 & 3 PSAR pages 7.3-22 and 7.3-39.
(6)
Revised PVNGS 1, 2 & 3 PSAR page 7.1-10.
(7)
Revised PVNGS 1, 2 & 3 PSAR Section 7.6.1 and 7.6.2.
Items (1) and (2) will be incorporated into Amendment 2 to the PVNGS 4 & 5 PSAR.
Items (3) through (7) will be incorporated into Amendment 20 to the PVNGS 1, 2 & 3 PSAR.
In addition, the PVNGS 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 FSAR will incor-porate the environmental conditions predicted for the Main Steam Support Structure during normal and accident conditions.
x[\\e 7901080 W g,
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 7-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Roger Boyd, Director Division of Project Management PVNGS-199-JMA/DBK January 3, 1979 Page 2 Respectfully submitted, ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY l
By:
4 40 A
1 Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President, Nuclear Projects ANPP Project Director On its own behalf and as agent for all other joint applicants.
STATE OF ARIZONA
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County of Maricopa )
Subscribedandsworntobeforemethis3 day of January, 1979.
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PVNGS-4&S PSAR design.
We will review the response to this guide when it is
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addressed in CESSAR, however you should be aware that heat-up and cool-down curves and technical specifications applicable to Palo Verde must utilize the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.99.
RESPONSE
Palo Verde will use the heat-up and cool-down curves and technical specifications resolved between the NRC staf f and APS in the FSAR.
Refer to CESSAR FSAR Appendix A for a discussion of the CESSAR design.
QUESTION 3A.9 Qualification Review Item (E-27) - Environmental Control and Qualification Outside Containment.
This response does not satisfy our concerns as stated in quali-fication review item E-27.
Specific problem areas of the response are:
1.
Only a few plant areas are identified, 2.
Only the temperature environment is mentioned, 3.
Portable temperature recorders are used to ensure that limits established by the environmental qualification program for Class lE equipment are not exceeded but they are placed in the area only after alarms indicate they are needed, 4.
Abnormal environmental conditions for the control room are not defined, f %.
C.
January 12, 1979 3A-5 Amendment 2 12-22-78
PVNGS-4&5 PSAR C..
Describe administrative procedures that will ensure 4.
environmental control systems continue to be operable during plant shutdown or hot standby, Justify the use of portable temperature recorders and 5.
describe how their use meets the requirements of qualification review item E-27 as it pertains to encironmental monitoring equipment (including con-trol room alarm),
Describe the method of analysis to be provided accord-6.
ing to qualification review item E-27, and Identify and justify each exception to the Staff's require-C.
ments A and B above.
RESPONSE
2 The following plant areas contain safety related A.
equipment:
1.
Auxiliary Building a.
HPSI pump rooms b.
LPSI pump rooms c.
CSS pump rooms d.
ECW pump rooms e.
ESF electrical penetration areas f.
CEDM control cabinet room 2.
Main Steam Support Structure Motor driven auxiliary feed pump room a.
b.
Turbine driven auxiliary feed pump room Area above elevation 100' c.
3.
Diesel Generator Building a.
DG rooms b.
DG control area Amendment 2 January 12, 1979 37 7 12-
-78
PVNGS-4&S PSAR dose of 1 x 10 R.
This qualification is sufficient to 6
ensure that the safety related equipment in the Main Steam Support Structure will not be exposed to environmental conditions during normal operation, shutdown or standby for which it has not been qualified.
B.1 The environmental control systems for the areas listed in Response A are described in detail in PVNGS 1, 2& 3 PSAR Sections 6.4 and 9.4.
In general, two for areas containing safety related equipment separate environmental control systems are provided.
One system operates during normal plant conditions.
The second (essential) system operates during emer-gency conditions.
The remote shutdown panel area is located adjacent switchgear, ESF equipment and essential to the ESF 2
battery rooms and utilizes the same environmental control systems as these rooms.
3 PSAR Table 9.4-2 summarizes the inside B.2 PVNGS 1, 2&
areas and rooms design conditions for the buildings, listed in Response A.
The normal and essential environmental control systems are designed to main-tain these conditions during normal plant operation Either and during shutdown or standby conditions.
the normal or the essential environmental control system is capable of maintaining these environmental conditions.
In order to assure the function of the safety related equipment listed in Response A during accident condi-tions, the equipment is qualified to perform its safety related function in the environmental condi-tions listed in PVNGS 1, 2, & 3 PSAR Tables 3.11-1 and 3.11-2.
January 12, 1979 3A-9 Amendment 2 12-22-78
PVNGS-4&5 PSAR b.
ESF equipment rooms c.
Essential battery rooms d.
Remote shutdown panel area 5.
Fuel Building Essential Exhaust Filter Temperature switches located in individual rooms alarm at a setpoint below the qualification tempera-ture of the equipment located in that' room.
Upon receipt of an alarm, the essential environmental control system for that room would be started to maintain room temperature below the equipment quali-fication temperature.
Operation of either the nor-mal or essential environmental control system will ensure control of humidity below that for which the equipment is qualified.
Therefore, only temperature switches are provided in each room.
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The temperature switch located in the exhaust duct of 2
the normal environmental control system for the ESF switchgear rooms, ESF equipment rooms, essential battery rooms and remote shutdown panel area monitors the performance of that system and changes in the heat loads of the areas it supplies.
The equipment located in the ESF switchgear rooms, ESF equipment ccsential battery rooms and remote s'hutdown
- room, area does not cerctitute a large Frat load.
It is expected, therefore, that temper re variations during periods of operations, s t.
Iby and shutdown would be slight, making the monitoring of individual rooms unnecessary.
The normal environmental control system will be balanced using manual dampers to pro-vide sufficient environmental conditioning to keep the safety related equipment served by it well below maximum qualified conditions.
These manual dampers C'
are not readily accessible and will not be adjusted January 12, 1979 3A-11 Amendment 2 12-22-78
PVNGS-4&5 PSAR
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this condition will be alarmed in the control room.
Administrative procedures will require operating peesonnel to respond to these alarms anf ensure that either an environmental control system is operating or if all systems are shutdown that portable temp-erature monitoring equipment is installe d nearby the affected safety related equipment before the environ-mental conditions exceed those for which the equip-ment is qualified.
Administrative procedures ensure that the environmental control systems in safety related areas are always maintained in operation during periods of plant shutdown or hot standby.
B.5 Temperature alarm setpoints are set below the quall-fication temperature of the equipment affected to allow sufficient time for corrective action or instal-lation of portable monitoring equipment prior t 2
qualification temperatures being exceeded.
The moni-toring equipment will be of high quality, continuously powered while installed and will provide a continuous temperature record during the time that temperatures exceed the equipment's qualification.
It should be noted that it is highly unlikely that both normal and essential environmental control systems will simul-taneously be inoperable requ5 ring installation of the portable monitoring equipment.
The monitoring equip-ment will be periodically testeo and calibrated.
B.6 The record of the abnormal environmental conditions in an area will be compared to the original equip-ment qualification records of the equipment in the affected areas and analyzed.
If required, appro-priate action will be taken to restore the equipment qualification.
January 12, 1979 3A-13 Amendment 2 12-22-78
(21 PVNGS-4&5 PSAR APPENDIX 7A RESPONSES TO NRC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION Refer to PVNGS-1,2,&3 PSAR Appendix 7A for responses to NRC requests for information on PVNGS-1,2,&3.
QUESTION 7A.1 Qualification Review Item (E.17) - R.
G.
1.105 - Instrument Setpoints.
The response to qualification revit4 item E.17 does not meet our requirements for conforming to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.105.
It is the staff's position that all 2
portions of R.
G.
1.105 be applied to all instrumertation sys-tems important to safety.
We request that you provide a commitment that all instrumenta-tion in systems important to safety will conform to the recom-mendations of R.
G.
1.105, and that each exception will be identified and justified.
RESPONSE
Refer to CESSAR FSAR Appendix A for instruments in the CE scope of supply.
All other instruments in systems impor-tant to safety will meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.105, except that securing devices will only be used when required to meet drift specifications and when available.
Setpoint securing devices are not used for transmitters located within containment nor for contain-ment pressure transmitters.
C.-.s January 12, 1979 7A-1 Amendment 2 12-22-78
(3)
PVNGS-1,2&3 PSAR ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
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temperature recorder will be placed in the areas alarmed to insure equipment qualification is not exceeded.
In the con-trol building where there is no potential heat source, and which is continuously manned, abnormal environmental conditions will be readily detected by operating personnel.
In the event of abnormal environmental conditions, portable temperature monitoring equipment will be placed in areas containing Class lE equipment to insure the equipment qualification is not exceeded.
In addition, the control building has not only 37 normal HVAC but two 100% redundant essential HVAC systems to insure proper cooling.
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PVNGS-1,2&3 PSAR ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS
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source of power is lost.
If the preferred source of power is not lost, the diesel will remain running for one hour.
The 3
diesel generator can start accepting loads within 10 seconds and be ccmpletely loaded within 60 seconds af ter closure of the 18 diesel generator breaker.
All the CESSAR ESF loads will be sequenced on within 30 seconds after receipt of a starting l12 signal as identified in table 8.3-3.
Relays at the diesel generator detect generator rated voltage and frequency condi-tions and provide a permissive interlock for the closing of the respective generator circuit breaker.
Upon loss of the preferred source of power without LOCA, the undervoltage system l7 initiates the starting of the diesel generators and sheds all loads.
The sequencer then automatically initiates the starting 18 of the cafe shutdown loads upon closure of the diesel generator breaker. The load shed 4che. i s blocW & 40seca %-nn3 a gum 6s.
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If the diesel generator is supplying power to the ESF bus, a 3g
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subsequent accident signal initiates starting of the loads associated with the second accident signal without shedding l3 any operating equipment.
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LO If offsite power is lost at some time after an accident and the required ESF equipment is running and the diesel generator 3
is up to rated voltage and speed, the LOCA sequencer completes restarting of the safety injection pumps within 5 seconds and 17 the auxiliary feedwater pump within 10 seconds (group 1 only) 34 such that:
A.
Interrupted flow to the core is fully reestablished with a 13 seconds.
7 B.
Interrupted auxiliary fer
'ter flow to the steam generator (s) is fully reestablished within 15 seconds.
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PVNGS-1,2&3 PSAR INTRODUCTION 4.22 Identification i
The PAM instrumentation channels will not uniquely be identified as such.
The chan-nels will be identified to distinguish between redundant channels for the same variable.
The balance of the portions of IEEE 279-1971 outlined in CESSAR Section 7.5.2.5 are not applicable.
(2)
The separation of redundant-channels is discussed 2
in section 8.3.1.4.
(3)
Conformance to Regulatory Position concerning information readout will be met by providing two redundant channels of indication for each of the analog parameters identified in CESSAR Table 7.5-3.
One'of the channels will be continuously recorded.
(4)
Conformance to Regulatory Position concerning provision for instrumentation channels to be energized from the onsite emergency power sup-plies to satisfy the single-failure criterion is discussed in section 8.3.1.1.5.
(5)
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It is understood that the NRC staff is currently preparing implementation guidance for Regulatory Guide 1.97.
Until.
this guidance is issued, it is premtture to address this Regulatory Guide.
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7.6.1 Description 7.6.1.1 Reactor Coolant Puno Cooling k'ater Supplv Monitoring Safety grade instrumentation is provided to detect the loss of cooling ~ water to the reactor coolant pumps to ensure that the operator will have sufficient time to initiate manual tripping of the pumps to protect the pumps from seal failure. The cooling water flow race to each pump is monitored by two redundant flow trans-mitters.
If the cooling water flow rate is reduced below the minimum required for pump operation, a low flow signal will be initiated in each flow channel for the affected pump. The low flow signals will indepen-dently actuate their respective Class IE redundant alarm systems in the control room.
The setpoint for alarming will be selected with sufficient margin to assure proper operator action will be taken. Refer to Section 7.6.1.2 and 7.6.2.2 for a description and analysis of the Class IE alarm system. The alarm system utilizes a one-out-of-one logic for each channel.
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'l 7.6.1.2 Class IE Alarm Svstem A Class IE alarm system is provided for a limited number te of abnormal operational occurances for which no specific automatic actuation of a safety system is required. The Class IE alarm system alerts the operator to keep the plant operating within technical specification limits and prevent equipment damage.
The IE alarm system consists of individual visual status indicators dedicated to each instrument signal with sepa-rate indicators for each channel. A common audible alarm is provided for each alarm channel. The alarmed con-dition is sealed-in once initiated even if plant conditions return to normal.
The IE alarm system is independent of the normal plant annunciation system and the redundant channels are powered from separate IE power trains.
Operator acknowledgment of IE alarms follows the same procedure used for the normal plant annunciator except that a key, which is under the administrative control of the shift supervisor, is required to silence and acknowledge the alarm.
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d 7.6.2 Analysis 7.6.2.1 Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling Water Supply Monitoring Monitoring the cooling water flow rate to the reactor coolant pumps with two visual status alarms for each pump on low cooling water flow provides sufficient information to the operator to determine if cooling water is available to each pump and take appropriate action in less than 30 minutes to protect the reactor coolant pump affected.
The instrumentation is provided in compliance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971.
7.6.2.2 Class IE Alarm System The Class IE alarm system utilizes 2 independent alarm systems, one for each channel.
There are no operating bypasses for the IE alarm system or inputs. The audible alarms for each channel must be silenced with the use of a key which is under the administrative control of the shift supervisor.
The instrumentation and input signals are providea in compliance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971.