ML19253C250

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Alternate Shutdown Capability:Cold Shutdown Phase.
ML19253C250
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 11/17/1979
From:
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML19253C249 List:
References
MR-FC-78-56, NUDOCS 7911300339
Download: ML19253C250 (22)


Text

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Alternate Shutdown Capability

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PREPARED BYl 4aMhA/4. Cold Shutdown Phase CHECKED 8Y C4 5 APPROVED # M R E V' O Dd[E //-f 7 79 (MAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT MR N0. FC-78-56 GENERATING STA. ENG.

FORT CALHOUN STATION ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COLD SHUTDOWN PHASE MR-FC-78-56 1442 307 qs113 003 -

REV. 3/79

MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 FORT CALHOUN STATION ALTERNATF SHUTDOWN CAPARILITY COLD SHUTDOWN PHASE MR-FC-78-56 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 DESIGN BASIS EVENT 3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA 4.0 SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN 4.1 Reactivity Control 4.2 Reactor Coolant Makeup 4.3 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control 4.4 Decay Heat Removal and Cooldown 4.4.1 Hot Shutdown 4.4.7 Primary System Temperature Less Than 515 F and Greater Than 300 F 4.4.3 Primary System remperature Below 300 F 4.5 Supporting Systems and Equipment 4.6 Process Monitoring 5.0 DETAILED SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 6.0 PROCEDURES 6.1 Emergency Repair Procedures 6.2 Procedures for Hot Snutdown

6. 3 Procedures for Cold Shutdown 7.0 DRAWINGS Table 1 Valve Positions for Alternate Shutdown Appendix A Cross Reference Between the Staff Position and this Report Appendix B Emergency Repair Procedure for Raw Water Pump AC-100 Appendix C Emergency Procedure for Pressurizer Controlled Cooldown

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MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 FORT CALHGUN STATION ALTEPNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COLD SPUTDOWN PHASE 1.0 INIR0 DUCTION Design modifications that are necessary to satisfy NRC Staff Posi-tion requirements (Reference SER Section 3.1.21) for an alternate shutdown capability following a control room or cable spreading room fire were detailed in the design description submitted to the NRC per our letter dated October 12, 1979.

This supplement details the operations and summarizes the pro-cedures necessary to achieve cold shutdown from hot shutdown condi-tion. The procedures for hot shutdown were addressed in our earlier report. To facilitate the NRC review, this report, like our earlier report, also follows the staff position outline.

Appendix "A" provides a cross reference between the statf position and this report.

2.0 DESIGN BASIS EVENT The design basis for this analysis is a fire in the c;atrol rou:

and/or the cable spreading room which results in evacuation of these areas. Safe shutdown capability will be preserved with (1) off-site power available; and (2) with off-site power not available (see Section 6.00).

3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA The criteria for achieving cold shutdown following the design bir;is event are:

3.1 Normal cooldown limits are maintained to assure tha; the reactor coolant system process variables shall be within those predicted for a loss of non'al A.C. power. This, in turn, will ensure that no fission product boundary is jeopardized.

3.2 Control room evacuation does not occur simultaneously with or subsequent to any other accident condition.

3.3 The :!ngle-failure criteria does not apply.

)hk b MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 3.4 In addition to the Reactor Operator and Turbine Operator (see Section 8.1 of the previous report), two electricians, one I & C technician, one chemist and five auxiliary operators are available in order to implement the cooldown operation.

3.5 The plant is initially in the hot shutdown condition and controlled from the Alternate Shutdown Panel (ASP).

3.6 Equipment required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown will be protected from fire damage.

3.7 No offsite power available before 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following the design event.

3.8 Reactor will be placed in cold shutdown condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

3.9 Manual operation of the required equipment locally or from the appropriate switchgear location is possible.

3.10 Entry into the reactor containment is feasible.

4.0 SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN The following is a summary of the processes required for achieving cold shutdown and the equipment and instrumentation needed to perform these processes. As described in our earlier report, most of the equipment and their controls required for these functions are already available from areas outside of the control room.

Where necessary, additional controls and instrumentation to perform these functions will be located on the alternate shutdown panel (AI-185) which will be located adjacent to the present auxiliary feedwater control panel (AI-179) in the electrical penetration room.

4.1 Reactivity Control: As aescribed in our earlier report, the pri-mary means of achieving and maintaining subcriticality is the control rod system. Before evacuating the control room the opera-tor will scram the reactor. As a further assurance the reactor operator will trip the turbine from the front standard which in turn will provide a backup scram signal.

1442 510 MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 The control rod system is sufficient to maintain the reactor sub-critical at hot shutdown. In addition, the suction of the charging pump will be aligned to the gravity-fed boric acid tank to provide additional negative reactivity insertion.

Before cooling the primary system below 515 F sufficient boric acid will have been injected into the primary system to ensure that the required shutdown reactivity cr;;6a will be maintained with the primary system in cold shutdown. Also, before cooldown, the charg-ing pump will be manually aligned to the Safety Injection Rafueling Water Tank (SIRWT). The boron concentration of the water in this tank is greater than that required in the primary system to main-tain the cold shutdown margin.

4.2 Reactor Coolant Makeup: Charging pump CH-1B will be used to main-tain the primary system inventory. The controls for this pump will be installed on the ASP as described in the previous report.

4.3 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control: The principal method for maintaining RCS pressure will be to control the Auxiliary Feedwater System to regulate the primary system heat removal via the steam generators. Valves HCV-11078 and HCV-1108B will be manually posi-tioned to adjust feedwater flow to the steam generators. If required, the operator will also manually open valve FCV-1369 and allow partial recirculation of the auxiliary feedwater flow. As the decay heat drops with time the operator can use or.s bank of the backup pressurizer heaters and intermittant charging pump auxiliary spray operation to maintain system pressure.

As the primary system temperature decreases further the pressurizer temperature decrease will be maintained within the technical speci-fication limit of 200 F per hour by using the auxiliary pressurizer spray and heater systems. It will be necessary to use the auxiliary system since the normal spray system is unavailable with the reactor coolant pumps shutdown. During the hot shutdown phase auxiliary spray valve HCV-240 was maintained closed to preclude inadvertent pressurizer spray and depressurization. This valve will be manually opened and the auxiliary spray operated per the procedure described in Appendix C.

4.4 Decay Heat Removal and Cooldown 4.4.1 Hot Shutdown The auxiliary feedwater system will be used to remove the decay heat from the primary system via the steam generators. The secon-dary cycle steam will be dumped to the atmosphere via the main steam safety relief valves which lift initially when the steam system pressure rises above 1000 psia and reset at about 950 psia.

This process will be continued until the plant is ready to proceed to cold shutdown.

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MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 4.4.2 Primary System Temperature Less than 515*F and Greater than 300 F In this range the cooldown will be accomplished by increasing the auxiliary feedwater flow by manually throttling feedwater valves 1107B and 1108B which are located outside the containment. A steam generator steam dump will be provided by manual operation of the main sceam code safety valves. The flow paths for these systems are shown in Drawings 11405-M-252 and -253. The cooldown rate will be maintained below 50 F per hour. Tne technical specification limit is 100 F per hour.

4.4.3 Primary System Temperature below 300 F.

Below Primary System Temperature of 300 F the decay heat can be removed by using the shutdown coolino system. Tne normal method of shutdown cooling is to use the LPSI pumps to circulate the primary system water through the tube side of the shutdown heat exchanger.

Component cooling water is circulated through the shell side of the heat exchanger. As a backup the raw water system can be used on the shell side for heat removal.

For this emergency cooldown the raw water system will be substi-tuted for the component cooling system. The system alignment necessary to perform this function is shown on Drawings 11405-M-40 and M-100. All of the valves can be opened or closed manually (see AAcIoS0"2 Table 1). Rawwaterpump'/AC-10Dwillbeutilizedandcanbeloaded onto diesel generator D2.

On the primary side, provision will be made to assure that RCS loop injection valve HCV-329 is available.

4.5 Supporting Systems and Equipment In additon to the Diesel Generator D2 and associated electrical distribution system; and AC and DC control power systems (see Section 4.6 of the previous report) the followir.g systems and equipment will be required for cold shutdown:

a) Containment Cooling b) Auxiliary Building Ventilation c) Emergency Lighting - Containment and Auxiliary Building d) Communications System e) Diesel Driven Fire Pump This will be used to supply water for filling auxiliary feed-water tank and also to supply water for fighting the fire.

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MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 4.6 Process Monitoring The instrumentation required to monitor the plant conditions is located on the alternate shutdown panel (see previous report on hot shutdown) and auxiliary feedwater panel (AI-179). The only other measurement required is the wide range reactor coolant temperature which is required to monitor temperatures below 515*F. This will be computed using the procedure cutlined in Section 6.3.3(g).

5.0 DETAILED SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 5.1 System descriptions for the systems required for hot shutdown are included in Section 5.0 of our previous report. These systems are:

- Reactivity Control

- Reactor Coc.lant Makeup

- Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control

- Decay Heat Removal

- Support Systems 5.2 As outlined in Section 4.0, the following additional systems are required for cold shutdown.

- Shutdown Cooling System

- Raw Water System

- Auxiliary Spray System

- Additional Supporting Systems 5.2.1 Shutdown Cooling The flow diagram for shutdown cooling system is shown in Drawing E-23866-210-130 Sh. 1 and 2. The system uses portions of other systems, i.e., the reactor coolant system and safety injection and containment spray sy .em.

In the shutdown cor ng system, reactor coolant is circulated using the low pressure s. :ty injection pumps. The flow path from the pump discharge run:, t.hrough normally locked closed valve HCV-335, through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, and through normally closed valves SI-173 or SI-174, to the normally locked closed valve HCV-341, to the low pressure safety injection header, and enters the reactor coolant system through the core and is returned from the reactor coolant system through the shutdown cooling nozzle in the loop No. 2 reactor vessel outlet (hot leg) pipe. The coolant is returned tc, the suction of the low pressure safety injection pumps through normally locked closed valves SI-125 and SI-126.

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MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 Under normal conditions component cooling water is used for shut-down cooling. Upon loss of compcnent cooling water, the raw water system can be used for heat removal. The system alignment neces-sary to perform this function is shown or Drawings 11405-M-100.

All of the valves can be manually operated or fail in desired position (see Table 1). Raw water pumps AC-10B and AC-10D will be utilized and can be loaded onto diesel generator D-2.

thdt On the primary side, provision will be made to assurefRCS Loop injection valve HCV-329 is available. The flow path for this function is shown on Drawings E23866-210-130, Sheets 1 and 2. All of the valves in this flow path can be manually operated or fail in the desired position. However, since the suction valve HCV-348 and the discharge valve HCV-329 are inside the containment, procedures are being developed to operate these valves from the motor controls center as a backup. LPSI pump SI-1B will be used and can be loaded onto diesel generator #2.

The cooldown rate will be controlled by manually throttling valve FCV-326 in the LPSI pump discharge line. Since the LPSI pump suction line is from primary loop 2 the system will be aligned for discharge into loop 1A. This will ensure that adequate mixing will take place.

5.2.2 Raw Water System Four raw water pumps are installed in the intake structure pump house to provide screened river water to the component cooling heat exchangers. Under normal operating conditions, only one pump is in service whereas during shutdown cooling and the period following a DBA, the operation of two pumps .s required. The pump discharge piping is arranged as two headers which are interconnected and valved at the pumps and in the auxiliary building. Each header is designed to accommodate full flow to the component ccooling heat exchangers under all modes of plant operation. The flow diagram is shown in Drawing 11405-M-100.

Upon loss of the component cooling system, raw water can be utilized for direct cooling in the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, the containment cooling coils (excluding nuclear detector well cooling),

the engineered safeguards and the control room air conditioning units.

The raw water lines between the intake structure and the auxiliary building are buried in separate trenches. During this emergency two raw water pumps AC-10B and AC-10D will be made available. With two raw water pumps operating the shutdown cooling system is designed to achieve cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Power for Raw Water Pumps AC-10B and AC-10D is supplied from Bus 1A4 which will be fed from Diesel Generator D2. Emergency repair procedures are being developed for both these pumps.

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MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 5.2.3 Auxiliary Spray System As shown on Drawing E-23866-210-120 Sh. 1 an auxiliary spray line is provided from the charging pumps to permit pressucizer spray during plant heatup or to allow cooling if the rear +,or coolant pumps are shutdown. During this emergency charging pump CH-1B will be operated from Alternate Shutdown Panel. Valve R V-240 will be opened manually and valves HCV-238, HCV-239 and CH-345 will be manually closed. All these valves are located inside the contain-ment. Modulation will be achieved by either manual operation of CH-194 or by intermittent operation of the charging pump.

5.2.4 Additional Supporting Systems a) Containment Cooling The containment will be provided with cooling by supplying containment coolers VA-8B with raw water, the system alignment is shown in Drawings 11405-M-1, M-40 and M-100. Containment fan VA-7D will provide air movement over these coolers and will be operated from the 480V loadcenter. Emergency repair procedure for this unit are being developed.

b) Auxiliary Building Ventilation If required, air flow can be established, especially in operating pump areas by operation of VA-35B and VA-40B (see Drawing 11405-M-2). The emergency repair procedures for both these units are being developed, c) Emergency Lighting System A brief description of emergency lighting system is included in Section 4.6 of the SER (Docket No. 50-285). For this emer-gency D.C. emergency lighting which is fed from D.C. Battery #2 will also be available.

d) Communication System As discussed in Section 4.7 of the SER (Docket No. 50-285) communications between the various points can be maintained utilizing portable radios. These are battery operated and will be available at the Security Building.

e) Diesel Driven Fire Pump A brief description of fire control system is included in Section 4.3 of SER (Docket No. 50-285).

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MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 One three-stage vertical shaft diesel driven centrifugal fire pumps is provided, with a rated output of 2,000 gallons per minute at a discharge head of 125 pounds per square inch gauge. The fire pump is driven by a six cylinder diesel engine listed by Underwriters Laboratory and approved by Factory Mutual for fire pump service.

The diesel engine-driven fire pump is provided with an Under-writers Laboratory listed and Factory Mutual approved auto-matic fire pump controller. This pump will start auto-matically when fire main pressure drops below 99 pounds per square inch gauge. This pump can be started from the control room and can be started manually at the controller at any time, but cannot be stopped or locked out from the control room.

This pump and one electric driven fire pump are located on the operating lavel of the intake structure. The distance between the pumps is over 50 feet, which should be sufficient to preclude damage to both pumps from a single fire. A 10 gallon fuel oil day tank for the diesel engine driven fire pump is located adjacent to the engine. Fuel is transferred 1 rom the 550 gallon outside fuel storage tank to the day tank.

6.0 PROCEDURES Detailed procedures are being developed to achieve cold shutdown following fire in the control room and the cable spreading room.

These procedures are divided into the following categories.

6.1 Emergency Repair Procedures - These procedures will ensure isola-tion of control circuits from the control room by disconnecting cables which go to the control room. These cables are disconnected at the switchgear or MCC. Jumpers are installed as necessary at the switchgear or MCC to override the control room devices. This will prevent inadvertent operation of the equipment. The protec-tive devices such as relaying within the switchgear are not dis-abled es a result of thse wiring modifications. Power feed for equipment required for cold shutdown is available from the switch-gear room and/or electrical penetration area.

6.1.1 Emergency repair procedures are being developed for the following equipment:

- Raw Water D"mp AC-10B

- Raw Water t.m. AC-10D

- Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump SI-1B

- Back-up Pressurizer Heater Group 4

- Containment Cooling Ventilation Fan VA-70

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MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0

- Shutdown Cooling Loop Isolation Valve H;V-348

- Low Pressure Injection Valve HCV-329

- Auxiliary Building Ventilation VA-35B and VA-40B 6.1.2 Detaited emergency repair procedure for raw water pump AC-10D is included as an example. See Appendix B.

6.2 Procedures for Hot Shutdown A summary of these procedures is included in Section 8.2 of our previous report. This will also include procedures to prevent inadvertent operation of safety related equipment and non safety related equipment.

6.3 Procedures for Cold Shutdown 6.3.1 As a funda'nental part of the design criteria it is assumed that offsite power has been lost for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The pro-cedure to achieve cold shutdown is based on that premise and is designed to achieve cold shutdown within this 72-hour period.

However, if offsite power is available this procedure may still be utilized in its entirety by insuring that bus feeder breakers from the 161 and 345 KV systems are tripped.

If it is desired to utilize offsite power to achieve cold shutdown, then an assessment of control room damage can be made. If damage is minimal, the present emergency procedure (EP-24) may be uti-lized. If the damage to control room equipment is too extensive to permit effective utlization of offsite power, the cold shutdown can be achieved using this procedure.

6.3.2 Before proceeding to cold shutdown, the ASP operator will ensure that the following persc.nnel are available at the appropriate locations and are in direct communciation with him. The numbers in parenthesis are the number of personnel required at that location.

These personnel can be made available for this function when required.

1) Auxiliary operators at feedwater valves 1107B and 1108B (2)
2) Auxiliary operators at the main steam code safety valves (2)
3) Electriciuns in the switchgear area (2)
4) Auxiliary operators to manually open valves in the raw water and shutdown cooling systems (2)
5) One I & C technician to determine RCS wide range tempera-ture at the electrical penetration area (adjacent to ASP).
6) One Chemist 1 A A2 50

MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 6.3.3 After ensuring that sufficient manpower is available, the Alternate Shutdown panel operator will proceed as follows.

a) The ASP operator will maintain the pressurizer level with charging pump CH-18. The controls for this pump are located on the alternate shudown panel. He can also control the pressurizer pressure using the emergency procedure outlined in Appendix C.

b) The ASP operator will control the steam generator level via instructions to the auxiliary operators at the 11078 and 1108B feedwater valves.

c) The ASP operator will instruct an electrician to start raw water pump AC-100.

d) The raw water system valve alignment to provide coolant to the containment cooling coils will be accomplished (see Table 1). The containment fans necessary to provide air movement over these coils will be operated from the switchgear area.

e) The ASP operator can now begin the cooldown by instruct-ing the personnel at the main steam code safety valves to manually operate these valves to begin RCS cooldown while maintaining primary system temperature and pressure within the prescribed cooldown limits. One valve in each line will be opened to balance the flow through both steam generators. The levels in the pressurizer and the steam generators can be maintained by using Steps a and b, respectively.

f) After a period of RCS cooling with the steam generatcrs, intermittent pressurizer cooldown may be necessary. This can be accomplished by using the charging pump to provide flow through the auxiliary pressurizer spray system. Use of the auxiliary pressurizer spray systems requires that HCV-240 be open using the procedure in Appendix C.

Throttling wil be done manually at valve CH-194.

g) The ASP operator will control the RCS cooldown to less than 50 F per hour. An I & C technician stationed at the electrical penetration area (near ASP) will determine the RCS temperature by temporarily connecting a wheatstone bridge to the RTD extension leads. Detailed procedure for temperature measurement will be later included as an appendix to this procedure.

h) Before the RCS pressure drops below 300 psig an auxiliary operator will isolate the safety injection tanks by manually closing valves HCV-2914, -2934, -2954, and -2974 in the containment.

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MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 i) When the RCS system temperature drops below 300 F and pressure below 265 psia, the ASP operator will switch from the steam generator steam dump method of cooling to use of the shutdown cooling system. The shutdown cooling system will be aligned as shown on Table 1.

The following equipment required for shutdown cooling can be operated from the switchgear area or motor control center af ter emergency repair procedures are completed.

1) LPSI pump SI-1B
2) The shutdown cooling RCS loop suction valve HCV-348 and 347 (these valves can also be manually operated).
3) The LPSI loop injection valve HCV-329 (this can also be manually opened from inside the containment).
4) Raw Water Pump AC-10B and AC-10D.

Immediately after initiating shutdown cooling flow, the RCS fluid can be sampled through the connection in shut-down cooling system suction line outside containment.

The boron concentration and the activity should be deter-mined prior to extensive flow of the RCS fluid through the auxiliary building.

7.0 DRAWINGS The following drawings have been referenced in this report.

Combustion Engineering E-23866-210-110 E-23866-210-120 Sh. 1 of 2 E-23866-210-130 Sh. 1 of 2 E-23866-210-130 Sh. 2 of 2 Gibbs & Hill 11405-M-1 11405-M-2 11405-M-10 11405-M-40 11405-M-100 11405-M-252 11405-M-253 11405-E-24 Sh. 4 010808674 Sh. 3 1442 3I9

. MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 TABLE 1 VALVE POSITIONS FOR ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN OPERATOR NORMAL FAIL DESIRED VALVE NO. DESCRIPTION TYPE POSI- POSI- POSI-TION TION TION Valve positions for shutdown cooling see Drawing E-23866-210-130 Sh. 1 & 2 11405-M-40 and M-100 and Section 6.3.3(i)

SIS HCV-348 RCS Loop 2 SDC Suct (cont) Motor

  • LC FAI O HCV-347 SDC Suction Outside Cont Motor
  • LC FAI O HCV-2937 SI-1B Suction from SIRWT Air
  • L0 F0 C SI-125 SI-1B SDC Suction Manual LC FAI 0 HCV-2938 SI-1B Discharge Air L0 F0 0 SI-124 SI-1B Recirc to SIRWT Manual L0 FAI C SI-169 SDC HX INLET Cross Connect Manual L0 FAI 0 HCV-350 LPSI-HPSI Pump Suction Air
  • C FC C HCV-344, 345 SDCHX Out to Cont Spray Hdr Air
  • C F0 C SI-173 SDCHX Out Cross Connect Manual C FAI 0 SI-174 SDCHX Out Cross Connect Manual C FAI 0 SI-177 & 178 Cont. Spray Header Isolation (cont) Manual L0 FAI C SI-186 Recirculation Valve Manual LC C 0 HCV-341 SDCHX Out to RCS Air
  • LC FC 0 FCV-326 SDCHX Bypass Air
  • L0 F0 T HCV-335 LPSI Pump to SDCHX Air
  • LC 0 HCV-329 LPSI to Loop 1A (cont) Motor
  • C FAI 0 HCV-2914 SIT SI-6A Outlet (cont) Motor
  • L0 FAI C HCV-2934 SIT SI-6B Outlet (cont) Motor
  • L0 FAI C HCV-2954 SIT SI-6C Outlet (cont) Motor
  • L0 FAI C HCV-2974 SIT SI-6D Outlet (cont) Motor
  • L0 FAI C PCV-2909 Leakage Cooler SI-4A Outlot (cont) Air C FC C PCV-2929 Leakage Cooler SI-4B Outlet (cont) Air C FC C PCV-2949 Leakage Cooler SI-4C Outlet (cont) Air C FC C PCV-2969 Leakage Cooler SI-4D Outlet (cont) Air C FC C RV HCV-2809C RW to LPSI Pump SI-1B Air C F0 0 HCV-2809D RW from LPSI Pump SI-1B Air 0 F0 0 HCV-2809B CCW to LPSI Pump SI-1B Air 0 F0 0 HCV-2851 RW Pump AC-10B Outlet Air 0 F0 0 HCV-2853 RW Pump AC-10D Outlet Air 0 F0 0 HCV-2894 RW Header Cross Connect Air 0 F0 0 HCV-2893 RW Header Cross Connect Air 0 F0 0 HCV-2883A RW to CCW HX Air' 0 F0 C HCV-2851 RW Pump AC-10B Outlet Air 0 F0 0 1442 520 MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 TABLE 1 VALVE POSITIONS FOR ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN (Continued)

OPERATOR NORMAL FAIL DESIRED VALVE NO. DESCRIPTION TYPE POSI- POSI- POSI-TION TION TION Shutdown Cooling (Continued)

HCV-482A,4828 RW to EDCHX AC-4A Air C F0 0 HCV-483A RW to SDCHX AC-4B Air C F0 0 HCV-483B RW from SDCHX AC-48 Air C F0 0 (Valve Positions for Providing Raw Water to Containment Air Coolers (See Drawings 11405-M-40 and M-100 and Section 6.3(d) ).

HCV-403A RW to Cont Air Coolers and 403E Air C F0 0 HCV-403C RW from Cont Air Coolers and 403F Air C F0 0 Valve Positions for Providing Auxliary Spray From Charging Pump CH-1B.

See Drawing E-23866-210-120 Sh.1, E23866-210-130 Sh.1 of 2 and Section 6.33(f)

CVCS LCV-218-2 VCT Suction Motor' 0 FAI C (C)

LCV-218-3 SIRWT Suction Motor

  • C FAI 0 (C)

HCV-238 Charging to Loop 1A (cont) Airf 0 F0 C (0)

HCV-240 Auxiliary Pzr Spray (cont) Air

  • C FC 0 (C)

HCV-258 BA Tank to Ch Pump Suction Motor

  • C FAI C (0)

HCV-265 BA Tank to Ch Pump Suction Motor

  • C FAI C (0)

HCV-239 Charging to Loop 2A (cont) Air

  • 0 F0 C (0)

CH-194 Charging Isolation to Cont Manual' 0 FAI T (0)

HCV-315 HPSI to Loop 1A (cont) Motor

  • C FAI 0 HCV-308 Charging to HPSI Header Motor" C FAI 0 Valve Positions for Providing Steam to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump See Drawing 11405-M-252 and 253; and Section 6.3.3(e)

STEAM YCV-1045 Mn Stm to Aux Feed Pump Air

  • C FC 0 YCV-1045A Mn Stm to Aux Feed Pump Air C F0 0 YCV-1045B Mn Stm to Aux Feed Pump Air C F0 0 Valve Position to Provide Steam Dump See Drawing 11405-M-252 HCV-1042 A/B Mn Stm Isolation Air 0 FC C HCV-1041 A/B Mn Stm Isolation Air 0 FC C MS-291 Mn Stm Code Safety Auto C ** 0 MS-292 Mn Stm Code Safety Auto C ** 0 1442 321

. MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 TABLE 1 VALVE POSITIONS FOR ALTERNATE SHUTOOWN (Continued)

OPERATOR NORMAL FAIL DESIRED VALVE NO. DESCRIPTION TYPE POSI- POSI- POSI-TION TION TION Valve Positions for Providing Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generators.

See Drawing 11405-M-253 and Section 6.3.3(b)

FEED FC 1369 TDAFWP Recirc Air 0 F0 0 HCV-1107A AFW to SG RC2A (cont) Air C F0 0 HCV-1108A AFW to SG RC2B (cont) Air C FO 0 HCV-1107B AFW to SG RC2A Air + C F0 T HCV-1108B AFW to SG RC2B Air # C F0 T HCV-13878 SGP.C2B Blowdown Air 0 FC C HCV-1388B SGRC2A Blowdown Air 0 FC C NOTE: Positions shown are for cold shutdown; position in parenthesis are for Hot shutdown.

LEGEND:

C - Closed 0 - Open FAI - Fail As Is F0 - Fails Open FC - Fails Close T - Throttle

  • - Provided with Hand Wheels
    • - Coded Safeties 1442 322 MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 AR ENDIX A Cross Reference Between the Staff Position and this Report Staff Position Report Design Basis Event (1.0) Section 2.0 Limiting Safety Consequences

& Required Shutdown Func-tions (2.0) Section 3.0 Performance Goals (3.0) 3.1 Reactivity Control Section 4.1 3.2 Reactor Coolant Makeup Section 4.2 3.3 Reactor Heat Removal Section 4.3 3.4 Process Monitoring Section 4.6 3.5 Supporting Equipment Section 4.5 3.6 Hot Shutdown Requirements Sections 4.0, 5.0 and 6.0 of our prai9us report 3.7 Cold Shutdown Requirements Sections 4.0 and 6.0 3.8 Design Criteria for Hot Section 3.0 Shutdown PWR Equipment for Hot Shutdown Addressed in Previous Report PWR Equipment Generally Necessary for Cold Shutdown 5.1 Reactor Coolant System Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.2 Pressure Reduction to Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Capability 5.2 Decay Heat Removal Section 4.4.3 5.3 Support Section 4.5 6.0 BWR Not applicable 7.0 BWR Not applicable 1442 323

. MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 Staff Position Report 8.0 Information for Staff Review a) Description of the systems required for hot shutdown is included in Section 5.0 of our earlier report. Brief descriptions of those portions of the raw water system, shutdown cooling and auxiliary pressurizer spray systems used to achieve cold shutdown are contained in Section 5.0 of this report.

b) Drawings for hot shutdown were submitted with earlier report. Additional drawing showing flow path for cold shutdown are attached (see Section 7.0).

c) Modifications are discussed in Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.6 of our earlier report. No additional modification to safety systems will be required to achieve cold shutdown.

d) Discussed in Section 6.1.1 and 6.2.1 to 6.2.6 of our earlier report. For cold shutdown see Section 6.1.

e) Discussed in Sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5 of our earlier report and Section 6.1 of this report.

f) Summary of hot shutdown procedures was included in our earlier report Section 8.0. Section 6.0 of this reports provides a summary of these procedures for cold shutdown.

Detailed procedures are being developed.

g) The detailed procedure will list the requirements for spare fuses to be stored at the site.

h) Discussed in 8.1 of the previous report and Section 6.3.2 of this report.

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MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 Staff Position Report i) Section 7.0 of the previous report provides a summary of such tests for hot shutdown. Detailed procedures are being developed. The systems will be tested, after the installation is complete. No modifications are required for cold shutdown.

j) This will be addressed, after the detailed procedures and start-up procedures are developed.

k) This is discussed in Section 4.0 of the previous and this report. Equip-ment used for achieving hot and cold shutdown is presently installed and has been verified by test or analysis with performance evaluated. Modifi-cations will be made to either control or monitor this equipment from e separate location.

1) Repair procedures for cold shutdown are being developed. Summary of these procedures is included in Section 6.1.

1442 525 MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 APPENP_IX B EMERGENCY REPAIR PROCEDURE FOR RAW WATER SYSTEM

Purpose:

Provide emergency repair procedure for raw water pump AC-100 following fire in control room and/or cable spreading room.

References:

11405-E-24, Sheet 4 010808674, Sheet 3 Basis: 4.16 KV breaker feeding raw water pump AC2 10D is located in switchgear room. Part of the controls of this breaker are located in the control room. Schematic for this breaker is shown on Drawing 11405-E-24 Sh. 4. DC control power feed for this breaker is from D.C. Bus #2 located in switchgear room. This procedure provides for isola-tion of the close and trip circuits of the breaker from the control room by disconnecting cables which go to the control room. These cables are disconnected at the switchgear. Jumpers are installed as necessary at the switchgear to override the control room devices. The protective devices such as relaying within the switchgear are not disable as a result of these wiring modifications.

Prerequisites: Diesel Generator D2 on line.

4160V and 480V switchgear load shed completed.

Special Equipment: None.

Procedure: Go to the 4160V switchbear 1A4 unit 12. Verify that the breaker is tripped. Pull the "Close, Trip and Standby" fuses. Verify that the fuses have not blown. Place a jumper across terminals AA5 and AA6 thus shorting the CT circuit. Lift cable ED-7395 conductors AC10D-C12 and AC10D-C22.

Turn the 69 switch to trip.

Lift cable ED-7392, conductors AC10D-PAS, AC10D-PAS 1, AC10D-PC, AC100-PC1, and AC10D-PC2.

Lift cable ED-7393, conductors AC100-PT, AC100-PT2, AC100-T, AC100-G, AC100-PT3, AC100-PT4, and AC10D-PTS.

Place a jumper between contacts 1 and 6 of the 69 switch (at the switchgear).

Replace close and trip fuses. (Six fuses required).

Go to Valve HCV-2853 located in the intake structure.

MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 APPENDIX B EMERGENCY REPAIR PROCEDURE FOR RAW WATER SYSTEM (Continued)

Procedure: (Continued)

Verify at the valve that the raw water pump discharge valve HCV-2853 is open. Disconnect the two solenoid wire leads to prevent spurious signals from the control room closing the valve. Should the valve be closed, discon-necting the solenoid will open the valve.

Close breaker using the 69 switch located at the breaker cubicle.

1442 327 MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 APPENDIX C EMERGENCY PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURIZER CONTROLLED C00LDOWN

Purpose:

To provide for controlled cooldown of the pressurizer during RCS cooldown from outside the control room withcut offsite power.

References:

E-23866-210-120, Sheet 1 of 2 E-23866-210-130, Sheet 1 of 2 E-23866-210-130, Sheet 2 of 2 Basis: Control room is uninhabitable due to fire and RCS cool-down must be accomplished locally.

Prerequisites: 1. The RCS is cooled to a temperature where pressurizer cooldown is desirable.

2. RCS makeup is provided through the normal charging path from charging pump CH-18.
3. No reactor coolant pumps are available to provide normal pressurizer spray flow.

Special Equipment: None Procedure: 1. Stop the cooldown of the RCS (decay heat may con-tinue to be removed but no density change of the RCS is permitted).

2. Stop charging pump CH-18.
3. Establish a new charging lineup through the high pressure safety injection header by opening valve HCV-315 (inside containment) and valve HCV-308.
4. To isolate the normal charging path, close valve CH-194 and the following valves inside the contein-ment: HCV-239, HCV-238, and CH-345.
5. Establish an inside containment charging flow path to the pressurizer spray by manually opening valve HCV-240.

1442 328 MR-FC-78-56 Revision 0 APPENDIX C EMERGENCY PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURIZER CONTROLLED C00LDOWN (Continued)

Procedure: (Continued)

6. Controlled pressurizer cooldown may now be performed during simultaneous RCS cooldown by throttling valve CH-194 to divert charging flow to the pressurizer, or cooldown of the pressurizer alone may be achieved by opening CH-194 fully and pressurizer spray obtained by intermittent operation of the charging pumps.

CH-191 may be closed or throttled to divert more flow to the pressurizer spray.

The preferred method is to cool the pressurizer by diverting a small flow from the charging stream while simultaneously cooling the RCS. This will provide a slow, even pressurizer cooldown with only one initial thermal shock to the pressurizer spray notzle.