ML19249B796

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Rept on SEP of Operating Facilities
ML19249B796
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 11/25/1977
From:
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:
Shared Package
ML19249B789 List:
References
NUDOCS 7909050371
Download: ML19249B796 (39)
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Text

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CFF:CE CF NUCLEAR REAC~CR REGLLATICN I

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SYSTEuATIC E'/aLUAT:CN CF CDERAT!NG 2AC:LITIES i

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!NTRCOUCTION T='

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The Office of Nuclea* Reactor Regulation (NRR) nas initiated a p

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prcgram for the systecatic evaluation of ccerating nuclear gewer E

f acili ti es. 1ce program, called Oe Syste-atic Evaluation 3r: gram

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(SEP), nas ce following cojectives:

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1.

Reasses: te safety margins Of :ne cesien and cceration of p, _

selected ol:er ::erating nuclear :cwer cl ants.

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Estaclisn dccumentation whicn snews hcw eacn c erating 21 an reviewed in the SE' ccmcares wi n curren criteria en s-

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signi ficant safety :cnsideratiens. and *nich provides a Oasis fer acce :ance of any decar ures from tese criteria.

3.

Provice ce ca:acility to make integra:ec and calanced cecisions wi n es:ect c any recuirec safety '

revements.

4 Icentify anc resclve significan safety ceficiencias early in :ne SEP, i f sucn ceficiencies exist.

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5.

Efficiently use availacle :ersennel and minimi e NRC and licensee resource recuire.ents to :erf:r, One SE?.

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Phase I of :ne program c:nsistec of developing ne process for systematic evaluation of :ertain cider operating react:rs and of estaclishing tne rescurce needs and schedules. Phase II consists of reviewing, within a h

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pericd of tnree years, eleven cicer cperating reactors. These react:rs c_

pr consist of the eight oldest facilities (excluding Indian ?cin: 1 and p

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Hum:cidt 3ay) and the remaining facilities having previsional :cerating E

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p licenses (PCLs), which will be converted :: full tern licenses (RLs) cy p--

this pr gram.

Ancther facility, Menticello Nuclear Generating Plant, g=

nas a previsional acerating license Out has teen excludec fr:m ?hase : I p.-.

of the SE? Decause one staff evalua-icn and AC2S review of ne Monticello jftt:.

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?CL-FTL conver',f on has been comol etec. Certain ma ters ala ed : tais ESE.

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l iicensing action are still pencing :efore me nearing card; hcwever, f

re'v are ex::ectec :: :e resolved in me near future, *nien aill per :i-l

nverting Cis ?CL := a TL.

The results of me SE? review will provice

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iEE an acequate safsty : asis for making a :ecision regarcing granting a ML.

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Therefore, conversion Of One remaining :CLs c il Oe an acjunct :: the SE?.

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The eleven react:rs :: se reviewec curing Phase :: Of SE? are listed in

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A::acreent 1.

Fellcwing :xcle:icn of tais three-year :r: gram, One i

NRC will evaluate the a::prepriateness of whether One program snculd ce

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extenced :: crer ::erating react:r facilities.

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T',e nee: for a :cre reutine sys ematic evaluation f :cerating f acili-f es 17.ne lign: Of Our en: (ncwlecge anc licensing :ractices has :een

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recogni:ed for s:ce time. On May 3,1375, ne Di rect:r, Division of Cc. rating React:rs, established a Task orce to deveic: a program plan

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for (1) evaluating licensed nuclear pcwer clants against curren:

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criteria, and (2) develocing a framework fr:m which backfitting I~~-

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. decisions can be evaluated considering all plant features relating y

to safety. The Task Forc.e was ccmcosed cf re:resentatives with a bread s:ectrum of technical bac.tgrounds. Re resentatives fr:m other D

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NRC Office and NRR Divisiens particicated in ce Task Force eff r bi..

and rovi:ed valuable incut.

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The Task Force : nciucec cat a systemati evaluation ;r gram is needed

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and recen: ended a concect for reviewing Operating react:rs. B.ey al so

{m-rec:c:1encee :na the staff take stets t: limi! the cotantial nuncer of facilities *na neec systematic review anc elimina a 2e n<.ed f:r future systemati: evaluati:ns. To i : clement rese rec:mmenca:icns, 7

NRR management initiated measures n assure that devi ations fr:m licensing requirements anc neir asis for acce :ance be Occuren ec in fu ure

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coerating license reviews.

In acciti:n, ali new licensing recuirements

<ni:n are icentified :y the Regulanry Recuirements Review C r:littee, (RRRC) to be acclicaole :: Ocerating f acilities are eing assessac for each of these f acilities and Me c:nclusiens cccumented as new recuire-Z.~.~

tents are acceted. 31ese do act':ns will insure na: in tne fut:.re

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cerating plants will nave a rec:r: Of me esui ts of the staf' view f all safe y issues Inc :Ma re -ec:r 4: 11 :e ::n:i ucus!/ ucca ac as.ew i ss:.es Ire i cen*i #iec y :ne s af #.

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n January 1977, the Ccr=1issian a: reved ne :bjectives and general

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approach of the pr0pcsed Systematic E'taluation Prcgram.

In approving Phase I cf the program, tne Cerr.11ssion requested the staff to provide

_._5 adcitional informatien regarding the sc ce of review and rescurce f.[-

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retuirements price to initiating any plant-specific review efforts.

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In March 1977 a Systematic Evaluation P gram (SE?) Review arcu y_.

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was established in :ne Division of Operating teact:rs :: ir.cl ement

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Phase : cf One :r: gram as accreved by the Commission /

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re:cris to =e Assistant :irecter for Ocerati:nai Tecnnciogy anc c nsists of seven full-time NRR professi:nals, One :1E professional,

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a Group Leader and a Secretarf. The folicwing activities asscciated

.vi*n Phase ! cf O e SEP have ':een ccmcie:ad:

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A :cerenensive Lis: Of SE? Tcci s of safety significance (hereaf ter m..,

ref erred 0 as the 70::10 List") nas teen cevel ec f:r use in ce y.=

systematic evalua-icn of c:erating react:r f acilities.

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cf :ne T pic List invcliec an evclutionarf pr: cess, starting 4it.1 all

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known :::ics Of safer / ::ncer1.

To:ics in varicus general catascries E

  • nica did nc need :: te : nsicered in :ne SE? were deleted.

~h e resul ting final 7 cpi List is provided as A::acnment 2.

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Memcrancum fr m Samuel Chilk ::.ee '/. C-c s si ck (SECY 75-Ea5),

SF "Commisticn Saicance on NRR Systema-i Evalua:i:n Or: gram f:r

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C:erating React:rs" (?:licy Sessi:n ::em), Januar/ 27, 1977.

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Definitions for each of :ne items on ce Tcci: List, includinc a statement of me safety sucstance, and a discussion of ne status

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of any ongoing work rela ad to the t;pic have been crecared.

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,t process for conducting plant.s ecific reviews including general IEt w.

criteria for ceternining design accectaoility has Oeen develo:ed.

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4 Rescurce requirements and associated schecules for implementing h.._

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SEP have been reassessed.

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~he imcact of the 5E? On c:Mer NRR programs and :n Other NRC SE2 Officas has been evalua ad.

The results of me :hase ; eff:r eere ; resin ac :: me -ecmissi:n :n Z-i Neveccer 9,1977. Tne Cc=mi ssion a:crevec ce program as presented

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and. directed tnat Phasa II, the review cf eleven 0:erating react:rs,

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be initi sted imedi ataly.

' I:. PC.CGRAM The Systa<:iatic Evaluation ?r: gram is basec :n a lis-ing af s:ecific areas :: be examinec (Tccic List) and en an in ecra ac review of "r!.m

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ce overall acili y of a plant t0 rescenc :: certain cesign basis g.g-events (challenges), including nortal : eration, *.ransients and

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cstul ate
acci dents. Tne review precedure will resul; in a

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reassessment of the overall safety margins at eacn facility and

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..:5 dec' mentation cf the reassessment on the basis of current criteria.

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Tyce of Tooics

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The Tocic Lis*. can be considered to consist of nree types of Ep...

00 pics. The first tvee consists of design basis events, i.e.,

transients, accidents and natural :hencmena, which 'ne plan

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r-shculo be acle :: aitnstar.d withcu exceecing sceci fied accectance p...

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Examoles of such cesign casis events are turoine trip,

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failures of hign energy iping lines, fires, seismic even 3, anc y.=::

ficccs. Tne sec:nd tvee consists of icentifiec potenti al f ailure

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recnani sms ai tnin safety-related systems ( e.g., steam generatcr-Es._

i ntegri ty ). Tne third tvoe is associa:ec'*itn activities to limit

$.2 he likelinced Of f ailure in safety-rela ed systems (e.g., equi: men:

teni Or tne : ncition of J.C. :cwer system su: lies).

.g.g The Tocic List ( Attacnment 2) was generatec in several steos.

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First, a listing of all kncwn and :reviously identifiec safety

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c:nsiderations nas :: coiled.

This included ger.eri: issues

( e.g., water hammer, fire Or ection), and 0:ner kncwn safety tcpics ( e.g., even:ressuri:ation Orctection). 'laricus NRC Cffices

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and Divisions were requestec :: identify any acci:icnal safety considerations and to suggest other review :: pics f:P inclusien dNE zw.-

in the Tcpic Li st.

(The Introduction to tne Tcpic List in

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Attacncent 2 identifies the source of the tecics and discusses the t

fp' evolution of the Li st). More than SCO tccics were c nsicered in i.

c Ce develoceent of the cric.inal list, wnica was created :y we n.

r-R. m si=cle aedition of all listings. This pr: cess, Of c:urse, led us L

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to icentify many items tna were duclicative in nature and, c:n '

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sequently, Omi ttec.

As a sec0nd ste;: in ceveicping a *Tcpic Lis ", ::cics not ner ally

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includec in -he review of light water rea,ctors anc ::cies ei ner C._

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relatec Oc resaaren and develeccen ;r grams cr :: we evel:: ment of analytical evaluation accels anc me=cc icgy ere enagerically celetec. Next, Octn :ncse ci:s wnica are beirg reviewec :n 3 periccic casi s in ac::rcance win curren cri. aria (e.;., fuel

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erfor
ance) and =csa tecnnical sucjects : at ;revi:usly nave Oeen reviewed and i clemented on :: era-ing reac Ors (e.g., 3',R Channel Scx :ntegri y) were also :negerically celetac. These grou;:s of tccics were celetec :ecause current 1RR practices alreacy a:cr:oristely address such issues, anc they have been 1:Orecriately ::nsicerec for

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coerating f acilities.

~i T'ne emaining :::ics.ere ar angec in ;r:u:s ::r es:croirg 0 =e cu:line :f me NRR 5 ancar R evi ew M an 'IR?}.

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we-e ; sac as.eaci ngs in =e 7 ci:.is-f:r =e :ur cse of :rgani:ing b

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tne cpics into the for nat of One SRP; newever, all titles sik

-2e themselves do not necessarily represent :.; pics for consiceration.

hh Folicwing :nis structuring of topics, a "cef fii:icn* was prepared

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for each cpic to ensure a cc= men understanding.

i ni s.ceri ni tion.

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incluced a statement of ne safer / ocjective and the curren status F=:

cf :ne review coic. The listing sc genera:ec was terned tne "T0cic I

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The final Taci: List has been reviewed by III Divisi:ns Of 1RR and :y

ne NRC Offices of :1E, $D, RES, anc ELJ. The T::ic List nus cevelcpec

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incluces general to;ics icentifiec by CCR staff rem ers for a systematic L.

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evaluatien, s;ecific safety c:nsidera:icns no: :revicusly consicered EA f

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generic i ssues, anc reviously identi fiec generi: issues fr:m ACKS cr c ner NRR generic issue lis s.

These ;revi:usly icentifiec gene-ic issues are eitner ancer investigation, :u; cnly rescivec on an intar m Oas:s g=:

( e.g., pressure-su:gressicr, 5'aR : ntat ment in ta;ri ty), or are :efinec as generic issues Out resen-ly no: :eing actively investiga:ec f:r :cerati facili ties (e.g., c:ntrol r cm ha:itacili ty).

Scme of :ne generic : pics are One sucjec Of ngoing :regrams anc will :e resolvec and inclementac ince:encently of SE? activities, :.e.,

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-esciution Of nese issues will nct :e ac::::lisnec as part Of ne SE?

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eff r. Mcwever, f:r ne :i ants wnicn are :ar: Of =e SE? effort,

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Oe ul,i~.d!a ::nCiusi:Es Of f aCi' # y eviiks #:r Ongei 7s ge*er#c

0CCar9s anc f ne IE? Will Oe :losaly i7 ag#atac,
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into an Overall NRC pcsition Oc imcreve ce effectiveness and efficiency of nese efforts and to linimize any imcact en licensees.

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In addition, the status and conclusions of all generic issues will

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ta molded into the final safety assessment for each plant.

==5-When the Topic List is a;olied to a specific lant, addi ti onal

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teoics will be deleted because (1) certain topics a: ply only to a s:ecific reac ce ty:e (e.g., SkR cr PNR) er design feature t.. ;.::-

(e.g., ice condenser ::ntai cent for ?%Rs) anc (:) seme neics E.

p have been previcusly rescived for a s:ecific 011n (e.g., Overnead Hancling Systems - Cranes).

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Safety Sicnificance of Tceics F.

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ine on g,.nal.

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iast.corce expected ma a1 rge num:er Or 0;1cs

uld be deleted generically, for ali reacurs On :ne Oasis Of

' lesser safety significance'. Be SE? ircu: i niti ally i:enti fied scme ::ci:s of 'iesser safety significance' for ali :: era:i.; :lin s; hcwever, i t became a:;arent ma: ce saf e.y signi ficance of :any

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cics is :iant ce:endent anc cnly a few :::ics : ul
e catager cally b

deleted from =e Tacic Lis :n mis tasis.

Early in ce plant scecific reviews Of Phase !!, ce ::ics will :e

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evaluated f:r saferf significance t0 Cat ;lant.

Curing this chase VE-it is ex:ectad Oat acciticnal

ics mi'
e deleted cn tne basis Of
  • lesser saf ety si gni ficance '.

Afte-1 #ew :1an -eviews have :een ini-3:ec, it may also :e f:unc =a: mere n:i:s can te :2:e;c 4:a'1y ele:ac ** '1 Ce gene-i Ui

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~~e 2a5'I f ' lesser Ia' Sty signi#i: arcs'.

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The

  • lesser safety significance will te evaluated on ce basis y

of the probacility of Occurrence of a given event and the nagnituce

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=.=. ::1 of the radiological consequences of such an event snculd it occur.

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'When the procacility or consequence of an event related to a particular 5

E topic is judged to be sufficiently small, the t0oic will not be D...

reviewed in detail and the basis for acce:: ability will be dccumented.

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For example, a mini :um review eff:rt will be recuired to deternine

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.e ce likelihced of an aircraft crasn at a remote site away frem E ir p

air;crts and flight paths. rigure i sacws gra:hically the relati:n-E shi: se ween :ne precability of :ccurrence anc =e resulting racio-

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logical c:nsequences with : mmenly acce::ed nresheids for bc.n.

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Tcpics related to events which have an ex:ected likelihcod Of

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.i Occurrence en ce order of 10 ~ to 10 per year cc, given te even:

F cccurs result in consecuences of :nly a small f action Of 10 CFR ?ar; 1C0 guicelines are considered :: be Of

  • lesser safety signi#icance*.

Exam les of ::ci s wnien were generically celeted on Me asis of

' lesser safe y significance' for ali Ocerating :lants folicw:

(1) Centainmen: Exterral Desien :ressure witn Res:ect t: Containmen-inacve-tent i:rav Ccera en Tne NRC normally reviews tne ::n.ainment functional design (SRP fi.2.1) for CF and CL a lications, inclucing c:nsideration i= E

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of external design :ressure.

a c:nservative s uctural cesign g.

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plan: protection system.and acmini strative centrol s are

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required to preclude inadvertent ::eration of ::ntair ent heat removal systems; or for steel containment vessels, Qf

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vacuum relief devices are provided in accordance with 55E

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applicable c de recuirements.

Inacvertent conninment r:.

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so-ay coeration results in :: cling of the containmen:

arcs:here and I wering its ressure if (a) ne inc:cing M

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containment s; ray liquid is colder ::an -he tuilding arcsoneric tem erature and (D) ne tuilcing is a closed vessel (no vacuum breakers and no ventilati:n sys em in i::.

c;erati on). Using conservative assume icns, One calculated

[=gg e:uilibrium containment pressure wculd be a: cut 3 ?si beTcw E

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n te cuiside air :ressare. newever, using realistic ini-ia,i c=

erating c:nditicns, the ci'ferenti al :ressure resul-ing N

frem inaever:en s: ray coera.i:n -cui c :e no mere : nan locut

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1.5 :si. C erat:r interventi:n anc/:r vacuum :reaker actuation

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wcui: recuce One :ressure cifferential even cre.

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Secause of ne inneren: ::ntainment streng:n resul-ine frem re:uirements :: Teet its internal :esign :ressure, it snculd

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1:ns and an external :ressure of at least a psi.

nus, it is i ;.:--.

r.c eX eC dd O f ail in "ne even* Of inac'/ertant scray 0 erati n M

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even uncer ::nse-vative :cstui atec ::ncitions.

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Hence, icgical technical arguments c:ucled with Oe very

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cssibility that a c:ntaineen: -culd be required

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to perform its safety function simul:3necusly with IEr.. -..

inadvertent s;: ray aceration, justifies deletion Of this E..

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cic for ccera. ting facilities en ce basis Of lesser safety

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significance.

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Inadvertent s: ay coeration wculd necessitate a reacter G..-

snut: wn and ::uid recuire ins:ecti:n, estiac, anc e: airs P._.

P Of c:mecnents and s uctures, i# nct acecua:aly desi:ned ::

E c

witnstand tne external pressure,. : assure taeir acceptacility L..

n_....

for ::ntinued cperatten.

inis *cul t have an unnecessary,

.z G undesiracl e i ::ac :n f acility acera-icn.

'heref:re, it is cru-i dent :: : ntinue :: review ni s :::ic f:r new facili y a :iitati:ns en a c:nserva-ive : asis :: assure :na: reas na:.e :reca.:icns

=

have teen taken :: ac::mccate inadverten s:-ay : era-i:n.

- z (2)
tacicactive Was es Svstems

~

3asec :n :as; c:erating ex:erience, inclucing ::nsiceraticn of system anc ::mecnen:,a t,t u re s, releases Of gasecus,

.... P liquid, Or solid radi: active aaste nave net excaeced iC CFR 7.~.'::.

Par: 20 T imi ts.

n aeditien, if - e -crs: :cssi:le f ailure
  1. ~

[.

Of any :f Oese sys ams aere :cstui a ed : :ccur, i: nas teen 1.

alcula ac =a: - e uu.an

=nse:ue cas cu : :: ex:ee:

.O 4.O3

..ON...O O

[

k

.s p

.O$.FS.4..

N.

4, 2

s

...O.

1,J aww g,,

( U U h U dia' di h l

t l

-g.....

ir been : nsicered Of

  • lesser safe y signi#icance' and 7

was deleted f c= :ne 70:ic Li st.

Tni s determination, e- -

E:-

hcwever, cces not coviata =e need to evaluate de W

design of these systems in new facilities.

a...

1.~.

If a topic is associated with an event ex:ected :: cc:ur mor=

r p

frequently than a: cut 10~' to 10" ::er year and wnica mav E'

.=

lL potentially result in consecuences greater can a small

++--

fractica of 10 CTP. Par: 100 guicelines, it is c:nsidered to

.I...G..

nave ?ctantial safety significance.

as 110i:ated 'n rigure 1,

  • nese guicelines are act defined :y well :elineatec Ocuncaries, Du instasd by
  • grey areas *, anere tne safety significance Of a y

e

=:.

topic has :: be deternined :n a case-by-casi: basis. Tne t

ceternination of wnetner a :ci: in mis

  • grey area" is safety signiff: ant involves ::nsidera-i:n :f :=er f ac :rs, sucn as =e 20e exam:le, if

=

egree of : nservatism in =e safety analysis.

an event is f:unc nave a f ecuency ;f c:ur tr.ca s cewnat higner : nan abcu: 1C

er year :v a vere c:nseriative.metnoc 1

-C

_.=

=

anche if =e : nsecuences ass ciatac wiu 09e event have been Oe:arnined :: be small :y a more realistic a:Or acn, men :ne tecic may be judged by Oe SEP :: be Cf lesser safery

1._

.u.~e.

5 i cni *i Cance *.

=

~t

.::. m

':..:L

..._p..

g,#*

3E 4'

. p'

i F

u. -..

-la-

[..

i P.

C.

Review Precedure The capability of a plant to res:cnc c selected design basis events will be the basis for assessing the safety acecuacy cf :ne

.. =..

=

ccerating facilities reevaluated. The selected design basis events

-=

are included in the Tecic Lis and consist of identified single pp t:

- events wnich can ;ctentially result in greater than routine L

releases of radicactive ma:ariai frem =e site.

Bis se: Of v _.-

cesign basis even s incluce:

(1) na,: ural ;nenc= era such as earecuakes, fires and G ccs anc (2) events resul-ing frem

_7 Ocstul atac pl ant transients, ac:icents anc f ai:ures sucn as turcine missiles and pipe treaks.

An :erating f acility will gyg be considered Oc be acecuately safe if it can be demonstrated

' =..

~

t

na: =e f acility will reliacly rescenc = all design casis events wi n 10 C. t Part 100 ;ui:elines valaes 70: :eing exceecec.

Safe:y :::ics remaining :n ce 7:0i: ' i s af a-ce remeval Of Oe design : asis events are of tac y;es, acse ua: affect ne likelinccc of Occurrence of an event anc Ocse ma; af fect te

=-

res;cnse f c e siant :: ne evaa: ( s me ::ci:s affect acc). Sc n t e likelibccd of te event anc :'e ;iant res: csr :: Oe even v il be censidered in making safety assessments. A s:ecific 01 ant

- =

evalua-i:n nill :e :erf r ed in :nc stees:

Cirs, eacn :esi;n basis even.ill :e evaluatec se:arately anc sec:ncly, an Overail :; an: safe y GT-'

assessment wi:1 :e ma:e ::nsiterinc ce :1 an; res:cnse : al' :esi;r

asis events.
  • Oi scuss :n Of te rac sta:s f :: >s.

YO MPE b d d h Ml i mil d /}h.

L TC

v,

=

- 1c.

i=

i:

t-

.
.m. :.

Ste: 1 31 ant systems and :neir functions wni:n res:end :: mi ti gate m-One consecuences of each cesign Dasis event will :e icentifiec.

.5.:n

=...

Next the saf ety issues from ce T:cic List wnich af fect each system r==

or system function will be identified. Tne rel ationshi beraeen a l{

cesign basis event and Oe systems Inc safety issues wnicn affect it are shcwn belcw.

l..

f.. -

r :.

Safety Issue 1 Sys em '

!af ety *.ssue 2 l

afe:v '.ssue 3 s

esign Basis System 2 Safety :ssue a g--

gyen )

Safe y *ssue 5

[N r _.

,i

.a ety.ssue :

I System 2 Iafety issue 7 i

Safe y :ssue 5

..=

n nis ciagram, Sys ems 1, Z anc 2 ire re:resan ative Of clin:

systems cesignec c res:cnc : Cesi gn Basi s Ever.: 1 (i.e., or tect

[b

.==

ce iant :r.ne :uolic or :c a).

Saf ety :ssues 1, I anc 2 are iTML saf ety issues frem =e T: ic is ani:n ;c entially affect ce ca::acili:y of System 1 Oc ;erf:rn its safety function. '.i k ewi sa

,-.=

Safery !ssues 3, a anc 5 Iffect System 2 inc Safety *.ssues 5, 7 u= =

and 3 affect Sys eq 3.

It sncui: :e acted Sa scce systems are 95-

= --

"-~

cesignec f:r rctecti:n #

m more tan :ne Ces ;n 3 asis Even; anc Oa s00e sa#e*y i ssues "an If f eC; nCre Can One sys!3m.

P00R DiMNAL sa

16 -

Consideration of tota plant systems and design basis events is P

censidered necessary to provide a :neaningful c:ntax: for resolving the safety issues, and :: provide a basis for assessing One effect p.

1 of the safety issues on overall plant safety. All ;lan: systems F.

which are imcortant to protecting the plant frca the design basis events will al so se identi fied. These systams aill :e :m:arec

[

v..

C':

witn similar systems required f:r current plants : ce: amine

=e extent of cif ferences.

s SR? criteria will :e usec as a cauce e de: amine ce ex an: Of y

confornance wi th curren: licensing criteria.

'f =e resul ts of

=..

=...

One review cf a given ::alc is :nat tne,01 ant :eets current requirements, t en i will :e :eemec :: :e satisf ac :ry anc will :e sc cecumentec.

If =e results cc nc: ree: :ur en requirements ( nica <e ex;:ect :: Often :e One case), :ne :egree or :evia ;an fr:m, current cri teria, as < ell as any viac e.

i

=

correc::ve measures, wi,;l :e ::cumentec for l ater c:nsi: era-

_5f-tien enen re :verail plant safety assessmen: (as cutlinec in Step 2) is mace.

When cevia-icas ' rem current 'icensing 10:rcacnes are iter.ti'ied, r

=?

=e f:ll: wing al ternatives r ::mcinaticns Of al ematives) will e c:nsi:erec as a :asi s #:r es.a:iisning acce::a::ili y:

1.

Tne :evia:1:n :a. :e.usti'iec is : sig #ica -ly :ecreasi g Or.e 14 vel Of safe 7y, i.e., - e F :a i'f:7 1.c :Onsecue*Ces Of eve.*3 are suf#icient'.y ':w.

,l

' i:,g s cn =

k._ @,p. t?lp4. ehidlj

(

p

.5

+

o-w.~, -

J H'

)

ta 1,,

f..

e.

2.

.Use of non-safety systems :: "erfora safety functicns.

]7' E

3.

Administrative or prececural :nanges :: ennance system

TR rel iabil i ty 7..=..

4.

Augmented surveillance programs gE r:

5.

Selected backfitting ta emance system reif ability E

An evaluation of relevant cperating ex;erience will also be inciuced in each ste; af nis ;r: cess, as 3;:re:riata.

inis p

r=.-

evaluatien will incluce a review of licensee ::erating anc if-L.___.

event re:cris for incications Of neeced :nanges :: reduce Me likelinced of system or ::m:enent f ailures. -av:ra le ::erating ex;erience will also be ::nsidered in assessing ceviations from f:f t...

. =.

current criteria wnere ac;r ;riate.

Tne elements of me ;ericdic I

~ ~ ~

(ten year) review rec:c.enced by One AGS wil' Oe i F.cluced f:P the I an*s reviewee curing ?hase I., Out sill Oe :arfer"ec anC OcCumen*ec in a "lanner :: su::Cr* Oe SE. reviiw ?r:Cass.

Eacn cesign basis event will :e evaluatec as escritec accve anc any ;ctential : rrective measures will :e cccumented f:r

nsiderati:n.nen :ne Overa'i :T ant saf e y as ses sment i s mace.

Ste: 2 After the preliminary assessmen Of eacn incividual design basis event as cutlinec in Ste: I is ::meletec, an Overall :1 an

$5 saf ety asses sment.,:,i :e race.

ne e-ect at. :Orr?c::ve easures icentifiec curing Ste: 1 f:r eacn incivi:ual even evalua ec sil'

~~1 c -

e.) 'i.j u

4 p..

g..

rr G.

g._.

DE

, t s..,;..

g..

be examined to determine the integrated effect of ne preli.minary i:E..

.hl s will pr0vice g.g assessment frca all other design basis events.

i

=

assurance that measures taken to assure an acce:tabie rescense to s

one event will not adversely affect the plant's res;cnse to scme cther event, that backfitting decisions can ba balancec decisions,

=

and tna :ne ecs: efficient a:pecacn :: any necessary plant u: grading Er is taken. Af ter :ctantial conflicts in sy :am functions have been b

p.

c.

icentified and resolved, One alternatives listec in Step 1 eill te ria --

nsicerec anc Overal1 in:agratac cecisi:ns :n Me ;lan: is.a 4ncie can ce race On Me a:propriate :Orrective action.

U The above :recacurs will previce a casis for maki*g balanced b'acxfi:

I decisiens Decause of te ;ers:ective gainec by ::nsicering al' identifiec i an ceficiencies an: ai;arnata ca:a:ili ties.

.3......

Oevia-icns frem current :riteria w;il :e eemec acce::a:1e f # re s.af' evaluation sccws -hat te ;I an: vill res: enc sa-i sf actorily :: all cesi;n basis events; i.e.

na ce pr:ca ility Of :esign : asis events are nc-signi'icantly nigner man for a facility 'icansac i ac::rcance.i a :;rren:

criteria anc the ecnsequences of :neir :ccur ence are ai hin :ne gui:eline values of 10 C'R Aar: ICO.

9

['

s.1 '

s / '

i F. -z._.

. =.

.,_=

The SE? review will e scmev hat cre lini:ad in sc::e can a complete c nstructi:

per nit (C?)/cceratino license (CL) review aased On the comolete set of licensing recuirements.

(Fer exanole, safety

?

relatec features which are '<newn tc have been designed to criteria ccm-p.

iw-paracle to those currently used will not be re-evaluatad.

Also scme r4 review will be dcne utili:inc on-site ins:ections, review cf coerating

,[

t, :..

ex:erience anc c:=:arisens of similar systems anc ::mcenents in lieu f:sf_

. r --

e =:

of de. ailed descri icns anc analyses re:uirec f:r a CP/CL review.).

M L..;

Cnly cri eria ela ec :: ne safety issues en ce ~ i: Lis: 1us Ocse tna. scecify systam functions and ;lant resecnse :: =e Oesign F- -

r ::.

' ill be cen.sideraoly Oasis events Will te exa:nined. Al.ncuen ce review

~

smaller in sc :e nan the current C? and CL, review, i will be sufficien-

~ ::.: :.

Oc ascertain wne=e

-Me f acility satisfies One e-eral Cesi:n Cri aria anc ::ner a::1ica le regul a; ions.

=:..

-=

. /.

-:- r: r :. g n.,

e. r u. e. t i.. c. m.. s_..: :.. r. y e

__w_

w.

NRR :nsiders Se Systematic Evaluati:n 3= gram Oc :e a si:nificant,

['I_.

imacrtant tasX and as sucn aill staf# i t act:rcingly.

3asec cn a i"""

c:nsi:eration of ne sc :e Of =e r:gra:n and n any :c:antial o

inter'erenca wita ::ner engcing ;r: grams, ne eleven reviews cf Phase !! are scneduled for c:ccle i:n wirin nree feers.

Tni s p.

.e.ee.

scnecule will enacle =e assignmen Of suf #icien anecaer in eacn I.T=

engineering tisci line.vi = cut signi #icantly i cacti g : er ~-i;n 7a e.,,,.:+:

c..,

, c.. e. s. - n..,.,.

w e4nea..

-,...a-.

.=,.

m....,,,.a,a.a a. 4 s

a a

2 w

w w

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w

w

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i ev ews.

h 4 l !b g bdIA_ f lf) k r -

'sc n kj

r.

,...... :.r...

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= =-

Licensee rescurce requirements will be minimi:ec and aill :e limitec l.jg

= _...

~

by a staff screening and evaluation of available decke:ad information

_j=i.f 2.'.~.7 :

price to requesting accitional informatien fr:m the litansee. To

iH assure that information requests are limitad
Oa: necessary for c:=pleting an SEP review, infomatien recuests will te ailcrec f:r i

each facili ty.

=

V.

SU W RY

7...

'The NRC ' as ceternined ca: ce Systematic Evaluati:n Fr gram is a g.;--

n niin :riori y task that shcul: Or:ceec e.t:eci ticusly f:r ce elever icenti fi ed :1cer : erating f acili-f es.

Inis ;r gram will :rovice:

-7

a. A reassessm.ent of Oe overall safe:f nargins at eacn f acili y.
3. A rational 3 asis for ::m:ariscn ni:n current licensing cri: aria, U~

anc a : asis for acca::ing :evia: ices Om curren: c ri :a ri a.

c. A means Of icen:ifying sys: ems interacti:ns ir a mancer
c:ati le ni n tne generic evalua-icn Of systam intaraction
eing :erf:rtec in ce NRR Tecnnical Activities ?recram,
d. An integra:ac anC alanCad a :reaCn :: Oackfi: ::nsi: ra icas as F.eces sa ry.
e. Cem renensive cccumentatica ani:n accr?sses :ne icentifisc v.=

safety issues, wi= cut ped:rning a ccm:lete C?/CL *y e review Of eacn :1 ant.

me eu a

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Ortscen 1 C9/23/59 IC/14/50 2.

Yanxes hwe 07/09/50 C5/22/51

. l."

Big Rect 3:i n C8/20/52 CE/01/54 r--

San Cncfre 1 02/27/57 li.

Cenn Yankee C6/20/57 12/27/74 La Cr:ssa 37iC2/57

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9

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CL,,e t Or ;i alif :r :: sac '.;.r

?v e. :;ri ; :Mase...

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d d

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,. 4 $

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LR_.73 5r/ e r.d.
  • e*

a IL

.w

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(10/11/77) x

!n recucticn

=

Tnis cecorenensive Tocic Lis previces the basis for One systamatic

1'..

evaluatien of ccerating reacters. Tne Topic Li s was cerivec fr:m

ne follcwing listings cf items:

(1)

ISAR-254: Technical Safe *:y Activities Re:crt, 055 u:cate, 254 ftems, F

.,ec ecce r 19,s.

L eme Eisennu: c 5:ello (2/15/77) - Pri:riti:a-icn of (2) Enci 3-224:

v NRR Technical Generic Activities, 32". i ems (3) 7 L-113:

Tasx cree Re;cr n ce Sys e-a-ic Evaluation :f Ocerating lucl ear. : wer Pl ants, accencit 3, Noveccer 1975,

m.

11S items 1

(1) 007-1 C ^ :

Lis f 102 i e-s :recarec :y CCR in "aren 1977 The 3:cve lists ere c:mcilec anc organi:ec in ne gereral f:r a: Of the 3:ancard Review Pl an (SRP) w1 n res ec c c.acter i denti'ica:icn.

F0llcwing the cemeflati:n and Organi:atien of - e 2:cve listec items,

=s a culling :rececure aas initiated. "any ::igs ~ere cate;crically removec ' rem One list :asec cn the f:llcwing cri aria:

...,. eea.#..r=

a'....d-

... a.

i_.-e 3.

u. v...

e.i g.4...

2........

3 s s.~ ~. *.. '. :. *. v '. =.w

( =..,.,

.~~.i.---C...=..=".

..-".iR,'_"==.R,..'.-

~

2.

sncre :lants, Resear:n anc Tes: Reacters an: unlicensac facili-ies).

2.

Resear:n and :evel::cen: Or: grams in r:gress (e.g. evalua::en :f accustic emissi:n and ::ner advance: NCE ac ni:ues) 3.

Refinement f evalua-icn ecnni:ues (includes :e=ccel:qy anc ca.a c:llecti:n :: ernance s aff :a:a:ili-ies Ou Oces c-

.. =... r e. 3.

...a.. c.=.-.. e s i -. ',.

e...,..3 y 3 : <. w...

u...

43 1

Suggestec :::i:s anich -ere ::c general (e.g. review ;eclogy) anc nen-safety relatec issues.

mew.e..

. t., i. w.3. '. a n s 4

. a. i. s n i..n.'. a. " s ". i. s.-

a.. s i.. a a. '.., *u. '.-

.c. va.. '...i=.~..a."...'.,*

2.

n.ew f acili-i ss.

7 T::d:s <ri:n u.ve :een eviewec arc i:; : riita / i : e-e

  • c.

.. v.,w, 4_

4.c4..

. a. s. s :.

. u.-..., ~...

.. 4

........2.

...4..,..

4...,.

+

...... 3 :..,

._,;2....c..

..........,=...e.,

-e

,e,

.4.,.

...c.

..-.,4..,

<,...,..,..7,

,,y.

b s

,j j,

Q

i

.=

-c-l

- :.a '
10. Cccoination of similar :::ics in :ne Ore: ara-icn :f ::cic

.?

1

~

I defi ni ti ens.

211 i

m_..

This Tcpic Lis; includes generic issues :resently unter review, these 5

i for which there is an interim NRC Ocsition, and generic issues nct 65E

eing actively investiga:ec. These ::cics have :een icentified by an
  • i n the l e f t ma rgi n.-

Tney are ret.ainec cn the list for SE?

felicwu: and a:crecriate evaluation and integra:icn in:c :1 ant s:ecific reviews but SEP will no: De rescensi:le fcr develcceent Of L

csitions en generic issues. Generic issues wni
P involve 1cng i..

te m research anc ceveletren: Or:grans have nct teen inciucec cn tac T:ci c '.i st.

Fi gure i ;ra:nically dis: lays tre evolu-icn :f J.e Cercrecensive Tccic F

List.

4 y

7...-.

.=:

  • bU.h'

..:.. z h

""; C :-

s = $,w= *, y

  • )

... i.

_.7 f.

aJ '

s

~, <

g i d.'.

/Cs' "~..~.N r..e e. r..' m e-. i. ;;,

NC'I: " A" re::rese.. :

M=

generic ::cies at:c

  • 3* re::rtsents

=

ci:s whi:h must be ::nsice.~.c :y t.

.er.

p ::.

SCC -

i..

i s.

M

%.e.eeee.-

M l

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9

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  • f. *.T.bu'.

eIt engg (".O.

47

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..F L...

i l

g..

=w d

r.J K.

C

=

n._2...

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=

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6

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s A.

.=.

M

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,,,4.

' = ~ ~ ~ * * '

~., ;.=.;

94 '

1, y,.

Li

I s.u...

II SITE CHARAC~_.;:57:C5 II-1 Site 3

N. ' :.-" "

A.

Exclusion Area AuOcciT/ and Centrol ri~.?

3.

Peculati:n Di stribution f.

C.

Pctential Hazards or Changes in ?ctantial Ha: arcs O_~..

Due to Trans:cetation, Institutional, Industrial, and Militarf Facili ti es t:

II-2 Metecrclecy

'[~~ ~

I --

A.

Severe Weac er Shercrena r=..,

'3.

Onsi te 5'etec-01:gi:11 "easurecents ?- grim C.

A -.cs:heric Trans:cr inc Di#fusien Characteristics f0r

~

Acci0ents Analysis

.: =

0.

Availability of Metacrol:gical Cata in ce Ccntr:1 Recm t.'=.

r

-I Hverciccy a.

Mycroicgic Cescri::icn 3.

leccing :o ential anc ?r : action Recuiraren s

..a:acili y Or. e-ati ne -. an-a. ce i--

-i

esign Basis 21cecicg C:nci: ices C.

Saf e y-rel atac Water Sueciy ('J1 -.,a a Hea-5: < ('.'HS))

==

' Generic issues ancer review.

C20:-FE'IT 2 I kun L;dibliddl

J., a

I E

2 T..

II A Geolocy and Seismolcev Q.

'A.

Tectonic Province

[_].

3.

Fraxinity of Cacable Tectonic Stractures in Plan:

Vicinit/

C.

Historical Seis=1cirf within 200 Miies of P1an:

D.

Stacility of Sleces E.

Dam Integri y F.

Settlement of Fcunca icns anc Suried Ecui:nen:

p e..=

e.eeme...

" Generic issues uncer review.

CC: "ENT I

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!!!-l Classifica:icn of Str;c*ures, C:reenents and Systems 2.y t5eismic anc Cual1:vi

. _=:-

' ' ' ' ". ~.

III-2 'lind and Tornade Loadines FE-;..

. - - = - - -

!!:-3 Hydr dynamic L0 ads I, -

A.

Effects of Hign '4atar Level en Structures 3.

Str;c ural anc Ct.ter Consecuences (e.g. Ficccing of Safety-p.

Reiated E:ui; ment in 3asements' cf r ilure f Uncerdrain i....

a Systects

[]

=:=:

p C.

Insertice 'ns:ecti:n of Water Centrei Str;ctures C..

J.

Mi ssile 'ieners t en anc :-: ect' en ior acc Mi ssi,ies f.i...

3.

Turcine Missiles

s--

oR-O.

Internally Generated Missiles

,=.

U :.T:

D.

g;.te.reximi y w. ssi s (..ncl udi ng 41 rcra rts, te e---.

-5 E-[sl ua ti cn of ? i
e B re a'< s
.J M.

Ef fects of Pi:e 3reak :n S ructures, Sys sms and Com:enents nsi te "cntai n. ment

=_

'S.

Pi pe 3reat Cutsi ce Ocntainc.en:

E[

  • ~...
-c Seismic Desi
  • n C:nside-i-icns f

I 7..

'Gere-i: i ssues unce-evi ew.

CC:-FENT 2 7.

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II-7 Catecerv '. Structures Intecri ty r--.

=

'A.

Inserdce Ins:ection, Includinc Prestressed :ncre:2 Centainments witn Eitner 'Ircuted er Uncreuted Tencens

?=L.

  • B.

Design Codes, Cesign Cri teria, Lead Cemeinati:ns, and

y1 Reacter Cavit1 Desic.n Cri teria t....

C.

Delamination of Prestressed Ocncreta Centairrent Strxtures t: -

r-O.

Centainment Structural !ntegrity Tests L

I:I-3 Reae::r '/essel Internals Intee.i:v

'A.

L:cse Parts Mcnitoring ar d Core Sarrel 'libratien "cnit: ring h-

  • S.

C:ntr:1 R:c Crive "echani sm *ntecri y C.

'craciation Damage, Use of Sensi-i ec 5 ainlass Steel and r ti:ue Resistance a -

r..

=:-

  • 0.

Core Succarts and fuel Integrity

{-

-=

'I!!-9 Sucecr. Intecrity

'.-10 :2mos anc 'laives :ntecri v A.

Tner-'al-Overicac :r::ection for "c ces c " :r-3 c era ac 'laives Q

i

.n

_,ywnee,.. tegr1 y

. rum:

'C.

Surveill ance Recuirements :n :'aR Reci cul ati:n := s km..

~

and Jisenarge 'laives E.E

-il C
meenen
  • .n scri v
-12 Envi rcemental Cuali ficatien f Saf e v Rel atec E:ui: men:

ie.e..

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'Generi c i s sues unce'* evi ew.

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t' 1

l IV RE.1CTOR i

l IV-1 Themal Hvdraulic Cesien and Derfemance 5xi.

'A.

Operatien With Less Than All Lcces In Service c2...

IV-2 Reactivi*y Centrol Systems Includine Functicnal Oesien and f~

Protection A;ains: 51ncle Failures i-i It'"

IV-3 3W Jet Pu::es Oce-stine Indica:icns

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'h neri: issues uncer review.

A CIC:-MENT 2 e"~ 5

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48.J '

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o 1

y ae c.ita... i...y. ev.e r.y 139

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'V -1 Cameliance with Ceces anc Stancarts (1C CFR 50.55a) l~-

'V-2 Acclicaole Code Cases

  • V-3

~0vercressuri:atien 3retecticn

  • V 4 Picine and Safe End Intecrity V-5 Reactor Cecian: Pressure 3cundare IRCPS) Leakane.

Detec:1cn

[

'V-6 Reac:Or Vessel Intecri v

_e

'V -7 Reac er Cecian: Dum: Overs:eed

'V-a Steam Generater (SG) Intecri v

'i-9 React:r C:re :s01ati:n Ceci'ne 5estam (3kR)

V-10 Residual Heat Removal (RHR1 Sys em

,, at - xchanc.er. uce.- ail ures ne

, h,n A.

s W

'3.

RhR Reliability

~

V-il Hien :-assure /Lew :-essure :- e # ace

'A.

Recuirements for Isola:icn of Hi;n and L:w essure Systems 3.

RER *.n erlecx Recuirements 1-12 React:r Watar Cleanu Sys am f5kR)

A.

Wa er ?uri ty of Sciling Water React:r *imarf C cl an

'V-13 Water Harrer

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'Generi: i ssues uncer revi ew.

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.. u V:-l Organic Materials and Pest Accident Chemistry

mar._.

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V!-2 Centaineent Functienal Desien

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'A.

Pressure-Suppression Type %R Containments

'3.

Subcec:arcen Analysis

'C.

Ice Ccncenser Containmen:

[;

'O.

Mass and Energy :elease for ?:ssible Pi;e 3reak :nsi:e Ccntai nment 7

'V -3 Centaf-ment ?-essure and Heat Remeval Cacati11_~

'/ : 4 Contai men- ! sci stion Svstem

/ I - 5 Comeustible Gas Centrol gf. -

mm:.

  • 'l l -6 Contai-ment Leak Testin

==.:.:

'I - 7 Emergency Core Ceci' e Svstem A.

Emerger.cy Ccre Cccling Systea ?erfor ance a : un-for :ncreasec 1.

ECC3 Re-evalua-icn ::

c

'lessel Head Tem erature

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AUAC:-MENT 2 EE.-

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2.

' Japer 31enum Injecticn

- +

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3.

ECCS Actuation System

= =.

'4 Core Spray No::le Effectiveness

. f-f 3.

ESF Swit:never frem :njection to Recirculatica "cce

( Aut matic ECCS Realignment) i.

r ilure Critarien and Re uire ents for

Lccking Cut Sewer to 'lalves Including Incecencence of Intericcks en E~CS Valves I:......

"~

1.

A::encix < - Electrical :ns: urentati:n and Con r:1 (E C) Re-reviews

. - a;. l u re uOce.na.ysis

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c

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.i.2...

n 3t. e :. e.... 44 7<g i.,,,. r o.

,' u ri ng a,.C. O n...rer,.: mance r

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e.:., -,i cc ci n c J.

,0nc ier i 60ci:nc. - Passive -ai,iures w

of xecuncant wom:cnents)

...... =.s. '.e.r Re d.,."'\\.2.4.s, " ca

. e..

. e c.u.'. '. a. s i. : a.

Effec *iVeness

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C00.nJ I a :Or Isol a*.i ca 'lil ves ? ws r d.*c ~0n tr^l Sy s ".2"'

E.

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,.esign v!.8 C:ntr:1 'ece Maci aci'i v e.

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VI-9 Main.~ team ! sci ation A.

Main Steam Line !solatien Seal Systen - SWR

. =... _

m::;

VI-10 Selected Encineered Safe v Featuras (ESF) As:ects l5. 9.5 A.

Testing of Reactcr Wip System and Engineered Safety Features Including Rescense Time

{J Testi ng g

t:

3.

Shared Engineered Safe y features, Cn-site Emergency ? wer, F.

IJ ficil i ti es and Seavice Systems f0r Mul-i ie Unit

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A.

!sclation cf React:r Protection System from Ncn-safety h

Systes.s, including Qualifications of !sclati:n evices

+;-r -

r J.

Tri; Uncertainty and Set:oint Analysis Review of ^ erz-ing f.I Cata 3ase

'~

t Y!I-2 Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Svstem Centrcl L:ci and Oesien i-t' V:*-3 Svstems Recuired for Safe 55utacwn f

I

'V*I-4 Effects of ~ailure in '!cn-safe:v Relatap _ Systems On Selected Encineerec 5a'e v eatures

'VI!-5 Instruments for "cnit:ri c taci atien and :-ecess

'< aria ies 2arinc a :1:ents c

'VII-6 Crecuency Decay Y!I-7 ac:ectacility of Swinc Bus Desi:n en SW~ 1 Plants u.-..

  • ~;".T" A

P v

4.';

'GerePiC issues unde" revisw.

1 ~~ 1 C'. ' E.'i' 2

i.

11 t=. :

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r.i.e. %.

c :.

r- -

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VIII-l Of# site Dewer Svstems

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'A, Potential E:ui;: ment :aflures Asscciated witn a Degraced ME Grid Voltage h-:_

h

'Y!!*-2 Cnsite E.ercency Pcwer Svstems - Diesel "enerat:r j'

r:

VIII-2 E.mer:ency DC 2 wer Systems l".

'A.

Statien Battery Ca:acity Test secuireme.es p',

[.

t_..

p: - ;

3.

CC Pcwer S,vstem Sus Voi.ac.e "cni crinc. and E. _ _x..

Annunci ati:n

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  • y.. ?.. ; : i.,.
4. w.21 2.... 3
4. w.,. s... q., C..... n. 3 5...,...

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  • t ' X *. t..* A k v..y C.7..u.t w

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".rInes

' ~Z~

  • X-2 5tati:n Iervice Inc C:clice 4 e-Svstens

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IX a 3cecn Acci-ion S< stem

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IX-5 Ventil ation Sys ems

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  • ieneri: i ssues ancer review.
  • DC:-PENT 2
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12 X

IUX:L:ARY ::ECWATER SYSTEM

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?:r:

XI RADICACTI'/E WASTE MANAGEMENT

=. =.

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XI-l Accendix I t-

  • XI-Z Radiciccical (Effluent' and Process) Meni t:rinc Systems f.

tt_.

r..

b

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C:

(Section en RACIAT*CN :RCTECT:CN :n:er,:icnally Lef 31 ank }

.(,..

s, i... 1 g X '.I-1 Concuct of "cerati ns

'U:!-2 Safecua?cs/Incustri ai Securi ty r

.we

e..z.190
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11 uun udlGiWra.

1, XV ACCICENTS AhD M ANS:EMTS XV-1 Decrease in :eecwater Teme usture, :ncrease in Feeo.ater Flcw. increase in 5 team Ficw anc inacver ant Coenanc or

- = -

a 5.eam C:enera:ce <.eiter or dare y taive

.2._..

r ilures Inside and

[{.

XV-2 Scectma of Steam Svstem ?icine a

Cuts 1ce of Containmen: (?WR)

.6 XY-3 Less of External Lead. Turoine Tric. Less of Cendenser P

I-

' Vacuum. Cicsure or Mai n 5:eam isci a:1:n daive (sWA'.

I:k anc S eam ? es:sure Reculat:r atiure (C. sec) k_

is---

XV 1 Less of 'Icn-Emer:ency A-C 3 we*

0 the S ati:n F...

0 Aux 1;: artes F

XV-5 L:ss of 1c cal reecwa er 01:w XV-d fee w1*.er Sys e9 3':e 3rea=E r

XV-6 C:ntni Red Misc:erati:n (System "al' unction Or u.,,. 2... :)

-(,. :

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w... ~, w..4..s
i..c

, r w a.

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a 3d ' *

'i'*: e r a tu re, a.nc 2lew Or *.rO i i e r

. C:r"?C*

vai"unc- :n Caus1cc an ;ncrease in iaA :::E 2'_h v l'uncti:n M"'e.....

XV-10 Chemi cal anc volume antrol Svstem a

.na-iesui s in a Oecrease in ne scron ::ncer.-

r.a len 1 n.ne Reac :r C:c i an: hAi P

1^..

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.. 46 l_] **.?

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'XV-il I*adverten: L adiac and C: era'i:9 Of a fuei 1 557mIV in an i Or cer ?:st:1cn XV-12 Scectrum of Red Eiecticn A :idents (3'421 XV-12 Seectrum cf Red Dree accidents (3WR)

XV-la Inadverten: 0:eratien of EC*S and Chemical and Volume Centroi System Mal func: cn ina

ncreases Reac
Or Ccolan: Inven:c ry t

XV-15 Inadverten: Ccenine cf a 3'4R Rressurizer Sa#ert/ Relief valve or a 3 R ia e:v/Reiter talve XV-16 Racic1ccical C:nsecuences of r ilure of 5,ra11 Li es a

Carry 1nc P rimary Ccci ant :uts1:e :en atcrent XV-17 Raciclegical C nsecuences Of Steam Gene:::r Tute

atiure

.3 4R) r ilure XV-13 Radiciecical Consecuen.cas Of "ain 5 eam Line a

Cu:31:e C:ntairren is R)

XV-19 L:ss-of-C cTan: accidents Resultinc f em Scectrum Of Pas uia ac ?tein: area <s A1:m:n ce Reac::r C cian:

  • - ~

Pressure Scuncarr XV-ZC Radi:1ccical cesecuences of ruel Camacim: a :4 :ects c

(insice anc ;utst ee : ntal men ;

  • 1'l-21 Scent.uel Cask Cr:0 a :icents c

'1V-22 Antici:a ed Transients Witncu: Scram XV-22 Yul-itle Tu:e 'ailures in Steam Gene-aters

'XV-Za L:ss f all a-C ? wer

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?E3ATIONAL CA ORCGRAM

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