ML19250A711
| ML19250A711 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1979 |
| From: | Allen J, Gibson A, Hosey C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19250A702 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-79-20, 50-270-79-18, 50-287-79-20, NUDOCS 7910240312 | |
| Download: ML19250A711 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1979020
Text
.
h
UNITED STATES
'
!
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,
(
..; }
REGION 11
'
o,
,/
101 MARIETTA ST.. N.W.. SUITE 3100
%
g*
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
Report Nos. 50-269/79-20, 50-270/79-18, and 50-237/79-20
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242
Facility Name: Oconea
Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287
License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55
Inspection at Oconee si
, near Seneca, South Carolina
M
7
Inspectors:
/
C e dn)/ l
C. M. Hose
Datd Sign'ed
7khn
,
{J.R.
lh n
Date 'Sigded
Approved by:
9 [(0 [] #J
A. F. Gibson, Section Chief, FF&MS Branch
Date Signed
SUMMARY
Inspection on August 6-10, 1979
Areas Inspected
This routine, unannounced inspection involved 74 inspector-hours onsite in the
areas of radioactive waste management program, including radioactive effluent
release reports, procedures for controlling the release of effluents, effluent
control instrumentation, solid radioactive waste disposal; radiation protection
program, including licensee audits, posting, labeling and control of radiologi-
cally controlled areas and material and external radiation exposure control;
and followup on previously identified items.
Results
Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified in seven areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in
one area (Infraction - Failure to Maintain Positive Control Over Individual
Entries to High Radiation Areas (269/287/79-20-01; 270/79-18-01) Paragraph 10).
..
1204
065
7910 2 4 0 3 l 2__.
.
.
.
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
R. M. Koehler, Superintendent of Technical Services
- C. T. Yongue, Station Health Physicist
L. A. Blue, Health Physicist
S. R. Newcomb, Junior Health Physicist
J. Owens, Health Physics Supervisor
T. A'exander, Health Physics Supervisor
C. Harlin, Junior Health Physicist
D. Davidson, Health Physics Supervisor
D. Yoh, Shift Supervisor
- R. T. Bond, Technical Services Supervisor.
- D. Dalton, Quality Assurance Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included five technicians, two operators,
two mechanics, and three office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, 1979 with
those persons indicated in Paragraph I above. The Station Manager acknow-
ledged the item of noncompliance. With regard to the training of utility
operators, the Station Manager stated that presently employed operators
would complete the formal training program prior to December 31, 1980. He
further stated that in the future utility operators would only be assigned
to perform tasks for which they have been trained and qualified. The
inspector outlined the NRC's program for increased surveillance of activi-
ties related to the transportation of radioactive material. The following
areas were discussed: NRC inspection of shipments received at burial
sites, compliance with Department of Transportation regulations and burial
site licenses and adherance to requirements in certificates of compliance
for NRC approved containers.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Noncompliance (269/287/78-27-01; 270/78-26-01), Failure to Keep
Entrance to High Radiation Area Locked.
During tours of the plant, the
inspector observed that new hollow-metal doors with metal frames and
automatic closer had been installed.
The inspector had no further
questions.
..
.
.
-2-
.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Radioactive Effluent Release Report
Technical Specification 6.6.1.4 requires that a report on the radioactive
discharges released from the site be submitted to the NRC semiannually. An
inspector reviewed the plants Semi-annual Radioactive Effluent Release
Report for the period of July 1978 through December 1978 and discussed the
report with licensee representatives. The inspector had no further questions
concerning the report.
6.
Effluent Control Instrumentation
An inspector observed the alarm / trip setpoints for the low pressure service
water monitors (RIA-31 and RIA-35) and the liquid waste discharge line
monitors (RIA-33 and RIA 34) and verified that the setpoints for the monitor
were set as required by plant procedure PT/0/A/230/01, " Radiation Monitor
Check."
7.
Radioactive Effluent Release Monitoring and Records
Technical Specification 3.9.8 specifies the sampling and monitorin require-
ments for radioactive material in liquid waste effluents.
An inspector
observed.the collection and analysis of a liquid sample from the Units 1
and 2 laundry and hot shower tank (LHST) "B" and verified that the collection
and analysis was performed in accordance with plant procedure HP/0/B/1000/60C,
Procedure for Sampling and Release Requirements for CTT, CMT, and LHST, and
the technical specification. The ins;.r-tor observed the discharge of the
contents of the LHST "B" and verified that the release was made in accordance
with plant procedure OP/0/B/1104/34, Laundry and !..t Shower Waste System -
Operations Procedure.
The verification included a review of the valve lineup
used and the setpoints for liquid radwaste discharge monitors (RIA-33 and
RIA-34). The inspector reviewed the completed liquid waste release permit
for the discharge and verified that the release w4s witLin the limits
established in the technical specifications.
8.
Solid Radioactive Waste Disposal
By review of records, chservations and discussions with licensee representa-
tives, an inepector reviewed the plants solid radioactive waste processing
and disposal program. The inspector selectively reviewed shipping records
for radioactive material shipped out during 1978 and 1979.
The shipments
appear to have been made in accordance with 10 CFR 71 and Department'of
Transportation regulations. The inspector had no further questions.
..
~
1204
067
.
-
-3-
,
9.
Licensee Audits
An inspector discussed the audit program related to radiation protection
and radioactive waste management with a licensee representat.ive and reviewed
the following audit reports:
a.
QA Audit 0-79-5, dated June 21, 1979, Audit of Technical Service
Department (includes health physics and chemistry).
b.
Surveillance 0-579/5, February 14-26, 1979 (whole body count, ALARA
program, dosimetry, HP personnel training and qualifications, exposure
records, dose extensions).
The inspector evaluated the frequency,
scope and followup action of radiation protection related audits and
had no questions.
10.
i;ostlug and Control
The inspector revieved the licensees posting, and control of radiation
areas, high radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, contamination
areas, radioactive material areas, and the labeling of radioactive material
Juring tours of the auxiliary buildings and Unit 3 reactor building.
Luring a tour on August 6, 1979, a set of keys was found in the doot leading
to the waste gas decay tank room. Although the waste gas decay tank room
was posted as a radiation area at the titre the keys were found, the keys
could have been used to < pen the door leading to most high radiation areas
in the auxiliary building.
No one was in the room at the time the keys
were found. A licensee representative stated that a check of the key
check-out records indicated the keys had not been signed out.
The inspector
stated that failure to maintain positive control over each individual entry
into high radiation area by maintaining control over keys to such areas is
in noncompliance (269/287/79-20-01; 270/79-18-01) with 10 CFR 20.203(c).
11.
External Radiation Dose Control
During tours of the plant, the inspector observed workers wearing TLD
a.
badges and pocket dosimeters.
The inspectors discussed the radiation
dose monitoring program with workers and licensee representatives. An
inspector reviewed the daily exposure control report for August 9,
1979 and the computer printout of doses for the quarter ending March 31,
1979 An inspector verified that radiation exposure history records
(NRC Form 4) required by 10 CFR 20.101(b) were on file for each indi-
vidual who had exceeded 1250 mrem for the calendar quarter.
b.
An inspectc reviewed the radiation dose monitoring program for diving
operations in the spent fuel pools associated with installing new
storage racks. Multiple TLDs are being worn by the divers to monitor
exposure to the whole body (head and trunk) and extremities.
The TLDs
are being read onsite by plant personnel.
Plant procedure.HP/0/
B/1000/65, " Issue and Readout of CaSO : Dy Dosimeter for Spent Fuel
4
Pool Diving Operations" stated that periodic checks of the instrument
calibration would be performed using TLDs exposed to known doses.
1204
06B
.
-4-
,
,
However, the procedure did not specify what action should be taken if
the check indicated the calculated internal reference light value was
different from the value determined the last time the instrument was
calibrated. The inspector commented that the procedure should state
how much the reference light value calculated during these checks
would be allowed to differ from the value determinad at the last cali-
bration before the instrument would require recalibration. A licensee
representative stated that the procedure would be reviewed to provide
an acceptable range for the checks. The procedure also states that
the TLD laboratory supervisor would be notified if the peak preheat
temperatures differed by more than 5 C from the previous reading
listed on the performance log. A review of the perfcrmance log
entries for the period of June 1979 through August 1979 revealed that
on five occasions the temperature differed by more than 5 C.
However,
the records did not indicate what specific action was taken as a
result of the preheat temperature readings being out of specification.
The inspector commented that the out-of-specification temperature
cc uld have resulted in error in the dosage assigned to the divers.
The station manager stated that a review of the dosage assigned the
divers would be conducted and the corrections made if necessary.
He
further stated that this review would be completed by September 1, 1979.
The inspector stated this would remain an open item (269/287/79-20-02;
270/79-18-02) pending coupletion of the review.
12.
Other Areas Inspected
An inspector reviewed the plants procedure for releasing material and
a.
equipment from the radiation control areas. Plant Procedure HP/0/B/
1000/09, Procedure for Removal of Items from Radiation Control Zones
(RCZ) or from Radiation Control Areas , requires that a radiation and
smear survey be performed on items prior to their release.
The in-
spector reviewed the survey results of a Dillion Dynamometer (serial
No. 3338) that was released for unrestricted use on November 13, 1978.
The radiation levels and removable surface contamination levels were
below the release limits established for the plant. The inspector had
no further questions concerning the release of equipment from radia-
tion control areas or zones.
b.
An inspector reviewed the corrective action taken to prevenc a recur-
rence of an incident which occurred on December 5,1978.
A small
shielded cask used to transfer incore material fell from a truck as
the truck was being backed down the ramp providing access to the Unit
2 reactor building equipment hatch. The cask is used only for moving
material around the site and is not designed for off-site shipments.
An area of approximately 113 square feet was contaminated when approx-
imately one gallon of water spilled from the cask. The area was
promptly decontaminated. The inspector had no further questions.
Aninspectorreviewedtheradiologicalaspectsofspillso[ radio-
c.
active water from the Unit 3 Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) on
May 16 and May 17, 1979. The Unit 3 fuel transfer canal was being
1204
069
A
.
.
-5-
t
pumped down to the Unit 3 BWST via the low pressure injection (LPI)
system. While the canal was being pumped down the BWST was being
recirculated using the BWST recirculation pump. Pressure buildup in
the BWST due to rapid filling from the LPI system caused the recirc :-
lation flow, which connect to the BWST tank overflow line, to go over
a 50 inch loop seal and into the liquid waste system. A valve in the
line leading to the radwaste system had been opened witheut a written
procedure. Upstream of where the four inch overflow line reduces to a
2 inch line, the west penetration room floor drain line ties in.
The
water backed up into the west penetration room, ran over a dam at the
door, down the steps and through a door to the outside.
It is esti-
mated that approximately 1000 gallons of water was released to the
west penetration room twice durirm the draining of the fuel transfer
canal on May 16 and 17, 1979, and approximately 100 and 200 gallons of
water respectively reached an area outside the Auxiliary Building
during each release. An area of approximately 100 square feet outside
the auxiliary building was contaminated. The area outside the auxil-
iary building and the nomally uncontaminated areas in the plant were
decontaminated and returned to uncontaminated status. Noncompliance
items concerning this incident were discussed in Region II inspection
report no. 269/270/79-14; 287/79-15 dated July 17, 1979.
d.
An inspector reviewed the radiological aspects of a release of radio-
active water to Lake Keowee on July 4, 1979 which resulted from a tube
leak in the low pressure injection (LPI) cooler A. At approximately
1:30 a.m.
on July 4, 1079, the radiation monitor in the low pressure
service water (RIA-35) reached the alarm setpoint. At the time M the
alarm, LPI cooler B was in use and cooler A was isolated.
The plant
isolated the B cooler and brought A cooler on line. Radioactive
concentration in the Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) as measured by
RIA-35 increased significantly. At 6:30 p.m.
on July 4, 1979, it was
determined that a tube in the A cooler was leaking. The A cooler was
immediately isolated. The initial increase in activity in the LPSW
was caused by leakage passed an isolation valve. Analysis of samples
taken of LPSW indicated that apparently all activities were less than
the maximum permissible concentrations allowed by 10 CFR 20.
The LPSW
is a once through system and discharges to Lake Keowee after dilution
in the recirculating water system. Samples taken in the condenser
cooling water discharge indicated very low levels of radioactivity
present. The radioactivity levels returned to background levels on
July 11, 1979. The inspector had no further questions.
e.
On May 24, 1979, the laundry and hot shower tank (LHST) A was released
without prior sampling.
LHST B was sampled and was to be released.
However, the B pump was inoperative. A utility operator attempted to
line up the A pump to the B tank without benefit of a written proce-
dure. A misalignment was detected when a second operator was sent to
align the valves to flush the line. 2335 gallons were released to the
Keowee hydro tailrace. All activities in the unrestricted ,rea were
less than the maximum permissible concentrations allowed by 10 CFR 20.
The inspector reviewed the cortpctive action taken by the station in
1204
070
'
.
.
-6-
>
response to the incident. The inspector commented that the corrective
action did not address the training rnd qualification of the utility
operator who performed the initial valve line up.
The utility operator
is relatively new and during a review performed prior to signing the
operator qualification sheet, the utility operator could not demon-
strate that he had sufficient knowledge to line up the LHST for
sampling and analysis, yet he was given the task of performing the
valve line up to release the B tank. The inspector commented that
assigning an unqualified utility operator to perform the valve line up
contributed significantly to the incident.
The plant manager stated
that a formal qualification system has been developed and that all
currently qualified utility operators will complete the qualification
program prior to December 31, 1980. He further stated that only
qualified personnel would be assigned to perform task such as per-
forming valve line ups associated with the release of radioactive
liquid. The inspector stated that the qualification of utility
operators would be carried as an open item (269/287/79-20-03;
270/79-18-03) pending completion of the formal qualification program
for utility operators. Noncompliance items concerning this incident
were discussed in Region II Inspection Report 269/270/79-14;
287/79-15, dated July 17, 1979.
..
1204
071