ML19249B026
| ML19249B026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1979 |
| From: | Hitz G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290224 | |
| Download: ML19249B026 (33) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1,
In the Matter of:
2, IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
31 of 4
Gregory R. Hitz Shift Supervisor 6
7 8
Trailer #203 9,
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
May 77 1070 12, (Da'te of Interview) 13
,1.,1v o. 1o7o (Dat'e Transcript Typed) 14l 15l 262 1
(Tape Numoer(s))
i 16l l
17l I
laj 01 l
21j j
NRC PERSONNEL:
22' o o C) }48 Dorwin R. Hunter 23 William H. Foster 24r 25 i
I
)
1 FOSTER:
The following interview is being conducted of Mr. Gregory R.
2!
l Hitz.
Mr. Hitz is Shift Supervisor for Operations at the TMI Nuclear 3
Power Facility.
The present time is 4:28 p.m.
Today's date is May 23, 4
1979.
The place of the interview is trailer 203 located immediately 5
outside the south gate of the TMI site.
Individuals present for the 6
interview are: Dorwin R. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter is an Inspection Specialist 7
with the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Performance Appraisal 8
Branch.
My name is William H. Foster.
I'm a Senior Inspector and 9
Auditor for the Office of Inspector & Auditor, NRC, and I will be 10 monitoring the interview.
Mr. Hitz was previously interviewed as part 11 of this investigation on April 22, 1979.
At this point I am going to 12 turn the interview over to Mr. Hunter.
13 14!
HUNTER:
Thank you.
Greg, a couple of things that we will sort out 1
15!
just to get things rolling.
You were in Unit 1 on March 28 and we were 16!
trying to locate some information where a phone call was made to Unit 1 17 from an outside agency and giving a person possibly information to the 18!
tune of checking high pressure injection on, or getting high pressure 19 injection on, or would you express to management in Unit 2 to the 20 desire to provide high pressure injection and to get it into the core 21 at that time.
Do you recall any telephone conversation with an outside 22 agency with that tone to it?
23 9
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HITZ:
I guess I'm confused; okay, you know there is a phone call that 2'
we make to outside agencies, and one of the agencies that we talk to, 3
we give them the status of the plant, Unit 2:
Did high pressure injection 4
actuate, what's the RCS pressure, what's the RCS temperature, so forth a
~
and so on.
Is that what you are referring to or...
6 7
HUNTER:
No. That would be status, okay.
8 HITZ:
Yes, plant status.
10 U
HUNTER:
But a specific call back to unit control room, because they 12 couldn't get Unit 2 control room, okay?
13 141 HITZ:
Well, I had talked, this was sometime later in the morning.
A
(
15 group of NRC officials had come into the control room and I had directed 16!
them to set up their office in the Unit 8 Shift Supervisor's Office.
17 And I had talked to some people in the NRC and giving them plant status 18
-which they could not get out of the Unit 2 contrci room.
We got the 19f information over our hot line and I gave that information to the people I
20 from the NRC.
And, if I understand your question, did someone direct 21 me to tell the Unit 2 control room to go on to high pressure injection?
22 23
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1 HUNTER:
To assure or to express the concern that high pressure injection 2
should be initiated or maintained in the morning or early afternoon, 3
you know sometime, maybe like 12:00, plus or minus a couple of hours, 4
either way.
Do you recall getting an outside call and then relaying that to Unit 2?
6 7
HITZ: I Fnow that I relayed at lot of information to Unit 2. On thesc 0
lines there were a lot of conversations that were transmitted to me to 9
transmit back to Unit 2.
That specific instance I don't remember, but 10 I do remember talking to them and telling them, hey, you know this ll{
outside agency or that agency recommends that we look at doing this or 12 possibly look at doing that.
1 know there was a lot of concern that 13 they were looking at the pressure-temperature relationship and the fact 14!
that we were floating, what they call floating on the core flood tanks.
t 15l And it seems to me that was the area that they were talking about, and 16l whywedon'tgobacktohighpressureinjecbion,andIrelayedthat 17 message to the individuals in Unit 2.
It looks to these people that 18l maybe you ought to think about going back on high pressure injection.
19 You know, you ought to look at that'and see what you think you ought to 20 do.
21 22 HUNTER:
Would that be the understanding that you had during these 23 conversations,thatyoushouldconsidergoingbackon,orthinjthat 24 you should consider, high pressure injectiDri?
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1 HITZ:
Yes, that's to me, to the best of my recollection, you know 2
because I said are you, I'm pretty sure I asked the individual, whoever 3
it was, and I don't remember who it was, "Are you telling me to go on 4
high pressure injection?" Or if that was instance, I always said "Are 5
you telling me to do this or are you telling me to do that?" And the 6
guy always said, "I'm not' telling you to do anything, I'm recommending 7
or suggesting that you do that."
8 i
9 HUNTER:
Okay.
10 11 HITZ:
Okay, and thats, you know, I, in turn, transfer that information 12 to Unit 2.
13l i
14l HUNTER:
That's why I was asking the question more, than, to direct i
15l that the conversation or tone was recommending that to your management 16 or to people in Unit 2 that they should in fact consider safety injection 17 or high pressure injection?
18 19l HITZ:
That s right.
20 21!
HUNTER:
Do you recall something similar to that?
I 2 21 23 HITZ:
Similar to that, yes, I do.
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l HUNTER:
Okay, now I'm asking. Who did you send, who did you relay that 2!
l message to or any other messages that you had went to Unit 2 to relate?
3l i
4l HITZ:
Okay, we have a hot line.
Basically, how that works is you pick ~
ei
]
up a phone in Unit 1 and it automatically rings a phone in Unit 2 and 61 when he picks it up he's talking directly to you, between the two 7
control rooms.
I talked to several individuals over there.
And I 8
can't specifically say, hey, for this instance I talked to this indivi-dual, for that instance, I talked to that. Because it was my job in the 10' Unit 1 control room to get plant status back from Unit 2 so I could run 11 backup calculations for offsite doses and so forth and so on.
Now f
12 t that, you know, it could have been any number of individuals that I I
13 talked to.
14:
15!
HUNTER:
Would it be worthwhile for you to try to relate the indivi-I 16i duals that you recall talking to during tha; time?
17 I
18!
HITZ:
I talked to, you know, you are talking the whole day or the F
lW whole time that I was here.
Because I talked to control rcom operators.
l 20 You knew, I talked to Mm k Coleman, I talked to Len Right, I t:lked 21 Denny Olson, I talked to Mike Ross (he is the supervisor of the office).
22lI I talked to Jim Selinger, he's the Unit 1 superintendent.
And you got 23 to understand, I talked to these, you know, every time I picked up the 24 phone depending on what each of these different individuals were doing.
l 25}
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6 1l I could have gottun a different guy each different time.
You know, Mr.
2.
j Ross and Mr. Seelinger were directly involved in directing the activities 3
of the unit.
Consequently, if they were involved in a meeting on 4
making the major decisions such as what you were talking about, of 5
putting high pressure injection back on, I could have gotten some 6
control room operator.
And I would tell that individual, "Please relay 7
this following information to Mr. Ross and Mr. Seelinger."
8 HUNTER:
Would that be the type of comment that you would use to relay 10' to a certain person?
a lli 12-HITZ:
Yes, I always make sure that the information, if I received any 13 information that I was to transfer over to the Unit 2.
I always made 14 sure that if I didn't talk to either Seelinger or Ross, that that 15 information got to them via the individual that I was talking to.
15!
i 17 HUNTER:
Okay, now good, that's what we are looking for.
That will key 18l us back to one or two people that we can discuss that that particular 19f issue.
20 21 HITZ:
Now there are times also that I talked to the Shift Supervisor 22 over there.
Alright, and there were two of them over there at the 23 time.
And that was Mehler and Chwastyk.
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HUNTER:
Okay, I understand.
2, 3
HITZ:
See, I tried to work, you have to understand, I tried to work at 4I the top 'of the chain and work my way down.
Do you understand what I'm S
saying? To get the man who was in charge, and if I couldn't get him, I 6
would try to get the man directly underneath him.
And if I couldn' t 7
get him I would try to get the man directly under that individual and 8
that went like Seelinger, Ross, Chwastyk, Mehler.
Chwastyk and Mailer 9
are in the same plant as the control room operators.
10!
11 HUNTER:
Greg, did you keep a log of your phone conversations during 12 that time period.
Or any kind of notes?
13 i
14 HITZ:
Of my individual...I...we kept notes. I didn't keep specific 15 notes of anything that I '.ransmitted to them.
The notes that we kept 16l were the conversations that were transmitted over the headsets between 17 the ECS and the control room and between the ECS and the offsite teams.
18 But my specific conversations between Unit 1 and Unit 2, no I did not.
191 i
"0!
HUNTERL In a previous interview we talked, or in a previous interview 21 (I have read a number of interviews now), anyway you made a tour of the 22' auxiliary building.
Can you go through your path, your activities, and 23 what you did while you were in the auxiliary building on this tour?
24
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k
8 1;
l HITZ:
Sure. We deemed it necessary to go into the auxiliary building 2!
l due to the fact of the water situation on the floor, to try and determine 31 l
if we had a leak or what exactly was the problem down there.
So one of the health physics people and myself donned the proper orotective 5
clothing and so forth and so on, the Scott airpacks and went into the 6
building with the proper radiation monitors that we used to monitor our 7
dose rates, and we...the first place I went was to the radwaste panel, 8{
and I wanted...when we got into the buildin.g I wanted to try and see if 9
I could do anything about the standing water on the floor, that is, to 10 transfer water from the auxiliary building sump into one of the neutra-11 lizing tanks.
I also wanted to make sure that I didn't have leakage 12 through the reactor building isolation valves via the reactor building 13 sump into the auxiliary building.
So the first thing I looked at was 14 the reactor building sump pumps. They were not running; they were off, t
15!
but they were in the auto position.
So I turned them to the off position.
16 The reactor building isolation valves were in fact closed, but some of 17 the downstream valves, which do not receive any S signal, or SFAS 18; signal, to close, were still open, and they should have been open 19 because they transfer... you know, when you transfer water those valves 20 normally stay open.
I closed those as a backup in case there was 21 leakage by the valves, by the reactor building isolation valves.
I 22 also tried to start the transfer pumps to transfer water from miscel-23 laneous waste holdup tank into the neutralizing tank so I could drain 24 the auxiliary building sump into the miscellaneous waste holdup tank.
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I could get none of the pumps to start down there.
Due to the fields 2
of radiation that we were in, I couldn't afford much time to go check 3
breakers, or so forth and so ca.
My afforts were futile to get any 4j water transferred.
So I deemed it necessary at this time to take a 5
tour of the uxiliary building to see if I could determine if there was 6
(a) a leak, or (b) how bad the damage was in the building as far as 7
water depths and so forth and so on.
One of the places I went was into 8
the area of the auxiliary building sump, and the water level in the auxiliary building sump was flush with the floor, meaning that the 10 water that we had on the floor had backed up through the floor drains.
11' E 9rywhere there was floor drain, there was standing water.
12; 13 HUNTER:
OK and, if I recall right, then you left the auxiliary building i
14f and got out of your clothing and, via Unit 2, went back to Unit I?
15 16 HITZ:
That's correct.
17 18 HUNTER:
All right,'let me go to another area I will cover with you.
19l The emergency feedwater valves, the EF flow valves A and B, have been a 20 problem and they were a problem during this event; they were closed, 21 and we are doing a specific investigation effort concerning the emergency 22 feecwater surveillance program, and I'm in fact involved in that particular 23 activity.
We have discussed with a number of operators to determine, 241 Greg, exactly how they do business, how they do the surveillance, l
2s
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what's saved in the surveillance procedure, what's discarded into the 2.
l trash, you know, what's in the surveillance file.
One of the problems 31 1
that we came up with is that the EF-12 flow valves apparently have been 4l found closed before, and possibly even the pumps in " pull to lock."
I 5
need to ask you if you have ever been aware that they were, in other 6l words, you noted that they were not in their normal condition, that 7
might be the'5's, the A7's or the 8's or the 12's and also the pumps, 8
or was it ever reported to you that they weren't in their normal condition, i
9 that you recall?
10 11 HITZ:
You're talking any time during the plant...
12 13 HUNTER:
Yes, sir, when they were not supposed to be closed, meaning 14 mode 1 through whatever, that they were not in there normal position.
15j 16 HITZ:
They're supposed to be in their normal position when the turbine 17 header pressure gets equal to or greater than 800 pounds...why? why?
18[
any time in plant life.
19j 20 HUNTER:
So in Unit 2, that would be from core load, you know, it seems 21 to come in this direction..
22 on? 258 23 24 25 I
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11 1
j HITZ:
It seems to me that during a heatup one time; let me think, 2:
l okay?
It seems to me that during a heatup one time we did have a 3
problem with one of those.
We were in the process of a heatup, and by 4
that I mean we were going from a decay heat removal situation where the 5
RCS temperature was 100 and some degrees, maybe 100, 140 degrees, and 6
we were heating up.
And of course when you heat up, the secondary side 7
starts to pressurize.
And what happened is, at shift relief time--my 8
shift was coming on and another shift was going off--and one of the things that you got to do in order to go from one particular mode of 10 operation to another particular mode of ooeration is to fill out a--they 11 have certain surveillances that have to be done.
And one of the surveil-12(
lances that you have to do after you get up above 200 pounds in the 13 turbine, in the steam side, on the secondary side, is the emergency 14 feed pump surveillance.
I believe that we were taking, we were in the l
15 process of going up, getting close to this 800 pounds and they were 16 finishing up the surveillance on the emergency feed system.
And in the 17 process of the turnover we found that the 12 valves were closed, I 18 believe we found the 12 valves closed.
I'm pretty sure of that, okay?
1N All right.
Do you understand what I'am saying? We were, like one 20' shift, like I'm coming in to relieve you, okay? And you are doing a 21 surveillance, and it looked to me like it was the in point where they 22 were finishing up on the surveillance and we were coming in to take 23 over.
Now whether... I can' t remember whether we did the steam generator 24
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I surveillance or not.
I don't believe we did.
I believe it was the 2
final; the final touches were being done when we came in.
I'm almost 3
sure of that.
4 s
HUNTER:
You need tiiae, you're saying the EHV12 A&B valve?
6 HITZ:
Yes, three-twelve.
8 9
HUNTER:
What about the pumps?
At any time do you recall them being 10
" pull to lock?"
11' 12 t HITZ:
Boy, pumps " pull to lock."
I can't remember, I just can't 13 remember any time.
14 i
15l HUNTER:
We'll proceed through this thing.
At the point, in the modes 16!
in tech specs, as soon as you go into a specific mode, the feed system, 17 the emergency feed water system, needs to be in the operable condition, 18 meaning 3 pumps, 2 flow paths.
If, in fact, at that time those pumps 19l were B 12 A&B valves closed, and header valves closed, meaning that the 20 two headers where inoperable or shut, would that put you in violation 2 16 of the tech specs?
22 23 HITZ: If I was in the mode that they were supposed to be in? Absolutely.
24 ;
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13 1
HUNTER:
Do you recall if you were in violation of tech specs at that 2!
condition that you were speaking of, when you found the 12 A and B 3
valves closed?
4l, 5
HITZ:
I couldn't have been in violation of tech specs or I would have 6
wrote it down, I would have reported it.
That would have been a reportable 7
incident.
8 9
HUNTER:
Let me ask you, if in fact you find them, in, an operator or 10 to his shift foreman that you report the valves were in other than 11 normal position, what's your action at that time?
12 13 HITZ:
Which condition am I in? Am I in a condition where I'm violating 14 tech specs or not violating tech specs?
151 i
16I HUNTER:
Violation of tech specs; a condition where a piece of equipment 17 has failed or a valve has failed.
18j 19!
HITZ:
Okay, if I come in and I find a condition where we are violating 20 tech specs, I immediately make corrective action for that.
And the 21 tech specs tell me what the corrective action can be. If in fact I have 22 to cool back down, I'll cool back down.
If I've got, if I'm on a time 23 clock, which scmetimes you get yourself on a time clock, I'll take the 24 corrective action, and if I can complete that corrective action on a 25l l
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time clock, then I can continue on with my heatup. OK? Or whatever I'm 2.
j doing, or I can stay at power, let's see.
But I must write a report.
31 i
OK? I must notify the Supervisor of Operations, and I also make it a 4
point to notify, well, I made it a point to notify the Supervisor of 5
Operations and I must notify the Station Unit Superintendent also.
I 6
also notify the PORC members right away.
It depends what time of the 7
day it is as to how we notify the NRC, 8
HUNTER:
Let me ask you a couple of questions concerning the emergency 10' feedwater system valves, the EF12 valves; also the EFil valves.
Have 11' you ever had problems with the EFll valves being left in manual?
Have U
you ever run into that type of situation?
13 14!
HITZ:
I have run into a situation where I've had the main feedwater 15 valves in manual.
The main reg valves, yeah.
16l 17 HUNTER:
I understand.
18j 19l HITZ:
I have had them blocked open.
We did some maintenance and it i
20 calls for those valves to be tagged open, and evidently what they did 21!
was they tagged them open, they put them in manual, and when they went 22 and removed the tags they never put them back in auto; and the valves, 23 24
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j of course, when you put them in manual and open them, they do not 2
respond to the ICS control station.
They stay wide open; as a matter 3'
of fact, it caused me to have a turbine and reactor trip.
4l HUNTER: I understand; okay.
Another condition that we were interested 6
i. 4 whether or not you personally have seen anything at any time, an ercat where the EF11 B valves on a unit trip, or your steam generators 8
come to the low-level control point of 30 inches--have you ever seen 9
when these valves didn't respond to that low-level control point?
10 11 HITZ:
Well, I personally have seen EFV11 B not respond to its control 12!
point.
13 14 HUNTER:
And maintain steam generator level of 30 inches after a unit i
15j trip.
16 17 HITZ:
I believe there was one time; you've got to understand that I've 18l been involved in several trips. OK? And I believe that there was one 19!
trip that we had where we had to take manual control of one of the 20-emergency feed valves, if not both.
21 22 HUNTER:
Greg, if that happens, what would be your action?
More so 23 interested in, yes, I had the problem, and also, what are your actions 24 as a Shift Supervisor?
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HITZ:
First of course, I get control of the plant.
And once I've got 2f j
control of the plant...if I'm not mistaken, when we write a work request, 3
and what you do is, if you have a problem with a piece of equipment you 4
write a work request to get it fixed.
I'm not positive, but I think 5
those are the valves that we have the problems with the controllers, 6l the Bailey controller on it.
'!ct the one in the control room that the I
air E to peak converter so forth and so on down at the valves.
8 9
HUNTER:
At the valves.
10' 11 HITZ:
We have had problei.
with those.
I'm positive, I'm 98% sure 12 that that's on the emergency feed water, the 8-lls.
13 14 HUNTER:
Have you ever had the problem with maintaining steam generator i
15' levels even in manual on a loss of...
16!
I 17f HITZ:
Yes, there was a trip that we had problems with.
We had to go 18" to the 32's and 33's.
19i l
20 HUNTER:
Okay, would you, can you recall the trip, or the type of trip, 1
21(
or the time frame?
22 23 HITZ:
The time frame was the shift relief time again.
The Shift 24 Supervisor that I was relieving was still there, George Chwastyk.
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HUNTER:
Can you recall the time in plant life?
2 3
HITZ:
Boy, I sure can't.
It was before commercial operation.
4 5
HUNTER:
And during the startup program, before commercial?
6 7
HITZ:
I'm almost sure of that, yes.
8 9
HUNTER:
And what was the problem there, do you recall?
10 11 HITZ:
It seems to me that, if I'm not mistaken, that's when the, for 12 some reason the feed pumps just wound down and didn't pump.
And they 13 actually, it was either the feed pumps wound down or we lost the con-14!
densate and condensate booster pump, which of course was the operating 15 feed pump.
We were at low power level.
And when I say low power, I'm 16 talking somewhere between 20% and 25% power.
17 18l HUNTER:
Greg, when you say " wound down", would that be other than a l
19l feed pump trip, or would you just...
l 20 21 HITZ:
For some reason, I've seen, I've had a situation where the pumps 22 just, for some reason, never even, just went back to minimum speed.
23
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18 1
l HUNTER:
And what does that do to you?
2 3
HITZ:
Decreases feedwater flow.
4 i
Si j
HUNTER:
And the results of that would be what?
6 7
HITZ:
High reactor coolant system pressure, which would cause a reactor 8
trip if the reactor was online.
i 9
10 HUNTER:
I can trip on the high reactor pressure; then would the emer-11 gency feedwater come on automatically?
12 13 HITZ:
Only if the feed pumps tripped or received a trip signal to 14 trip.
I 15j 16 HUNTER:
And if the feed pumps did not trip?
17 18{
HITZ:
Nothing, the emergency feed pumps won't start.
19f 20 HUNTER:
And what would be plant shift reaction to that?
21f 22
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19 li HITZ:
Well, the first thing you try to do is get the feed pump back 2L up.
If the feed pump won't come back up, you trip the two main feed 3
pumps or the feed pump that was on--at this time it should only be one.
4 And when that trips, the emergency feed pumps start automaticaly.
5 6
HUNTER:
Do you recall going through a problem like that and having to go on the 32 valves?
Is this the same situation?
9 HITZ:
Yes, this is the same situation.
10' 11 HUNTER:
D'd the guy have to manual start the aux water feed pumps?
12 1
13
'HITZ:
I can't remember; see, the Shift Supervisor (the other Shift 14, Supervisor) and I were in the Shift Supervisor's office turning over,
{
15!
and all I did was look up and I seeen the rods fall in. I seen all the 16 control rods trip, and I knew we had reactor trip.
When we went out, 17, we were in a loss of feed condition.
The emergency feed pumps were on 18{
at this point.
19f 20 HUNTER:
As you understand it though, since the main feed pumps only 21 went...
o"9 267 22 23 24 25 I
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20 1
HITZ:
They either wound down or they tripped.
2 3
HUNTER:
That would not trip the aux feed pumps.
The operator would 4
then have had to notice the condition and start the auxiliary feed i
5 pumps...
6l 7
HITZ:
Yes. That's true. The emergency feed pumps only start in two 8
conditions, three conditions.
And that's not one of the conditions.
9 10 HUNTER:
Okay, the guy would have started the emergency feed pumps.
11 Then, what happened to the 11 valve, do you recall?
That you had to go 12 on backup with the 32 valves.
13, 14l HITZ:
I didn't look at the 11 valves, I looked at steam generator 15 level.
And steam generator level was not responding.
So we went to 16 the 32's in this 17 18!
HUNTER:
And what would go ahead in case the ll's were not opening?
19 Was this before you had actual indication on the 11 valves?
In other 20 words, they only had a signal to them and later on you ended up with 21 some...actually ended up with indication on the valves themselves.
22 l
23 HITZ:
Yes, but that doesn't tell you valve position.
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HUNTER:
Even on Unit 2 it still doesn't?
2 3
HITZ:
No.
4 5
HUNTER:
Okay, so you went to the 32's just in c'ase?
6 7
HITZ:
Yes, you know, if you go to measure variables it tells you valve 8
demand.
It tells you what the valve should be, but it doesn't tell you 9
where the valve is.
And, you know, the steam generator level was not 10 reacting the way it was supposed to, and I know for a fact that this 11 was before commercial operation, because it was right after we did the 12l cooldown from outside the control room test.
13 14!
HUNTER:
What's the time frame on that?
t 15j 16l HITZ:
That would have been fall, sometime in the fall.
But it was 17 right after we did the cooldown from outside the control room.
That's 18 when you go out and manually control your steam generator levels and 19 makeup tank level and pressurizer level from outside the control room.
20 21.
HUNTER:
Okay, and the operators then would have used the 32's.
Are 22 those full open, or are they just stroke valves?
23 24 HITZ:
We sent people down to control room them, manually.
25l o"9 269 i
l.
22 l'
l HUNTER:
And then they would manually control the 32's or 2!
l assuming he opened them all in, got some water to the steam generator?
3l 4
HITZ:
Yes, to the best of my recollection, that's what happened.
5 6l HUNTER:
And those in are there, because of, just in case, this type 7
problem, they bypass the 11 valves?
8 HITZ:
That's correct.
10' 11 HUNTER:
Another question I want to ask them to discuss a little bit..
12 13 HITZ:
Let me say something, I believe that's the point where we found 14 out that we had problems with the little grey Bailey control box down 15l at the valve center.
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17 HUNTER:
Okay, the problem then really was the 11 valves, the actual 18 local controller?
19 20 HITZ:
Right.
21, 22 FOSTER:
We are going to break now and change the tape.
The time is 23 4:58 p.m.
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FOSTER:
We are going to continue with the interview of Mr. Hitz.
The 2!
time is 5:00 pm.
3 4l HUNTER:
Okay, Greg, we have just discussed the fact that the EFV 32 5
A&B valves, the back 5 valves on the automatic feedwater for steam 6
generators had been used and, subsequent to that use of those valves, 7
it was found out locally that EF 11 A&B valve local Bailey controllers 0
were at fault, and that the valves did in fact not open or they didn't respond all the way out.
I am assuming that.
10' 11 HITZ: Right.
12 13 HUNTER:
Okay, and I indicated I would like to ask another question 14; concerning the emergency feedwater system as a whole.
We'd like to'get 15 an indication from you. The Unit 1 and Unit 2, you have operated both 16!
units.
Now Unit 1 seems to be a fairly calm unit, on a unit trip.
17 Things seem to work, and you have not had S's and you haven't had the 1
18l problems since preops started.
On Unit 2, the operators and Shift 19f Supervisors look at Unit 2 as being a very sensitive unit--the best way 20 to put it, I guess.
The primary system is very sensitive to a trip.
21!
Things change, pressurizer level goes below 80 inch =Es, may lose their 22 heaters. They have had safeguards features, EFF actuation due to low 23 pressure. The operators are getting very good at trying to maintain the 24 plant on the line by starting the second makeup pump, closing letdown, 25; "9 271 t
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and doing the thingc to try to stabilize.
Some of them even take the 2
pressurizer spray valve, crank it open, and try to clip that pressure 3
spike, and then put it back to auto; then feed from the BWST to try to 4-maintain pressurizer level.
Looking.at that concept, on a loss of feed 5
accident. One of the things that would happen or on a turbine trip with 6
the main feed pumps, you could run into an overfeed problem, if you 71 were still feeding the steam generators as the turbines or feed water 8
regulator valves came down.
If one of them was in manual, you would 9
overfeed and end up with a severe cooldown transient.
If you have a 10 main feed pump trip and the auxiliary feed system starts, and the steam 11 generators start down level with the auxiliary feed pumps on, and 12, operating at shutoff pressure behind the EF11 valves, that would be the i
13 normal situation.
If, in fact, as a generator goes below 30 inches the 14!
EFil valves start to open and try to maintain 30 inches, that could, in
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15j fact, constitute a, or would that in fact, constitute an excessive 16!
feedwater flow? Would it constitute excessive feed flow in the operator's 17 eyes? Are they sensitive to that particular aspect of the plant.
181 l
19j HITZ:
I think you want to know, if the operator puts the valves to 20 manual and just runs the ll's open, to get water back in the generator?
21, 22 HUNTER:
That. How he treats those, whether he would put them in manual 23 or keep them closed, or put them in manual and open them to try to 24 limit the transient on the plant.
Have you got any feeling for that?
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j HITZ:
How would the operator respond if the valve didn't function and 2l' he was now controlling the valve?
Or if he just, if it was in manual 31
{
and he wanted to go up and just popped it to auto, that type of thing?
4 5
HUNTER:
Let's say that we're sitting and the plant is at 97% power; 6
feedwater pump trips due to whatever; both of them trip; you really don't get a chance for a runback or anything, it's just down and you 8
get the reactor trip.
It's obvious that the auxiliary feedwater pumps 9
should start and do start, no problem.
Considering the normal lineup 10 that the EFl2 valves should be open and the 11 valves should be closed, 11 weighting the ICS low limit to 30 inches, then they would start open.
12' Would there be a possibility that the operators would not allow them to 13 open?
Like walking over and putting them in manual while they're 14 closed? Have you ever seen anything like that happen or did you see 15 anything like that talked about?
16j 17 HITZ:
It would be conceivable, okay, depending on what reactor coolant 18f system pressure was doing.
You know, pressure, reactor coolant system 19i pressures and feedwater control; feedwater can control reactor coolant 20 system pressure.
It can stop, you can increase or decrease pressure 21 and stop it on a dime by centrolling feedwater flow.
If pressure is 22 going extremely high and you're into a plant transient, all you got to 23 do is take either the valves or the demands to manual, and either run 24 them open or run them closed and that will stop your RCS pressure.
It 25
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depends what that operator seen the pressure doing.
If he seen pressure 2!
l screaming out the top, it's conceivable that he could put those valves 3
to manual and close them, I'm sorry, open them.
Try to open the valves 4
to overfeed the generators, which, in fact, would give you a bigger 5
heat sink and stop your pressure rise on the primary side or, if pressure 6
was going out the bottom, going down real fast, he could take the 7
valves, put them manual and bring them closed.
Yes, that's conceivable; 8
I've done it when I was a control room operator.
Not on the emergency 9
feedwater valves.
I've never would done anything like that in emergency 10 feed water valves.
I've never seen emergency feedwater systems start 11 automatically in Unit 1 on a transient; I have seen it start, okay, but 12 I due to a reactor trip or feed pump trip.
13l 14 HUNTER:
What about on Ur.it 2?
Have you ever seen the operators take 15!
control of the 11 valves and keep them closed?
Say, for instance, i
16l pressure is down below 1700 and continuing to drop, take manual control l
17 of the Fil valves and keep them closed?
18l l
19 HITZ:
We did when I had a severe trip here; we lost vacuum.
I don't 20 know if you are familiar with this trip or not.
But we had, for scme 21l reason, vacuum went way down on us and it caused the turbine to trip.
22 Well, eventually the feed pumps, which we don't have auxiliary vacuum 23 pumps in Unit 2--they come off the main vacuum pumps.
I had a trip to 24 the main feed pumps too and we were scrking with the emergency feedwater 25!
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27 1
valves.
And we, I believe we did do some controlling of steam generator 2l level with the ll's in hand that day.
That was quite an unusual situation.
3 We bottled up the RCS system.
What happened was the bellows on the 4
j atmospheric relief valves ruptured.
I don't know if you are familiar 5
with this issue or not, okay?
6 HUNTER:
Yes.
8 9
HITZ:
Well the room, we lost all pressurizer heaters because the 10 pressurizer heaters are located in the same room as the code relief 11 valves and the atmospheric dumps.
We found, from the control room, 12 that when we closed the atmospheric relief valves from the Bailley 13 coatrol stations, that the noise level decreased to 0 and they didn't 14 hear any steam rumbling.
So we kept the atmospheric relief valves 1
15l isolated and controlled steam generator level manually i
16!
thus bottling up the RCS system.
17 18i HUNTER:
And by controlling them in hand, would you have been... the 19" vacuum was lost so you don't have atmospheric, you don't have condenser 20' dumps.
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28 1:
HITZ:
I don't have condenser; any cooldown rate that I would have 2
wanted, or any way to cool the plant down, would have been opening the 3
atmospheric relief valves and blowing that live steam into that cubicle 4
which we call the M20 area; but it's the area where the pressurizer 5
heaters and the code relief valves are--the pipe, in fact, itself.
6 7
HUNTER:
During that incident, Greg, I might assume that there was a 8
low power history on the plant.
9 10!
HITZ:
Yes, very little.
I 11 12!
HUNTER:
Otherwise, you would have been on the safety valves with a 13 secondary.
14
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15 HITZ:
Yes, sir, we were at... the plant actually tripped.
We were 16i below 20% power, I believe, because I noticed, I was watching vacuum 17, and I shouted at a control room operator, I said "the vacuum is going I
18[
down; send somebody down to the vacuum pumps.
Get an operator down to 19 the polishers and let's watch reactor power."
And as vacuum continued 20 to decrease, and it decreased at an alarming rate as far as I was 21 concerned-you can open a vacuum breaker and it takes a long time for 22 30 inches of vacuum to dissipate--this was screaming down at a alarming I
23 rate.
At that time, when I knew that we had a problem, I said to the 24 operator that was on the primary side " start reducing reactor power."
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He started reducing power to try to bring power down along the 15%
2' range instead of the 18% to 22% where we were; but the turbine tripped.
3 At that time, when the turbine tripped, I heard we have microphone 4l j
that's mounted down where tne code relief valves are so we can tell in Sl j
the control room when the relief valves are lifting.
I heard the code 6l reliefs go for an instant, and then everything went silent.
And I knew 7
something was wrong. At that time I ordered the control room operator 8
to continually to drive rods till the reactor was, in fact, shut down, 9'
and to continued to drive rods until the rods were...we were down into 10t J
the intermediate range of power level.
11 12 HUNTER:
Okay, looking at the same type situation as far as locating 13 emergency equipment in other than normal conditions, looking at the 14; core flood tank valves or the high pressure injection M16 valves, or I
15 !
the B16 valves, or the containment spray pumps, or the decay heat pumps 16!
in " pull to lock."
Do you recall ever having any input from the opera-17 tors that any of those particular pieces of equipment were not normal, 18 or during your tour of the control board ever found any of that equipment 19l in the abnormal condition?
20f i
21!
HITZ:
I found I can't remember if it was the building spray or the 22; decay heat.
I don't even remember what mode we were in.
But I did l
23 find, it was either one or both, no, it was only one. I can't remember, 24l okay, but I did find a pump in " pull to lock" and I can't remember if I
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30 it was decay heat or building spray.
I seem to think it was building 2!j spray, but I don't know that for sure, okay? You're got to remember 31 l
the building spray and decay heat pumps, the control switches are right 4I next to each other.
One's elevated a couple of inches.
Again, I can't 5
remember what mode we were in.
6 HUNTER:
Do you recall doing anything with that event or...
8 9
HITZ:
If we would have been in a mode were I had to report that, I 10 would have reported that.
We talked about this before, when you asked 11 me about the 12 valves being closed.
If I'm in a cnndition, okay, 12 where its not a reportable incident, I will talk personally to the 13 Shift Supervisor of the individual of the shift that I've relieved and 14; make him aware of what I found so that he can definitely talk to the 15j individual who was involved in that situation.
If it's in a condition 16!
where its a reportable occurrence, and by that I mean where you're in a i
17l mode, let's take for example the 12 valves because that's the ene 18[
everybody talks about. If I was in a condition where steam header 19l pressure was above 800 pounds, that's a reportable incident; its cut 20[
and dried.
I 21:
" 9 278 22 HUNTER:
No problem?
23 241 l
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1 HITZ_: No.
2 3
HUNTER:
Okay, have you ever run into problems where, or had the feeling, 4
that something like that may have been repor?.ed. to.he. foreman and it 5
didn't get to you? The operators here do not fill out a corrective 6
actions system report.
7 HITZ:
The control room operators?
9 10 HUNTER-Right, or an incident report or any type of corrective action 11 document that would force the issue, if you will.
So it is strictly 12, verbal.
13 14l HITZ:
That's right.
And I know if it was reported my shift foreman, 15, he would report it me.
I know my shift foreman like a book.
I 16l
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17' HUNTER:
Any comments?
I've got the information I raeed.
Any comments; 18I do you have any, we covered a lot of area as far as inoperable systems.
i 19l 20 HITZ:
You know, and so much has nappened, I have experienced so :liany 21 trips, and when I say so many trips, I've experienced, you know, I 22 could probably say 5 reactor trips.
From the star'.up program up till 23 now, okay, you know, to try to pick att a specific instance, that's 24 o
9 279 25 l
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l tough.
Did you operate those valves in manual at any time from the 2'
time you loaded the fuel till now? Hey, that's tough.
You know, you're 3
talking, you know, what, 2 years?
4 i
St HUNTER:
Hopefully, the event that the 12 valves being closed, and I 6
say "did you in fact remember them being closed?" That's significant 7
enough so you wouldn't forget it. I'm hoping that that's the case.
8 HITZ:
When I pulled that out, you know, once you, I had to sit and 10 think about that. If it would have been a reportable occurrence--and 11 you're got to understand again when I say reportable occurrence that 12 means I'm in the appropriate mode and, hey, I'm in direct violation of 13 tech specs--if you close both 12 valves, you won't have any speed to 14 the steam generators, okay? And that's, you know, you' re directly 151 violating tech specs; that's a reportable occurrence.
16!
i 17l HUNTER:
No question.
18 19!
HITZ:
Okay, and I would have made out a report.
You know, if I'm 20 below 800 pounds, it is not a reportable occurrence.
And I tend to be 21 emotional, and if somebody comes to me and says "look at this," I don't 22 know if I did or not, but I'd bet $100 that I went through the overhead 23 when a guy told me that.
I would probably blow up and chewed on my 24 2sj
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control room operator for something he didn't even do.
But I know that 2.
I would have gone to the Shift Supervisor and Shift Fore: nan or the guy 3,
i who I relieved, and talked to him and I do do that.
4 5
FOSTER:
Greg, thanks a lot.
We are going to conclude here at 5:15 6
p.m.
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