ML19256E793
| ML19256E793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1979 |
| From: | James Smith, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256E777 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-79-15, 50-301-79-13, NUDOCS 7911150235 | |
| Download: ML19256E793 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000266/1979013
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-266/79-13; 50-301/79-15
Docket No. 50-266; 50-301
Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company
231 West Michigan
Milwaukee, WI 53203
Facility Name:
Pcint Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: Two Creeks, WI
Inspection Conducted: August 21 thtu 24 and 28 thru 31, 1979
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Inspector:
J. D. Smith
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Approved By:
R. F. Warnick, Chief
f- 2 //- 29
Reactor Projects Section 2
Inspection Summary
Inspection on August 21 thru 24 and 28 thru 31, 1979 Jteport
No. 50-266/79-13; 50-301/79-15
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection on August 21 thru 24
and 28 thru 31, 1979 to review plant operations, procedures, non-routine
event followup and independent inspection. The inspection involved 60
inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the three areas inspected, no items of noncon.pliance were
identified in two.
One item of notcompliance was identified in one area,
(Unit 2), (Infraction - Failure to observu Technical Specification require-
ments with more than one control rod inoperable - Paragraph 2.c).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- G. A. Reed, Manager, Nuclear Power Division
- J. Greenwood, Assistant to the Manager
- F. T. Rhodes, Operations Superintendent
T. F. Deddins, Maintenance Superintendent
J. Reisenbuechler, Instrument and Cont.rol Engineer
C. H. Harris, Radiochemical Engineer
- F. Zeman, Office Supervisor
The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of
the operations and maintenance section.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on August 31, 1979.
2.
Plant Operations
a.
Plant Tour
(1) The inspector performed a plant tour. The housekeeping
was good.
(2) Selected valves in the auxiliary feedwater, residual heat
removal, and core spray system were checked for proper
alignment and no discrepaccles were noted.
.
(3) Shift turnovers were observed to verify continuity was
maintained. No discrepancies were noted.
b.
The jumper bypass logs were reviewed and no discrepancies were
noted.
c.
Log books, log sheets and shift surveillance check records were
reviewed for selected days during the past five months. One
item of noncompliance was identified as follows:
On August 10, 1979, at 0310 hours0.00359 days <br />0.0861 hours <br />5.125661e-4 weeks <br />1.17955e-4 months <br /> with the reactor at 1007,
power, Unit 2 experienced a " Rod Control System Urgent Failure
Alarm". The shift operators noted that none of the rods would
move in manual. Plant management was then notified and Instrumen-
tatioc and Control department stiff were called to the plant to
correct the problem. At approximately 0452 the problem was
corrected and the rods could then be stepped in.
During this
period the requirements of Technical Specification 15.3.10.c
were not followed. These requirements are as follows:
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(1) A control rod shall be considered inoperable if the
following occurs:
(a) The rod does not drop upon removal of stationary
gripper coil voltage.
(b) The rod does not step in properly.
It shall be
assumed inoperable until it has been tested to verify
that it does drop.
(c) The rod is shown by the rod position indicator channel
to be misaligned by more than 15 inches.
It shall be
assumed inoperable until it has been tested to verify
that it does step in properly or that it does drop.
(2) No more than one inoperable control rod shall be permitted
during sustained power operation.
(3) When it has been determined that a rod does not drop on
removal of stationary 8 ripper coil voltage, the shutdown
margin shall be increased by boration as necessary to
compensate for the withdrawn worth of the inoperable rod.
If sustained power operation is anticipated, the rod
insertion limit shall be adjusted to reflect the worth of
the inoperable rod.
The inspector discussed this failure at length, with
Mr. Rhodes, Operations Superintendent and Mr. Greenwood,
Assistant to the Manager prior to the ex. . interview and
again at the exit interview. A discussicn was held on the
subject during the exit interview with Mr. G. Reed,
Manager, Nuclear Power Division, and at Mr. Reed's
suggestion subsequent to the inspection the inspector
discussed the problem by telephone with Mr. J. Zach,
Reactor Engineer. The uniform interpretation held by all
of them was that a Rod Control System failure did not
constitute a failure of the rods due to the fact that the
operator still has the capability to SCRAM all the rods.
This position seems valid, however, it does not relieve
the licensee of compliance with the definition of in-
operable control rods as defined in Technical
Specification 15.3.10.c.1.b.
As defined, the operator has
to demonstrate operability by stepping rods in or by
dropping them in.
Therefore the licensee was in violation
of subject Technical Specification on August 10, 1979
since neither action was taken. This item is an
infraction.
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d.
Special Orders and Operation Standing Orders
The current subject order = were reviewed and no discrepancies
were noted.
e.
Manager's Supervisory Staff Meeting Minutes
The subject minutes for meetings 79-08 through 79-35 were
reviewed. No items of concern were identified.
f.
Significant Operating Events
The inspector reviewed SOE's for the period of April through
August. No items of concern were identified.
3.
Procedures
a.
The following procedures were reviewed by the inspector.
(1) Operating Procedures
OP-1A Cold Shutdown to Low Power Operation
OP-3C Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown
OP-4A Filling and Venting Reactor Coolant Systeur
OP-4B Reactor Coolant Pump Operation
OP-5D Chemical Addition and Control
OP-7A PJacing Residual Heat Removal System in Operation
(2) Emergeacy Procedures
E0P-10A Control Room Inaccessibility
(3) Special Maintenance Pracedures
SMP 337, Installation of Press. Spike Dampeners in
Charging Pump Discharge Lines
SMP 338, Perform Valve Installation per M480 and Pump and
Valve Maintenance per MR-19946
SMP 339, Inspect and Repair SW-273 (Service Water
Throttle Valve Unit 2 Containment Coolers)
SMP 340, Repair Burned Cable on 2TIA Breaker
SMP 341, Perform Installation of Valve per M-481
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b.
The procedures listed above were reviewed to verify that:
(1) Procedures and changes to procedures were reviewed and
approved in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
(2) Procedure changes were made to reflect Technical
Specifications revisions.
(3) Changes made to these procedures were in conformance with
10 CFR 50.59 requirements.
(4) The overall contents of the procedures are in conformance
with Technical Specifications.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Reportable Occurrences
The following reportable occurrences were reviewed by examination of
logs, records, and through discussions with plant personnel. Occurrences
were reviewed for completion of reporting requirements, compliance
with Technical Specifications, investigation and determination of
cause, proposed corrective measures, and/or completion of corrective
action.
a.
RO 50-266/79-06 - Heat tracing of Boric Acid System, (circuit
47) inoperable. Shorted cable replaced and circuit returned to
operation.
b.
RO 50-266/79-07 - Potential loss of lubrication to plant emer-
gency diesel generator turbocharger on a hot start.
Administrative controls have been implemented to preclude
problem until modification package is installed.
c.
R0 50-266/79-08 - Design feature which allowed potential over-
loading of plant diesel generators. Pressurizer Pressure Logic
and Instrument Power Supplies have been re-configured by design
change,
d.
RO 50-266/79-09 - During a hydro of the fire water system a
fitting failed. System repaired and returned to service.
e.
RO 50-266/79-10 - Review of Engineered Safety Features circuitry
indicated vulnerability to single failures. Performed modi-
fications to the design to eliminate the problem.
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f.
R9 50-266/79-11 - Violated Containment Integrity due to failure
of a mechanical interlock. Repaired interlock, retested it and
returned to service.
g.
RO 50-266/79-12 - After coming online following an outage
discovered tube leaks in steam generator "A".
Removed the unit
from service and performed eddy c_: rent testing and leak testing.
Leak tests revealed two tubes leaking in "A" steam generator
and several damp areas in "B" steam generator. As a result of
leak tests and eddy current tests, 52 tubes in "A"
and 45 tubes
in "B" steam generator were plugged.
h.
RO 50-301/79-03 - During leak tests of containment isolation
valves two were found to have excessive leakage. Valves were
disassembled, cleaned of foreign matter in the internals and
successfully retested.
i.
RO 50-301/79-04 - During surveillance testing of safeguards
equipment, bus supply breakers exhibited an erractic long time
delay time.
Investigation revealed a problem with the Westing-
house DB50 and DB75 breakers.
In the interim the licensee will
replace questionable parts in the breaker if one is noted to
exhibit erractic behavior.
j.
RO 50-301/79-05 - Snubber on Main Steam Line was discovered to
be leakinh. Piston "O" rings were replaced and snubber
returned to service.
k.
R0 50-301/79-06 - During outage it was discovered that the
auxiliary feed line connection to main feedwater line connection
did not meet design requirements. The connections were replaced
with weldolets to meet Piping Code B 31.1 requirements.
The review of these occurrences indicated the licensee's
corrective actions appear to be adequate.
(All closed)
5.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with the licensee's representatives (denoted in
Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 31, 1979.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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