ML19249B788
| ML19249B788 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck, Millstone File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Grasso E CONNECTICUT, STATE OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19249B789 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909050357 | |
| Download: ML19249B788 (4) | |
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UNITED iTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (dfa p A
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 August 10, 1979 OFFICE OF THE CH AI RM AN Docket Nos 50-213 245 o
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The Honorable Ella Grasso E
Governor of Connecticut
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Hartford, Conr.ecticut 06115
Dear Governor Grasso:
As pralised in my May 11, 1979 letter, I am providing a more detailed response to your May 7,1979 letter requesting infomation about the nuclear pcwer plants in Connecticut. First, let me assure you that I and the other Commissioners and the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are endeavoring to take all necessary and appropriate T
acticns to assure that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the operation of any nuclear power facility. This, of course, is the basic charter cf the NRC. We are keenly aware of our resper.sibility to assure that other operating nuclear plants are ade-quately protected frm the causes of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident. You may be assured that we are conducting a thorough review of this and other recent events experienced at operating nuclear power plants.
Folicwing the TMI-2 accident, we inmediately initiated a review of the
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cther coerating plants, starting with the facilities designed by the same manufacturer as iiiI-2 (Babcock & Wilcox), next 1ccking at the same reactor type, ?ressurizer Water Reactors, designed by other marufacturers and finally the Boiling Water Reactors.
The reviews were initiated by a series cf bulletins issued to all nuclear pcwer facility 'icensees sich identified actions to be taken by the licensees.
The reactor type, designer and status of the nuclear power plants located in Connecticut are identified be ow.
PLANT UPE DESIGNER STATUS Millstone Unit 1 BWR General Electric Resumed Operation on June 27, 1979 Foli cwi ng Refueling / Maintenance Outage Millstone Unit 2 PWR Combustion Engineering Resumed Ooeration en May 13, 1979 go600L i
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The Honorable Ella Grasso PLANI TYPE DESIGNER STATUS Millstone Unit 3 PWR Wes tinghouse Under Construction Connecticut Yankee PWR Westinghouse Operating (Haddam Neck)
Millstone Units 1 and 2 completed their refueling / maintenance outages and were returned to operation on June 27 and May 18, 1979, respectively.
Haddam Neck has been operating at full power since March,1979.
Entiosed is a discussion of the results of our reviews of the above facilities and responses to ycur s;ecific inquiries.
With respect to Millstone Unit 3, the Construction Permit, CPPR-il3, was issued on August 9,1974.
Construction was estimated to be about 25%
complete in May 1979.
The lacest available information indicated that
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the apolicant will tender its application for an Operating License in the Spring of 1983 to support fuel loading in December 1985.
The major emphasis of the current staff effort is focused on nuclear oower plants that presently have cperating licenses.
However, tne results of the staff's investigations will also be applied to plants that are currently under construction and clants for which construction permits have been applied for but not yet issued.
Therefore, before Millstone Unit 3 begins operation, consideration will have been given to the lessons learned from TMI-2.
I wholeheartedly endorse your views en candor and openness in nuclear power development in this country. We at NRC are, of course, not involved in the development of nuclear power, but rather with its regulation.
The NRC has striven to be as open as any gover1nment agency.
The entire licensing process recuires, and is designed to require, the openness you espouse.
No complex technology can be entirely problem-free, and surely the problems of nuclear power have, especially lately, been widely discussed.
The NRC is cornitted to continue to address tnese problems, and will continue with whatever efforts are necessary to imorove the safety record of nuclear power in this country.
As the enclosed responses to your cuestions indicate, we are dedicated to assuring that nuclear pcwer facilities in this country are operated without undue rick to the health and safety of the public; however, it must be recognized thac it is not possible to anticipate all future n.
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The Honorable Ella Grasso problems that could occur.
You have my assurance that I am personally satisfied that the nuclear facilities in your Sta:e, as in all other States, are determined by the t egulatory process ';o be safe before they are permitted to operate or return to operation following a shutdown.
I trust this is responsive to your concerns.
Sincerely, t
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( CO dosephM.Hendrie
_d Ciairman Enclosurr'.
Responses to Inquiry of Goverior Grasso n.
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-ye RESPONSES TO INCUIRY OF GOVERNCR GRASSO 1.
Assurances that actions to be taken by licensees under order of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Infomation and Enforcement Bulletins 79-06,79-06A, 79-06B and 79-08 have been fully implemented by the licensee of the two plants in question.
RESPONSE
f IE Bulletin 79-06B, applicable to Millstone Unit 2, was sent to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) on April 14, 1979.
By letter dated April 24, 1979, NNECO responded to the Bulletin for Millstone Unit 2.
Based on their response, subsequent discussions
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with NNECO, and infomation supolementing their original response, we have concluded that the requirements of the Bulletin have been satisfied (Staff Safety Evalution attached). Onsite inspection of the implementation of applicable Bulletin immediate action i! tens was completec prior to startup of the facility on May 12,1979.
With regard to Millstone Unit 1, IE Bulletin 79-08 wa; sent to 'WECO cn April la, 1979.
~he Bulletin specified the actions. to be taken by BWR licensees tc ad an accident similar to that which occurred at TI-2 cn March M,1979.
By letter dated April 24,1979, NNECO res:cnded to the Bulletin for Millstone Unit 1.
It should be noted tnat the potential for cccurrence of an incident simila'r to the TMI-2 incident at illstone Unit 1 is greatly reduced by the basic design of the pl ant. Millstone Unit 1 is a BWR, whereas TMI-2 is a P'4R with once-tnrough steam generators.
We nave evaluated one NNECO resocnse to IE Bulletin 79-08 and the infoma..un orovided to the licensee by the reactor vendor (the General Electric Ccmeany) for use in responding to the Bulletim We conclude tnat the licensee has correctly intercreted IE Bulletin No. 79-08.
In addition, we conclude that the actions taken by the ~ licensee denon-strate an understanding of the concerns arising frr. the TMI-2 accident in reviewing their implications on Millstone Unit I crerations, and crevide added assurance for the prote: tion Of the public health and safety during plant oceration.
A Safety Evaluation Report documenting cur evaluation cf Millstone Unit 1 is expected to be published in August 1979, at which time a copy will be forwarded to you.
Our review and inspection of procedure modifications that have been con-pleted at Millstone Unit I was completed prior to returning; the facility to operation.
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_i-Based on the above, we are satisfied that the licensee of Millstone Units 1 and 2 has previded satisfactory responses to the Bulletins related to the-TMI-2 accident to assure that they may be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
Connecticut Yankee Atemic Power Company (CYAPCO) responded to IE Bulletin 79-06A and Rev. I thereto by letter dated April 24, 1979.
Af ter reviewing their response, a meeting was held with representa-tives from CYAPC0 on May 11, 1979.
Clarifications of our require-ments and of their responses were obtained from the sneeting and supplemental information was provided by CYAPC0 letters cated May 14, 18 and 31 and June 26, 1979.
Based upon the information supplied by CYAPCO, we nave concluced that they have complied with the requirements and guidelines of IE Bulletin 79-06A, which gives additional protection to tne health and safety of the public.
We expect to issue our evaluation in about one month. We will send you a copy of our final Safety Evaluation of the CYAPCO response to the Bulletin when it is completed.
Our Inspection and Enforcement Regicn I staff wl..
prov de yo ;r staff with information about Millstone 3 when it is avatilasse.
2.
Information concerning other directives or recommendatians from the NRC, or frce the reactor and ecuipment manufacturers, r egarding tne safe operation of these units; in addition, your opinion as to whether these directives cr recommendations have been f oilowed.
RESPONSE
We have discussec the directives or recormendations from reactor manufacturers to NNECO regarding the safe operation of these units.
These recc nendations are of two types.
One type concerns those reccomendations to assist the utility in resoonse to the Bulletin and the other concerns longer-term recommendations of possible improvements to provide adced assurance for safety.
The first type of recommendations are reflected in tne NNF.C0 rescanse to tne Bulletin and thus have been evaluated by tne staff.
Tne others are uncer evaluation by the NNECO for possible future design changes which will be submitted for staff review if the determination is made that such changes are cesirable.
Most of tnese potential changes are part of the overall ongoing staff evaluation of the lessons learned from tne TMI-2 incident. The results of our evaluations may require such design cnanges as recommended by the vendors to NNECO. Examples of design changes being preposed by reactor vendcrs and licensees include such items as:
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Modification of the reactor protection system logic to actuate safety injection solely on low pressurizer pressure.
2.
Modification of the Containment Isolation logic such that a safety injection signal will initiate isolation of non-essential systems.
3.
Modification to permit reactor coolant pump operation with a coincident safety injection and/or containment isolation signal.
During the first seven months of 1979, additional IE Bulletins, copies attached, have been transmitted to the licensees of all nuclear power facilities with an operating license or construction pe rmi t.
All of these issues identified in the attached Bulletins are being actively evaluated.
For Millstone Units 1 and 2 the applicable issues identified prior to the end of their recent refueling outages were resolved to our satisfactiun prior to startup from the outages.
The applicable issues, with the exception of Bulletin 79-01, are being resolved for Haddam Neck on an expedited basis.
Bulletin No. 79-01 will be resolved in the Systematic Evaluation Program for Haddam Neck.
IE Bulletin No. 79-05 was omitted because it is applicable only to facilities designed by Babcock & Wilcox (S&W). There are no C&W designed operating nuclear facilities in Connecticut.
3.
Knowledge of other actions the Nuclear Regulatory Cammission anticipates taking concerning nuclear plant operations, equipment and training programs as a result of the Three Mile Island accident and other nuclear incidents.
RESPONSE
Other NRC actions as a result of the accident at TMI-2 include the following:
1.
Preparation of a report applicable primarily to Babcock &
Wilcox plants discussing ways tu improve the response of these plants to incidents similar to the events at TMI-2. A copy of this report, NUREG-0560, recommending changes in procedures, equipment, and operator training, is attached.
2.
Preparation of reports similar to that described above but applicable to Westingnouse and Combustion Engineering plants.
These reports are expected to be available in September 1979.
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Initiation of a longer term study to assess the Tessons learned from the events at ~I-2 to identify any indicated changes in NRC licensing requir..nts and to the licensing process ideif.
A Task Force directed by a Division Director has been established to implement this effort.
4.
Preparation vf a report covering recommended changes in NRC requirements and guidance to licensees for qualification of nuclear reactor operato. I and licensee practices for operator training and testing. This report is before the Cormission for consideration.
5.
Ontinuation of the investigation of the TMr-2 accident.
This i, vestigation may provide further input to other tasks listed herein.
!n addition to this staff effort, the Commission ihas institu:ed a Special Inquiry to review and report on the TMI-2 accident.
The attached Statement of Policy describes in det. ail tne objectives and scope of war.? of this Special Inqtriry.
6.
A Special Task Force on Emergency Planning was estabilished.
A preliminary report has been made to the Commissiomers and tne final recommendations of the Task Force are expected this month.
It is expected that the final report will i ricl ude recommendations for extensise upgrading of emergency' planning from licensee notifications through licensee and fecleral state and local government agencies response. The N;RC Office of State Programs nas initiated an accelerated program of regional team assistance to State governments in preparine State raciological emergency response plans with the goal of obtaining NRC concurrence.
In addition, the NRC is cocsidering the adoption of additional regulations which will establish as conditions of power reactor oceration increased emergency readiness for pubH c protecticn in the vicinity of nuclear pcwer reactors on the part of botn the licensee and local and state autnerities. On July 17, 1979, the Commission published in tne Feceral Register an advance notice of proposed rulemaking requesting public comments on what items should be included in the rule (copy attached).
We would be pleased to provide copies of the remaining reports when ccepleted, if so desired.
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In addition to the reviews discussed above, the Advisory Consnittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) is examining the TMI-2 accident and its relationship to other plants.
They have made various recommenda-tions in their letters of April 7,17 and 20,1979 (copies attached),
which are characterized Dy the ACRS as generic in nature applying to all PWRs.
The ACRS letter of April 20, 1979 states "None are intended to i
require inmediate changes in operating procedures or plant modificat ons of operating PWR's.
Such changes should be made only after study of their effects on overall safety.
Such studies should be made by the licensees...ar ' by the NRC staff." These recommendations will be considered in the studies described above.
On May 2,1979, a loss-of-feedwater transient occurred at the Oyster Creek BWR, which resulted in the water level in the reactor vessel decreasina below allowable limits for a short period of time. This event is currently being reviewed to determine its potential occurrence at other facilities.
We have made a preliminary evaluation of the possibility of a similar incident occurring at Millstone Unit 1.
While our review of this incident is still in progress, we can state that the potential for such an incident to occur at Millstone Unit 1 is minimal, because o' the difference in design of Oyster Creek and Milistone Unit 1.
T'ie jet pumps in Millstone Unit I alter the coolant flow paths within the reactor vessel so as to preclude the sequence of events which occurred at Oyster Creek. This incident is unique tu 5WRs therefore a similar incident could not occur at Millstone Unit 2 or Haddam Neck.
4 Knowledge of any problems we may anticipate with our nuclear power plants in the near and long-term future.
RISPONSE:
In response to your fourth specific request, a major thrust of our regulations, review guidance, and the review process itself, is to anticipate possible problems and to assure to the extent possible tnat plants are designed to prevent cccurrence of these problems inc/or to mitigate tne consequences of these events if they were to occur. Two efforts directed toward identifying and resolving such proolems are described below.
A Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) of eleven older operating plants is in progress.
The objectives of this program are to identify significant safety deficiencies, assess adequacy of safety margins, idErtify deviations frCm Current licensing Criteria On significant safety considerations, make balanced decisions relative to any required safety improvements and document the results cf the eviews.
This program and the scnedule for its completion is discussed at lengrh in the attacned " Report on the Systematic Evalua-ion of Opera *ing Facilities," dated Ncvember 25, 1977.
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' In response to Section 410 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, we submitted to the Congress NUREG-0510, " Identification of Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants."
A copy of tnis report is attached for your information. Tnis report covers 17 unresolved safety issues which are being examined to ascertain whether our requirements should be modified for new and operating plants.
Such issues are considered on a generic basis only af ter the staff has made an initial assessment fcn-individual plants and has mact a determination that the safety significance of 5L the i sues do not prohibit continued operation or.equire licensing action while the long-tena generic review is underway-Attachmen ts :
1.
Evaluation of Millstone Unit 2 Resconse to IE Bulletin 79-058 2.
IE Sulletin 79-03 5.
IE Bulletin 79-06C 7.
IE Sulletin 79-10 10.
IE Sulletin 79-17 17.
NUREG-0560 13.
Statement of Policy
- 19. Acvance Notice of Rulemaking dtd 7/17/79
- 20. ACRS letter, 4/7/79
- 21. ACRS letter, 4/17/79 22.
ACRS letter, 4/20/79 23.
Report on the Systematic Evaluation of Ocerating Facilities, 11/25/77 24 NUREG-0510 s!ltat L!!ili;ia ;c 4.
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