ML19256D039

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Forwards Insp Rept 50-289/74-35 for Revision of Tech Specs Re 100% Rated Power & Shock Suppressor Surveillance
ML19256D039
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/03/1975
From: Brunner E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Thornburg H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML19256D033 List:
References
NUDOCS 7910160764
Download: ML19256D039 (2)


See also: IR 05000289/1974035

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UNITED STATES

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

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H. D. Thornburg, Chief, Field Support and Enforcement Branch, RO:HQ

RO INSPECTION REPORT 50-289/74-35 (Track //F14043H0)

The subject report is forwarded for Headquarters action as follows:

1.

Revision of Technical Suecifications with respect to 100% rated cower.

As noted in report Dets

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there is an apparent discrepancy

between the Technical Spec ___eations and the license with regard to

the limit on reactor power.

Also the regional position on this mat-

ter, which was provided to the licensee, is stated.

Our position

was based on the following:

a.

License Condition 2.c(1) is in itself explicit, and compliance

with this limit is, in our opinion, determined by heat balance

in accordance with Technical Specifications Table 4.1-1, Item 3.

b.

The Technical Specification limit of 102% power refers, in our

opinion, to power determined by the power range channels (neutron

detectors) which provide input signals to the protection system

reactor power / imbalance trip circuit.

c.

According to Technical Specifications Table 4.1-1, Item 3, when

the core heat balance and the power range channels differ by

more than 2%, the power range amplifier for the affected chan-

nel(s) must be recalibrated.

Therefore, core power by heat

balance could be 2535 MWt (licensed power) and core power by

power range monitors could be 102%, the license and Technical

Specifications would be adhered to, and the apparent discrepancy

referred to disappears.

We believe that the proper method of clearing up this matter, is by

an appropriate change to Section 3 of the Technical Specifications,

i.e., defining a new LCO.

We would like to see a specification

which addresses core power limit, as identified in the facility

license, the method for determining core power, and the actions re-

quired when this limit is exceeded. Additionally, this recommenda-

tion should be applied generically for inclusion in Standard

Technical Specificationc currently being developed by DL and to

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other facilities which, like Three Mile Island, are not explicit

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in this regard.

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H. D. Thornburg

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2.

Revision of Technical Specifications with respect to shock supptessor

surveillance.

As noted in report Detail 2.b(8), several snubbers were found with

very little fluid in their reservoirs, and the licenaee's resolution

of this specific problem and long term corrective actions are dis-

cussed.

Other similar failutes have been reported by the licensee

(Abnormal Occurrence Reports Nos. 50-289/74-14, 74-20 and 74-23)

and additional commitments are described in these reports.

These failures were detected during surveillance inspections started

by the licensee in August 1974 as a result of suggestions made by

our inspector because Technical Specifications Table 4.1-2, Item 11

only requires inspection at refueling intervals.

Additionally,

Calvert Cliffs Technical Specifications Table 4.2-2, Item 24 also

requires inspection at refueling intervals.

We believe that refueling interval inspections are inadequate based

on Met Ed's experience and are inconsistent with the inspection fre-

quency for Bergen-Patterson and other brand suppressors established

by DL correspondence to several licensees following initial discovery

of this problem with Bergen-Patterson snubbers (example enclosed as

Enclosure 1).

In the case of Met Ed the snubbers involved have been

manufactured by Grinnell.

We recommend that the Technical Specifications for all licensees

should include inspections of snubbers at 120 day intervals.

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Et J. Brunner, Chief

R actor Operations Branch

Enclosure:

As stated

cc:

J. Davil

K. Seyfrit

F. Dreher

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