ML19254A656
| ML19254A656 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1979 |
| From: | Werts R GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Arnold R GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254A654 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906260211 | |
| Download: ML19254A656 (3) | |
Text
Inter-Office Memorandum 4e
_MA! 3, 1979 cer REIAIATICS OF EXTRA-PRECAUTIONARY MFJ.SURES 20 PO'aER SUPPLY AT 'Dil MR. R. C. ARNOLD Locaten RT GINC Our me=o of April 12, 1979 outlined the precautionarv and saf ety =casures taken to establisi. and caintain the security of the power supply to the Island.
Subsequent to that meso, an additional meeting was held on April 17, 1979 with the NRC/GPU/ Met-Ed staff to develop an additional of f-site source to the 4.16 kV bus to backup the circulating pu=ps.
The plan was approved by the NRC and the 13.8 kV f acilities were installed and ready for service by April 25, 1979.
Now that the unit is approaching cold shutdown, the 6.9 kV pt=ps are not required, and the of f-site direct feed to the 4.16 kV bus is available, we request per=ission to remove the personnel on standby at the TMI 230 kV switching station and at the Middletown Junction substation. These een are required for duty elsewhere and were originally deployed to provide emergency operations during the critical ti=e i==ediately following the accident.
Both stations are remotely controlled anc'. supervised from the Lebanon Dispatch Office. Telephone. and radio co==unications are available between the dispatcher and the 'DtI Control Roem.
We vill continue to have supervisory personnel on call during any extreme weather conditions. Hence, it is proposed to return.the combustion turbines in Met-Ed's Western Division to normal economic dispatch, discontinue roving line patrols, and return to normal' r.aintenance practices on the bulk power system.
The reliability of the electric supply to the Island will not be jeopardized by the discontinuance of these extra-precautionary measures implemented for the original emergency.-
e Your early response vill be appreciated.
I N
R. V. L'ERTS RW/wp J. S. Zartman #
cc:
C. M. Daniels H. M. Dieckamp R. E. Dudley J. D. Cassert D. S. Righ I90gggggf E. Newton Jr.
H. L. Robidous
Question III.4:
Is more attention currently needed to the sabotage risk
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at TMI?
-- Please comment specifically on the articles c.
this subject that appeared in the Harrisburg Guide on this subject.
Include with your response the cc.nplete LER file on this matter.
Answer Special safeguards measures have been put in place at TMI in order to maintain the effectiveness of their security program. The two units have been physically separated and an access control point has been established to limit and control movement of personnel from one unit to the other.
In addition, both Units 1 and 2 have a separate, armed response force dedicated to meeting the response requirements at each location. The alarm stations and off site radio communications for both units are located within the Unit 1 area. These modifications will remain in effect for the duration of the recovery efforts underway at Unit 2.
In regard to the news article, the observations reported in the Harrisburg Guide article raise three general issues of concern:
(1)
Present limitations on the effectiveness of license programs for pre-employment screening of guard personnel (both contract and proprietary) and regular plant employees; (2)
Potential procedural deficiencies in TMI's implementation of 10 CFR Part 73.55, and; (3)
Disclosure of plant specific information regarding reactor security programs.
Relative to item (1), this recent incident highlights the need for action on the part of the NRC to impose specific requirements for the conduct of pre-employment screening programs at licensed facilities. This matter has been the subject of prolonged debate throughout the NRC in the context of the proposed Access Authorization rulemaking proceeding (RM 50-7).
In addition, the Division of Safeguards, NRC, is actively developing a pre-employment screening program for specific application to guards and security personnel employed at nuclear facilities.
Such a program would provide a significantly greater impediment to unauthorized access than the programs currently being conducted by reactor licensees.
Relative to item (2), we have not identified any violation's of 73.55. However, there may be deviations from the NRC-approved security plans.
If this is substantiated by the Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment, the NRC will take any licensing actions that may be warranted to rectify these problems.
_2-In regard to item (3), the NRC has supported safeguards legislation pending in this Congress (as part of the NRC's FY 1980 Authorization Bill) for authorization to issue regulations requiring the protection of power reactor physical security plans against unauthorized disclosure.
The legislation also specifies that any person, licensee on authorize, who violates this requirement would be subject to civil penalties.
/
o
Question III.5.a: The current approach to assuring adequate safeguards and physical security at licensed facilities appears to largely be independent of and segregated from, the assurance of radiological safety. While this may be less significant in the context of specific facility evaluations, integration of safety and safeguards issues would seem to be essential at the programmatic level of r.gency decisions, such as budget priority-setting and resource allocation.
Please describe the NRC's process for balancing safety and safeguards risks in its decision making process.
Answer On a generic basis potential conflicts between safeguards and safety are addressed and resolved during the rulemaking process.
On site specific basis, the Office Directors are responsible for assuring that a staff analysis accompanies any decision that could produce a cross-functional impact.
Contrary to the implications contained in the question, safety and safeguards measures fo,r the most part compliment each other.
Significant conflicts are rare and none are unresolved.
What agency resources in terms of funding and Question III.5.b:
personnel, are directed to safety / safeguards interface?
ANSWER:
Agency resources directed to safety / safeguards interface activities are those expended in the evaluation of safety / safeguards impacts in connection withThe specific reactors licensing actions and potential safeguards rule making.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation routinely conducts a safety impact review of each reactor safeguards matter submitted by the licensee.and the evaluation /
Four professional man-recommendations provided by the NMSS safeguards reviewers.
years are budgeted in FY 1981 by NRR to coordinate safeguards matters with This consists of three professional man-years for the NRR licensees and NMSS.
Safety / Safeguards Interface Group and one professional man-year for the safeguards
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licensing actions required of the NRR project manager assigned to specific licensees.
QUESTION III-6.
NRC safeguards regulations (Part 73) mandate that a high degree of assurance be demonstrated against specified design basis threat levels. This approach appears to be analogous to the safety review finding of reasonable assurance of pub-lic health and safety for specified design basis accidents.
But unlike safety analysis, no comprehensive risk assessment studies have been perfonned that explicitly test the regulatory standard for safeguards.
6a: Is it possible to perform risk studies for safeguards?
Answer It is conceptually possible to perfonn risk studies for safeguards.
NRC has not pursued quantitative risk :tudies for safeguards because of extreme difficulty in adequately quantifying the various factors contributing to risk. This view was expressed in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1400) and sustained by the Lewis panel's peer review of that document. The Lewis Panel Report (NUREG/CR-0400) states:
"The risk from sabotage was not calculated in the Reactor Safety Study. The omission was deliberate, and proper, because it was recognized that the probability of sabotage of a nuclear power plant cannot be estimated with any confidence."
Similarly, estimates of the probability of successful nuclear theft and of likelihood that it would result in fabrication and explosion of a nuclear device cannot be made with any confidence. Therefore, while quantitative risk studies are possible, we do not believe they are, as yet feasible in the safeguards area.
On the other hand, the deterministic aspects of NRC risk studies such as WASH 1400 are being exploited for safeguards purposes.
For example, we are using fault tree analysis to identify vital components, vital areas and failure mechanisms in order to logically analyze the potential problem of sabotage at nuclear We are testing and applying computerized methods power plants.
developed by Sandia Laboratories for analyzing permutations and combinations of intruder paths for penetrating safeguarded facilities and the effects of various safeguards ineasures applied to such paths.
OUESTION III-6b.
Without reliable estimates of safeguards risk, how can reasoned decisions be made on safeguards?
Answer In their report (NUREG/CR-0400) the Lewis panel points out that, even with " realistic" risk estimates, further conservatisms must be incorporated in the regulatory process.
In the absence of
" realistic" risk estimates, it is even more important to incorpor-ate conservatisms in regulatory decision making.
This is the approach taken in safeguards.
We know of no instance in which a subnational group has success-fully fabricated a nuclear explosive device. We know of no attempts to sabotage a licensed nuclear reactor in a manner lead-ing to significant radiological release. But we have conserva-tively assumed thac theft and sabotage might be attempted and that a nuclear explosive device could be illegally fabricated following successful theft.
Furthermore, we have attempted to determine, logically and systematically, the characteristics of persons who might attempt to perpetrate such crimes.
The results of our threat characterization work have been published as NUREG-0459, Generic Adversary Characteristics Summary Report and have been considered in formulating the design basis threat levels specified in 10CFR Part 73. The NRC Safeguards staff is continuing to work on threat characterization.
Its latest efforts are focused upon " insider" threats.
Finally, we are continuing our program of safeguards vulnerability.
assessments in which NRC safeguards staff teams assisted b. U.S.
Army special forces personnel probe for possible safeguards vulnera-bilities at licensed nuclear facilities.
In 1977, the Commission initiated that program for fuel cycle facilities processing wea-pons usable nuclear material. The Commission provided Congress with copies of the safeguards evaluation report on every one of those facilities. The staff is now refining its vulnerability assessment program to increase its efficiency and adapt it for future use a t licensed reactor facilities.
O
QUESTION III-7.
The NRC's 1981 budget request allocates six positions to extension of the IAEA safeguards agreement to additional facilities.
How many facilities are involved and will the manpower expenditure be one-time or ongoing?
Answer:
In the FY 1981 budget, NMSS allocated 6.7 manyears for implementation of the IAEA Agreement in U.S. domestic nuclear facilities excluding those with direct national security significance. This antici-pates placing the agreement into force in approximately 90 additional nuclear facilities in FY 1981.
In terms of overall administration cost, NRC estimates that 23 manyears staff effort and $550,000 contractual support will be required in the initial three-year implementation pertod; thereafter, approximately 4 manyears effort will be necessary per year to maintain the IAEA safeguards regime in about 200 U.S. facilities.
Question III.8.a:
Please provide an update on material control and accounting at the Erwin plant'.
Is the plant meeting the new, higher MUF limits?
Answer At facilities such as NFS, a measured material balance is closed by conducting a nhysical inventory following each two-month period of operations.
Following the extended shutdown, NFS began the current operating period on January 21, 1980.
The next physical inventory will be conducted during the week of March 24 and the results (i.e., the MUF or Inventory Difference) will be determined 30 days later.
Consequently, while it is too early to determine NFS's performance in accounting (as reflected by ids), the staff will be monitoring this performance over the coming year.
Question III.8.b: What has been the experience with the enhanced physical security measures required to be implemented at the plant?
Answer Prior the resumption of operations, NFS demonstrated to NRC personnel the adequacy of their procedures responding to the enhanced physical protection requirements. Subsequent inspections and daily observations have verified, except for one instance of procedural violation, continued compliance with these new requirements.
Question III.8.c: Have any problems developed at other licensed facilities in their ability to stay within MUF limits? Have there been any requests for relaxation of MUF limits?
Answer Over the past three years, no other facilities have excceded the MUF limits which would require a plant re-inventory or shutdown. The staff has not received any requests for the relaxation of MUF limits.
HART QUESTIONS IV. Other 4
QUESTI0'l IV-1.
It appears that responsibility for the review and evaluation of reactor operating experience is spread over a number of organiza-tions within the NRC.
(a)
Please comment on the anticipated interactions of these various groups and who will ultimately be held accountable for assuring that proper action is taken.
ANSWER.
The assessment of operating experience, of necessity, involves a number of NRC's offices. Each of these offices has differing responsibilities, capabilities, priorities, and workloads which are being factored into an integrated agency-wide -
program. The assessment and feedback of operating experience will involve coordinated staff actions with some parallel studies of selected events. The functions and interfaces of the involved offices are being defined in interface agreements and an agency management manual chapter now under development.
AEOD is to serve as an agency focal point and an independent organization for the assessment of operating experience. In addition, other NRC offices will retain their responsibilities. Thus, the office ultimately held accountable for assuring that proper action is taken will vary depending on whether it is a licensing action, an enforcement action, or one involving developing or revising regulations.
In any event, specific accountability will be assigned as part of the agency's action and coordination system for assessing and responding to operating experience.
QUESTION.
(b) Specifically, how will the new Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data interact with other offices with responsibili-ties in this area, with the Executive Director for Operations and with the Commission?
ANSWER.
AE0D is responsible to: (a) systematically and independently review, analyze, and feedback operating experience to NRC and to licensee activities; (b) achieve an effective and integrated program involving the NRC, industry organizations, licensees, and foreign experience reports; (c) assure that appropriate action is taken in respense to the results of safety evaluations; and (d) serve as a focal point and central point of coordination, both within and outside the agency, for the collection, analysis, and feedback of operating information.
Within its area of responsibility, AE0D will work closely with the other involved NRC offices, including coordinating on selected studies, sharing data and background information, providing comments and particular expertise upon request, irdependently evaluating the results of other analyses, and providing leadership in developing and implementing the necessary program guidance documents and computer activities.
The AE0D end-product will generally be in the form of a recommendation for action to another NRC office, i.e., proposed IE bulletin; requested NRR licensing action; requests to SD for the development or revision of regulations and regulatory guides.
_2_
As an independent office reporting to the EDO, AE0D will deal directly with the EDO on operational, policy, and administrative matters in the same manner as other EDO staff offices.
It will communicate directly with other offices and, on occasion, will request action through the ED0 to other offices.
It can also propose actions for the EDO to direct other offices. The office will respond and interact with the Commission through briefings, but generally communication channels will go through the EDO.
QUESTION.
(c) What level of staffing has been achieved to date?
ANSWER.
The permanent Director reported in mid-February and currently has a staff of six (five professionals and one secretary).
In addition, offers have been extended to five additional personnel.
It.is anticipated that AE0D will have ten permanent staff members by March 30, 1980 and will be staffed with approximately 20 individuals by May 30, 1980.
QUESTION.
(d) How will any differences in policy or in proposed actions between the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data and other offices be resolved?
ANSWER.
Differences in policy or adequacy of action to assure public health and safety between AEOD and other NRC offices will be discussed specifically between the two offices at the Office Director level in an attempt to resolve the difference.
If the matter cannot be resolved, the issue will be forwarded to the E00 for resolution. The ED0 may decide that the matter warrants Commission attention and discussion because of the nature of the policy issue or.the potential signifi-cance of the matter. The normal approach will be to attempt to resolve differences at the lowest organizational level commensurate with the urgency, importance, and nature of the matter.
QUESTION.
(e) What mechanism is being used to expedite resolutions of such differences?
ANSWER.
As noted in the response to item (d), mechanisms are available to resolve differences in positions between offices. These mechanisms are being formalized in the agency management manual chapter discussed in response to item (a). Resolution of any such differences in terms of timing and documentation is often a function of the issue, but normal organizational channels are considered adequate for the prompt resolution of office differences.
o
1
. QUESTION.
(f) What is considered a reasonable time frame for resoluticn of such differences?
ANSWEP..
The time frame for resolution is a strong function of the urgency of the matter.
For example, a matter which potentially involves a question of serious health and safety consequences to the public from the continued operation of a facility must be resolved on an immediate time frame.
Issues involving such items as design features of plants under construction must be decided upon promptly, but generally not within hours or days.
A specific AE0D responsibility is to assure that it assesses the adequacy of actions taken in response to the feedback of operating experience.
Inherent in this responsibility is the setting of priorities and, accordingly, assuring that serious priority issues are forced to resolution promptly.
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QUESTION IV-2. Provide a list, for the last twelve months, of the substantive policy papers prepared by the Office of Policy Evaluation, the action taken by the Comission on each paper, and the ultimate disposition of the issue addressed by each paper.
ANSWER.
OPE has divided the following list into two principal categories:
those prepared primarily at the initiative of the Commission or a Commission-level office, and those primarily responding to the staff-level initiative.
Commission Initiative Assessment of EPICOR-II System for Decontamination of Water at Three Mile Island (TMI)
Commission approved OPE recommendations.
EPICOR-II System is operating.
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NRC Programs for Emergency Response and Human Factors in Light of TMI Accident OPE review of NRC's Emergency Planning Program identified policy assumptions underlying the program, listed ongoing staff actions, and enumerated significant outstanding issues which required Commission attention. The need for NRC to emphasize human factors in its regulatory program was highlighted.
Provided background for later action by Commission on staff proposals.
Commission Decision Memorandum and Order on UCS Petition Regarding Qualifi-cations of Electrical Equipment and Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants (prepared with OGC)
Commission action is pending.
Five Reactor Shutdown for Seismic Re-analysis Provided information on seismic re-analysis; included estimated start-up, updated information on costs of replacement power and sources of make-up energy and electric subregion reserve margins.
No Commission action was required.
Decision Memorandum on Siting Policy Issues Led to Commission decisions which will be reflected in (a) advance notice of proposed rulemaking on siting and (b) a proposed rule on alternative sites evaluation under NEPA.
Both are being prepared for publication in the near future.
Study of Potential Threats to Licensed Industry Commiss, ion approved OPE proposal for staff study.
QUESTION 2. Final Rule for Physical Protection - Category II and III Material Performed special study on equivalency between IAEA physical protection recommendations and those of the staff.
Commission adopted OPE conclusion of equivalency and a separate subsequent OPE recomendation related to Category II and III material in transit.
Inventory Differences at Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin, Tennessee Outlined safeguards options regarding the operation of the high-enriched uranium plant in light of large inventory difference reported in September 1979. Options were considered by Commission.
Economic Considerations for NRC Judgments and Decision-Making Commission accepted OGC and OPE views on the appropriateness of using economic factors in reaching NRC decisions.
Preliminary Assessment of the Economic Impact of Shutdown of Nuclear Plants for Seismic Re-Analysis Performed a preliminary assessment of the economic impact of shutdown of the five nuclear plants for seismic re-analysis.
No Comission action required.
Analyses of Fuel Requirements for the Indian Tarapur Reactors Comission considered the conclusions from these analyses in making decisions on Tarapur export cases. Most recent case is still pending.
Analysis of Seismic and Volcanological Issues Raised by the Philippine Reactor Performed a review and analysis of IAEA and related documents on volcanological and seismic issues for the Napot Point reactor site.
Comission considered in connection with its review of Philippine applications.
Delegations of Authority in Export and Related Areas Comission approved delegation suggestions with minor changes.
Federal Register Notice announcing amended regulations has been issued and delegations are being implemented.
Development of Request-for-Proposal for Commission Management Study Comission appraved RFP. The Commission is evaluating contract proposals.
QUESTION 2. Control Review Procedures for Exports to Pakistan Commission ar.cepted OPE recommendation and' transmitted letter from Chairman to Acsistant Secretary of State.
Exports to Japan -- Analysis of NNPA Criteria 4 and 5 Evaluation accepted by Commission.
Proposed exports to Japan have been approved.
The Commission's Decision-Making Role in Emergency Response Prepared an " issues" paper and decision memoranda which examined the desirability of Comission participation in emergency response decisions, the limits to Commission participation, modes of Commission participation, a spectrum of possible nuclear emergencies, and possible items for Comission emergency response agenda.
The Commission took action on the basis of these papers.
Agency Meetings Performed a comparative analysis of frequency of Comission meetings in other Federal independent regulatory agencies in connection with the Sunshine Act.
Testimony for NRC's FY 1981 Budget Hearings Prepared testimony for NRC's FY '81 budget hearings with substantial input from staff.
Nuclear Advisory Boards Examined alternative proposals to establish nuclear advisory boards, explored the experience of other federal agencies, particularly the Departments af Energy and Defense, and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of alternative advisory groups.
Commission is studying.
Selection and Training of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Members:
Report to Congress, NUREG-0548, March 1979.
(OGC/0PE/ASLAB Task Force)
Task force (with NRC staff) report accepted by the Commission. Report sent to Congress. Recomendations implemented.
QUESTION 2. Task Force (with NRC staff) Study of Use of Part-Time Members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Commission-endorsed recommendations are being implemented.
Review of Delegations of Authority within NRC Report prepared with the Office of General Counsel.
Commission decided to implement several of the options for change presented in the report, notably delegation of substantial rulemaking authority to the Director, Office of Standards Development.
Board Notification Procedures Analysis and recommendations underly staff paper detai. ling recommendations for improvement; now before the Comission.
Report of Advisory Committee on Construction During Adjudication, UREG-0646 (OPE represented on Committee; charter based on OPE /0GC proposal)
Options presented by the Committee published by the Commission for public comment.
GA0 Report:
"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission: More Aggressive Leadership Is Needed" Commission approved OPE response to recommendations of GA0 report.
Policy, Planning and Program Guidance OPE prepared policy and planning sections using input from Commissioners and EDO staff.
Commission has approved draft and requested staff reviews and comment.
Staff Initiative Conditioned Licensing of Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Highlighted certain issues related to operator training and experience and emergency preparedness which required resolution prior to Commission authorization for fuel load zero power tests, low power tests or full power opeiation at Sequoyah. The Commission noted OPE's coments in approving the Sequoyah application.
QUESTION 2. Reactor Operator Qualifications and Training Evaluated staff recommendations for improvements.
Comission approval of staff proposals took into account OPE's suggestions.
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Operating Data Gathering, Mandatory Reporting of Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System Evaluated staff recommendations and recommended Comission guidance to staff.
Comission adopted OPE recommendations.
Classification of Safeguards Information Commission approved OPE recommendation to classify sensitive safeguards information regarding licensed fuel fabrication facilities. Rules are being implemented.
Proposed Recommendation to D0T on Highway Routing of Radioactive Material Recommended revising the NRC's environmental impact appraisal to be more representative of likely future radioactive material transportation and NRC's commenting on the DOT transportation rule when published rather than prior to publication as proposed by the staff. The Comission approved the OPE recommendation.
Clandestine Fissionable Explosives Evaluated staff recomendations to modify approach used by relevant operating assumption. Comission adopted OPE recommendation.
FY '80 Domestic Safeguards, Technical Assistance, and Research Contractual Projections Evaluated ED0-recommended package of 44 proposed projects.
Commission adopted OPE recommendation.
Comprehensive Safeguards Evaluation Reviewed staff reports completing evaluations and followup actions taken at 11 fuel facilities that processed strategic quantities of special nuclear material. All OPE recommendations were adopted by the Commission.
QUESTION 2. Transient Shipments Commission directed staff to deal with enforcement problems pointed out in OPE memorandum.
Change to Upgrade Rule Impact of Upgrade Rule on Non-Power Reactors Commission accepted OPE recommendation of limited exemption from Upgrade Rule for non-power reactor while staff performs additional studies suggested by 0PE.
Proceeding to assess Basis for Confidence in Safe Disposal of Nuclear Wastes Reviewed staff pro'posal and recommendation that the' Commission imediately initiate a legislative type rulemaking proceeding on its basis of confidence that a safe method for disposal of nuclear waste can and will be available when needed.
OPE recommended that the Commission begin such a proceeding.
Commission decided to comence waste management basis for confidence proceeding.
Commission Response to Interagency Review Group on Waste Management Working with other Commission offices and OPE was responsible for the Commission's position letter and response to the IRG.
Proposed 10 CFR Part 60 on Procedural Aspects for Disposal of High Level Waste in Geologic Repositories Reviewed staff's proposed procedural regulation for waste management and recommended Comission approval of the draft regulation for public review and coment.
Comission approved publication of the draft rule for comment.
Draft Report to Congress "Means for Improving State Participation in Federal Nuclear Waste Management Programs" Reviewed staff's draft and recommended that the findings and recommendations be related more closely to the intent of the legislation and to staff's analysis.
Comission approved OPE's suggestions and requested OPE to assist staff in revising the draft, which was then approved by Commission.
QUESTION 2. Commission Alternatives in Connection with its Consideration of Health and Safety Factors in Nuclear Export Licensing:
The Philippine Export License Application The Commission adopted a more narrow jurisdiction than that recommended by an OPE /06: analysis of options.
Consideration of Philippine export license still in progress.
Proposed Licenses for Exports to Taiwan Commission accepted OPE evaluation.
Licenses subsequently issued.
Proposed Retransfers for Reprocessing from Japan to the United Kingdom and Japan to France Commission approved OPE recommendation.
Letter sent to Department of Energy.
s Foreign Physical Protection of Category 'IEIand III Material Commission accepted OPE evaluation.
No action required.
Tarapur Fuel Application XSNM-1222 OPE (and OGC) evaluated issues surrounding the need for an oral hearing on application and whether additional information was required from Department of State.
Commission considered these in arriving at its decisions.
Acquisition of Information on Implementation of International Safeguards for Export Licensing Reviews Commission approved OPE recommendation.
Letter sent to State Department.
Proposed Revision of 10 CFR Part 51, and Related Conforming Amendments to CEQ's NEPA Regulations Recommended qualified approval and suggested that the Commission seek further justification from staff on the large number of categorical exclusions and clarification of the provisions for public involvement and distribution. Also suggested that a NEPA review official report directly to the E00 and that the regulations should take effect when final rules were adopted. The Commission agreed with the recommendations.
O
QUESTION 2. Report of Task Force on Emergency Planning Reviewed the Task Force's proposals and suggested that the Commission give special attention and guidance to staff on proposed amendments tu 10 CFR Part 50; to the status of local emergency plans to integrated federal plans, and to creation of a clear organizational focus within NRC. The Commission has acted on the first two all of these proposals.
The third will be acted on when NRC/ FEMA relationships have been further clarified.
Employment of Consultants and Members of Advisory Panels
, Reviewed staff's proposed Manual Chapter and recommended changes that would enhance managerial control over all types of consultants employed by NRC whether hired by the personnel appointment process, contractual arrangements or interagency agreement. Commission approved all changes.
Annual Redetermination of Agreement State Adequacy and Capability for Calendar Year 1979 Proposed that the Commission approve the annual redetermination but also request staff to take appropriate action to improve the basis for determining the effectiveness of state programs in achieving radiation protection goals. The commission approved OPE's suggestions.
G
QUESTION IV-3.
The Commission is in the process of developing policy, planning, and program guidance for the staff. The following statements are taken from a January 30, 1980 draft of this guidance:
"The NRC will seek to define more clearly the level of protection of the public health and safety that it be-lieves is adequate..."
"Some consideration of costs which the licensee or its customer's might incur may be appropriate..."
" Recognizing that accidents, theft or diversion cf nuclear materials, and sabotage or other illegal acts can occur, NRC will place increased emphasis on measures that can minimize their harmful consequences."
(a)
Does the Ccmmission believe that this type of guidance is sufficiently clear and explicit to be effectively used by the staff?
ANSWER.
The statements are from the policy section of the draft Policy, Planning, and Program Guidance (PPPG) document which the Commission is developing.
In the January 18, 1979 policy statement, the Commission expressed its support of the use of probabilistic risk assessment in regulatory decisionmaking. Although we expect the policy statement will provide useful guidance for the staff, it must be supplemented with the planning and program guidance presented in the PPPG in order to be most effectively used by the staff.
At this time, the staff has not used the PPPG. The first staff use of the guidance will be in the preparation cf the NRC FY 1982 budget rquest, i.e., during the next three months.
t
QUESTION IV-3 (b).
What specific activities does the NRC have underway to clearly define " adequate" safety?
ANSWER.
To define " adequate" safety for a particular activity, it is necessary to be able to " measure" safety, i.e., to be able to estimate quantitatively the risk to the public health and safety that may result from that activity.
To provide a firm foundation for this task, the NRC has a program under the direction of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) to develop and improve risk assessment methodology, and to promote its appli-cation to the activities subject to NRC regulation.
The work is being performed by the Probabilistic Analysis Staff of RES and by contractors.
'In May of 1979 the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards recommended that the Commission consider establishing quantitative safety goals for the overall safety of nuclear power reactors.
At the Commission's request, the ACRS's subconmittee on Reliability and Probabilistic Assessment is now studying the question of how to develop quantitative safety criteria. The subcommittee expects by the end of this year to submit a report outlining an approach and possibly giving some examples of quantitative safety criteria.
QUESTION IV-3 (c). While it would appear that regulatory criteria for backfitting are increasingly important, this issue does not seem to be addressed in the policy guidance. What is the Commission's policy on this subject?
ANSWER.
The NRC has maintained a strong program to improve reactor safety.
Improvements to existing plants (both operating and under construction) are made based on operating experience, and new knowledge or understanding of safety issues through research, testing, and analysis.
Such improvements are frequently referred to as "backfitting".
Problems arising at operating reactors may require immediate action.
Such issues are generally handled within the framework of existing licensing requirements.
On the other hand, assessments of safety isstes that arise may lead to a deter-mination by the staff of the need for basic changes in existing safety require-ments. The latter are usually placed in the Comission re'gulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR).
Over the years many new requirements important to safety have been added to the regulations; also staff criteria have been issued which provide further interpretation of the regulations for existing and future plants.
All technical requirements in the regulations {'10 CFR) dealing with safety must be complied with by all licensees unless specifically exempted. Generally, newly issued or revised rules do not exempt operating facilities.
Prior to 1975, changes in licensing requirements and backfitting in general were determined primarily by the technical staff of the affected disciplines.
In 1975 the Regulatory Requirements Review Comittee was established.
This group, composed of senior technical management personnel, was chartered to assure that proposed changes in licensing requirements were thoroughly assessed for application to both operating plants and plants undergoing licensing review.
Since the TMI accident the Commission has been heavily involved in assessing the need for backfitting.
Assessments have been made of the recomendations made by the Lessons Learned Task Force, improved emergency preparedness, and many additional issues contained in an Action Plan now being completed by the staff.
There are organizational changes and policy development activities now underway within the staff to improve the clarity and technical basis for backfitting in general. The need for these changes was highlighted by several investigations of the TMI accident and by the nuclear industry both before and since the accident.
A specific regulation (10 CFR 50.109) states that matters can be required to be backfit when that change will provide substantial additional protection that is required for the protection of the health and safety of the public.
Strictly speaking, Section 50.109 refers to "the addition, elimination or modification of structures, systems or components of the facility after the construction permit has been issued."
It has not been specifically invoked on more than a few occasions, but the concept it embodies has been the basis for many backfit decisions.
, As new safety issues are identified they are assessed for applicability to each facility.
Reviews are generally conducted with the cooperation of licensees. The Commission has various formal authorities to obtain information and analyses from licensees. Such reviews may identify the need to either modify facilities or to change procedures to correct indicated deficiencies.
Such upgrading is generally done with the voluntary cooperation of licensees through "retrofitting" that is less formal and broader in nature than the provisions of 10 CFR 50.109, thus explaining the fact that the regulation has only seldomly been specifically cited.
6 6
QUESTION IV-3 (dl.
How does the present system for making backfitting decisions differ from the one in place prior to the TMI accident? Please itemize the principal differences.
ANSWER.
There are no principal differences in our post-TMI system for making "back-fitting" decisions. The NRC staff has identified several issues deemed to require facility upgrading. Expedited correspondence with licensees to acquire needed information has included letters, group meetings and seminar type conferences at NRC locations, and facility visits by NRC staff.
The NRC staff has derived "backfitting" subject candidates from a thorough assessment of the recommendations of various gro0ps that have investigated the TMI accident.
Actions to improve the safety of nuclear power plants now operating were necessary immediately after the accident.
Such actions were identified in the Bulletins and Orders issued imediately after the accident, in the first report of the Lessons-Learned Task Force issued in July, by the Emergency Preparedness Task Force, and by the NRC staff and Commission.
These immediate actions which applied to operating plants were approved by the Commission as well as senior technical staff management and is ued to licensees, and were or soon will be implemented by licensees.
Since the TMI accident backfitting decisions have been expedited by using extraordinary staff resources. The Comission has also been deeply involved in assessing and approving recommendations by the staff concerning back-fi tting. Most "backfitting" done to date, and that to be done in the future, as a result of the TMI accident will be carried out within existing regulations.
A few issues require new regulations.
QUESTION IV-4.
A GA0 study released in November,1979 concluded that the role of NRC resident inspectors needed to be more clearly defined.
(a).Has NRC's thinking crystallized on the role of resident inspectors and their interaction with regional inspectors?
A NS'rT P.
The role of the resident has been defined. This definition has been disseminated to the resident inspectors.
Some refinement of this role will be continued throughout the remainder of this fiscal year, as needed.
QUESTION (b) Provide the status of any actions taken in response to the GA0 findings.
ANSWER.
Attached is the Commission's statement on actions taken with regard to the recommendations made by.the Comptroller General in the November 15, 1979 report, " Placing Resident Inspectors at Nuclear Power Plant Sites:
Is it Working?".
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i L
NRC RESPONSE TO THE REPORT On November 15, 1979, the Comptroller General issued a report to the Congress of the United States on the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's Resident Inspector Program. This report, entitled " Placing Resident Inspectors at Nuclear Power Plant Sites:
Is It Working?", makes five recommendations to the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Actions taken concerning these recommenda-tions are as follows:
1.
Recomendation - Require that resident inspectors perform more direct observations than review of records and provide inspectors with more administrative support.
NRC Action A restructuring of the expanded NRC inspection program for operating and preoperational reactors is undemay. This reworking will require more direct observation and independent measu.rement of licensee activities than review of records. As a result, the Senior Resident Inspector at each site will be devoting a substantial portion of his inspecting activities to direct observation or to independent measurement.
The other resident inspector or inspectors at each site will be performing essentially all of their inspections by direct observation or independent measurement.
The program for resident inspection at reactor construction sites is being modified to similarly emphasize direct observation and independent measurement.
Part-time clerical positions are being assigned to each resident office.
These clerical personnel will assist the resident inspector (s), relieving them of some administrative burdens and providing services previously available only from their Regional Offices.
2.
Recommendation
" Define the role of the resident inspectors and establish what qualifications and training they need, specifically requiring them to have plant-specific training, and a level of training comparable with a reactor operator."
NRC Action The scope of duties, responsibilities and authority for resident inspectors has been conveyed to these inspectors, primarily through the Fundamentals of Inspection Course in the NRC training program. A formal statement on the resident inspector's role in performing an integrated, regional-and resident-based inspection program was prepared in February, 1980. A similar statement on the resident's role in responding to incidents was also prepared in February,1980.
The training and qualifications needed to become a senior resident inspec-tor were defined in 1978. Other than for some minor modifications these criteria continue to be followed today and for the foreseeable future.
We provide up to two years of training and inspection experience to new inspectors who already possess solid qualifications in reactor operations or reactor construction but who have little or no direct experience with the NRC regulatory program.
. The training progr:ms and qualifications needed by the additional resident inspectors at a site are different because of their more limited duties and responsibilities. These inspectors must receive training in regulatory matters and inspection techniques.
We expect to provide one year of training and NRC work experience to these new inspectors when they already possess experience in nuclear operations.
If tney do not have this experience a longer training program wil1 be necessary. The Resident Inspector Operations Training Program has been expanded from 8 weeks to 11 weeks.
Included in the additional training is more time on the reactor simulator, detailed discussion of the safety importance of plant auxiliary systems, and increased emphasis on reactor transients. Additional courses will also be pro-vided to improve understanding of the safety analysis of the plant from an engineer's point of view.
All resident inspectors are provided plant-specific training. Much of this is obtained in their study of plant FSAR's, technical speci-fications and other written documents and in their repeated observa-tion of plant activities. Only upon completion of such training, are they fully qualified to perform the duties as resident inspectors for that unit.
It is not our present intent to require that resident inspectors be licensed reactor operators; but they will receive training that will achieve substantial comparability to the knowledge level of the average senior reactor operator.
3.
Recommendation
" Assign resident inspectors to those reactor sites that are most in need of regulatory attention."
NRC Action In consonance with the President's December 7 message on the Kemeny
~
Commission Report, we are accelerating implementation of the Resident Inspector Program. By June,1980 each site with an operating or preoper-ational reactor will have the equivalent of at least one resident inspec-tor. All such sites will have a full complement of at least 2 resident inspectors by September 30, 1980. The number of resident inspectors will increase from 46 at 34 sites as of December,1979 to about 130 for 60 sites as of September,1980. Subsequently, resident inspectors will be assigned to reactors as they reach the preoperational stage.
Since we plan to have resident inspectors at all operational and preoperational sites by September 30, 1980, we do not believe there is a need to prioritize such sites. However, if it becomes apparent that we cannot meet this goal, the sites will be manned in' priority order.
By June,1980 NRC resident inspectors will be assigned to the ~16 sites where construction activities are in the crucial final period. NRC resident inspectors will also be assigned to sites in earlier stages of construction where problems are evident. There are four positions budgeted for such assignments. Additional construction sites will be manned as qualified resident inspectors become available. We are hoping to man three or four such additional sites by September,1980.
. 4.
Recommendation
" Coordinate the interface between the existing Regional inspection approach and the evolving inspection approach."
NRC Action An NRC task force is developing an integrated, routine inspection program for preoperational and operating reactors. They are incorporat--
ing recommendations from current Regional and resident inspectors, inspector supervisors, and the various studies of the Three Mile Island accident. The first step, temporary instructions controlling and integrating these efforts, was issued February 7.
The final product is to'be issued by October, 1980.
5.
Recommendation
" Reevaluate.and restructure the performance appraisal team and develop appropriate goals and measures of effectiveness for its (NRC's) nuclear power plant inspection program."
NRC Action We have recently concluded an evaluation of the performance appraisal team, one that included both an in-house review and an independent contractor's assessment. We are considering alternatives relating to the location of the staff organizationally and physically.
In addition, emphasis is being placed on staffing and policy development. The per-formance appraisal function has been given high priority relative to the other programs of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
The NRC Special Inquiry Group ("Rogovin") recommended "a team or blitz approach, in which a number of inspectors make unannounced visits from Regional headquarters to conduct in-depth inspections of the overall operation of a plant for at least a week or more, perhaps accompanied by their supervisor or by project management personnel." The perform-ance appraisal team provides a limited version of such blitz inspections with emphasis on quality control management at the plant and at licensee corporate headquarters. Consideration is being given to expending this currently limited approach to provide a comprehensive inspection of overall plant operation.
Attempts have been made in the past to develop appropriate goals for the nuclear power plant inspection program, and also to develop assessment procedures to measure the effectiveness of the inspection program towards achievement of those goals. The attempts were unsuccessful. The diffi-culties of defining goals more specific than the overall regulatory goal of assuring public health and safety, and of specifying means to measure progress towards those goals, are well known and have been cited as a major reason for the lack of past progress in this area. While we appre-ciate the difficulties of the task we do not view them as insurmountable and believe that with concerted effort and the revised attitudes that have resulted from the experiences of the past year, appropriate goals
...s..
. and assessment measures can be developed. We plan to have an organi-zational element within the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, whose principal responsibility will be overall inspection program development and the auditing of its implementation, address this problem on a priority basis. We believe a successful program can be established if the proper resources are assigned to the effort.
QUESTION IV-5. In the current economic climate it appears likely that the Committee on Environment and Public Works could recommend percentage cuts of agency budgets under its jurisdiction.
To be able to accommodate any such cuts with the least substantive impact on NRC programs, please indicate programs and dollar amounts where cuts could be made to achieve a 5% and 10%
overall reduction in the budget.
ANSWER The process of developing NRC budget estimates requires 3-4 months.
This process involves a careful balancing of schedules and resources to ensure that the most cost-effective approach is taken for needed programs.
We also review the priorities of all programs to identify lower priority programs which can be cancelled or deferred to accommodate new high-priority programs or place more emphasis on other higher priority programs.
Thus we believe our budget request represents programs required to carry out our mandate to protect the public health and safety.
To identify programs associated with overall reduction of either 5% or 10% will require us to again carefully balance our program.
That is, we will have to essentially repeat the earlier budget process for each reduction.
This will require considerable staff and Commission effort and time to ensure that we maintain a cohesive regulatory program for each of the percentage reductions.
In the absence of this thorough review, we cannot responsibly identify programs and dollars for a 5% or 10% cut.
G SIMPSON QUESTIONS O
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QUESTION S-l.In the beginning of his prepared statement, Chairman Ahearne emphasized that TMI is not an " add-on", but rather, the priorities of the agency have been redefined to correct weaknesses revealed by the TMI accident.
Is the Commission satisfied that all of the agency's responsibilities are being adequately carried out and that no area is suffering from this restructuring in response to Three Mile Island?
ANSWER.
The Commission is satisfied that the agency's responsibility for protecting the public health and safety from the potential risks of nuclear power plants is being met.
However, it has been necessary to reorder priorities and staff assignments so that the safety implications of the TMI could be promptly analyzed and appropriate actions taken.
Thus, the pause in the licensing review process actually resulted.from the. diversion.of staff resources.
As higher priority concerns have been dealt with and the needed resources __ __ __
become available, we will move toward resumption of licensing reviews.
QUESTION.
Does the FY81 budget request contain sufficient resources for NRC's responsibilities for reviewing S-2.
States' radiological emergency plans?
What is your best estimate now as to when all States' plans will meet present NRC guidelines for emergency planning?
ANSWER.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission / Federal Emergency Management Agency (NRC/ FEMA) Memorandum of Understanding describes the primary review responsibilities of each agency.
FEMA will review the States' radiological emergency plans and provide their findings to the NRC.
The NRC will review these findings and incorporate them into their assessmant of overall offsite and onsite emergency preparedness..The FY81 budget request contains sufficient resources
~
for this review.
The current guidance, as spelled out in NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants", is presently being applied in the review of State and licensec emergency plans.
It is expected that these provisions generally will be met by January 1981.
However, comments received by the staff in the course of the Emergency Planning rulemaking have indicated problems on several requirements (e.g. notification systems, exercise requirements).
The NRC will have to consider time extensions for these items.
Since TMI the Commission has taken measures to clarify its QUESTION S-3.
role in managing emergencies. What are these changes, have any of them been implemented, and if they have been, how effective were they during the recent Crystal River incident?
ANSWER.
The Comission has taken several steps to clarify and improve its managing the spectrum of roles which NRC may have to exercise in an We are working to coordinate our functions with other emergency.
Federal agencies, particularly FEMA, State and local officials, licensees, the nuclear industry and the public.
In addition to the role clarification activities, other related changes have been instituted.
To directly involve the Comission early in the NRC response,
_0raa ni za ti onal_.
the Chairman or his designated alternate will be Director of the Executive In addition, the technical support staff has been Management Team (EMT).
reorganized to quickly identify and take better advantage of the technical competence of NRC staff no matter what office they work in.
Procedures.
Incident Pesponse Procedures have been developed to incorporate the organizational changes identified above. A twenty-four hour duty officer system has been initiated which can respond quickly and effectively to any significant event reported to Headquarters or the, Regional Offices.
In addition, off-duty recall procedures have been modified to assure that necessary individuals will get to the field site from the Regional Office and adequate Headquarters personnel will report to the Operations Center promptly.
Procedural relationships among the Federal agencies are being updated, e.g., an MOU with FEMA on incident repsonse has been drafted, the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan is undergoing extensive modification and major changes to the NRC/ DOE Interagency Agreement on Emergency Response is being considered.
The NRC Operations Center is undergoing significant changes Eoui pment_.
to upgrade its capability to comunicate effectively with all other participants in an emergency and assist the EMT and technical staff in carrying out their functions.
NRC response to the recent incident at Crystal River was much improved over the situation before TMI as well as during exercises conducted The new organization appeared to operate effectively, since TMI.
the imediate notificiation by the licensee was quite good and the physical and comunications facilities within the Operations Center showed significant improvement.
However, it is evident that continued emphasis must be placed on upgrading the NRC's Incident Response Program in all the areas identified above.
In addition, preliminary design work is continuing on the conceptual model for a Nuclear Data Link to provide real-time data directly from facility process computers to the Operations Center.
QUESTION S 4 As a result of the Short-Term lessons Learned Task Force's recontendations, NRC has required all operating reactors to implement certain changes by January 31 or the reactors might be shut down.
What is the status of reactors corplying with these requirements and do you anticipate that any reactors will have to be shut down?
ANSWER.
As of March 18, 1980, all operating nuclear power plant licensees have indicated compliance with Short-Term Lessons Learned requirements. The staff has completed its review of approximately one half of the operating reactors and has concluded that adequate implementation of short term requirements is complete for those plants. The remaining post-implementation review by the staff is scheduled for completion by April 15, 1980. While two of the plants were required to shut down to complete Lessons Learned requirements, we do not anticipate any unplanned shut downs will result in the future.
A number of licensees were not able to fully comply with lessons Learned requirements by the required date because of equipment procurement delays.
If equipment to complete Lessons Learned require-ments was scheduled for delivery after January 31, 1980, the licensees were required to have installed the equipment within 30 days from date of delivery or shut down the plant until installation was complete.
In no case is a plant to continue operating without full compliance after June 1,1980.
Thirteen (13)
- plants indicated equipment delivery problems would preclude their full compliance by January 31, 1980. Of these, 9 plants have received and installed the equip-ment. The remaining 4 are scheduled to receive equipment by May 1980 and will either have completed installation or will be shut down by June 1,1980.
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QUESTION S-5.
The Chairman's testimony stated that it may be difficult to recruit enough qualified personnel for regional inspectors, and that additional legislation may be needed to resolve some of the impediments to recruitment.
Please explain further what these impediments are and what kind of legislation is needed.
ANSWER.
The Chairman stated that the pool of regional inspectors had been reduced to a low level in order to fill resident inspector vacancies at reactor sites. We have been recruiting vigorously to fill the regional vacancies as well as those at the sites. However, the Resident Inspector Program had the first priority. At this point we still have some vacancies in regional offices.
If the President's partial freeze does not impact our recruitment effort too severely, we should be able to fill the remaining vacancies within the next 2 - 3 months.
The " impediments" to recruitment referred to resident inspectors rather than regional inspectors.
In general terms the principal impediment has been the out-of-pocket losses which inspectors have experienced when they have relocated fron the regional office to the resident sites.
Inspectors also anticipate tht they will experience similar losses when relocating to another site or to another NRC office.
In addition to the losses which have arisen because government-wide regulations do not provide full reimburse-ment of relocation costs, there has been the rapid rise in mortgage interest rates. This factor has had an immediate adverse affect on our ability to attract and retain highly qualified individuals for the Resident Inspector Program.
We are acting within existing authority to make the Resident Inspector Program more attractive.
We are collecting data which will be used to develop a request to the Congress that would authorize the agency to provide relocation benefits more in line with the private sector.
If approved by the Congress and si,gned by the President, the new authority would allow us to minimize out-of-pocket financial losses which have had a negative effect on our ability to attract and retain highly qualified inspectors in the Program.
QUESTION S-6.
Please explain in more detail what the Commission intends the Integrated Reliability Evaluation Program to accomplish and what kind of resources will be needed to carry out this program.
How does this program complement the Systematic Evaluation Program, particularly if the SEP is expanded to include all operating reactors?
ANSWER.
The Integrated Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) will identify, in a preliminary way, those nuclear power plants that appear to have a higher level of public risk due to potential accidents than that indicated in WASH-1400.
At the same time, this program will train both contractor and NRC personnel in the use of quantitative risk assessment techniques so that an enlarged skilled cadre of practitioners will be available.
The IREP task will be less complete than WASH-1400.
A balance has been drawn between the need for completeness and the urgency involved in finding the most obvious outliers while at the same time Jeveloping a skilled cadre for application of quantitative risk assessment techniques.
The event trees will be at least as complete as those in WASH-1400; however, simplified fault trees will be used.
This means that while various areas such as common cause failures, human error, and some system interactions will be addressed in a limited way, they will not be covered completely.
Nevertheless, obvious outliers will be found by this approach and a foundation will be set for future studies if they are determined to be necessary.
The analytical models of nuclear power plant safety that are developed during this project can be used in a wide range of subsequent risk and reliability studies.
The Integrated Reliability Evaluation Program is an interim proaram by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). Management of the effort will be the responsibility of RES, but staffing will be provided by both RES and NRR.
In addition, there will be some contractual assistance. RES is presently responsible for resource estimates in connection with this program, and they are described in Draft 3 of the TMI Action Plan.
The purposes and methods of IREP are summarized in the Action Plan (Item II.C.1 and 2), but the fundamental objective can be stated quite simply.
It is to employ risk-assessment methods to identify particularly high-risk accident sequences at individual operating plants and determine regulatory initiatives to reduce these sequences. The program provides an overlay to the deterministic methods embodied in the Commission's current regulations that are intended to provide assurance of high safety reliability, e.g., the single failure criterion, seismic and environmental qualifications and design diversity.
_2 The intent in the initial IREP is to perform what can be thought of as a simplified reactor safety study fcr six operating plants in the course of the next six months.
Then, depending upon the outcome of the studies, a decision wiil be made as to whether to proceed with the application of this methodology and, if so, whether such application should be by NRC, by licensees, or by a combination cf the two.
Simultaneously with this initial IREP effort, NRR will be studying how to expand the present Systematic Evaluation Program to cover operating reactors other than the 11 in the current program.
It is likely that IREP would be a portion of an expanded SEP and that premise is part of the current development of alternative methods performing systematic assessment of all operating reactors. Decisions on this matter are not expected until next summer.
4
QUESTION S -7.
The Chairman'a testimony suggested that the research program may have to reprogram funds in FY 1980 and FY 1981 in order to address safety issues raised by the TMI accident.
Please indicate t.he amount the Agency will need to reprogrr.a for each year and what programs within RES will be affected.
ANSWER.
We have provided a table in response to another question
- from the Subcommittee which illustrates those programs which have been reoriented in FY 1980 in order to address safety issues raised by the TMI accident.
Because of the uncertainty in the resources needed for the agency's TMI Task Action Plan and contingencies associated with the FY 1980 supplemental, we are uncertain at the current time as to our reprogramming needs, if any, in FY 1981.
- See response to Question I-l.
QUESTION S-P.The NRC staff has developed a Comprehensive Action Plan in response to the accident at TMI. What role has the Comission played in developing and approving the plan?
ANSWmR.
In its November 9, 1979, response to the President's Commission on TMI-2 (NUREG-0632), the Comission outlined the steps to be taken to account for One of these steps was the development of TMI-2 Action the TMI-2 accident.
Plan.
The first draf t of the Action Plan was reviewed by the Comission at two At those meetings, the Commission public meetings on December 19 and 21, 1979.
approved a proposed priority ranking system for the action items in the plan and instructed the staff to identify the action items considered by the staff to be those that would be necessary to be accomplished prior to issuing an operating license.
The Comission, at a public meeting on January 9,1980 began its review of the near-term operating license (NT0L) requirements as proposed by the staff.
At this meeting, it also instructed the staff to obtain an operator's assess-ment and viewpoint of the impact on plant safety of imposing these proposed NT0L requirements.
On January 23, draft 2 of the Action Plan was issued.
At a public meeting on February 7, the Comission was briefed on the staff response to the report of the NRC Special Inquiry Group and the results of The Commission th site visits to obtain operator's coments on the NTOL list.
_gave preliminary approval as "necessary" the proposed NT0L items and by letter of February 19, requested ~tfiHdVice of the' Advisory Comittee on.R.eactor
~
Safety (ACRS) as to the riecessity and sufficiency 6f thfNT0L items.
~
Beginning on February ll, the Comission conducted a series of four public meetings during which it considered in some detail each action item in the importance and schedules for accom-Action Plan, concentrating on the relative The Commission also directed that plishment of the individual action items.
policy, management, and organizational recomendations be placed in a separate chapter for further Comission consideration.
This draft accounts A preliminary draft 3 of the Action Plan has been prepared.for the re the results of the Comission's review during February, and a complete accountina-While the of all of the recommendations from the ACRS regarding TMI-2.(1) Office Director's Comission has this preliminary draft, it is awaiting:
response; (2) EDO examination of what reprograming and deferral actions would be necessary and appropriate and; (3) ACRS coments on this draft.
In accordance with Comission instructions, the staff is now evaluating the relative importance of the action items in the TMI-2 Action Plan compared to This evaluation the on-going, non-TMI, safety-related programs of the agency.
will result in recommendations to the Comission in early April regarding necessary reprograming of activities and resources, and regarding the possibility of the need for additional resources.
Question S-8. In summary, the Commission has played an active role in the development and approval of the Action Plan.
It directed the development of the plan; it reviewed the various drafts of the plan in some detail, issuing instructions that have helped shape the current version of the plan; it has approved those items in the plan that needed to be put in place early to effect prompt safety improvements in operating reactors (this approval was given even prior to the first draft of the Action Plan); and it has given preliminary approval as "necessary" for the proposed list of NT0L action items.
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QUESTION.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has stated that it is now S-9.
prepared to resume issuing operating licenses.
It has also stated that certain actions in the Action Plan must be finished before licensing can be resumed. Can you explain what those actions are, and are they now completed?
ANSWER.
The Commission has preliminarily identified a set of requirements within the TMI Action Plan that must be satisfied before granting any new full power operating license, i.e., the so called near term OL (NTOL) requirements list. The Commission has not yet decided whether the NT0L list is sufficient for full power operation, but it has concluded that the items on the list that are required to be complete before fuel loading and low power testing of new plants are adequate.
In at least one case, the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Commission used the fuel load portion of the NTOL list as a portion of the basis for granting a low power license.
In early March, the ACRS' advised the Commission that the NTOL requirements list, subject to certain qualifying comments, provides a satisfactory basis for the resumption of licensing. The Commission will consider this ACRS advice in connection with its review of a third revision of the TMI Action' Plan which is now underway to incorporate comments and directions from t.Se Commission on previous revisions. We expect to be considering the third revision of the TMI Action Plan with the Commission in mid-April.
In the interim, we are continuing to work on fuel load and low power testing requests from the applicants for OLs for North Anna 2 and Salem 2.
The NRC is intergrating the Action Plan into the overall agency program plans. As part of this process, the Commission will examine what items of the current programs should be deferred or cancelled in order to reprogram funds for Action Plan items.
The Commission will also establish schedules for the longer term items that take into account the relative priorities of the program items.
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QUESTION S-10.
The NRC now has responsibilities in the area of export licensing.
Your testimony stated that because the Commission has had to devote additional time to domestic nuclear reactor safety, more authority has been delegated to staff in processing export cases.
Is this a satisfactory arrangement?
In view of the lessons learned after TMI, should the Commission be relieved of some of their responsibilities in areas such as export licensing so they can devote more time to regulating nuclear reactors? Please state what percentage of the Comission's time and resources are devoted to export licensing matters.
ANSWER.
An amended Part 110.40 of NRC's regulations, in which delegations of authority to the staff in the export licensing area were established, was published in the Federal Register on February 20, 1980 (45 FR 11114). These and other delegat. ions relating to non-NRC licensed export matters are currently being implemented while further delegations are still under review. Although these new delegations of authority have only been in effect for less than one month, we expect they will prove to be a satisfactory arrangement.
With reference to the second and third parts of your question, the Commission beliries export licensing should be removed.
The Commission's position as we'.I as desenting views are outlined on pages 3 and 4 of the attached February 6,1980 Commission letter to James McIntyre, Jr., Director, Office of Management and Budget.
pn nao u
[k UNITED STATES t
E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 j
r.
February 6, 1980 CHAIRMAN The Honorable James T. McIntyre, Jr.
Director, Office of Management and Budget Room 255 Old Executive Office Building Washington, D.C. 29593
Dear Mr. McIntyre:
In its January 7,1980 letter to you regarding the NRC reorganization plan, the Comission stated that-it intended to deliberate further on the plan and would provide additional recommendations. This letter contains those recomendations:
1.
In the past, the Commission has requested statutory status for the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. The importance of this office is comparable to that of the other NRC offices with statutory status,
- However, and it actually has a larger staff than those other offices.
although there is widespread agreement on the need for stronger inspection and enforcement action, the Comission is considering a variety of managerial and structural alternatives to best achieve these goals.
The Commission will make its recommendations as to how to best strengthen the inspection and enforcement functions as soon as it resolves these outstanding issues.
The reorganization plan should clarify the respective roles of NRC and 2.
FEMA in the review and approval of State and local plans for offsite emergency response to nuclear accidents.
In his December 7 statement, the President directed FEMA to take the lead for all off-site nuclear emergency planning and response. However, under current law, NRC continues to have responsibility for a review of State and local emergency plans insofar as these plans are significant to licensing decisions. As you may know, NRC has recently proposed new rules which would as a general matter' require NRC concurrence in appropriate State and local emergency plans as a condition to its granting licenses.
In
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the event that NRC does not concur in such plans affecting~an operating plant, the proposed rules present alternatives for NRC action which could include eventual shutdown of the' plant.
Further, the adequacy of such plans will be an open issue in HRC licensing and enforcement proceedings, irrespective of the findings and determinations of FEMA.
Thus, there is a possibility of continuing duplicative efforts by FEMA and NRC.
The Honorable James T. McIntyre, Jr.
2 To remedy the possibility of duplicative efforts, the reorganization plan should provide for the transfer to FEMA of all NRC functions with respect to State and local emergency plans incident to NRC's licensing and regulatory responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act and Energy Reorganization Act.
However, to avoid the possibility of regulatory gaps, the transfer should not be effective until the NRC determines that the FEMA program for assessing the sufficiency of such plans is adequate to protect public health and safety.
Upon such a finding and transfer, NRC's authority and responsibility would cease, and FEMA would have exclusive authority to make determinations respecting the sufficiency of State and local plans.
FEMA's determinations would not be subject to review in NRC proceedings.
3.
The requ'irements of the Energy Reorganization Act that the Commission can take action only through a rajority vote of Commissioners "present" and that a quorum of the Commission must be three members "present" should be relaxed.
The Commission is unique among multi-member regulatory agencies in being unable to act other than by a vote of members present.
At times, this requirement can effectively preclude or delay Commission action.
At other times, it necessitates assembly of the. Commissioners to dispose of minor routine matters which they have each individually approved previously.
We therefore recommend that the reorganization plan provide for waiver of the "present" requirement when all members of the Commission agree to such waiver.
4.
The plan should relieve the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards of the requirement to review every construction permit and operating license application for a large facility.
The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island also recommended this course of action. The Committee agrees with this recommendation, as indicated in the attached letter.
The mandatory requirement of ACRS review under current law results in a needless expenditure of resources by both the Committee and the NRC staff.
For example, it necessitates ACRS review of issues which the Committee has already evaluated in its review of similar license applications.
Relieving the Committee of this requirement would not reduce protection of the public health and safety.
The Committee would retain the ability to review any license application or portion thereof.
If the Committee elected not to
' review an application, it would be required to notify the Commission of its decision that review was unnecessary.
Also, the Commission c~ould direct the ACRS to review an application.
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9
The Honorable James T. McIntyre, Jr.
3 5.
The plan should provide for the transfer of nuclear export licensing functions from NRC to an agency within the Executive Branch.
These functions, which involve a substantial amount of the Commissioners' time, divert agency resources from domestic safety matters.
The narrow expertise of NRC with respect to nuclear exports does not justify the large expenditure of Commissioners' time and other agency resources.
Chaiman Ahearne notes that with regard to this item:
"I would like to point out how much time we actually are devoting to international matters'.
It is difficult to assess how Commissioners spend their time.
How we spend our time will depend in many cases on what are the current high priority issues.
For example, over the last several months most of our time has.been spent on Three Mile Island related events.
However, in the year precedino passage of the Non-Proliferation Act we received 911
. official papers for the Commission to handle. Of these, 27% were related to international matters, including 14% related to e.xports.
In the year followino the passage of the Non-Proliferation Act (which year ended prior to Three Mile Island, so these numbers are not affected by the accident) we received 962 papers.
Of +Se total, 38% were international, including 23% related to exports.
Our international papers went from 27%
of the total to 38%.
Infomation papers are a measure of the amount of time that we should spend to keep abreast of staff activity.
In the year following passage of the NNPA, the international information papers nearly tripled. from 80 to 231.
In addition, in both years over one ouarter of all Commission action papers -- these are ones on which the Commissioners must vote -- related to exports, and about 40% were on one or another aspect of international matters.",1/
Concerning the proposal that the Executive Branch assume the NRC's responsibilities for nuclear export licensing, Commissioners Bradford and Gilinsky note:
"Two years ago Congress examined the issues in great detail and assigned the NRC an independent role in export licensing by a vote of 411 to 0 in the House and 88 to 3 in the Senate.
This was a specific and carefully crafted manifestation of Congress' discontent, in the wake of the disclosure of a U.S. role in the India nuclear explosion, and of its consequent insistence on an independent review of nuclear export licensing to ensure consistent and thorough administration of the law.
The legislation was introduced by the Administration and was strongly
. supported by President Carter who described it as 'of overwhelming importance to our nonproliferation policy.... a major step forward.
... which would put into effect a clarified and an adequate American policy on the.use and provision of atomic. fuels....'"
,1f Remarks by John F. Ahearne, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, before the American Nuclear Society Executive Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 11, 1979; "Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?"
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The Honorable James T. McIntyre, Jr.
4 "The only new wrinkle in.the argument made by the other Commissioners is the suggestion that export licensing distracts Commisson attention from safety, a concern that was never mentioned during the extensive hearings on the proposed NNPA or in the several NNPA-related hearings held since its enactment.
The statement that export licensing involves a 'large expenditure of Commissioners' time and other agency resources' is simply wrong.
Under the regular procedures resulting from the NNPA, nonproliferation concerns related to exports have occupied less than 10% of the Commissioners' time and less than 1% of the agency's resources:
Tieing domestic reactor safety failings to export regulation is at best misleading.
The fact is that the Commission has and has had enough time for safety.
The problem in the past was that the Commission took an overly relaxed view of its safety responsibilities."
"The use of Commission paperwork as a guide to Commission time is misleading here. The 'Information Reports' are inflated by a very high percentage of notices regarding routine exports (to say nothing of imports) handled
' by the staff requiring no Commission time and by international health and safety matters that would remain with the NRC in any case. Most of the
' Action Papers' in the export areas are equally routine.
It would be just as incorrect to say that the NRC's agency priorities were heavily slanted toward nuclear medicine because we have issued thousands of licenses in that field and have issued only 70 nuclear power plant operating licenses.
A review based on Commission meetings shows that in the 23 months since the NNPA took effect, international matters have taken about 9.3% of the. Commission's meeting time, with about 7.6% devoted to non-proliferation.
A better guide to the future may be the last year (post-TMI and also post-the adoption of formal NNPA procedures) when the total is 6.5% and the nonproliferation subtotal only 4.1%.
Even the paperwork percentages devoted to exports would fall off considerably in 1979, if they had been calculated."
6.
The plan should authorize a Commissioner whose term has expired to remain in his position until a successor has been confirmed and has assumed the office.
In the past, Commissioner vacancies have impeded Commission action.
This provision would reduce that possibility in the future and would put the Commission on a par with other regulatory agencies in this regard.
With respect to this item, Commissioners Bradford and Silinsky would support such a provision for Commissioners who have been renominated by
'the President.
A broader provisio.n invites unnecessary delay.in the process of filling Commission vacancies.
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The Honorable James T. McIntyre, Jr.
5 Appended to this letter is statutory language which would effect most of the above Comission recommendations.
Statutory language for transfer of NRC export licensing functions will require additional time to draft, so as to retain for the Comission its other responsibilities with respect to international cooperation; we would assist in drafting such language, if you so desire.
The Comission will provide statutory language for its Office of Inspection and Enforcement when it makes its recommendations as to how best to strengthen that office.
If we may be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call on us.
1 Si ne el John F. Ahearne Attachments: As stated t
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January 15, 1980 Honorable John F. Ahearne Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
RECCENTIONS OF FRESIDEh'i'S CCMMISSION ON ACRS ROLE
Dear Dr. Ahearne:
The following co=nents are offered in response to Mr. Chilk's letter of November 9,1979 requesting that the ACRS provide the Commission with its views and analysis of the role of the ACRS as contained in the recommenda.
tions of the reprt of the President's Commission (PC) on the Accident at Three Mile Island.
Individual recommendations from the report are listed below with ACRS comments following.
1.
"The Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) should be retained, in a strengthened role, to continue providing an independent check on safety matters." The ACRS agrees.
2.
"The members of the Committee should continue to be part-time appintees;...."
h e ACRS agrees.
3.
"The staff of ACRS should be strengthened to provide increased capacity for independent analysis." The ACRS agrees that current staff supprt is inadequate to provide suitable independent-analysis capability; to keep abreast _ of NRC Staff, industry, and foreign group activities on specific safety mat.ters; to provide tachnical and background information to the
. members so the latter can make the best use of their limited time; and to provide proper supprt to the numerous ACRS subecc:mittees. R e Cw.mittee therefore requests that ten additional, senior-staff positions.be author-ized for the ACRS staff in order to' meet the sense of the PC's recommen-dations and to provide an adequate technical supprt base for improved operation of the Committee. Rese psitions are intended to be in addi-
. tion to those authorized in the Fellowship Program.
However, if budgetary limitations prevent this level of support, the Committee would accept.some conversion of Fellowship positions into permanent, senior positions.
In connection with strengthening the staff, it is noted that the help of some outside organization could occasionally be very useful in the assenbly of information and data or in carrying out some specific analysis.
It is requested that means be explored whereby the ACRS could obtain such short-term studies as needed.
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Honorable John F. Ahearne January 15, 1980 4.
"Special consideration should be given to improving ACRS' capabilities in the field of public health." At the present time, the Committee has one member who is a specialist in the field of public health, and it can call upon an extensive list of highly gaalified consultants.
One of the initial group of ACRS Fellows was gaalified in this area, and new Fellows, or p ssibly full-time staff members, knowledgeable in this field could be added to our staff as needed. Consequently, the Committee believes it has adecuate competence in this area..
5.
"The ACRS should not be required to review each license application."
'Ihe ACRS concurs with this recccmendation and stggests that legislation be passed such that, unless the Commission specifically recuests a re-view and report on an application or portion thereof, the Comnittee may dispense with such review and report by notifying the Commission in writing that review by the Committee is not warranted. We would expect that su:h notification by the Committee would be rade part of the public record.
6.
"hhen ACRS chooses to review a license application, it should have the statutory right to intervene in hearings as a party.
In particular, ACRS shodd be authorized to raise any safety issue in licensing pro-ceedings, to give reasons and arguments for its views, and to require formal response by the Agency to any subnission it makes." While the ACRS agrees that additional emphasis should be given to ACRS reccomen-dations during the hearing process, 'it believes that a more desirable method of achieving this purpose would be to alter the statute to re-quire that all recommendations made by the ACRS on given licensing.
proceedings be treated as substantive issues during the hearing.
In order to protect the advisory role and collegiality of the ACRS, the statute should also specify that neither the Committee nor its members should be involved as a party nor be subject to subpoena in connection with the hearings.
7.
"Any member of the ACRS should be authorized to appear and testify in hearings,...." The Committee believes that one of its rain strergths results from its collegial approach and that this would be jeopardized if members departed from the collegial forum.
Although members can ex-press disagreement with full Committee views by adding separate comments to our reprts, we believe the ecliective aspect is overriding ~and we cannot support the reccreendation.
A member should be free, of course, to participate.as an intervenor in his. capacity as a private citizen.
8.
"ACRS should have similar ' rights in rulemaking proceedings.
In partic-ular,1t should have the power to initiate a rulemaking proceeding before the agency to resolve any generic issu'e it identifies." The.
Committee agrees with the thrust of this recommendation but believes that the Commission would, as a matter of course, initiate a rulemaking pro-ceeding when recommended by the ACRS.
Ibwever, as noted in our letter of December 13, -1979 to Commissioner Bradford, we believe that well-defined 8
Honorable John F. Ahearne January 15, 1930 procedures for ACRS input to the rulemaking process wauld be useful for clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the ACRS and the NRC Staff in this area.
Such procedures should include enough flexibility to allow those departures Wich may be required by special circumstances.
We have also informally sought comment from the President's Office, the Com-mission, the ASGP, the NRC Staff, Congressional Staff, and from the Commit-tee members on ways to strengthen the role of the ACRS.
Four major sugges-tions have surfaced, and these are addressed below.
1.
It has been suggested that it would be of considerable value to the Commission if the ACRS could periodically assist in establishing pri-orities among the many safety matters needing attention.
One approach.
to accomplish such an assignment, Wich we are prepared to undertake, would be for the Committee to comment on the priorities indicated in the report on unresolved safety issues Wich is submitted annually by the NRC to the Congress.
Such a review should include consideration of other issues Wich are potential candidates for the list.
A second, more time-consuming approach, somewhat experimental in nature, might be for the ACRS to evaluate and provide comments to the Commission on the general objectives, priorities, and resource allocations of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or other NRC Offices. We would be pleased to work with the Commissioners to determine whether this or some other approach might prove useful.
2.
It has been suggested that the NRC needs a senior advisory group to assist in consideration of problems covering all aspects of the fuel cycle and that the PC seems to suggest that this role be filled by the ACRS. As you are aware, the ACRS, at the request of the Commissioners, either is or has been involved in safety-related aspects of reactor pwer plant design and operation, advanced reactor develognent, Depart-ment of Energy and Naval reactors, research, siting, chemical processing facilities, nuclear safeguards, transportation of radioactive materials, industrial sabotage, waste management, emergency planning, and spent
' fuel storage capacity..Ihus, it already serves as an advisory body on subjects covering rest of the breadth of the safety aspects of the fuel cycle. Although the Committee's time is limited, it could undertake additional work on the few remaining safety aspects of the full fuel-cycle.
.Ihe Committee feels that some of its recommendations have not been fol-3,.
Iowed up by the Commission and the NRC Staff in an adequate or timely fashion. We are pleased to see that you have initiated actions recently to r solve this matter, and we are prepared to work with you or your staff as,,eeded.
We believe that the Com:61ssion and Staff should develop a
. specific procedure for handling ACRS recommendations and for commenting on the reasons for the actions taken.
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s 4-January 15, 1930 Honorable John F. Ahearne 4.
It has been suggested that the ACRS should devote a greater fraction of its time to some of the broader, as contrasted to detailed, aspects of reactor safety. The Committee is in agreer.ent with this point and had begun moving farther in this direction prior to TMI-2.
We would welcome the opportunity to discuss any aspects of this letter on which you have questions.
Sincerely, m -
A P
f Milton S. Plesset Chairman e
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2.
Transfer of Functions to FEMA The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 as amended (42,0.S.C. 5801 eti sec.) is amended --
1.
By redesignating subsection 201(f) as paragraph (1) of sub-section 201(f); and 2.
By adding a new paragraph (2) to subsection 201(f) to read as follows:
"(2) There are transferred to the Federal Emergency Management Agency all of the licensing and regulatory functions of Ehe Nuclear Regulatory Commission with respect to review and approval of State and local plans for offsite emergency response.
The Agency shall have the exclusive authority to make determinations about*the adequacy of such plans, and such' determinations shall not be subject to review in' any Commission proceeding.
This transfer shall be effective upon a finding by the Commission that the Agency has a.
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program for making -such determinations which is adequate to protect public health and safety."
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The "Present" Requirenent The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 as amended (42 U.S.C.
5 801 eji seq. ) is amended by inserting the folloving new sentence after Ehe sixth sentence in section 20- (a)(1):
The presence requirement for quorum purposes and for taking action shall be waived in the case of any action of the Commission if all members of the Commission (whether or not present) havs indicated in. writing, in such form and manner as may be prescribed by the Com-mission, Ebat they agree to such waiver with respect to such action.
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Mandator' ACRS Review The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as anended (42 U.S.C. 2011 el sec.) is amended --
1.
By striking the word "which" after the word " thereon" in subsection 182b.; and
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By adding the following new words to subsection 182b.
after the word " thereon":
- Provided, however, That unlo6m the Commission specifically requests a review and report on an application or e
portion thereof, the Committee may dispense with such review and report by notifying the Commission in writing that review by the Committee is not warranted.
Any report or notice required by this subsection e
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- 6. Carry ~over of a Commissioner The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 as amended (42 U.S.C.
5801 et seq.) is amended by adding a new sentence at the end' of subsection 201(c) to read as follows:
A Commissioner may continue to serve after the expiration of his term until his successor has taken office, except that he may not so continue to serve for more than one year after the date on which his term would otherwise expire under this subsection.
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QUESTION.
The Commission requested additional resources for NRR last S-11.
year in order to process the backlog of licensing actions and then TMI intervened. What is the extent of the backlog presently and does the FY 1981 budget request sufficient resources to address this problem? How many of the backlogged licensing actions are either a result of TMI or relate specifically to the kinds of problems experienced at TMI?
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ANSWER.
At the present time there is a backlog of approximately 2600 licensing actions not related to the TMI accident.
In addition the TMI accident will result in an approximate doubling of the new operating reactor licensing actions in FY-1980 and FY-1981.
Because of additional incoming licensing actions (not TMI related) and the heavy workload of actions resulting from the TMI accident, we expect little decrease, perhaps some increase, in the backlog by the end of FY-1981.
Budget requests for subsequent years will identify the resources necessary to address our goal of reducing the backlog of licensing actions.
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QUESTION.
One of the stated goals for NRR is to continue to work towards S-12.
expedited reviews for standardized applications for nuclear power plants. How have the events at Three Mile Island imparted the Agency's views regarding the advantage and dis-advantages of standardized designs?
ANSWER.
The experience and knowledge gained as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) pc~nts out clearly the wide varying plant designs, differing operating parameters and procedures, and different safety margins to postulated transients and plant conditions, even for plants involving a single nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) vendor. The combi-nations of designs, procedures, set-points, respcnse to transients, etc.,
for all plants, pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR), is significant.
As a result of this situation, a number of points emerge:
the staff has detailed knowledge of representative plant systems and predicted responses to transients, but often lacks ready in-depth knowledge and understanding of any specific plant design and perfor-mance; generic analysis and predicted plant responses have only limited value - generally, plant-by-plant and case-by-case studies and analyses are required because of specific plant differences; plant simulators used for operator training cannot accurately simulate plant responses and procedures associated with all plants of that NSSS design - and thus, operator training must be augmented through unique plant specific training; when a problem having public health and safety implications is experienced, there is an inherent time delay as staff and technical support personnel get up to speed, with regard to a particular plant design and anticipated operating characteristics, and the possible impact on other plants from the same problem; immediate and long-term corrective action to assure adequate margins for all plants from serious problems are not easily or rapidly determined -
generally, a plant-specific analysis must be conducted and a unique plan of action developed for each plant; because of the nature of the competitive nuclear industry and under the present regulatory process, this situation is not likely to be different in the future. As the TMI and the Brown's Ferry accidents make clear, the NRC must be able to move quickly and decisively for situations having public health and safety implications; because of the NRC role and responsibilities and public and Congressional perceptions of our role in cases involving serious reactor operational problems, one aspect of on-going studies include the procedural and organization changes which offer potential Tor the staff to react more quickly for serious operational events;
2-many of the initial difficulties faced in coping with the TMI incident would have been reduced had TMI been one of a family of standard plants under a standardized policy implemented with a high degree of discipline; standardization provides a policy and framework for the staff and tne industry to know, understand, and model the response of plant systems, and thus, to quickly and effectively analyze differing situations.
When viewed in the context of prevention of an recovery from accidents, such as experienced at TMI and Brown's Ferry, disciplined standardization provides a number of distinct advantages, such as:
A uniform system design results in a much greater understanding of the specific design and associated plaat response characteristics.
This is true for utilities, NSSS vendors, architect-engineers, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Atomic Safety at Licensing Boards, and the public and staff.
Definition and examination of interfaces between NSSS, balance of plant and site aids in gaining an understanding of system interactions.
More complete and effective simulation and research and development are possible when results are applicable to a class of plants whose population is relatively significant.
Uniform design, procedures, and setpoints from plant to plant permit efficient feedback of design solutions to minimize recurrence of operational difficulties.
Generic reliability studies, failure modes and effects analyses or risk analyses can be effectively conducted since applicability is to a class of plant:: whose population is relatively significant.
Operator and maintenance training can be conducted using uniform pro-cedures and accurate simulation.
Therefore, the proper and disciplined application of standardization policies has the potential to minimize sinilar type events in the future and maximize the ability to react quickly, effectively, and decisively should unexpected serious events occur, having real potential for public health and safety impacts.
Some may believe that standardization tends to put too many eggs in one basket, and that if one egg is wrong, the whole basket would have to be discarded. We don't believe that view is correct. First, because of competitive pressures, there will be at least one design, and perhaps more, from each NSSS vendor for one or more plant sizes. Secondly, each A-E will develop a unique design for each type of plant. Thirdly, there will be a shift of designs with time and thus, the population of any one combination of NSSS, B0P and power level will not be large. Also, problems will show up one at a time - and the impact of such problems and the effectiveness of corrective action for other plants should readily and accurately be determined.
We fully expect that standardized designs will continue to play an important role in the licensing of nuclear power plants.
We note that the CESSAR and GESSAR-233Til Final Design Approval applications are expected to serve as the licensing basis for a major fraction of numerous operating licensing applications.
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QUESTI0" S-13. NRR plans to conduct value/ impact analyses to evaluate the
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impact of regulatory actions versus the value gained in protectionofthepublicandtheenvirorhynt.
Please describe in more detail how the Agency intends to make this analysis and what criteria will be used.
ANSWER.
For the past several years, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, consistent with Commission policy, has required that value/ impact analyses be performed on all proposed changes in regulatory requirements for nfulear power reactors.
Procedures for these analyses have been promul-gated within the office and are in use for any changes to our Standard Review Plan.
Similar procedures are followed in the Office of Standards Development for changes in Regulations or Regulatory Guides.
A copy of the NRR guidelines for value/ impact analyses is attached.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO*.iMISSION j,ky }
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January 31, 1978
'% =..,'t MEMORANDUM FOR: Roger S. Boyd, Director, DPM Harold Denton, Director, DSE Roger J. Mattson, Director, DSS Victor Stello, Jr., Director, DOR FROM:
Edson G. Case, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF VALUE-IMPACT AN
SUBJECT:
NRR OFFICE LETTER NO. 16 In accordance with the value impact guidelines given in SECY-77-3SS and the guidance given in the August S, 1977 memorandum from S. J. Chilk to L. V. Gossick, the attached instructions have been developed for use in NRR for the preparation of value-impact analyses in support of signi-ficant changes in regulatory requirements.
Effective immediately, all NRR divisions will use these instructions in the development of value-impact analyses to assure that all significant alternatives and other e
considerations have been identified and weighed prior.to NRR management i
approva.1, including RRRC consideration, and staff implementation of sign -
ficant changes in regulatory requirements. After a period of one year the instructions will be reviewed and changed as necessary to reflect experi-ence in their utili:ation.
The August S, 1977 memorandum identiffes other issues, not accounted for in the attached instructions, that should be addressed in implementing the value-impact guidelines. These include allocation of resources (staffing, training, outside contracts, etc.), assignment of points of contact, and the development of manuals. No special guidelines are They will be developed presently established with regard to these issues.in the f ture to sup u
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__t-Edson G. Case,' Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Instructions for Pre' paring Value-Impact Analyses 2.
Memo from Chilk to Gossick dtd 8/5/77 e
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
" Instructions for the Precaration Of Value-Imoact Analyses" Introduction Value-imoact analyses shall be performed for each significant change in regulatory requirements to demonstrate that all significant alternatives and considerations were identified and weighed.
The alternatives and considerations to be weighed include all the values to be gained, such as contribution to public health and safety and reduction in environmental damage, and all the impacts that result, such as increased risk to plant operators, increased environmen al damage and increased costs.
A value-impact analysis should not be construed to mean that cost considerations take precedence over considerations of health, safety, or national security.
These factors remain paramount.
Cost, however, is an important factor in many regulatory matters and must be a prime consideration when there are alternative means of achieving desired levels of health, safety and national security.
Value-impact analysis as interpreted by the staff is essentially a technique equivalent to benefit and cost analysis, or cost and effectiveness analysis.
The term value-impact was introduced at NRC to dispcl certain connotations associated with the other terms.
Benefit-cost analysis, in particular, is often misconceived as a process of reducing all factors to a common dollar form.
This, the staff felt, was too restrictive, and therefore the terms value and impact were' rec 6mmended and designed to include noncommensurables, and variables that are nonquantifiable or nonmeasurable.
Thus, it was believed that the new terms would allow for analysis to incorporate very
.g.
important but nonquantifiable judgments of the staff and other expert parties.
It should be noted, however, that cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, properly conducted, have just as broad a scope as that envisioned by the staff for value-impact analysis.
Proposed actions to which these instructions apply include the issuance of new and substantive staf f positions (Regulatory Guides, Branch Technical Positions, and other positions given in the Standard Review Plans for both safety and environmental reviews), new and amended Regulations, and Ccmmis-sion papers involving a potential change in regulatory requirements or policy.
Generic and specific environmental impact statements are excluded because they customarily contain both an analysis of alternatives and a cost / benefit analysis.
These instructions also will not apply to the case-by-case licensing activities by NRR Divisions on construction permit and operating license applications and amendments or operating reactor orders and amendments.
Decisions in these cases flow from the existing regulatory base (regulations, guides, and review procedures) and involve technical judgment to assure that an acceptable level of safety results in each case.
In the main, these routine licensing activities do not involve changes to the basic frame.iork for the licensing and regulation of nuclear power plants and therefore do not warrant a value impact analysis of the scope discussed in this document.
However, licensing reviews for cps and Ols have, in the past, exhibited a tendency for escalating regulatcry requirements through reinterpretation of rules, guides and review procedures.
Such escalations sometimes have a considerable impact with little perceptible gain in plant safety. To control this tendency, all significant deviations or departures should be s~ubjected to value-impact analysis just as though they were proposed new guides or branch positions.
The fact that they are applied on case reviews is not cause for exemption.
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. In general, a value-impact analysis should document sequentially the logic utilized in developing a prcposed action, with each step in the logic sequence accompanied by a value-impact analysis pertinent to the step, as appropriate.
The outline of a value-impact analysis is shown in Table 1.
For the case of' Commission papers, only a few of which are expected to require a value-impact analysis, the value-impact analysis would be provided in addition to the discussion of alternatives identifying pros and cons normally included in Commission papers.
These are generally more subjective in nature than the value-impact analysis addressing administrative, procedural and budgetary areas appropriate for Commission-level consideratica.
Only the summary and conclusions of the value-impact analysis nr.ed be appended.
For the case of other proposed actions, the value-impact analysis will serve as the primary vehicle for justifying the proposed action.
As such it should be appended in its entirety to the documentation containing the proposed action as it traverses the review and approval process through NRR management, including RRRC or ACRS.
The first major element of the value-impact analysis involves establishing the need for a change in the regulatory base.
The guidelines require consideration of both the values and the impacts in establishing that there is need for a change. The second major element is consideration of the available technical alternatives involved in developing the selected approach including trade-offs.of the various technical factors and their safety, environmental, or safeguards implications.
The third factor involves an assessment of the safety or environmental significance of the p'roposed action with regard to the associated plan for implementation on nuclear power plants in various stages of design, construction and operation.
The final factor is c'onsideration of the procedural method for implementing the action.
It consists of an identification of the rationale for selection of the procedural method, such as a regulation, a regulatory guide, a branch technical position, or a Commission policy statement.
. As an example, applying the above sequential approach for value-impact analyses to the case of guidance for fire protection for nuclear power plants, the first decision is whether additional requirements or guidance for fire protection are warranted, and includes consideration of the alternative of taking no action at all.
The second decision is whether the favored technical approach should be separation, barriers, detection equipment, extinguishing equipment or some combination.
The third decision involves an assessment of the safety significance of the fire protection guidance with regard to the plan for implementation of the guidance, in whole or in part, for the spectrum of nuclear plants, ranging from new applications to operating plants.
The fourth decision is issuance of the guidance or requirements in regulation, regulatory guide, branch technical position, or other form.
In the interest of efficiency and reduced paperwork, the guidelines are structured so that only preferred actions are examined in detail to establish the best method of implementation.
Experience shows that significant costs can be associated with the method of implementation.
Therefore, it is important that the interrelationship between technical and procedural alternatives be well understood and explained in the analyses so as not to overlook cost-effective methods of achieving necessary changes in the regulatory base.
In preparing value-impact analyses, the following general guidance should be utilized:
1.
Each section of the outline should be addressed to the extent necessary to reveal the basis for a given conclusion.
If a particular section is determined to"be inappropriate or not applicable to the proposed action, this should be so stated.
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. In these guidelines, impacts are negative, i.e., effects on, or 2.
outlays by, somebody or something such as risk, radiation dose, Conversely, environmental damage, money, time, or other measure.
values are positive or beneficial, i.e., contribution to public health and safety, reduction in radiation dose, reduction in environ-mental damage, etc.
It is neither sufficient nor acceptable to declare "no impact" from a 3.
proposed action because industry has accepted the position (e.g., a national standard is endorsed).
Such endorsement does not alter the f act that values and impacts will result.
On the other hand, industry acceptance, comments of other government agencies, expert opinion, or other considerations may be important factors in characterizing the weight of particular values and impacts of a proposed action, and in weighing several alternatives.
No particular analytical technique or formal decision methodology is 4.
recommended at this tir.e for comparing the values and impacts of In most cases, particularly for preliminary state-alternatives.
ments, the balancing dill be done on the basis of professional judgment.
When it is possible, neaningful and appropriate, however, values and impacts should be translated into such measures as exposure dose, monetary units, time, risk, etc.
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Table 1 VALUE-IMPACT ANALYSIS I.
The Procosed Action A.
Description B.
Need for the Proposed Action C.
Value-Impact of the Proposed Action 1.
NRC Operations 2.
Other Governent Agencies 3.
Industry 4.
Public D.
Decision on the Proposed Action II.
Technical Aoroach A.
Technical Alternatives B.
Discussion and Comparison of Technical Alternatives C.
Decision on Technical Approach III. Plan for Imolementation Safety or Envircnmental Significance of the Proposed Action A.
B.
Decision on the Plan for Implementation IV.
Procedural Acoroach A.
Procedural Alternatives B.
Value-Impact of Procedural Alternatives C.
Decision on Procedural Approach V.
Statutory Considerations A.
NRC Authority B.
Need for NEPA Statement VI.
Summary and Conclusions References S
- we me e
..m
VALUE-IMPACT ANALYSIS 1.
The Procosed Action Description - This section should provide a description of the A.
In most cases, the proposed action will be to proposed action.
provide some type of guidance, either new guidance or a revision to existing guidance, to applicants or licensees on matters of health, safety, environment, siting, or national security.
Need for the Procosed Action - Describe the current situation B.
Discuss the that underlies the need for the proposed action.
reasons for proposing a change such as safety concerns, environmental impact mitigation, changes in policy, or other In factors, including consideration of "no action" at all.
short, where are we now with regard to the area of concern, and why do we want to change.
Value-Imaact of the Prooosed Action - Describe the values and C.
impacts associated with the proposed action for each affected group.
NRC Operations - Describe the expected values to the NRC 1.
regulatory function and the expected impacts in terms of resources required for implementation, licensing review and other functions.
Impacts may include funding require-ments'for needed technical assistance or research, such as contracts with other Federal agencies or consultants.
G oes
. Other Government Acencies - Describe the values and 2.
impacts of the proposed action to other government agencies including Federal, state, or local agencies.
Indicate whether assistance will be expected from any of these agencies and the extent of such" assistance.
Determine and describe any potential conflicts or overlaps with other agencies, e.g., EPA, CEQ, 00E, 00T, that may have parallel or opposing requirements to the proposed action.
If known', also include State and local agencies.'
Industrv" - Estimate the values and impacts for (a) any 3.
expected participation by industry including the pre-paration and review of documents, and (b) any subsequent implementation by industry including reporting require-ments, if any, for applicants and licensees.
Reporting requirements may have significant value to the staff and public but will also impact the applicant or licensee.
Identification of significant comments received from industry grcups through discussions or other communi-cations should be included, as appropriate.
4.
Public - Describe values and impacts expected to the public or segments of the public.
Identification of significant comments received from the public should be included as appropriate.
" Industry should be interpreted in a broad sense to include all parties other than the general public that may be affected directly or indirectly by NRC regulatory actions.
Thus, the definition will include workers involved with nuclear power plant facilities (including both nuclear suppliers and the utilities).
= -- _.
-g-D.
Decision on the Procosed Action - Provide a summary statement as to why the proposed action thould be undertaken.
II.
Technical Accroach A.
Technical Alternatives - List alternative technical methods for accomplishing the proposed action.
The number of technical alternatives will not usually be numerous, but any that can reasonably achieve the objective of the proposed action should be included.
B.
Discussion and Comoarision of Technical Alternatives - For each alternative discuss the technical factors, as values and irtoacts, that are involved with respect to the proposed action.
Particular attention should be given to the trade-offs that
~
may be involved.
As examples, stiffening a reactor core to reduce internal vibration may lead to increased susceptibility to effects from ground movement; lower limits on effluents offsite may result in increased occupational doses onsite; the installation of straps to prevent pipe failure due to vibration may increase risk of failure by constraining thermal expansion and contraction during normal heatup and cooldown.
These examples are not necessarily inclusive or typical.
- However, they illustrate the important point that any given change usually induces a reaction, and the extent and probability of the reactions affecting safety need to be identified and balanced against the expected value of the proposed action.
In addition, trade-offs are involved not only in hardware-related actions but also
- .o lude such software-oriented actions as the processing and analysis of data, proposals for conducting practice public emergency evacuation, and similar measures.
. Decision on Technical Acoroach - In the light of the techn' 31 C.
approaches considered, re-evaluate whether the proposed action should or should not be undertaken, and state the technical acoroach that is selected to accomplish the action.
III. Plan for Imolementation Safety or Environmental Sionificance of the Procosed Action -
A.
Make a determination of the significance to safety or the environment of the proposed action, and present the rationale used in making the determination.
This should result in the classification of the proposed action into one of the following categories:
Small improvement to safety or protection of the environ-(1) ment that warrants implementation on new plants only.
(2) Greater improvement to safety or protection of the environment that warrants a review of plants that are licensed or operational for possible implementation ~ _n a case-by-case basis in addition to implementation in new plants.
(3) Significant improvement to safety or protection of the environment that warrants implementation on all plants regardless of design, construction, or operational status.
The determination should include a description of the expected value to the public health and safety or for protection of the environment to be achieved in implementing the proposed action
- on the plants associated with the selected category of signi-ficance.
It should also include a description cf the expected impact for the selected implementation plan.
Consider pertinent comments from.the public and industry as appropriate.
Provide a staff response to these comments.
B.
Decision on the Plan for Imolementation - State the conclusion reached on the selected' plan for implementation of the proposed action.
IV.
Procedural Acoroach A.
Procedural Alternatives - List alternative procedural or administrative approaches that can be utilized to accomplish the proposed action.
The alternatives will usually be limited to:
o Regulation Preparation or revision of input for a regulatory guide o
o NUREG Report o
Brancn Technical Position o
Cammission Paper B.
Value-Imoact of Procedural Alter,atives - Discuss the arguments for and against a particular alternative and other possible and reasonable alternatives.
For many actions the choice of procedural method will usually be straightforward.
In some however, the choice may be difficult and require a more
- cases, extended discussion of pros and cons as they relate to NRC, other government agencies, industry and the public.
me--ee m
-12_
C.
Decision on Procedural Acoroach - Identify the procedural method selected for development and implementation.
V.
Statutory Considerations A.
NRC Authority - In essentially all cases regulatory actions originating in or issuing from NRC will derive from basic statutory authorities, namely, the Atomic Energy Act (the Act),
the Energy Reorganization Act, or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
From these statutes flow regulatory pro-cedures, authorities, or requirements that are promulgated as regulations in the several parts of 10 CFR.
To implement these
- regulations NRC has promulgated a series of Regulatory Guides.
To. contrast these regulatory tools, note that a regulation flows directly from statutory authority, whereas a guide flows from the requirements of a regulation.
This means that regulations have full force of law, and guides do not.
In practice, however, guides have been applied by licensing review staff and been considered by industry to have nearly the same force as regulations. This occurs principally because of the timeliness of accepting the solution or position presented in a guide when compared to the task of developing and defending an alternative solution.
In any event, it is important to understand and describe the relationship of the proposed action to the authority that provides t' ; basis for its promulgation.
8.
Need for NEPA Statement - A preliminary evaluation should be made as to whether the proposed action is a major action that may significantly affect the quality of the human environment
- and thus require preparation of an environmental impact statement.
For guidance on this question see 10 CFR 51 and particularly 10 CFR 51.5(a)(10),10 CFR 51.5(b)(6), and 10 CFR 51.5(d)(3).
VI.
Summary and Conclusions Summarize the value-impact analysis for the proposed action including:
(1) A description of the proposed action, (2) The technical alternatives considered and the alternative a
- selected, (3), The plan for implementation, (4) The procedural approach selected, and (3) Other significant considerations.
References - List the references used in preparing the value-impact statement.
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1 L' f August 5, i:77
}EIC?.KQQI IOP.:
Lee V. Cossick, Executive Director fc: Operadhsis
/I s.
TEC".:
Sa=uel J., Chilk, Secreta.
7 CCBDfISSIONEF. Cb:OII:i 5 ON D2g-uu.u. CU!OEI.IliES SU3JEC :
(SECT-77-388) AliD M30 7I, PA:.. A The C==issi:ners have reviewed the propcsed -hpact-value essessce::
guidelines contained in SECY-77-338 and Cc= issiener Kennedy has been Detailed cc_=ents on the draf t guidelines briefed cc M30 71, ?ar: A.
are at: ached to this =e=crandc.=.
is Because the success of i= pact-value depends hea -ily c= hen it ac:urlly carried cu, each of the staff effices should de'relop specific p1rns for i=ple=e :ing the guidelines in their particu12:
These action plans chzuli address such circu= stances of cpera:icn.
issues as:
o Establish =an: pf cffice policy, cri:eria, and ex2=ples for deciding when er when net to issue an i= pact-value assess =ect, the thres-including (1) the :rpes of appr:priate uses and (2) hold of signifi:2nce f=
i= pacts.
Allecs: ion cf resources fc i=pi =enta:icn, =anage=ent and
.o quali:7 con:rol (including s:af f, training, and perh2ps cen-tracts on =e:hedology develop =ent).
u-2hin of responsibilities and points of con:at:
Assig.=en:
o each office for the preparation, review, distributien and utilization of inpac:-value assess =ents.
4 Desirsbility of developing canuals providis; de: ailed o
assistance and exa=ples of relevance to the particular tasks of each office, consistent.rith the ge=eral guid nce in SECY-77-338.,
As each office develops its acticn plans, the Cx=:issicners infor=ed with regard to the range of available o
should be kep:
al:ernatives.
s
. August 5, ic77
-: :e.. Cscalck Age =cy-side Obj ectives VI, Par A should be expanded beyond retan f
nu=eral three to include an everview secticn which tracks the Tc.e Cc dssica j
deveicpcec and i=ple=entatien of these actica plans.
should revie: and approve the amended I-20.
Tne proposed guidelines coc:ained in SECT-77-358 reaf fir = the Cet ission's dedicatica to the C=ce the full use of i= pact-value assess =ects as a =acter of polic/.
t l
Cc-- #ssion is en board, further briefings en i= pact-value assess==n:
before final Cce ission aq:ica en the guide-vill p cbabl7 be necessarf Beesuse of the i=per:ance cf this ca :er, represen:sti.
l
, lines is taken.
cf the varicus line offices should pla: en attending uhen the Cc==issien censiders IVA again.
Inclosure:
As s 2:ed cc:
Cc==issicner Gilirs!cf Cc
- ssiener Kennedy Ji= Hard, CCli Ja:es Kellev.
Ken.Federsen P
s
(
o
QUESTION.
The Division of Operating Reactors plans to factor lessons S-14.
learned from unexpected events into the licensing process to make sure that necessary followup action is taken.
Please describe how this will be done and how the Commission plans to coordinate this activity with the new Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data?
ANSWER.
The Office of NRR and the Office of AE0D are assigned responsibilities which require both offices to review, evaluate, and disseminate operational data from reactors and other facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 50.
AE0D has the responsibility to coordinate and appraise the effectiveness of all NRC data gathering, analysis, and feedback efforts; serve as principal NRC contact for coordination and interaction with ACRS and industry organ-izations in the areas of collection, processing and use of operational data; perform long term analyses and evaluations of operational data to identify trends, potential accident precursors, or new accident sequences; provide oversight and peer review; make recomendations for corrective actions; and perform reliability assessments of plant components, reactor systems, and operation to determine risks associated with normal plant operations and accident sequences.
Among the principal responsibilities assigned to NRR are the establishment of safety and environmental criteria for license issuance, evaluation of license and amendment applications, and issuance of licenses and amendments which meet established criteria.
Included within these principal responsibilities, NRR assures that plants continue to operate safely through the review and evaluation of operational experience and by implementing necessary licensing actions to resolve immediate as well as longer term plant specific and generic safety concerns.
In addition, NRR analyzes and utilizes operational data as a basis for changing the licensing requirements and in the evaluation of overall licensee performance.
These NRR functions will provide assurance that operating experience is fed back into the licensing process via the followup of recomendations made in operating experience feedback memoranda which will serve to disseminate operational data.
_.. _ ~.
QUESTION S-15.
Me Systratic Evaluation Program has as one of its major objectives, "to provide the capability to make integrated and balanced decisions with respect to any recuired backfitting". Please provide the criteria which will be used in caking these decisions.
A'SE.
%e capability of a plant to respond to selected design basis events will be the basis for assessing the safety adequacy of operating plants. The selected design basis events are included in the Topic List and consist of identified single events which can potentially result in greater than routine releases of radioactive material from the site. This set of design basis events include:
(1) natural phencmena such as earthquakes, fires and floods and (2) events resulting frcxn postulated plant transients, accidents and failures such as turbine missiles and pipe breaks. An operating plant will be considered to be adequately safe if it can be demonstrated that the plant will reliably respond to all design basis events with 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines values not being exceeded.
The determination that a plant will " reliably respond" to all design basis events cannot be readily quantified and will necessarily depend upon the experience and judgement of the Coccission and its staff. In determining whether a plant is safe with respect to a given stopic the following factors need to be considered:
- conservatisms in the analysis
- results of more realistic analysis
- availability of non-safety sys't ss
- probability of initiating events
- past plant experience
- degree by which criteria <re exceeded
'Ihe concept of performing an integrated assessment should simplify the decision making process because of the perspective gained by considering all identified plant deficiencies and alternate capabilities at one time. For a single deficiency it may be difficult to justify backfitting. However, when considered with several other deficiencies the decision to require backfitting'fix' whichmay be more readily justified. Furthermore, it may be possible to design one will serve to resolve a n eber of deficiencies at one time.
Inehaluatingadehiationfromcurrentcriteria,adeterminationismaderelatihe to its significance.
If it is a significant reduction in safety margins the staff has and will require prompt backfitting to provide substantial additional protection for the public health and safety. An example of this is the recent order regarding the liquefaction concern at the Lacrosse facility.
If.the staff concludes that the deviation is not of major significance and a prompt remedy is not required, implementation of changes will be considered in the integrated assessment. An example of this is a change in the plant tech. specs. concerning impurities in plant water systems.
OVESTION S-16. The Office of Standards Development plans to issue a study during 1980 concerning the feasibility of epidemiological studies on low-level radiation effects.
Does this feasi-bility study include populations exposed to low levels of radiation during and after the Three Mile Island accident?
When is completion of this report expected?
ANSWER.
The contract in question to conduct a feasibility study was placed in July 1979 and contains wording which directs the contractor to include evaluation of the employees of the licensee, contractors and subcontractors at Three Mile Island.
The final report is expected in September 1980.
(See attached Statement of Work Article I, Section C).
e
Ont ra ct Go. MC-01-79 410 Fage 2 of 6 A.
Regarding ARTICLE I - STATEMENT OF WORK 1.
Section C.
STATEMENT OF WORK Within the current context of the statement of work, the contractor shall examine the incident at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility i,n Pennsylvania.
As a minimum, the contractor shall evaluate the feasibility of epidemiological research on the health effects of low-level ionizing radiation exposure to licensee, contractor, and subcontractor employees as a result of:
(1) The accident of March 28, 1979, of the Three Mile Island unit two nuclear facility in Pennsylvania; (2) efforts to stabilize such facility, or reduce or prevent radioactive releases therefrom; and if practicable, (3) efforts to decontaminate, decommission, or repair such facility.
2.
Section D., REPORT REQUIREMENTS, Part I, SPECIFIC REPORT REQUIREMENTS; Item C is changed as follows:
_c-Delete the date August 31, 1979 and substitue in lieu thereof the date September 28, 1979.
C 3,.
Section F., MEETINGS; Part 2 is changed as follows:
s_
Delete the dates September 10, 1979 and August 31, 1979 and substitute in lieu thereof the dates October 10, 1979 and September 28, 1979 respectively.
B.
Regarding ARTICLE III - CONSIDERATION 1.
In Paragraph A., Estimated Cost, Fixed Fee and Oblication, the fo.llowing changes are made:
Subparagraph 1. is changed to read as follows:
"It is estimated that the total cost to the Government for full performance of this contract will be $308,495.00, of which the sum of $288,258.00 represents the estimated reimbursable costs, and of which $20,237.00 represents the fixed fee.
Note:
The proposed fee of $950.00 for "Equifax Services" has been included in the above fixed fee amount.
Any change in the amount of "Equifax Services" required for the performance of this contract shall not alter the fixed fee stated above."
OUESTION S-17.
Under the Revised Inspection Program, approximately how much of the Performance Appraisal Team's time will be spent in direct observation and independent measurements as opposed to auditing activities? Please describe in more detail how the PAT intends to confirm inspector objectivity.
ANSWER.
In FY 1979 the Performance Appraisal Team (PAT) allocated approximately 20f, of their inspection effort to direct observation of licensee performance.
This level of direct observation is expected to continue.
Independent measurements have not been performed by PAT to date although some independent measurement work is scheduled for FY 1981.
The role of PAT in confirming resident inspector objectivity is one of identifying to IE management situations where PAT inspection results differ significantly from the findings of the resident inspector; i.e.,
where PAT inspections indicate a level of licensee performance appreciably below that found by the resident inspector.
IE management would then explore the causes for this difference which could involve loss of objectivity or other factors related to the proper conduct of the inspection If loss of objectivity is determined to be the cause, proper program.
corrective action would be immediately taken.
QUESTIOM S-18. Three additional people have been requested for the Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Program.
You have stated that approximately 50% of safety related equipment problems reported can be attributed to vendor activities.
In light of this statement, do you believe the LCVIP has adequate resources to conduct effective inspections?
ANSWER.
The level of effort planned for the Vendor inspection program relates directly to the reduced number of forecasted reactor starts.
New construction of nuclear power plants has virtually stopped (no new construction permit applications since 1978) resulting in a rapid decrease in the backlog of nuclear work at the vendor product suppliers.
It is on this reduced work-load basis that we believe an adequate level of inspections of these suppliers can be maintained with the present inspection staff.
Extensive design efforts are expected to continue, however, with reactor modifications as well as the generation of new designs.
This will require a modest increase in our inspection of architect engineers and the nuclear steam system suppliers for which we have requested resources in the FY 1931 budget.
4
QUESTION S-19.
The frequency of inspection of materials licensees is based on risk potential. These licensees are grouped into 7 categories of priority, whose frequency of inspection varies from twice a year to once every 10 years.
Please provide a listing of the types of licensees in each category.
Does the Commission believe resources are currently at a level to provide adequate inspec-tion for the facilities in each of these seven categories?
ANSWER.
The below listing shows the types of licenses by priority and the frequency at which each of the priorities are inspected.
Licensee Type Priority Insp. Frequency Major Processors-Distributors I
1 to 2/yr Radiographers II 1/yr Waste Disposal Special Nuclear Material Academic III 1/2 yrs Source Material Teletherapy IV 1/'s yrs Waste Collection Industrial Medical Environmental 1l None at Present V
1/5 yrs Industrial VI
' 1/10 yrs-2/
Civil Defense
_2/
Medical VII 1/20 yrs All other specific Licenses 1/ Licenses moved to Priority IV 2] These licenses total 4800. In FY ' A1, six additional nnsitions have been rtquested and if approved it will allow us to increase the freauency of insnections from 1 in every 20 years to 1 in 2 years.
_- Resources are adequate to implement the materials inspection program as currently defined.
However, we are currently examining a nunber of areas where a change in the current program seems warranted.
These are:
Placing additional emphasis on emergency preparedness for certain byproduct material licenses.
Increasing inspections of radiography field sites.
Increasing emphasis and followup of reported misadministrations of radioactive drugs.
Implementing environmental monitoring at certain materials licensees.
We believe that with a careful assessment of priorities and making some realignment of resources based on these priorities, that an effective materials inspection program can be maintained. We would prefer to increase inspection of the lower priority cases--however, they do not rise to the level of concern addressed by higher priority agency needs.
=
QUESTION S-20. The Office of Inspection and Enforcement has requested six additional positions to staff the NRC Operations Center.
How many people currently staff the Operations Center and what will be the responsibilities of the additional six persons?
- ANSWER, There are currently two positions budgeted in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement to provide direct support to the Operations Center.
The six additional positions requested in the FY 1981 Budget will bring this staff to eight positions.
In addition to these full time positions, the Operations Center is operated continuously using senior reactor specialists from various NRC offices. These individuals are assigned to the Operations Center for a seven day tour once or twice per year.
This system has been helpful in assuring that a knowledgeable individual is available to respond to detailed technical questions.
However, these individuals do not function in this capacity long enough to know how to most effectively operate the Operations Center communications system and other equipment, be thoroughly familiar with emergency notification procedures, provide needed continuity in running a disciplined Center and understand how to get the Center operating quickly in the event of an emergency.
Five of the six additional positions requested by IE will be used to provide this capability and thus assure that an effective, dedicated and disciplined group of specially trained communicators are continuouslyThe available to assist NRC in responding to any significant incident.
other position requested will provide administrative /cleri' cal support.
QUESTION S-21 please describe in more detail the kind of ir. formation which will be obtained from safety studies of the high-level waste systems at West Valley, New York. Once this information is obtained, how will it be used?
ANSWER:
The NRC wants to assure that continued storage of the waste in the tanks poses no significant risks pending final disposition.
The study objectives are to:
(1) determine the condition of the storage tanks, and (2) predict the potential for radionuclide (waste) transport through soils surrounding the tanks.
The evaluation of the condition of the high-level liquid waste storage system will consist of separate technical tasks described below:
1.
Tank and Vault Inspection - All waste tanks are single-shell tanks contained in underground concrete vaults. This task provides for photographic inspection of the interior of the neutralized waste tank and television and photographic inspection of the tank exterior and concrete vault surface.
To further support the evaluation of the neutralized waste tank, wall thickness measurements of the tank will be obtained over a limited area accessible through existing openings into the annulus forced by the tank exterior and concrete vault.
Measurements will be obtained be remotely operated. ultrasonic test equipment. A review of structural specifications, static and design loads, thermal history, and control confomance reports will be performed.
Prior corrosion data will be reviewed and stress corrosion cracking coupons will be installed within the tank to evaluate prior and future corrosion potentials.
Compmhensive mports and an overall evaluation of the tank concition will be prepared.The purpose of tFese measurements is to determine whether or not corrosion has taken place.
2.
Soil Transport Studies - Io evaluate the potential risks associated with any leaks which breach the tank and vaults, the transport of radionuclides through the soils surrounding the tank will be evaluated. Soil sampling and drilling will be performed in order to determine soil permeability and sorbtive properties of the soils with respect to the waste solutions.
Radionuclide transport modeling will be used to assess the impact of the various release scenarios. The impact of predicted transport mechanisms on the environment will be assessed and documented in a technical report.
3.
Themal Evaluation - To provide a basis for predicting tank and waste temperatures associated with various alternatives for managing the West Valley waste, accurate estimates of the hect
a
'. generation are desirable.
In situ neasurements of soil thermal conductivity will be obtained followed by calculations of heat flowing from the tank to the surface by neasurements of temperature gradients in the soils covering the tankc. Heat balance calculations will be made for the tank co establish a basis for assessing temperatures resulting from various options such as liquid removal in-situ solidification of the waste. A technical report docunenting the evaluation will be 1ssued.
4.
Waste Sampling and Analysis - Under a program originally formulated by NRC, but now to be funded and managed by DOE as a part of their West Valley high-level waste immobilization project, the wastes (supernate and sludge) will be sampled and analyzed.
In addition to providing DOE with information needed as an input to waste solidification process selection and design, the sampling program will provide NRC with important safety information.
The sample results will include a radionuclide source term for use in the analysis of potential accident consequences as in task 2 above.
In addition, the waste analysis will provide the concentrations of those chemical components in the waste which will either enhance or inhibit corrosion. This sample analysis input is needed for the corrosion studies described in task 1 above.
The information describea above is important to fully evaluating, using state-of-the-art technology, the safety of continued storage of the wastes pending their final dispostion.
QUESTION S-22.
During the past year all three of the commercial low-level waste sites were closed for a period of time. One of the reasons cited by the Governors in temporarily closing these sites was inadequate packaging of radioactive materials for shipment.
Has NRC requested additional resour chs to specifically address this problem?
ANSWER.
The NRC has requested 11 inspectors and $100,000 in program support funds in the FY 1980 Supplemental to address this problem. These resources are also reflected in the FY 1981 Budget request. The 11 people will conduct inspections at the shipping point, whi~e in transit, and at the collection points.
Program Support funds will be used to contract with the Department of Energy (DGE) to open waste containers at DOE facilities to directly verify packaging integrity.
O
QUEST!0N S-23.
In FY 1979 NRC initiated an in-depth review of DOE's high-level waste management program.
When will this review be completed and what kind of information will be obtained?
ANSWER.
The Assessment of the DOE Waste Management Program is an on-going NRC activity that is planned to continue over the next five years in order to provide 00E with timely regulatory guidance of its high-level waste management R&D program.
NRC anticipates that the first periodic review of DOE's present technica,1 program for high-level waste management will be completed by January 1981.
This review will evaluate the adequacy of DOE's research program on (1) waste form and packaging, (2) generic site related activities, (3) repository design, and (4) waste isolation performance.
/
O
QUESTION S-24. NMSS plans to complete the safety review for renewal of Barnwell, South Carolina 's low-l evel waste disposal f acility in FY 1980.
Will the recent allegations regarding the disposal of spent fuel have any effect on delaying renewal of this license?
ANSWER.
Since the application for the re.newal of the Barnwell facility low-level waste license was submitted about five months later than had been originally planned, NRC now anticipates that it will complete the safety review for the Barnwell facility in FY 1981 instead of in-FY 1980.
This should permit all inves-tigations on the spent fuel allegations to have been completed well before NRC's final decision on the license renewal.
As a result, NRC does not believe that the process of inve'stigations concerning these allegations will have any effect on the schedule for the licensing action.
QUESTION S-25, (a)
For FY 1981, what percentage of the LOFT program is in direct response to the accident at TMI?
ANSWER.
Of the LOFT tests now planned for FY 1981, five are TMI related and one, a large break LOCA, is not.
Of the five TMI related tests, four had been planned prior to THI but they were scheduled to be done later in the program.
The fifth one is related to the question of keeping the primary coolant pumps running in the event of a small break; it is therefore a direct result of concerns raised by TMI.
QUESTION 5-25.
(b)
What percentage of the remaining Reactor Safety Research program has been directed to concerns raised by TMI.
ANSWER.
Approximately 27 percent of the remaining Reactor Safety Research Programs are directed toward concerns raised by TMI.
G
QUESTION 5-26.
What percentage of the research programs in each of the other RES programs--Environmental Effects and Fuel Cycle Safety, Waste Management, Safeguards Research, Risk Assessment, and Improved Reactor Safety--will be directed during FY 1981 to issues raised by the accident at TMI?
ANSWER.
Approximately 5 percent of the research programs in Environmental Effects and Fuel Cycle Safety research are directed toward issues raised by TMI.
None of the programs in Waste Management and Safeguards Resaarch are the direct result of the TMI accident.
Approximately 70 percent of the Risk Assessment programs are directed toward issues associated with TMI.
And in a broad sense, all programs in Improved Reactor Safety are applicable to issues raised by the TMI accident.
QUESTION 5-27.Recently, several Commissioners expressed goncerns over the recovery operations at Three Mile Island.
What level of resources has been requested to address NRC's responsibilities relating to recovery activities at TMI in FY81 and will this be sufficient in light of these new concerns.
ANSWER.
The various recovery activities at TMI are encompassed in Task Action Plan (TAP) II.H "TMI-2 Cleanup and Examination" of the TMI Action Plan. The objective of this TAP is to maintain safety and minimize environmental impact of post-accident operation and cleanup of TMI-2; obtain and factor into regulatory programs safety-related and environmental information from the TMI-2 cleanup. There are four subtasks to this TAP. The latest resource estimates associated with each of these subtasks for FY1981 are as follows:
Subtask 1 - Maintain safety of TMI-2 and minimize environmental impact (includes preparation of a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the cleanup activities).
Resources:
Manpower (qy)
Program Support ($)
$1,500,000
$66,200 Subtask 2 - Obtain technical data on the conditions inside the TMI-2 containment structure.
Resources:
Manpower (my)
ProgramSupport($)
RES RES FY1981 1
$1,185,000 Subtask 3 - Evaluate and feed back information from TMI.
Resources:
Manpower (qy)
ProgramSupport($)
1
$40,000
$2,250 Subtask 4 - Determine impact of TMI on socioeconomic and real property values.
Resources:
Manpower (qy)
Program Support ($)
RES RES FY1981 0
0*
- Studies totalling $420,000 have been initiated. Completion of study of effects of TMI on real property in Harrisburg, Pennsyl-vania area to occur in FY1981.
These resource estimates are being finalized.
However, at this time we believe them to be sufficient for accomplishing the various subtasks in this TAP as they are now described.