ML19256D426
| ML19256D426 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1974 |
| From: | Davis A, Spessard R, Sternberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256D423 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-74-23, NUDOCS 7910180768 | |
| Download: ML19256D426 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000289/1974023
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U. S. ATO:11C ENEnCY COM'11SS10::
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DIRECTO:L\\TE OF REGULATORY OPENsTIO::S
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REGION I
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50-289/74-23
Dochet No.:
50-289
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RO Insi.cction Report !!o.:
Licens~ce :
Metropolitan Edison. Company
License :o.:
- Three Mile Island-Unit 1
Priority:
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Category: B-2
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Location:
Middletown, Pennsylvania
Type of Licensec: PWR, 871 MWe (B&W)
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Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced
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Datesofkn'pection: May 21 thru May 23, 1974
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May 2,' 1974
Dates of Previous Inspection:
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Reporting Inspector:
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R. L. Spessard, iteactor inspector
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Accompanying Inspectors:
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D.
M'.
Sternberg, Reactor Inspector
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W. A. Ruhlman , 'Reac tor Inspec tor
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Other Accompanyin;; Personnel:
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Revie.ted 11y:
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A.
B'. Davis, Senior Reactor Inspector
D2:.
Reactor Operatiens Branch
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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Enforcement Action
A.
Violations
1.
Contrary to Technical Specification requirements, the licensee
was unable to produce any evidence to indicate the Reactor
Coolant System leakage had been evaluated on May 19 or 20,
1974, as required when the temperature of the Reactor Coolant
System exceeds 525 F.
(Detail 10)
2.
Contrary to Technical Specification requirements, the licensee
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performed modification maintenance on the 1B Emergency Diesel
Generator on May 17, 1974, without a procedure.
(Detail 19)
3.
Contrary to the requirements of Test Instruction 9, the licensee
conducted certain control rod system tests on May 22, 1974,
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using a Test Exception to deviate from an approved procedure
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when a Test Change Netice, routed through an appropriate
approval chain, was the appropriate and required procedure
change vehicle.
(Detail 20)
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items
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The licensee had taken the corrective actions described in his letters
dated April 11 and May 6, 1974, to correct the violations identified in
Reports 50-289/74-07 Detail 7a and 50-289/74-12 Detail 2.d.l.
The
inspector verified that the licensee had accomplished the actions de-
scribed in the response letters.
RO:I has no further questions on these
items.
Unusual Occurrences
A.
Two (2) Reactor Building pressure switches tripped at greater than
f our (4.0) psig during surveillance testina.
(A0 74-2, Met Ed
letter dated May 1, 1974 to Director, DL).
(Detail 16)
B.
Diesel Generator 1B f ailed to start.
(A0 74-3, Met Ed letter not
yet received).
(Detail 3 9)
C.
Control Rod Power Supply sustained fire damage.
(A0 74-4, Met Ed
letter not yet received).
(Detail 20)
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O'ther significant Findings
A.
Current Findings
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1.
The licensee has established a program for inspecting Makeup
and Purification System orifices.
(Detail 2)
2.
The SoNum ThiosulfateDas not yet been returned to full
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operational status.
(Detail 3)
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3.
The status of the licensee's Preoperational Testing, Initial
'Startup Testing and previous commitments to RO:I were in-
spected and the current completion level / implementation
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determined.
(Detail 4 through 7)
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4.
An apparent weakness was identified in the licensee's document
control system.
(Detail 8)
5.
The inspector found two (2) control room recorders operating
without chart paper.
(Detail 9)
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6.
The licensee had not established guidance as to the practices
to be followed by employees in evaluating a reactor ecclant
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leak.
(Detail 17)
7.
The inspector identified are.as of concern with the licensee's
Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Surveillance Procedure.
The
licensee took action to correct these concerns prior to the
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completion of the inspection.
(Detail 18)
8.
The inspector observed the personnel, procedures and techniques
used to determine RCS boron concentration.
(Detail 22)
B.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items
1.
The following items are resolved:
The flanged cicsures of the fuel transfer tubes have been
a..
rep, aired and successfully leak tested.
(Detail 7b(17))
b.
Type C (Isolation Valves) local leak rate testing has
been successfully completed.
(Detail 7b(17))
2.
The f ollowing items remain unresolved:
a."
The licensee's review and evaluation of the Diesel Gene-
rator Circuitry design changes has not been completed.
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b.
No procedure has been established to correct the defi-
ciency pertaining to the licensee's program for indicat-
ing the status of out of service / calibration gauges,
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- meters and instruments.
(Detail 11)
C.
New Unresolved Items
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1.
Apparent discrepancies exist in the implementation of the
surveillance test program.
(Detail 21)
Management Interview
An exit interview was held on May 23, 1974 at the conclusion of the in-
spection with the following attendees.
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Metropolitan Edison Company (Met Ed)
Mr. J. G. Herbein, Station Superintendent
Mr. J. R. Floyd, Supervisor of Operations
Mr. W. E. Potts, Supervisor of Quality Control
Mr. J. J. Colitz, Station Engineer
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Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon, Nuclear Engineer
General Public Utilities Service Corporation (GPUSC)
Mr. G. P. Miller, Test Superintendent -
Mr. J. J. Barton, Startup and Test Manager
Mr. M. J. Stromberg, Site Auditor
Mr. G. L. Roshy, Auditor
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The following sum =arizes items discussed:
A.
Makeup and Purification System Orifices.
(Detail 2)
B.
Sodium Thiosulfate Tank Operational- Status.
(Detail 3)
C.
Thermal Discharge Monitoring Equipment.
(Detail 4)
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D.
Facility Procedures.
(Detail 5)
E.
Initial Startup Test Program.
(Detail 6)
F.
Preoperational Test Program.
(Detail 7)
G.
Document Control.
(Detail 8)
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H. l Control Room Recorders.
(Detail 9)
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Apparent Violation - Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate Sur-
veillance.
(Detail 10)
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Instrument Status Indication. _(Detail 11)
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First Aid Training - Supervisory Personnel.
(Detail 12)
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Minor Deficiencies - Emergency Drill.
(Detail 13)
M.
Chlorine Discharge Logs.
(Detail 14)
N.
Work Authorization Approval / Routing - Additional Training.
(Detail
15)
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Followup Action - /0 74-02.
(Detai1 16)
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Reactor Coolant Leak - Sample Line.
(Detail 17)
Q.
RCS leak Rate Surveillance Procedure.
(Detail 18)
R.
Apparent Violation - Diesel Generator Fbintenance.
(Detail 19)
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Apparent Violation - Control Rod Drive System Test Procedure
Deviation.
(Detail 20)
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Surveillance Test Procedures Review.
(Detail 21)
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Boron Concentration Determination.
(Detail 22)
In each area listed above, the licensee representatives acknowledged the
information presented by the inspectors.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted on Site - - _ - -
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Metropolitan Edison Company (Met Ed)
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Dr. T. S. Baer, Station Engineer
Mr. E. E. Bulmer, Mechanical. Engineer
Mr. J. J. Colitz, Station Engineer
Mr. N. E. Derks, Shift Foreman - Unit 2
Mr. J. R. Floyd, Supervisor of Operations - Unit 1
Mr. K. H. Frederick, Staff Chemist
Mr. C. F. Gilbert, Supervisor of Operations - Unit 2
Mr. F. H. Grice, Administrator
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Mr. R. R. Harper, Instrument Foreman'
Mr. C. E. Hartman, Electrical Engineer
Mr. J. G. Herbein, Station Superintendent
Mr. T. F. Illjes, Auxiliary Operator
.Mr. G. A. Kunder, Engineer
Mr. L. A. Laine, Quality Assurance Specialist
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Mr. G. S. Millas, Mechanical Engineer
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Mr. R. P. Miller. Test Coordinator
Mr. H. M. Mitchell, Electrical Supervisor
Mr.
J.-P. O'Hanlon, Nuclear Engineer
Mr. R. H. Porter, Shif t Supervisor
thr.. W. E. Potts, Supervisor - Quality Control
Mr. W. S. Poyck, Staff Specialist
Mr. C. E. Randolph, Engineering Assistant
Mr. R. A. Rice, Security Specialist
Mr. M. J. Ross, Shift Supervisor
Mr. D. M. Shovlin, Supervisor of Maintenance
Mr. J. R. Smith, Shift Supervisor
Mr. J. W. Smith, Sr., Utility Man First Class
Mr.
H.- G. Synder, Mair'enance Foreman
Mr. J. H. Thomas, Coo .~.nator of Services
Mr. R. P. Valez, Radiation Chemistry Technician
Mr. D. E. Weaver, Instrument Foreman
Mr. H. L. Wilson, Instrument Foreman
General Public Utilities Service Corcoration (GPUSC)
Mr. J. Barton, Startup and Test Manager
Mr. T. Faulker, Senior Test Planner
Mr. R. Heward, Project Manager
Mr. C. Miller, Test Superintendent
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Mr. M. Nelson, Technical Engineer
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Mr. G. Roshy, Quality Assurance Auditor
Mr. M. Stromberg, Site Quality Assurance Auditor
Mr. R. Toole, Assistant Test Superintendent
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2.
Makeup and Purification System Orifices
This design change was reported by the licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 55 (c) .
(Met Ed letter dated April 30, 1974 and 50-289/74-18,
Design Changes, Item B).
The inspector reviewed the immediate
corrective action taken by the licensee until the future corrective
action is completed (installation of new orifices).
The licensee
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has established a program consisting of UT examination of the
recirculation orifice associated with each makeup pump (total of 3
pumps).
The inspection interval for these orifices is once every
two weeks.
This program including data evaluation is being con-
ducted by GPUSC-QA.
The inspector has no further questions on this
matter at this time.
3.
Sodium Thiosulfate Tank Operational Status *
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Based on a review of facility records, the inspector verified that
the tank level instrumentation had been calibrated on Fby 8,1972
and the tank concentration met the requirements of Technical Speci-
fi.;ation 3.3.1.3 on May 16, 1974 (e.g., 34,014 pounds of sodium
thiosulfate at 26.2 weight percent solution with a pH of 9.7).
The
inspector informed a licensee representative that since the tank
concentration was very close to the lower limit of the acceptance
band (34,000 - 36,000 pounds), it would seem prudent to add addi-
tional sodium thiosulfate to the tank to insure the tank concentra-
tion would meet the Technical Specification requirements at the
next quarterly sample.
The representative indicated that the
inspector's comment would be considered.
The inspector learned
from discussions with cognizant licensee representatives that
installation and testing of the tank heat tracing and installation
of the tank insulation had not been completed.
These items remain
outstanding, and they require completion before R0:1 will recommend
to DL that License Condition 2.c.(1) be cleared or unless DL amends
the license to impose a suitable Technical Specification limit on
tank temperature.
4.
Thermal Discharge Monitoring Equipment
Facility records indicated that this equipment was tested and'in
operation prior to heating of the Reactor Coolant System above
2000F, which occurred on May 17, 1974.
This item is closed.
(Report 50-289/74-18, Detail 13.0. (2))
- Met Ed letter dated April 11, 1974, to Director, DRO
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5.
Facility Procedures
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Based on discussions with a cognizant licensee representative the in-
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spector determined that Operating and Surveillance Procedures which
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were revised to incorporate changes created by FSAR Amendment 47 had
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been issued with the exception of the Surveillance Procedure for per-
forming In-Service Inspection.
The representative stated this pro-
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cedure would be issued in the near future, and the inspector noted
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that the procedure would not be performed until 3 years in the future.
This item is closed.
(Report 50-289/74-18, Details 13.a. (a)(c) and
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13.a. (2) (b))
6.
Initial Startup Test Program
a.
Procedures
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The inspector observed that all of these procedures had been
final approved by the TWG.
The inspector reviewed the follow-
ing procedures and verified that previous RO:I comments had
been included in accordance with the licensee's co=mitments.
(Report 50-289/74-18, Detail 6.b. Items (3) and (4))
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(1)
SP 710/2 Controlling Precedure for Post Core Load Pre-
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critical Testing
(2) TP 710/1 Zero Power Test
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Test Results
The inspector verified by review of the completed procedures
(Official Field Copy) that the licensee had accepted the test
results for TP 330/3A, Post Core Load CRDM Functional Test.
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Included in the inspector's review (on a sampling basis) was
the licensee's disposition of identified test exceptions and
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deficiencies and comparison of test data with acceptance
criteria. The inspector also observed that problems identi-
fled during hot functional testing had been corrected and
the CRDM's satisfactorily retested.
This item is closed.
(Report 50-289/74-08, Detail 6 Item e.).
Data also included
a satisfactory retest on CRD No. 29 which could not be moved
from its fully inserted position following cc=pletion of
cold /no flow CRD Trip Tests.
This problem which was reported
by the 1.'aensee by telephone to RO:I on May 15, 1974, was
corrected by venting the CRDM.
Additionally, all CRDM's were
vented.
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7.
Preoperational Test Program
The inspector reviewed TWG Meeting minutes for the period April
25 - May 21, 1974 (Meetings 103-109), completed test results
(Official Field Copy), and the status of the prerequisite list for
initial criticality.
Additionslly, the licensee's plans relative
to completion of the test program prior to initial criticality were
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reviewed.
The following information was obtained:
a.
Preoperational Testing Status
Tests Completed and 'ccepted
78%
Tests Partially Completed and Accepted
11%
Tests Completed and Under Review
7%
Tests Not Completed
4%
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The licensee does not plan to complete the tests listed below
prior to initial criticality.
Partial test completion and
licensee acceptance of partial test data are indicated where
appropriate.
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(1)
F1104/23 - Cycle Makeup Demineralizers Functional Test
(2)
F1104/6 - Spent Fuel Cooling Functional Verification
(3)
SP 102.6 - Fire Protectior. System Checkout (Partially
Completed)
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(4)
SP 254.33 - Turbine Generator Initial Operation (Partially
Completed and Accepted)
(5) TP 350/2 - Computoc 0 osm- - Field Verification (Sof tware)
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(PartiallyCompletedandpgcepted)
(6)
TP 350/10 - Computer Points Verification (Partially
Completed)
(7). TP 120/1 - Iuel Handling System Operational and Functional
Test (Partially Completed and Accepted)
(8)
TP 120/2 - Dry Fuel Handling Test (Partially Completed
and Accepted)
(9) TP 120/3 - Fuel Handling System Integrated Functional
Test (Partially Completed and Accepted)
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(10) TP 360/1A - Process Radiation Monitor Calibration and
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Functional Test - Portable Atmospheric (Partially Com-
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pleted and Accepted)
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(11) TP 230/8 - Solid daste Disposal System Test (Partially
Completed and Accepted)
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(12) Tp'230/7 - FWehanicif Draf t Cooling Tower Functional Test
The inspector informed cognizant licensee representatives that
their plans relative to not completing the preoperational test-
ing program as described in the FSAR (Section 13.1.3.2) would
constitute a change pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(a), and therefore,
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the applicable require-
ments of the Technical Specifications (Section 6) would have
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to be cet prior to initial criticality.
The representatives
acknowledged this information.
b.
Test Results
The procedures listed below had been completed and accepted by
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the licensee unless otherwise indicated.
Included in the
JBb
inspector's review (on a sampling basis) was the licensee's
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disposition of identified test exceptions and deficiencies and
comparison of test data with acceptance criteria.
The inspector
had no further questions relative to tha licensee's acceptance
of these results unless otherwise indicated.
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(1)
SP 267/5 - Flow Balance for FCR 218 (Hot Drain Coolers)
(2)
F1104/14E - Reactor Building Industrial Cooler System
Functional Verific:tf er.
(3) TP 302/2B - In-core vecector Pre-Installation Electrical
Test
(4)
TP 160/3 - Reactor Building Purge System Functional Test
(5)
SP 201.19 - Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration Test
(6)
TP 200/1 - Reactor Internals Vent Valve Inspection Test
(7)
F1104/29E - LWDS Functional Verification - Bleed and Feed
Processes
(8)
TP 310/4 - E.S. Annunciator and Alarm Test
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(9)
F1106/17 - Turbine High Pressure Fluid System Functional
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Verification
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(10) TP 266/4 - Nuclear Service River Water Functional Test
(11) SP 166.2 - Plant Test Panel Pre-Op Alignment
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(12) TP 600/21 - Integrated E.S. Test
(13) F1104/16 - Penetration Ccoling System Functional Test
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'(14) TP 600/29 - Reactor Coolant System Thermal Expansion
Functional Test
(15) TP 153/3 - Fluid Block System Functional Verification
.
According to the FSAR (Section 5.3.5.2), the anticipated
maximum leakage rate frem the groups of lines fluid blocked
by FB-T-1A and FB-T-1B is 0.0024 and 0.003 gpm respectively.
However, the test results disclosed the leakage rate from
both groups of lines fluid blocked by these tanks was
0.0027 gpm, thus indicating leakage in excess of the accep-
tance criterion for the group of lines fluid blocked by
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This matter was reviewed by GAI and was deter-
mined to be acceptable on the basis of a recalculated maxi-
mum leakage rate from these lines for actual system condi-
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tions. The FSAR is to be revised to reflect the as built
maximum leakage rate criteria,
e.g., 0.00354 and 0.00347
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gpm vice 0.0024 and 0.0027 gpm.
It remains open pending
FSAR amendment.
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(16) TP 120/3 - Fuel Handling System Integrated Functional Test
This test was partially completed using a dum=y fuel
assembly prior to fuel load and the results were accepted
by the licensee.
The open item in this test involves the
ccatrol rod handling mechanism which has experienced limit
switch problems.
The licensee plans to cr rect this pro-
blem prior to refueling operations.
.
(17) TP 151/1 - Reactor Building Isolation Valve Leak Tests
This test was completed and the test results were in the
licensee's review circuit. The flanged closures of the
fuel transfer tubes were repaired and data indicated
acceptabic leakage rates.
This item is resolved.
(Reports
50-289/74-18, Detail 3.a. (9)(a) and 50-289/ 74-12, Detail
2.d.(3)).
Data indicated that total Type C (Isolction
Valves) leakage corrected to Pa (55 psig) was 7,522.9
cc/ min as compared to the acceptance criterion of 7,865
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cc/ min (.2 La).
This item is resolved.
(Reports 50-
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289/74-18, Detail 3.a.(10) and 50-289/74-12, Detail 6)
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The inspector observed that the above tests had been conducted
and accepted in accordance with the licensee's commitments to
RO:I.
(Met Ed letter dated April 19, 1974 to the Director,
DRO, RO:I and Report 50-289/74-18, Details 2 and 3)
.
8.
Document Control
The FSAR (Appendix 1A) describe the lic.nsee's Operating Quality
Assurance Plan and Section VI of Appendix 1A describes Document
Control requirements. Administrative Procedure No. 1001 had been
approved and was being implemented in accordance with referenced
requirements. As a result of two separate occurrences observed by
the inspectors during this RO inspection, it appears that the
.
licensee's system does not include a'dequate controls to insure that
the latest approved drawing revisions are promptly distributed in
accordance with the Unit 1 Drawing and Micro-film aperature card
distribution list.
Examples illustrating
is weakness are as
follows:
a.
During discussions with a Met Ed Electrical Engineer relative
to recent design changes made to the Diesel Generator start
circuitry, the inspector observed that the drawing being used
by the engineer (No. 11865841, Rev. 11) did not reflect these
,
design changes.
This drawing had been revised (Revisions 12
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and 13) on April 4,1974, and a copy of the revised drawing,
which had been provided to RO:I during a previous RO inspec-
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tion (completed April 19, 1974), was being used by the in-
spector to conduct this review.
b.
A design change to one of the four main steam line penetra-
tions, as described in Met Ed's letter dated April 5, 1974 to
the Deputy Director for Reactor Projects, DL, was completed in
accordance with an approved GPU Work Authorization on Mty 8,
1974. During discussions with cognizant licensee representa-
tives, the inspector was informed that Met Ed personnel had
restored this enetration to its original condition because it
was observed ta be different frem the other penetrations as
described in facility drawings.
The inspector reviewed the
approved Met Ed Work Request No. 000062 used-to perform this
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work and observed that the Work Request had been initiated,
approved, and completed in accordance with Administrative
Procedure No. 1016. The work was completed on May 15, 1974.
This
condition was discovered due to an indication of excessive
flow (indicative of a leak) in the penetration pressurization
system which was the basis for the design change.
This marter was discussed with cognizant licensee representatives,
and it is considered an open item.
9.
Control Room Recorders
The inspector observed two (2) recorders operating without paper
on the Heating and Ventilation Control Panel in the control room.
Specifically, recorder No. 54, Fuel lJandling Building Exhaust Flow
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and recorder no. 56, Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building Total
Exhaust Flow.
When the inspector observed these recorders, they
had both been out of paper for appro::imately ten (10) hours accord-
ing to the time stamp on the chart paper.
When notified of the
condition, the Shif t Supervisor immediately caused the correct chart
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paper to be installed on the recorders.
The Supervisor of Operations
stated th. t all operations personnel would again be briefed on the
importance of properly maintaining all control room recorders.
The
inspector had no further questions in this area.
10.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate Surveillance
,
A' review of the logbook in the control room indicated that the reactor
coolant system was above 525 F from approximately 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> on May
19, 1974 thru May 23, 1974 when the inspection ended.
The inspector
requested the copies of the data sheets from Surveillance Procedure
1303-1.1 (Reactor Coolant Syrtem Leak Rate) for the period from May 19
through May.22, 1974.
The licensee representatives were unable to
locate any data sheets for May 19 and 20, 1974.
In addition, there was,
according to the Supervisor of Operations, no evidence to indicate that
required leak rate determination / evaluation had been perfor=ed
prior to May 21, 1974.
The licensee representative was informed
that the lack of Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate determination / evaluation
was in violation of the requirement of Technical Specifications
Table 4.2-1, Item 7 which states that daily, when reactor coolant
system temperature is greater than 525 F, RCS leak rate must be
evaluated. The representative acknowledged the information
11.
Instrument Status Indication
A deficiency was identified (Report 50-289/74-21, Detail 3) with the
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licensee's program for indicating the operating status of equipment,
especially out of service / calibration meters and instrumentation.
The licensee representatives stated that a system requiring the use
of special tags had been devised and that tags had been ordered.
The licensee representative further stated that the procedure stating
how/when these new tags were to be used had not yet been written or
approved._.S_ince the licensee _had_not yet completed or implemented a
.
system to alleviate the deficiency noted,.this item remains unresolved.
12.
First Aid Training-Supervisory Personnel
The sole remaining deficiency with respect to emergency training was
identified (Report 50-289/74-10, Detail 7) at the time of the Emer-
gency Training Exercise as the lack of intensive first aid training
for various supervisory licensee personnel. Records furnished by the
.
licensee during this inspection indicated that these personnel had
received the required training during a forty (40) hour course of
first aid instruction given during the period of March 11, through
15, 1974.
This item is now resolved.
13. Minor Deficiencies-Emergency Drill
,,
The minor deficiencies identified by both the RO:I inspector and the
licensee (Report 50-289/74-10, Detail 8) during the conduct of the
Emergency Training Exercise were not considered as serious or out-
standing items with respect to emergency planning.
However, the
inspector did discuss the action taken on all of these items with
licensee representatives during this inspection.
The licensee had
taken action on each item to ensure that the noted deficiency was cor-
rected and had taken steps to prevent recurrence. RO:I has no further
questions on these items.
14.
Chlorine Discharge Logs
In a letter dated March 29, 1974, RO:I identified a violation with
respect to chlorine monitoring associated with the chlorination
systems.
(Report 50-289/74-07, Detail 7a).
In the Metropoligan
Edison response to RC:I dated April 11, 1974, steps were outlined to
correct the deficiency. The inspector verified that the chlorine
usage logs referenced in the response were in use and reviewed weekly
by the chemistry foreman.
In addition, the training of persennel res-
ponsible for maintaining the log was verified in discussions with the
cognizant supervisor.
R0:I has no further questions in this area at
this time.
.
15. Work Authbrication Approval / Routing - Additional Training
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In a letter dated April 16, 1974, RO:I identified a procedural vio-
.
lation with respect to work performed without a completed and approved
work authorization.
(Report 50-289/74-12, Detail 2.d.1).
The cor-
rective action specified in the-licensee's response dated May 6, 1974
consisted of additional training for all supervisors functionally res-
ponsible for station operation or maintenance.
The training, a man-
datory three-(3) hour classroom session on the administrative proce-
-
dures covering Work Authorizations / Work Requests together with approved
work implementation procedures for all work on Quality Control related
systems, was given as stated in the letter.
The inspector verified the
licensee's implementation of the corrective action by questioning a ran-
domly selected supervisor about the contents, requirements and duration
of th'e lecture.
R0:I has no further questions in this area at this
time.
,
16.
Followuo Action-A0 74-02
The licensee stated in a letter dated May 1,1974, that the followup
action to correct the out of specification settings on the Reactor
Building High Pressure reactor trip pressure switches consisted of
__
making the setpoint for the switches 3.75 psig instead of the old set-
point of 4 psig. This action was taken based upon a review of the
technical manuals for the switches by on-site engineering personnel
who co,ncluded that the potential setpoint error was +0.135 psig.
The
inspector was shown documentation which indicated that the new setpoint
(S.75 psig) had bean set on each of the four (4) pressure switches as
indicated in the licensee's letter.
R0:I has no further questions in
this area at this time.
17.
Reactor Coolant leak - Samole Line
The inspector observed water dripping from the area of a fitting near
a valve in the sample line connected to the Pressurizer.
A licensee
representative was informed of the leakage.
This representative
evaluated the leakage and determined that the source of the water was
the reactor coolant system; shutoff valves upstream would isolate the
leak if closed; both samples and direct reading methods indicated
that thert was no detectable radiation.
The area was roped-off and
posted as possibly contaminated and the shutoff valves upstream of the
leak were closed. A formal evaluation was conducted the next morning
by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) .
The PORC concurr2d
with the initial evaluation but ordered a complete survey of al] valves
and lines in the sample sink area as an additional precaution.
The
survey ordered did discover some additional leakage and potential leak-
age probl. css and a work request was issued to fix all identified prob-
lems.
However, during discussions with cognizant licensee represenca-
tives in the course of following the actions taken above, the inspector
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determined that the licensee did not have any definitive instructions
which covered the actions to be taken with regards to: what manage-
. ment level is required to make an evaluation of leakage; what level of
evaluation is required with respect to causes, severity, potential
hazards, unreviewed safety questions, generic implication and other
salient points of interest.
The inspector stated that R0:I had no
-
further questions with respect to the actions taken on the particular
leak mentioned above; however, the licensee's lack of instructions
covering this area remains an open item.
The licensee representatives
acknowledged the inspector's statements and stated that the areas of
concern mentioned by the inspector would be evaluated.
18.
RCS Leak Rate Surveillance Procedure
In his review of the RCS Leak Rate S.urveillance Procedure (1303-1.1)
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the inspector expressed concerns in the following areas:
a.
The procedure used the approximate values for cubic feet per pound
mass per degree Fahrenheit and the values were only identified for two
(2) distinct temperatures.
-
b.
The procedure did net prohibit makeup to the system during the test
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nor did it account for any makeup =ade during the test.
Before' leaving the site, the licensee had approved and issued changes to
the procedure which eliminated both of the inspector's concerns.
The
inspector had no further questions in this area.
19. Diesel Generator Maintenance
Modification maintenance to the 13 Emergency Diesel Generator was per-
formed on May 17, 1974 without a procedure.
This maintenance consisted
of installing a larger diameter pressure sensing line for a low speed
oil pressure switch and re-installation of this switch following a test
in a temporary location. During this sensing line installation, 3 other
lube oil pressure switches were left disconnected.
A post maintenance
start of the diesel was attempted and the diesel shutdown at 810 rpm
due to the disconntected pressure switches.
Th _ s maintenance action is a violation of Technical Specification Section 6.2, which requires all =aintenance which affect nuclear safety
be accomplished using detailed procedurec.
The licensee stated he generated a procedure to correct this action
and that he will use it during the installation of the modification
of the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator.
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20.
Control Rod Drive System Test Procedure Deviation
While performing rod drop response time tests on May 22, 1974 with
the primary system in a hot, no-flow condition, a test procedure
change was proposed.
This change was intended to shorten the
duration of the test. The intent of the change was to pull two rods
at the same time, specifically a Group 2 rod with Group 5.
A Test
Exception was taken and the Group 2 rod was re-patched into Group 5
and a Group 5 rod was left unpatched.
During the re-patching the
motor power leads were transferred into Group 5, but the logic and
control patch was not moved.
This resulted in a fire and damage to
the control circuitry when the re-patched rod was placed on the
Auxiliary Rod Bus.
The use of a Test Exception to change the procedure was a violation of
.
Tcst Instruction 9, Conduct of Test,' paragraph 3.3.2.6 which states in
part,". ..During the performance of tests certain conditions may occur
th'at prevent the test from being performed as written.
Changes to the
test procedure are made by making an exception to it or by initiating a
Test Change Notice (TCN).
~T
A TCN is required if the. proposed change affects the procedure's scope or
intent. A Test Exception Change does not change the scope or intcnt
of the procedure. . ."
.
Since the scope of the procedure was changed by the re-patching, a TCN
which would have required detailed procedures should have been used in
this situation.
21.
Surveillance Test Procedure Review
The inspector reviewed surveillance procedures completed la the areas of
the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguards systems.
The data
reviewed had completed the licensee's review process, described in Admin-
istrative Procedure No. 1010 and were selected in a random manner by
the inspector.
Several general areas of concern were identified including unauthorized
changes to procedures, failure to follow the procedure, and incorrect
handling of test deficiencies.
Several typical examples are included
below to illustrate these com=erts.
a.
Failure to follow procedures:
1.
S.P. 1302-5.1,5.5 performed on February 25, 1974 and April
1, 1974 had data sheets which were not signed by the foreman
as required (Data sheets on page 65 and 4 and 5 respectively)
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S.P. 1303-11.11 performed on March 14,197equired that the
specific gravities of individual battery cells be recorded.
No such data
3 entered on Data Sheet 3.
b.
Unauthorized changes to Procedures
1.
S.P. 1302-5.1,5.5 performed on April 1, 1974 had the re-
-
quired values to be obtained changed in part 6.1 with no
explanation.
.
2.
S.P. 1302-5.6 performed on March 4, 1974 had the required
values to be obtained changed on Data Sheets 3,5,6 and 7
with no explanation.
c.
Incorrect Handling of Test Defi,ciencies
-
1.
S.P. 1303-5.1, 5.3, 5.8 performed on February 25, 1974 and
April 2, 1974 on pages 33.0, 34, 35a and 35b indicated that
certain circuit breakers were " Red Tagged" rather,than in-
dicating if they were in the required position for the test.
No Test Exception or Deficiency was noted.
These deficiencies occurred during surveillance tests performed prior to
the issuance of the Operating License on April 19, 1974.
Cognizant
licensde representatives were informed that if these deficiencies re-
mained uncorrected and the tests were used as a part of the bases for
'
allowing achievement of initial criticality, then this would be in
violation of the Technical Specifications.
The representatives tek-
nowledged the inspector's statement. This is considered an unresolved
item.
,
22.
Boron Concentration Determination
As part of the Initial Criticality pre-requisite review, the in-
spector observed a licensee's representative determine the Boron
concentration of the primary coolant.
It was observed that this was
done in accordance with the procedure, in a timely fashion and that
the person performing it was knowledgeable of the procedure.
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