ML19253C195
| ML19253C195 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19253C192 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911300135 | |
| Download: ML19253C195 (36) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 21 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-10 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, AND ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO.1 DOCKET No. 50-272 FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW l443 Ibb as a
00 f 79113
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 TABLE.0F CONTENTS I.
INTRODUCTION II.
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION A.
Water Supply Systems B.
Automatic Sprinkler and Manual Water Systems C.
Gas Suppression Systems D.
Foam Suppression Systen E.
Fire Detection Systems III.
OTHER ITEMS RELATING TO THE STATION FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM A.
Fire Coors and Dampers C.
Penetration Fire Stops D.
Ccamunication Systems E.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity IV.
FIRE FROTECTION FOR SPECIFIC AREAS V.
ACMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND FIRE BRIGADE VI.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS VII.
CONCLUSIONS 4
9 9
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report I.
INTR 00UCT!01 We have reviewed the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Numbers 1 and 2 fire protection program and fire hazards analysis submitted by the licensee. The submittal, including their answers to six NRC requests for_ additional _information, was in response to our request to evaluate his fire protection program against the guidelines of Apoendix A to STP APCSS 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants." As part of the review, we visited the plant site to examine the relaticnship of safety related components, systems, and structures in specific plant areas to both combustible materials and to associated fire detection and suppression systems. The overall objective of our review of the Salem Nuclear Generating Plant fire protection program was to ensure that in the event of a fire at either facility, Units 1 and 2 would maintain the ability to safely shutdown, remain in a safe shutdown condition, and minimi:e the release of radioactivity to the environment.
Our review included an evaluation of the automatic and manually operat'ed water and gas fire suppression systems, the fire detection systems, fire barriers, fire doors and dampers, fire protection administrative controls, fire brigade training, and plant fire protection Technical Specifications.
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. Since Unit 1 and 2 are of the same design, exceot where noted, the comments made in this report apply to both uni:s.
Our conclusion, given in Section VII is that the Fire Protection Program at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos.1 and 2 is adequate at the present time, and meets General Design Criterion 3.
Mcwever, to further ensure the ability of the plant to withstand the damaging effects of; fires that could occur, we are requiring, and the if censee has agreed to provide, additional fire pmtection system improvements. Until the comitted fire protection systen improvements are operational, we con-sider the existing fire detection and suppression systems; the existing barriers between fire areas; improved administrative procedures for control of combustibles and ignition sources; the trained onsite fire brigade; the capability to extinguish fires manually; and the fire pro-tection technical specifications provide adequate protection against a fire that would threaten safe shutdown. These additional fire protection features will be completed for Unit Number 1 prior to the end of its second refurling outage. For Unit Number 2, the program will be imple-m ented prior to the first refueling outage. The, schedule for specific
~
protection system improvements is presented in Table I at the end of this report.
Thf Mport su=ari::es the results of our evaluation of the Fire Protec-tion Program at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station.
m.
3-II. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION A.
Water Sucoly Systems The water supply system is common to both units and consists of two full capacity 2500 gpm diesel engine driven fire pumps, and a separate motor driven pressure maintenance (jockey) pump whose capacity is 30 gpm at 110 psig. Each pump has its own driver with independent power supplies and controls.
Separate pump discharge headers connect to the yard fire main loop at points approximately 5 feet apart and are underground. Post indicator valves are provided to isolate the pump discharge headers in the main yard loop. They are also provided to isolate sections of the fire loop for maintenance and repair.
The cwo tire pumps, their associated fuel oil day tanks, the jockey pump and the station fresh water pumps are located in the fire pump house. The fresh water pumps are separated frem the fire pumps by a three hour barrier. The fire pump room is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system with heat actuated sprinkler heads. Flcor drains are provided which would limit the spread of oil in the event of a leaking oil tank. The' fire pumps are mounted on 12-inch high concrete foundations. Separate alarms monitoring pump runnir.g, prime mover availability, or failure to start rre provided for the pumps in the plant control rocm. The fire pumps are installed in accordance to the applicable sections cf NFPA 20. We have evaluated the above design and griteria and found that it is an acceptable alternative to locating the equipment in separate rocms.
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. The water supply source is from t.vo 350,000-gallon fresh water tanks of which 3C 000 gallons in each is reserved for fire protection.
Make-up to the tanks is supplied frem on-site production wells. The fire puri:ps can take suction from either or both tanks. The fire suppression system requiring the greatest water demand is the deluge system for the main transformers. This water demand is 1400 gpm at 70 psig plus 1000 gpm for the hose streams. This is within the design capacity of 2500 gpm for tne system.
We have reviewed the design criteria and bases for the water supply systems and conclude that these systems meet the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
B.
Automatic Sorinkler and Manual Water Systems The automatic sprinkler system and manual hose station hose standpipe system are fed by the main yard loop with multiple connections to interior fire protection systems header, e.g., the auxiliary building, turbine building, service building and reactor bu'ilding.
Each sprinkler system and manual hose station has an independent connection to the fire protection header fed from two' directions, therefore, a single failure cannot impair 30th the primary and backup fire protection system.
Valves in the fire protection system which are not electrically super-vised, with indication in the control room, will be locked and super-vised in their normal operating position and checked periodically.
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. The autcmatic sprinkler systems, i.e., wet sprinkler system, pre-action sprinkler systems, deluge and water spray systems, are designed to the requirements of NFPA Standard No.13. " Standard for Installation of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA Standard No.15, "Stan-dard for Water Spray Fixed System."
Manual hose stations are located throughout the plant to ensure that an effective hose stream can be directed to any safety related area in the plant. These systems are consistent with the requirement:. of NFPA Standard No.14. " Standpipe and Hose System for Sizing, Spacing, and Pipe Support Requirements."
Arec, that have been equipped or will be equipped
- with automatic water suppression systems are:
(A) Water-Geerated Deluge Systems Deluge systems actuated by water-pilot line automatic sprinkler heads are provided for the following equipment areas:
(1) Nos.11 and 12 Turbine Oil Storage Tanks (2) No.1 Seal Oil Unit
~(3) No.1 Turbine Oil Reservoir (4) No. 1 Turbine Oil Makeup Tank (5) Nos. IlA and llB Feedwater Pump Turbine Oil Coolers (6) No.1 Turbine Oil Conditioner (7) No.1 Feedwater Puma Lube Oil Tanx
- To be installed in accordance with Table 1.
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1, 2 and 3 Station Air Ccmpressors (9) tios. 21 and 22 Turbine Oil Storage Tanks (10) Nos. 2 Seal Oil Unit (11) No. 2 Turbine Oil Reservoir (12) Nos. 21A and 21B Feedwater Pump Turbine Oi Coolers (13) No. 2 Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Tank (14) tio. 2 Turbine Oil Conditioner (B) Electricallv-Ocerated Deluce Systems Re-cycling deluge systems actuated by continuous strip overheat detectors are provided for the following equipment areas:
(1) No.1 Control Rcom Emergency Air-Conditioning Unit Charcoal Filter (2) flo.14 Auxiliary Building Standby Ventilation Unit Charcoal Filter (3) No.1 Containment Pressure Relief Unit Charcoal Filter (4) No.12 Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Unit Charcoal Filter (5) Nos.11 and 12 Iodine Removal Units Charcoal Filters (5) i;o. 2 Control Rocm Emergency. Air Conditioning Unit Charcoal Filter (7) No. 24 Auxiliar/ Building Standby. Air-Conditioning Unit Charcoal Filter (8) No. 2 Containment Pressure Relief Unit Charcoal Filters (9) No. 22 Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Unit Charcoal Filter (10) Nos. 21 and 22 Iodine Removal Units Charcoal Filters
. (C) Air Ooerated Celuce Systems Deluge systems actuated by air-pilot automatic sprinkler heads are provided for the following equipment areas:
(1) No.1 Main Transfomer, Phases A, B, and C (2) Nos.11,12,13 and 14 Reactor Coolant Pumps (3) Nos.11 and 12 Station Power Transformers (4) No.1 High and Low Pressure Turbine Bearing Housings (5) No.1 Auxiliary Transformer (6) Heating Boiler Fuel Oil Pump and Heater (7) No. 2 Main Transfomer, Phases A, B, and C (8) Nos. 21, 22, 23 and 24 Reactor Coolant Pumps (9) Nos. 21 and 22 Station Power Transfomers (10) No. 2 High and Low Pressure Turbine Bearing Housings (11) No. 2 Auxiliary Transformer (0) Wet-Pice Sorinkler Systems Wet-pipe sprinkler systems, consisting of piping systems which are filled with water, which will spray frca heat actuated sprinkler heads, are provided for the following areas:
(1) Service Building - Elev. 88 f t.,100 ft.,113 ft., and 127 ft., and the cable vaults carrying cables between the Auxiliary Building and the Turbine Building.
(2) Fire Pump House - Eley. 100 ft.
(3) Heating Boiler House - Elev.100 ft.
(4) No.1 Turbine Perimeter - Elev. 88 f t.,100 ft., and 120 ft.
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_ (5) No. 2 Turbine Perimeter - Elev. 38 ft.,100 ft., and 120 ft.
(6) Auxiliary Building Drunming and Baling Storage Area - Elev.
100 ft.
(7) Auxiliary Building Resin Storage Areas - Elev.122 ft.
(8) Auxiliary Feed Pump / Remote Shutdown Panel
- Elev. 84 ft.'
(9) Charging Pump
- Elev. 84 ft.*
'de have reviewed the design criteria and bases for the water suppres-sion systems und conclude that these systems with the additional sprinkler systems to be installed meet the guidelir.as of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and are in accordance with the applicable portions of the National Fira Protection Association (NFPA)
Code s, and are, therefore, acceptable.
C.
Gas Sucoression Systems Total flooding low pressure CO2 and/or Halon systems are orovfdad for the fallowing areas:
(A) Automatically-Actuated Carbon Dioxide Floodino Systems Automatically-actuated flooding systems are provided for the following areas:
(1) Nos. lA,1B, and IC Diesel-Generator Rooms. and D.G Control Rooms-Elev.100 ft. and Day Tank Areas - Elev.122 ft.
- To be installed in accordance e tn schedule in Table I,
_g-(2) Nos.11 and 12 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (3) No.1 Exciter Enclosure Elev.140 ft.
(4) Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Rocms (Unit :o.1) - Elev.
84 ft.
(5) Nos. 2A, 2B, and 2C Diesel-Generator Rcoms and Control Rooms - Elev.100 ft. and Day Tank Areas - Elev.122 ft.
(6) Nos. 21 and E2 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (7) Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Rooms (Unit No. 2) - Elev.
84 ft.
(8)
No. 2 Exciter Enclosure - Elev.140 ft.
(B) Automatically Actuated Halon Flooding Systems _
(1)
No.1 Relay Room - Elev.100 ft.*
(2)
No. 2 Relay Room - Elev.100 ft.*
(c) Manually Actuated Carbon Dioxide Flooding Systems Manually-actuated flooding systems are provided for the following areas:
(1) No.1 460V Switchgear Room - Elev. 84 f t.
(,2) No.1 4160V Switchgear Room - Elev. 64 ft.
(3) No.1 Electrical Penetration Area - Elev. 78 ft.
(i) No. 2 460V Switchgear Room - Elev. 84 ft.
(5) No. 2 4160V Switchgear Room - Elev. 6a ft.
(6) No. 2 Electrical Penetration Area - Elev. 78 ft.
- To be installed in accordance with schedule given in Table L 1443 170
. These systems are designed to flood the protected areas with carocn dioxide in concentratiens up to 50 per cent. Carbon dioxide fire protection for all areas, except the Exciter Enclosures, is supplied froni a 10-ton Cardox refrigerated storage tank (one per unit) located on Elev. 84 ft. of each Auxiliary Building outside the Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Rooms and is discharged to the protected areas either auto-matically or manually as indicated above. The carbon dioxide fire protection for the Generator Exciter Enclosure for each unit is supplied from a 750-lb. refrigerated storage tank located on Elev. 120 ft. in each Turbine Area.
Each tank contains a sufficient supply of carbon dioxide for two full discharges into the largest protected area.
~ There ore three diesel generator sets per unit and each set is flooded actuation. The CO system for each Diesel-Generator by independent CO2 2
Room and its associated Control Room and day tank area are actuated together. The CO system for the two Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Rooms for 2
each unit are also actuated together. All other areas are independently actuated.
The CO suppression system is designed'in accordance with NFPA 2
Standards Numbers 12 and 12A. We have reviewed the design criteria and basis for these fire suppression systems. We conclude that 9
these systems satisfy the provisions of Appendix A to Brandh Tech-nical Position 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
D.
Foam Suceression System h manually actuated foam system with a capacity of 300 gallons is located in a Foam Tank House south of the Turbine Area, for the pro-tection of No.1 Fuel Oil Storage Tank. The system has been designed and installed in accordance with NFPA Standard No.11 to cover the liquid surface in 30 minutes. The foam solution is double strength, 3% protein foam concentrate.
We have reviewed the design criteria and bases for the foam suppres-sion system and we conclude that the system satisfies the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
E.
Fire Detection Systems The fire detection system consists of the detectors, associated elec-trical circuitry, electrical power supplies, and the fire annunciation panel. The types of detectors used at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station are ionization (products of combustion), and thermal (heat sensors). The system is continuously supervised with a NFPA 72D Class 8 supervised system.
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. Fire detection systems will give aucible and visual alam and annun-ciation in the control rocm.
Local audible and/or visual alanns are also provided.
The licensee has agreed to install additional smoke detectors in the following areas:
(a) Peripheral rooms of the control rocm complex - Elev.122 ft.
(b) Spent and new fuel storage area (c) Piping penetration area - Elev. 78 ft.
(d) Control Area Air Conditioning System Equipment (e) Corridor Area - Elev.1C0 feet (f) Resin Storage (g) Auxiliary Building Ventilation Equipment (h) Boric Acid Pumps (t) Safety Injection Pumps (j) Component Cooling Pumps (k) Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (1) Charging Pumps (m) Containment Spray Pumps (o) Storage Tank Recirculatien Pumps (p) Residual Heat Removal Pumps (q) Emergency Air Ccmpressor (r) Chilled Water System Chillers
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_ (s) Mechanical Penetratien Area (t) Piping Penetration Area (Elev. 78 ft.)
(u)
Inner Piping Penetration Area (v) Outer Piping Penetration Area (w) General Containment (one detector in each recirculating fan)
(x) Reactor Coolant Pumps (y) Service Water Pumps We have reviewed the fire detection systems to ensure that fire detectors are located to provide detection and alarm of fires that could occur. We have also reviewed the fire detection systems design criteria and bases to ensure that it confoms to the applicable sections of NFPA No. 740. We conclude that the design and the installation o'f the fire detection systems with the additional detectors to be installed, meet the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and the applicable portions of NFPA No. 72D, and are, therefore, acceptable.
III. OTHER ITEMS RELATING TO THE STATION FIRE PROTECTION PROGPRi A.
Fire Barriers All floors, walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas are rated at a minimum of 3-hour fire rating with exception of the pene-trations discussed in Sections III, B and C.
The main control roem area contains peripheral rooms which are located within the main control room 3-hour fire barrier. These peripheral rocms are provided with detectors and alams and ninimum one-hour fire rated ceilings and
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_ The licensee has provided acceptable documentation to substantiate the fire rating of the 3-hour barriers.
B.
Fire Coors and Damaers We have also reviewed the placement of the fire doors to ensure that fire doors of proper fire rating have been provided. The fire rating of the doors as a minimum will be 1-1/2 hour rating based on the fire loading of the particular fire areas.
Ventilation penetrations through barriers are protected in scme areas by standard fire door / dampers. The licensee will provide one of the following for the rest of the unprotected ventilation penetrations:
1.
UL listed fire rated door type dampers at each penetration.
2.
Coat the ventilation ducts with a flame retardant material to a minimum fire rating of 1-1/2 hours based on the fire loading of the area.
In addition the licensee will provide rated fire dampers on all supply and exhaust cpenings in the ducts.
The licensee has provided the necessary informt. tion to demonstrate to our satisfaction that fire door / dampers and their method of instal-lation can provide a fire rating equivalent to the fire barrier or the fire loading of the fire area. The fire door / dampers are and will be installed in accordance with NFPA 90-A.
3443 175
_ C.
Penetration Fire Stoos Penetrations, including electrical penetration seals, through rated barriers are sealed to provide fire resistance equivalent to the barrier itself. The licensee has provided the necessary infonnation to demonstrate that the penetration seals used in the penetrations for cable trays, conduits, and piping and their method of installation can provide a fire rating equivalent to the fire barrier.
We conclude that the fire barriers, barrier penetrations, fire doors and dampers with the additional doors and dampers to be n: stalled meet the guidelines of Appendix A to Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
D.
Comunication Svstems Fixed emergency ccmunication using voice-powered head sets is available at specific locations throughout the station. There is a'so a public address system on each unit which is powered by an inverter normally fed frem the 230 volt alternating current vital bus C and backed up by the 125 volt direct current emergency bus C.
To satisfy the guide-lines of Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1,-the licensee has comitted, at our request, to provide an additional comunication system consisting of portable radio units. To preclude a single electrical fail,ure frcm causing the loss of all comunication systems, the licensee has docu-mented that the fixed repeater and other accessories ass::ciated with the portable radio ccmunication system of each unit will be powered from a different 125 volt direct current emergency bus as that of the public address system for that unit.
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.. The licensee has comitted to perfcm a preoperational test to demonstrate that the frequencies used will not affect the actuation of protective relays. We conclude that the addition of this new comunication system satisfies our guidelines set forth in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and therefore is acceptable.
E.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Intecrity We expressed a concern to the licensee that spurious valve operation caused by fire may affect theintegrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. We required that the licensee examine each interface at the reactor coolant pressure boundary and either demonstrate the capability of the design to withstand spurious valve operation caused by fire without the loss of reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity, or modify the design to assure integrity.
The examination performed by the licensee revealed that..the pressurizer relief lines having the electrically and pneumatic operated valves and which are connected to the pressurizer relief tank, were the only interfaces which were not isolated frem the high p. essure reactor coolant system by two normally closed' valves. Each of the two pressurizer relief lines in Unit I has a normally closed pneumatic operated relief valve in series with a normally open mater-operated valve. Each pressuri:er relief line in Unit 2 has one more pneumatic operated valve per line than U.1it 1.
This additional valve is nomally closed and connected in parallel with the other air operated valve.
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. The spurious opening of a single pr.eumatic operated relief valve caused by a fire could lead to ccmpromising the reactor coolant boundary integrity if the valve is not closed before the design pressure limits of the pressurizer relief tank are exceeded.
Each pressurizer relief line can be isolated by either closing the pneumatic or motor operated valve from the main control roca or frem the corresponding power distribution and motor control centers.
The licensee contends that there is sufficient time available to diagnose the situation and isolate the relief line while the pressurizer is relieving to the pressurizer relief tank.
Our review detemined that the existing provisions and future modi-fications for fire protection in the relay room. and other areas of the station where the electrical circuits and cables associated with the pressurizer relief valves.are located, are consistent with minimizing the probability of a fire causing the opening of the pressurizer reitef lines, and, therefore, we conclude that the design in this regard is acceptable. Furthermore, the consequences resulting frcm the spurious opening of a relief valve caused by a ' ire or other reasons compounded with the failure of the valve to close within the specified time, have been analyzed by the NRC staff.
It has been determined that the consecuences resulting frem this event are satisfactoril.y mitigated by the engineered safety feature systems.
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. IV. FIRE PROTECTION FOR SPECIFIC AREAS A.
Relay and Switchcear Rcoms Relay and switchgear rooms containing redundant electrical divisions are provided for each unit. These rooms are separated from each other and the balance of the plant by a minimum of 1-1/2 hour rated fire barriers.. The. relay and switchgear rooms for Unit 1 are separated from their counterparts in Unit 2 by two 1-1/2 hour rated fire barriers and a comon corridor. There are a minimum of two access doors to each of the rooms and the doors are located at opposite ends of the'rocms.
system is installed Currently a manually actuated total flooding CO2 in the switchgear rooms and manual hose stations are provided for the relay rooms. The licensee has agreed, at our recuest, to provide an automatic Halon system for the relay rooms.
When the Halon system is actuated, the ventilation system isolates the rooms and smoke venting can be initiated by manually actuating the exhaust fan. In addition, rmoke detectors are installed that alarm in the centrol room. The back-up fire suppressien system is the hose stations located in the imediate vicinity of the access doors and portable extinguishers.
All power, control, and instrumentation cable have passed the IEEE No. 383 Flame Test. All cable trays within these rcoms have a minimum separation distance of 18 inches vertical and 12 inches horizontal, as well as a fire resistant barrier of asbestos woven 1443 179
, cloth on the bottom of each tray. The licensee has performed tests to show that the cables used will not propogate a fire frem tray to tray with a vertical separation distance of 12 inches.
In addition, the higher voltage trays are installed above the lower voltage trays.
The licensee has committed, at our request, to establish an emergency shutdown procedure and necessary modifications to assure the capability to achieve safe shutdcwn in the event of an exposure fire in" these rooms which might disable redundant cable divisions of system necessary for safe shutdown. The applicant will provide an alternative shutdown method for our review.
This alternate shutdown method will include where necessary the rerouting of instrumentation cable to the hot shutdown panel. The procedures and modifications for hot and cold shutdown will be implenented by the second refueling for Unit I and the first refueling for Unit 2.
We have reviewed the licensee's fire hazards analysis and fire protection provided for the relay an,d switchgear rocms and consider that appropriate fire protection has been provided and after the modifications and procedures are implemented will conform to the provisions of Appendix A to STP ASB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, accept-able.
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. B.
Safety Related Puro Areas In the safety related pump areas, such as the auxiliary feed pump area and the charging pump, the pumps are located in close proximity to each other. Mcess to the pumps is usually an open corridor. We were concerned that a common exposure fire could jeopardize the safety function of two or more of the pumps.
At our request, the licensee has committed to install automatic water sprinkler systems in these areas.
In addition, a one hour rated fire barrier or, alternativly, a one-half hour barrier and a sprinkler system will be provided, where necessary, to separate redundant cable trains serving these pumps. Both trains of the auxiiiary feedwater system will be protected in this manner.
We have reviewed the licensee's fire hazards analysis for this area and conclude that appropriate fire protection has been provided and after modifications are implemented will meet the guidelines of Appendix A of BTP 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
C.
Diesel Fuel Oil Storace Rooms The _ diesel fuel oil storage area, located on elevation 81, contains two 7-day diesel oil storage tank rooms, two transfer pump rooms:
and the plant's CO system 10 ton storage tank. The fire suppression 2
total flooding system.
system for this area is an automatic CO2 We were concerned that a diesel oil fire in the tank rocms or the diesel oil transfer pump rooms could jeopardize the entire plant's CO suppression system, if manual fire suppression systems had to 2
be used. The licensee, at our request, has cormitted to install, in addition to the CO system, one of the following systems in the 2
diesel storage tank area:
$ 0,
. 1.
An au cratic open head deluge or open head spray nozzle system 2.
An au cratic closed head sprinkler system 3.
An automatic AFFF system, the foam being delivered by a sprinkler or scray system.
We have reviewed the licensee's Fire Hazards Analysis for this area and conclude that appropriate fire protection will be provided and after the mcdifications are implemented will meet the guidelines of Appendix A of STP ASB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
D.
Other Plant Areas In order to provide a defense-in-depth design so that a fire will not prevent the performance of necessary safe plant shutdown functions, the licensee has cccmitted to perform a fire interaction analysis on all redundant mechanical and electrical systems and components necessary for safe cold shutdown which are separated only by distance and are within 20 feet of each other. The analysis will postulati a fire in installed or transient combustibles and failure of the primary firs suppression system.
Where additiona: protection and/or separation is required to assure a safe shutdown condition, the appli' cant has cemitted to:
(1) relocate one or both divisions to achieve a minimum of 20-ft, separation between divisions, or (2) provide a c..e-hour fire rated barrier such as 1" inch ceramic fiber separating one safety related train frem the other or fren a cer=cn exposure fire and area automatic sprinkler systems
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_ will be provided to afford protection agai1st exposure fire at the interactions, or (3) provide an alternate shutdown method that is independent of the interaction area.
The licensee's Fire Hazards Analysis addresses other slant areas not specifically discussed in this report. The licensee has ccmmitted to install additional detectors, portable extinguishers, hose stations, and some additional emergency lighting as identified in the licensee's installation schedcle. We find these areas with the cennitment made by the licensee to be in accordance with the guicelines of Appendix A of BTP ASB 9.5-1, and the applicable sec-tions of the National Fire Protection Association Code and are, therefore, acceptable.
V.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS The administrative controls for fire protection consists of the fire protection organization, the fire brigade training, the controls over combustibles and ig6ition sources, the prefire plans and procedures for fighting fires and quality assurance.
d
.. In response to Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, the licensee described his proposed procedures and controls.
The licensee has agreed to revise his administrative controls and training procedures to follow supplemental staff guidelines contained in " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance," dated 6/la/77, and implement them by December 31, 1979.
The administrative procedures for the control of combustibles and ignition sources is complete for Unit 1 and will be implemented prior to fuel loading for Unit 2.
The present fire brigade consists of a trained thre.a-man brigade. The applicant has committed to have a plant fire brigade of at least five members that will be organized to provide immediate response to fires that may occur at the site. The full brigade will be fully trained and on site by December 31, 1979. The plant fire brigade will also be equipped with stored closed circuit oxygen-type breathing apparatus, portable communications equipment, portable lanterns, and other necessary fire fighting equipment. Spare oxygen cylinders and recharge capability are provided to satisfy the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1.
The fire fighting brigade participates in periodic drills. Liaison Between the plant fire brigade and the local fire departments has been established. The local fire departments have been on plant tours and have also been involved in training sessions with the plant fire brigade.
9
. We conclude that the fire brigade equicment and training conform to the recommendations of the National Fire Protection Association, Apoendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and suoplemental staff guidelines and are, therefore, acceptable.
VI. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS We have reviewed the plant Technical Specifications issued for Salem Nuclear Generating Statiot Unit Nos.1 and 2 and find that they are con-sistent with our Standard Technical Specifications for fire protection.
Following the implementation of the modifications of fire orotection systems and administrative controls resulting from this review, the Technical Specifications will be radified accordingly to incorporate the limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements to reflect these modifications.
VII.
CONCLUSION The fire protection system for Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos.1 and 2 was evaluated and found to meet General Design Criterion 3 " Fire Protection" at the time the original Safety Evaluation Report 4
was issued in October, 1974.
As a result of investigations conducted by the staff on the fire protec-tion systems, fire protection criteria were developed and further requirements were imposed to improve the cacability of the fire protec-tion system to prevent unacceptable danage that may result from a fire.
At our request, the licensee conducted a re-evaluation of their fire cratection system for Salem Units 1 and 2.
The licensee t omitted in iA43 i85
. September,1977, a Fire Hazards Analysis for both units and subsequently in response to cur positions, six revisions to the Analysis. He also has compared his systam, in detail, wf *h the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, "GuideNnes for Fire Protection for Nuclear Plants."
During the course of our review we have reviewed the licensee's submittals and his resconses to our requests for additional information.
In addition, we have made two site visits to evaluate the fire hazards that exist in the Salem Nuclear Generating Station and the design features and protec-tion systems provided to minimize these hazards.
The licensee has completed some modifications or proposed to make addi-tional modifications to improve the fire resistance capability for fire doors, dampers, fire barriers and barrier penetration seals.
The licensee has also proposed to install additional sprinkler systems for areas such as the auxiliary feed pump area, charging pump area, and various other areas, as well as an autcmatic Halon system in the relay rcoms. To ensure that fires can be detected rapidly and the plant opera-tors informed premptly, additional detectors will be installed in various areas of the plant.
In addition, the licensee has ccmmitted to establish emergency shutdown procedures to bring the olant to safe cold shutdown condition in the 1443 i86
. event of a damaging fire in the relay rocms, the switchgear rooms and other safety-related areas.
The licensee is connitted to making all imorovements by the second refueling for Unit 1 and the first refueling for Unit 2. thus meeting ht s license ccndition. We have reviewed the licensee's schedule and find it acceptable and have included it in Table I.
We find that the Fire Protection Program for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station with che improvements already made by the licensee, is adeouate at the present tine.and, with the scheduled modifications, will meet the guidelines contained in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and meets the General Design Criterion 3 and is, therefore, acceptable.
Until the committed fire protection system improvements are ooerational, we consider the existing fire detection and suppression systems; the existing barriers between fire areas; improved administrative procedures for control of combustibles and ignition sources; the trained onsite fire brigade; the caoability to extinguish fires manually; and the fire protection technical specifications provide adecuate protection against a fire that would threaten safe shutdcwn.
Our overall conclusion is that a fire occurring in any area of either Salem Nuclear Generating Station will not prevent that plant frem being brought to a controlled safe cold shutdown, and further, that such a fire would not cause the release of significant amounts of radiation.
1443
'o!
TABLE I
~
MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE Action S ta tus Item No.
Planned Action Item Descriotion Unit 1 Unit 2 1.
Make organizational revisions to assign the station superin-Completed Completed tendent resconsible for all aspects of firefighting and fire protection.
2.
List the Fire Protection Program as "QA Applicable."
Completed Ccmpleted 3.
Perfom detailed review of apolicable procedures for ade-Completed C mpleted quacy in addressing the requirements of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 and revise as necessary.
4.
Replace the wood planks on the new fuel storage pit with Completed Ccmpleted wood which has been treated with a flame retardant.
5.
Prepare an engineering procedure for perfonning additional Comoleted Ccmpleted fire hazards analysis to reflect future station modifi-cations.
5.
Approximately six (5) fire area boundary doors which are Ccmpleted Cctrpleted not currently locked or alarmed will be locked, provided with a time delay alarm to indicate in the Control Room when the door has been left open, or routinely inspected by a roving watch. This action will take into account station security plans currently being studied for the Salem Station.
7.
Remove the backuo hydrogen storage stations from Elev.
Completed Compl eted 122 feet at.the we.t end of the Auxiliary Building, or enclose the cresent station in a 3* hour fire rated concreta enclosure with forced ventilation to the outdoors.
8.
Add a wet pice sorinkler system for the Dimethylamine Deleted. Tanks have storage tanks located in the steam generator blowdcwn been removed.
sample reces, Elev.100 feet in the Auxiliary Building.
9.
a.
Ioni:ation tyoe fire detectors will be added as indi-Cctoleted Cenplated cated in Section II-E of this report to provide general area or tection of safety related ecuipment.
These detecto s will alarm and annunciate in the Control Recn are alarm locally.
6 Action Status Item No.
Planned Action hem Descri:: tion Unit 1 Unit 2 9.
b.
Installation of additional autcmatic smoke detectors which alarm and annunciate in the control room, in the following areas:
(1) Peripheral rooms within the control Compl eted Compl eted rocm ccmplex in which the operator does not have visual surveillance frcm the main console.
(2) Piping penetration area elevation 78 Compl eted Gmol eted feet.
(3) New and spent fuel pool area.
Completed Fuel Loadino 10.
Auxiliary Building floor penetrations for piping, cable, Comoleted Ccmpleted and ventilation ducting that have not been sealed will be sealed with silicone foam to provide a fire stop with a fire rating grea'ar than the area fire area load as reported by the fire hazards analysis.
11.
The lower electrical penetration area supply and return Ccmpleted Completed air ventilation dampers will be controlled to shut upon a CO discharge into the icwer electrical 'enetration 2
area 12.
Add fire rated ventilation danners, which will shut by Completed Completed both fusible-link and CO,, discharge, in the exhaust air duct from each dieset fuel oil storage tank rocm and each fuel oil transfer pump rocm.
,13 Approximately ten (10) additional emergency lights Completed Ccmpleted will be installed, as required, to orovide for safe evacuation from all areas of the station.
14.
Install a hose house at each yard hydrant. Hose Ccmpleted Completed house will meet the requirements of NFPA Standard No. 24 exceot the eouipment stored in each house will be that which is necessary and appropriate for the intended application.
15.
One (1) fire hydrant, presently scecified on the Ccmoleted Completed Fire Protection System drawing, Figure 0.1,-1, that has noc been installed, will be installed.
16.
Add a second A-inch diameter water suoply header with Comoleted Ccmpleted accrocriate isolation valves from the common Auxiliary Building Header to each Reactor Containment u: stream of
}443 h
. Actten Status Item No.
planned Acticn Item Descriotion Unit 1 Unit 2 16.
the Containment penetration iso'ation valve as shown (cont'd) schematically in Figure 3.5-2.
Add appropriate 6-inch valves in the Auxilia.y Building cormon fire water supply header.
17.
The hose standpipe root isol& tion valves and the Completed Completed yard main post indicator valves will be provided with locking devices.
18.
Add one hose station in the mechanical penetration Completed Completed area of each unit near the entrance to the Fuel Handling Building. Provide with 150 ft. lengths of 1-1/2 inch fire hose and adjustable fog pattern electrical safe type nozzles.
19.
Extend the existing fire water standoise in the Completed Completed Auxiliary Building corridor to reach Elevation 122 feet. Add a hose station at Elevation 122 feet with 150 feet of 1-1/2 inch fire hose and an adjustable fog pattern electrical safe type nozzle.
20.
~
Add a fire hydrant in the yard near the Service Completed Completed Water Pumo House.
21.
Two (2) dedicated air breathing units (Bio-pacs)
Completed Completed with two (2) spare cylinders will be stored at the Reactor Containment entrance for each unit on Elevation 100 feet in the Mechanical penetration Area.
This will be accomplishec by relocating four (4) of the twenty (20) units :resently avail-able at the station.
22.
In addition to existing CO type extinguishers, two 1/80 1/80 2
portable water extinguishers will be placed in the vicinity of the Control Room, Computer Rooms and the Watch Engineer's Office.
L
. Action Status Item No.
Planned Action Item Descriotion Unit 1 Unit 2 23.
Instrumentation will be provided in the exhaust air Ccmpleted Ccmpleted ducts from the Battery Rooms to indicate loss of ventilation flow with annunciation in the Control Rocm.
24.
Add dikes around each emergency air compressor and Completed Completed each chilled water system chiller to contain the spread of lube oil leakage.
25.
Provide manually operated isolation dampers in the Ccmpleted Completed sucply air and return air ventilation ducts serving the Drunning and Baling Area to pennit area isola-tion frca the remainter of the Auxiliary Building ventilaticn systems.
26.
Implementation of staff supplemental guidance contained in " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsi-bilities, Administrative Controls, and Quality Assurance," dated June 14, 1977 for:
a.
Administrative Procedures, Fire Compl eted Compl eted Brigade Size, and Testing Program b.
Storage of Combustible Material Compl eted Comnletv near Safety Related Conduit / Cable or Ecufpment.
27.
Installation of a portable radio system Second refueling First refueling incorporating repeaters as necessary for the fire brigade and operations personnel.
Preoperational testing will be perfor ed to demonstrate that the frecuencies used will not affect the actuation of protective relays. Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of the portable radios will be protected from exposure fire damage.
1443 191 Action Item No.
Planned Action Item Descriotion Unit 1 Unit 2 28.
a.
Verification that all fire doors used Compl eted Completed to protect openings in walls con-taining safety-related equipment and/or conduit / cable have a fire rating of at least 1-1/2 hours and that the rating is comensurate with the fire hazards analysis for the area assuming an exposure fire.
b.
Installation of fire doors as a result 1/80 12/79 of 28a above.
- 29. a.
Install in all 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier Engineering Solution comoleted October 1979 ventilation penetrations one of the following designs:
Implementation by Second refueling First refueling (1) Rated fire door / dampers in all ventilation penetrations (2) 1-1/2 hour fire retardant coatings on the duct work plus fire dampers at all louvers.
The NRC will review the design prior to installation.
In addi-tion the following areas will be modified to conform to this position:
- 1. Control Rocm Same as above
- 2. Relay Roce Same as above
- 3. Switchgear Rocms 10/80 10/80
- 4. Diesel Fuel Oil storage End of first Fuel loading Area-Inlet and Exhausts refueling
- 5. Fuel Oil Transfer Pump End of first Fuel loading Room Inlet and Exhausts refueling
- 6. Radwaste Area (Dru=1ing and 10/80 10/80 Sailing Area)
(covered under Item 25)
- 30. Installation of fixed 8-hour capacity Compl eted Comol eted self-contained emergency lighting of the flourescent or sealed beam type.
32 -
Action Item No.
Planned Action Iten Descriction Unit 1 Unit 2 31.
Installation of an outside hydrant Compl eted Ccmpl eted for back-uo fire suppression for the service water pump house with a hose horse over the hydrant and 1-1/2 inch he.a preconnected to the hydrant outlet. Also, provisions for a second hose of sufficient length to enable the second hose stream from the hydrant in the event that the second hose must be routed differently and when more than one hose stream is needed to fight the fire.
32.
Installation of autcmatic, zoned, pre-action, dry pipe sprinklers in the following areas:
- a. Charging Pump Area Second refueling First refueling
- b. Auxilia./ Feed Pump Area Second refueling First refueling 33.
InstElation of an automatic Halon total
~
Second refueling First refueling f1oiding~ system irilhe relay rocms.
- y
- Installation of additional hose stations Completed Compl eted near the battery rooms so that the rooms can be reached with a maximum of 100 feet of hose.
In addition the hoses will be equipped with the acoropriate nozzles to combat electrical fires.
35.
The total rerouting of the hydrogen lines -
Completed Compl eted to the volume control tank away from safety related equipment, cables, and conduf t.
{l}43 l93 O
. Action Iten
?!o.
Planned Action Item Descr.Jtion Unit I Unic 2 Installation of one of the folicwing fire 10/80 First refueling 1~6*
suppression systems as back-up to the automatic total ficoding CO system for 2
the diesel oil storage tank rooms:
- a. An automatic open head deluge or open head spray nozzle system.
- b. An autcmatic closed head sprinkler.
- c. An automatic AFFF system, the foam being delivered by a sprinkler or spray system.
37.
Implementation, modification and installa-tion of an alternative shutdown capability Implenentation by:
so that hot shutdown capability can be maintained and cold shutdown can be accon.- Second refueling First refueling plished wi' iin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, independent of the relay, switchgear and control rooms. This will include the rerouting of cables where practicable, installation of autanatic sprinklers and half-hour fire barriers between redundant trains and equipment located within 20 feet of each other and written procedures.
G G
. Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amen :.ct does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the acendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusions We have found that the Fire Protection Program for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station with the improvements already made by the licensee, is adequate at the present time and, with scheduled modifications, will meet the guidelines contained in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and meets the General Design Criterion 3 and is, therefore acceptabl e.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve 9 significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities wil' be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regu-lations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: November 20, 1979
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