ML19246C375
| ML19246C375 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1979 |
| From: | Bournia A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907240434 | |
| Download: ML19246C375 (19) | |
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UNITED STATES
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Docket Nos. 50-373 M I 4 '373 and 50-374 APPLICA1T:
Commonwealth Edison Company FACILITY:
La Salle County Station, Units 1 and 2
SUBJECT:
MEETING WITH COMMCNWEALTH EDISON COMPANY 01 MAY 11 Ai!D 24, 1979 TO DISCUSS OPEN ITEMS IN THE DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
Background
In our letters of October 16, 1978, December 21, 1978, January 22, 1979, and February 5,1979, the applicant was advised of those matters identified as outstanding issues in the draft Safety Evaluation Report.
Two meetings were held on May 11, 1979 and May 24, 1979, to discuss the open items.
A list of attendees for the May lith meeting is shown in Enclosure 1 and for May 24th in Enclosure 2.
Discussion Meetings were held on May 11, 1979 and May 24, 1979 with the applicant; the apolicant's A/E, Sargent & Lundy; and the applicant's vendor, General Electric Comoany tc discuss the open items as identified in our draft Safety Evaluation Recort (see Enclosure 3).
We were not able to discuss the areas of instrumentation and control and reactor system as the reviewers were ne' available due to Three Mile Island commitments.
The main portion of the May 11 *eeting was spent in discussing the ooen issues regarding containment.
Essentially therr were eight issues (!tems 44-51 of Enclosure 3).
For seven of the issues we were able to reach resolution with the applicant or further review was necessary due to additional information being provided by the acolicant.
Regarding the open issue on Appendix J, item 51, the applicant stated its understanding that its resconses which were discussed with us at a meeting held on September 13, 1973, were acceptable. We stated that further discussion would be necessary and that a telecon would be satisf actory.
In addition, discussions were held on the open issues in the area of accident analysis (item 62) and quality assurance (item 38).
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, J?i i i 1973 For the Vay 24 meeting, the open issues of Enclosure 3 which were discussed were in the areas of meteorology (items 1 and 2), auxiliary systems (items 4, 6, 77, and 79), structural engineering (items 7, 8, and 9), mechanical engineering (items 10 through 21, and 23), power systems (items 22, 72, 73, 74, 75, a n d 76 ), na ter i a l s ( i tems 31., 37, 33, and 39), and accident analysis (item 62).
One of the power system and mechanical engineering items was the information requested in order that the seismic qualification review team (SQRT) for the balance of plant equipment can perform its review.
We are waiting for the SCRT information.
With res;ect to the area of materials, it was suggested that in order to expedite the review with rescect to deviations of Appendie. G & H, a site visit be held in order that the areas of deviations be viewed thus providing a better insight into the applicant's problems.
The aoplicant was receptive to this suggestion and a tentative site visit was set for Jt'ly 12 and 13, 1979.
We infor ed the applicant that as a result of the Three Mile Island accident, the review of La Salle could be impacted.
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Anthony Bournia, Project Manager Light Water Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Project Management
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
See next page ye mq
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-1 we Mr. Byron Lee, J r. Vice President Coaronweal*.h Edison Concany P. O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 cc: Richard E. Powell, Esq.
Isham, Lincoln & Beale Cne First flational Plaza 2400 Chicago, Illinois 60670 Dean Hansell, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General State of I'linois 133 'iest Randolph Street Suite 2315 Chicago, Illinois 60601 4/
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E'lCLOSURE 1 ATTENDEES LIST 5 11-79 NRC A. Bournia H. Wong J. Kudrick
- C. Anderson F. Eltawila
- W. Butler
- T.
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- F.
Maura
- K. Carpe R. Sellamy
- W. Selke
- J. Gilray
- W.
Haass
- F.
Litton CCMMONWEALTH EDISON L. DelGeorge T. Hammerich SARGENT & LUNDY J. Gouvas G. Jones
- Part-time 403 210 m &_-v.t t
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ENCLOSURE 2 ATTENDEES LIST 5-24-79 NRC A. Sournia F. Litton J. Knox F. Cherny R Bosnak R. Stephens J. Fairobent R. Giardina C. Hinson K. Campe C0!"Otr.iEALTH EDISON CCf'PANY L. DelGeorge C. Schroeder G. Crane SARGENT ?,!.LNDY J. Gouvas G. Jones W. Schwartz R. Schiavoni D. Rahn S. Killian GENERAL ELECTRIC P. Thomoson E. Urata R. Johnson
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ENCLOSURE 3 Status of La Salle I ssues 1.
Metecrology - (2.3.332.3.6)
The display of neteorological data in the control rccm on analog dial meters are not acceptable because they provide instantaneous reacings.
Instantaneous readings of parcmeters such as wind, speed and direction may provide misleading in#0rmation.
'le require equiprent that provide time average values.
2.
Metecrolcgy - (2.3.6)
Cue to mal function of equipment. we ao not have a complete second year meteorological data as required oy Regulatorv Guide 1.70.
The additional data was scheduled to be suomitted in December 1978.
3.
F lccc P ctential - (2. 4.2 )
The revised gradation fcr the riprap submitted in klencment al to the FSAR is acceptable.
However, the a s-built spili aay riprap coes not conform to either the stated design in the FSAR or to good riprap erosion protection practices.
'he aoplicant is taking remedial acticn.
., hen th;s action is completed, we will inspect tne as-built riprap.
4 F lecc P rotecticn - (3. 4.1, 3.6 and 9. 3.3 )
Sufficient information has not been provided on the level monitoring and alarm systems' ability to meet the single f ailure criterion with regard to protection from flooding in safety-relatea areas, or on the capability of the systems to handle ficoding due to pipe breaks.
5.
I nternally Gereratec Missiles - (3. 5.1)
'he applicant has not supplied the inforration to show that all safety -
rel ated systems and components within cor.tair.nent, ir.cl udi ng the containment, are protected from missiles.
6.
P rotection Against Dynamic E ffects Asscciatec with the P ostulated R uoture of ? 1::1ng - (3.0)
The high energy systems outside containment have not been analyzed to deternine the effects of pipe whip and jet impingement in accordance with the Branch Technical Position AFCSB 3-1.
7.
S eismic : nput - (3.7.1)
Complete information pertaining to seismic input has not been furnished to j udge the adequacy of the plant's seismic Category I structures for withstancing seismic forces as defired la cur current seismic design,2 requi reme nt.
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I :ncrete C cntairrent - (3.3.1)
Tae design of the contain.ncnt and its interior structures nave not been aesigned to withstand pool dynamic loads. ( Ma rk I : p rool em) 9.
C cncrete and S tructural S teel I nternal S tructure - (3. 8. 2)
The design of concrete ano structural steel interior structures in the wet well to withstand pocl dynamics remain to be confirm. ( Pa rk I:
p robl em).
10.
P icing libration, Thermal E xcansicn ar.c Dynamic E f fects T est P rcgram -
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The applicant must supply additional information concerning tne bases for the allowable vibration anclitude derived and clarification of the use of twice this allowable is acceptable.
11.
P i,ing V ibraticn and Dyramic E ffects Test P rogram - ( 3. 9. 2 )
The ap;o icunt has ver0 ally committed to a test program for all non-class 1, 2, and a igh energy piping systens outside containment and all seismic Category I portions of moderate energy piping systems outside contairrent.
We require documentation of this test progran.
12.
Dynamic System A nalysis U nder F aulted C cnditicrs - (3. 9. 2)
We require documentation of the applicant's reevaluation of the reactor vessel, its internals, succorts, and attached piping for combined Icss-of-coolant accident and safety shutdown earthquake loads, incl uding tne annul us pressurization erfects.
13.
P reccerational Vibraticn A ssurance P rogram fcr R eactcr I nternals -
p.9.z, J.9.5)
The applicant references Ceneral Electric Topical Report SECE 20057-P which discuss's the proposed reactor internal /ibr3 tion test progran.
he need further information and clarification to corplete cur review.
14 U se cf SRSS other than LOCA and SSE - (3. 9. 3, 3. 9.5)
Ine use of the SRSS tecnniaue for determining dynamic respcnses other than LOCA and SSE is unresolvec and under study by us.
15.
L cacing C cmbinaticrs, D esign 'ransients and S tress L imits - (3. 9. 3)
'se require documentatio' of the applicant's reeviluation of the safety-relatec systems and components bared upcn the load ccrainatiens',}
response combination methocclcgy, and acceptance criteria hitb3 red /'
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4 The applicant must clarify its consideration of the cyclic loadings due to the operating basis earthquake and safety / relief valve actuation in its fatigue analysis.
- 16. All L oacing C ctbinations H ave N ot B een C ccsidered - ( 3. 9. 3 )
The applicant has not considered tne combination of ncrmal operating loads plus SSE Ic ds plus LCCA loads plus leads due to safety / relief valve actuation.
17.
Functicnal C acability of P ices - (3. 9. 3)
The applicant is evaluating his essential system piping against our criteria but has not completed this evaluation.
18.
Mccification to Feecwater N czzle and C ontrol R od D rive R eturn
.iozzle - (3. 9. 3)
'ne have not completed our review of GE Topical Peport NEDE-21821 addressing reactor feedwater nozzle /sparger design modification for cracks nor have we completed our review of GE's generic n,cdification to the control rod drive return nozzle.
This may require additicnal request f or i nformation.
19.
P umc arc V al se O cerability A ssurance P regram - (3. 9. 3 )
Additional inf ormation have been requested regarding the applicant's analytical and testing methods for the pump and valve operability assurance,:rogram.
20.
C ccconent S uccerts - (3. 9. 3)
Allowable limits for ASPE Class I linear and plate and shell type component supports and reactor vessel sucport skirt subjected to 'aulted condition loads nave not been provided. In addition, additional infornation concerning the design of support bolts and bolted connec-tion has been requested.
21.
I nservice Testing of P urcs and V alves - (3.96)
The applicant has not submitted its proposed progran f or the inservice testing of punps and valve as required oy 10 CFR 50.55 a( g).
22.
S =.smic Design anc Q ualificaticcs of I nstrumentation and E lectrical guiccent- ( 3. !0 )
require the docu,entations of seisnic qualification tests and/cr
.. e analysis results fc? selected electrical equipment.
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Seismic Q ualificaticn of Fechanical E cuicment - (3.10, 2. 92 )
Where ecnicnents have been qualified by testing or analysis to other than current standards (IEEE sta. 344-1975 and Regulatory Guides 1.92 and 1.100) ve will require reeval uation and possible requalification.
This will be depended on the findings of the sei smic qualification review team.
24 Seismic Q ualificaticn of C ategory I I nstrurentaticn ar.d E lectrical
- i c u i :.me n t - ( 3.10 )
Insu. icient infcrnation has been provided on the applicant's seismic qualification testing program for seismic Category I instru entation and control equipment.
25.
Environmental Design and Qualificaticn of Instrumentation anc Electrical E cu1; rent - (3.11)
Cumplete infcrmation has not beca submittec responding to our requests for additicnal information.
26.
E nvircemental C ualificaticn of S afety - Relatec Pechanical and Electrical E culcrent - ( 3.1 1 )
The applicant has not described adequately its environmental qualification program for its safety-related mechanical anc electrical equi prent.
27.
P each B cttcm T urbine T ric T ests - (4. 4.1) (4. 4. 2)
These tests must be evaluated and 3ssess using the CDYN computer code.
e.e have not completed our re. iew of the CDYN Coce.
22.
TCPR - (4.4.1) (4. 4.2 ) ( 15.1)
Af ter completion of item 27, tne minimta critical pover ratio must be recalculated taking into consideration the turbine trip without bypass event.
Thc transient of generator load rejection without byoass results in an MCPR equal to 1.02 which is below the Safety limit of 1.06.
The applicant classified tnis event an infrequent Occurrence which would allow some fuel damage.
We do not concur with this classification for this event, and we require that the operating limit ce modified to satisfy the MC PR 1 imit of 1.06.
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- 29. GEXL C crrelation - (4.4.1)
Although we conclude that the GEXL correlation is acceptable for initial core load, we are concerned that GEXL cc,rrelation ray not be conservative for reload operation. The applicant, in a letter dated Parch 7, 1979, comitted to incorporate the latest approved forn of GEXL correla: ion at the.ime of reloaa for La Salle. Li cense Condition.
30.
S tability E valuation - (4.4.1)
!n order to provide additional margin to stacility limits, natural circulation cperation of La Salle will be ;rcnibited until cur generic review of hydrodyr.anic stacility characteristics is completed.
- n addition, the La Salle stability dnalysis was cerforzee for first cycle.
.ie will require that a new analysis be submitted and approved prior to second cycles cperation.
The ap plicant, in 3 letter dated Yarch 7,1979, ccmitted to perform, as part of the future relcad analyses to update the hydrodynamic stability analyses.
Licen;e condition.
- 31. Centrcl R ed System - ( 4. 6. 2 )
As a result of eliminating the control red drive system return line, we are reviewing generically with regard to the inpact on control rod drive system perf ormance. Consequently, we require the acplicant submit system cerformance data directly applica0le to La Salle and will require the applicanc to conform to the conc; sicn of the generic study as applicaDie to La Salle.
32.
S afety/R elief V al ves - ( 5. 2. 2 and 6. 2. 2)
Adcitional information is required bcth to qualification tests and o;erating experience with the applicant's safety / relief valves.
- 33. Iri: of R ecirculation p uros to Mitigate ATWS - ( 5. 2. 2 )
We require the analysis for recirculation puncs at high pressure to mitigate ATWS arc /or the 1imiting event to be reanalyzed.
34 p reservice and : nservice as recuired by 50.55 af g) - (5. 2.4)
The applicant has not submitted his orogram of preservice and inservice inspection of Class 1, 2, and 3 components in accordance t o 5 0. 55 a( g).
35.
Detection of I ntersystem L eakage - (5. 2. 5)
We requested that the applica.it show hcw it intends to detect leakage frce the reactor coolant systems into both the low pressure coolant injection (3 trains) and low pressure core spray syste s asqrequire,d,
by Regul atcry Guide 1.45.
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- 36. O cerability cf P cst-accident C etecticn System follcwing SSE cr LOC? -
p. 2. 0 )
The applicant must confirm the oper3bility of the pcst accident leakage detection system following a sei saic event or a LCCA.
37.
A ccendix G - (5. 3.1 anc 5. 3. 3)
Sufficient information has not been provided to demanstrate corpliance with the requirements of paragrachs IV A.2, 3 and 4 and IV 2 of accendix G of 10 CFR Part 55(a).
- 38. O cerating L iritaticos - (5. 3.2) he require that the pressure - temperature limits shown in Fi gure 1 of
.,ECO-21773-A be included in the operating pressure - te,perature limits for the La Salle pressure vessels.
- 39. Accencix H - ( 5. 3. 2 a n d 5. 3. 3 )
Insufficient infernation was provided to show compliance with the require ents for specimen lccation and withcrawal schecules of Acpencix H of 10 CFR Part 50.
JU.
R eacter C cre I nsclation C cclirg 3 uro S uction - (5. 4.1)
The apclicant must supply further information to deternine whether the RCIC pump suction has to be automatically switched f rom the ccncensate storage tank to the suppression cool in tnc event of a safe shutdown earthquake anc conconitant f ailure of the condensate storage tank.
41.
S hutccwn U nirtentionally of the R eactcr C ore ! sciation C ccling System -
p. a.1 )
The reactor core isolation cooling systen has controls which can shutdown the system if ocerating conditions exceed certain i fmits.
We have requestec the applicant to show that the RCIC will not be shutdown unintentionally because of scuricus tencerature signals.
22.
R esidual Heat R emoval Syster - (5.J.2)
The apclicant nust perfora tests to show that flow through the safety / relief valves is adequate to provice the necessary fluid relief requirec consistent with the analyses recorted in Section 15.2.9 of the FSAR.
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C ategorizaticn cf V alve which I sclate RH1 frcr R eacter C colant System - (5.4.2)
We require that the valves which serve to isolate the residual heat recoval system from the reactor coolant systen be classified category A/C in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASPE core.
44 S te:m Bycass of the S uccressicn P ool - U 2.1.l; The applicant approach to suppression pcol bypass is not consistent with Branch Technical Position CSB 6-5.
2e applicant must comit to perform a low powr surveillance leakace test of the containcent at each refueling cutage.
45.
S ubccccartr ent P r essure A nalysis - (6. 2.1.1)
Be forces in the reactor pressure vessel affecting the design of
- ne support skirt are acceptable. However, additional evalcations nay be necessary following completion of cur task action plan A-2.
46.
P ccl Dynamic LOCA anc SRV L cads - (6. 2.1.1)
Be staff has ccocleted its review of the short-term progran and developed accectance criteria. We require that the applicant corrait to our acceptance criteria or justify any exceptions taken.
47.
S eccccary C ontaincent - ( 6. 2.1.1 )
..e will require the applicant to comit to leakage testing of the secondary containment to verify the inleakage assuaption and the drawdown tire #cr resstablishing the - 0.25 inches of water gauge.
48.
R eactor Builcing Clcsec Ccolice Water Syster; - ( 6. 2. 3 )
The applicant identified the reactor building closed ccoling water system as a containment isolation barrier.
Since this system is designed to (uality Group D requirenent and to assure the reliacility of the systen, we require the applicant to comit to perform inservice inspections of the systen in accordance with Section XI of ASPE Ccde.
49.
C cntainment P urge System -
,6. 2. 4 )
A 2-inch vent line exists in the purge system to bleed-cf f excess
- rimary containment pressure during oceratica.
We require the applicant tc evaluate this 2-inch bypass purge system in light of the Criteria of Era?ch Technical Position CSS 6-4 of n ~
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- 50. C cccustible G as C ontrol - (6. 2.5 )
Although the proposed cccbustible gas con:rol system is designed in accordance with requirerents of 10 CFR Part 50.44, we will require the applicant to comit the following because of certain systen character-istics;
( a)
If the containnent pressure is above 15.3 psig and the hydrogen concentration is 3.3 vol ure percent, the containment spray systen must be actuated to reduce the containment pressure.
( b)
Following a LCCA, the reccroiner systen becomes an extensico of the containment boundary. We require the applicant to denonstrate the leak light integrity of the recombiner system.
- 51. C cntairment L eakage Testing - (6. 2. 6)
Additional information is required relating to containrent leakage tes+ing to show compliance with Appendix J.
- 52. A vailab!e Net P ositive S uction Head - (6. 3.2 )
The acplicant must verify tha* the suction lines in the suppression pool leading to the ECCS ptrps are designed to precl ude adverse vortex f ormation and air injection which could effect the pumps per'orrer.
- 53. A ssurance of F illed ECCS L ire - (6. 3.2 )
Instrunentation is not sufficiently sensitive to detect voids at the tcp of ECCS pipe lines.
Be applicant must provide aceq" ate instrumen-tation to assure filled ECCS lines.
54 0 :e ra b i l i ty o f ADS - (6. 3. 2, 5. 4. 2 )
The applicant :ust show that the air supply for the ADS is sufficient for the extented cperating time required and assures us by reliability data that the ADS valves will function as required.
- 55. L eakage 3 Testing of '!alves U sec to I solate R eactcr C colant System -
p. 3. :. )
he require periodic testing and establishnent of leak ra*.e criteria for the valves that isolate *.he reacter coolant system from all the emergency core ccoling sys'.em.
- 56. O terability of ECCS curcs - (6. 3.2)
The applicant nust provide assurance that *ne ECCS pumps can function for an ex* ended time (maintanence free) under the nost limiting post-LOCA c ondi tions.
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9 57.
Acciticnal LOCA B reak Scectrum - (t. 3.4 )
The applicant was requested to submit two additional LOCA analyses to complete the La Salle break spectrtn.
These were as follows:
( a)
The cesign basis accident with a discharge cefficient of 0.6, and (b) A small break analysis for a recirculaticn line break of 0.02 square feet.
The applicant has nct submitted these analyses
- 58. LCCA A nalysis - (6. 3.4)
The applicant analyzed a coincident instantaneous closure of a flow ccntrol valve during a LCCA which resulted in a 3u0 increase in peak clad temperature.
<,e requested that this accident be reeval uated consicering more realistic valve closure dynemics.
59.
C rerator Acticn - (6. 3. 4)
The applicant nust show that adequate time is available for operator action to restore core cooling prior to excessive core heatings as a result of a crack in residual heat reroval lire.
60.
A r.alysis of C rack in the RER L ine - (6. 3. 4 )
In the applicant's analysis to evi.uate a crack in the residual heat recaval line that was postulated to occur during normal shutdown ccoling, operator action is indicated to restore Coru cooling. We require the applicant to show that adequate t ime is available for operator action.
61.
Civersion of L cw P ressure Ccolant i njection Systen - (6. 3. 4 )
Low pressure coolant injection ficw can be Jiverted to wetwell and drvwell scray and suppressicn pcol cooling. The acclicant must demonstrate that adequate core cooling is naintained when divers ton is consi::ered.
62.
R aciolacical P rctecticn of Control Recc Hability System - (6.4.1)
In order for the staff to accept the control rcon habitability systen against potential airocrne radiaticr, the applicant must ccmit to (l) nanualy actuate the recirculaticg charcoal filter when the ccatrol rcom receives a high radiation alarm frco the outside intakes, anc (2 )
yearly test the filter train in conjun: tion with the testing of the once-through charcoal filter.
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- 63. Physical Secaraticn and Electrical I solation - ( 7.1. 4,
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,. 6. 3 )
In the applicant's design, class l E instrumentation do not adhere to adequate separation criteric, have not keen qualified, and do not adhere to separation of Class IE to non-class IE instrumentation 64.
Test T echnicLes - (7.1.1)
In order to perform routine surveillance testing, it is necessary for the applicant to pull fuses.
'se consider that this design does not satisfy the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971 Pa ragraphs 4.11 and 4. 20.
65.
S afety System S etcoints - (7.1.4)
Ine range of class l E system sensors may be exceeded in the worst-case combination of setcoint and accuracy.
66.
D rawings - (7.14,7. 3. 3 cnd 7. 6. 3) h one line drawings and schematics contradict the functional control crawings and system description wnich are provided in the FSAR.
Fu rthe rmo re,
contact utilization charts contradict the actual schematics.
- 67. S afety - R elated D isolay - (7 )
The design of the safe shutdown indication does not satisfy the requirements of IEEE Stc 279-1971, Paragrapn 4.20.
68.
R cc B lcck.Ycnitor - (7. 6. 3)
Tne applicant does not agree that the rod black monitor is a orotection syst en.
69.
NSIV L eakage C cntrol S yster - (7.6.3)
' e identified a single failure to the MSI'/ leakage control system which could lead to possible f ailure of the system during testing or operation.
70.
S tancby icuid C cctrcl System - ( 7. 6. 3 )
In Fi gure 307E161"0 Sheet 3, the heater supplies fcr the standby liquid control system are not shown to be diverse.
- 71. F eecwater C ontrol System - (7. 7. 3)
Tne feedwater h gh level trip is a non-class lE contol system which is required to provide adequate margin during certain transients.
Sufficient inf ormation on this system has not been provided.
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. 72. L cw cr D egraded G rid V oltage - (8.2.2 )
La Salle's electrical system does not meet our requirements for protection under low or degraded grid voltage condit;ons.
73.
O nsite P cwer Systems - (3. 3. 2)
Test results for the diesel generators to indicate margin have not been s ubmitted.
74.
R eactcr C ontainment E lectr cal P enetrations - (3. 4.1) i The reactor containment electrical penetrations do not conform to Regulatory Gulde 1.63 and test results do not demonstrate that the electrical penetrations can maintain their integrity for maximum fault current.
75.
Acecuacy of the 120-V c1t Alternating C urrent R eacter P rctection System P cwer S uccly - (c. 4. 7 )
The applicant cornitted to the generic resolution or to expedite their license will comnit to the surveillance requirement which were applied t o ha t ch 2.
76.
Thermal 0 vericac P rotection Bycass - (3.4. 9)
We require the applicant to provide the detailed analysis and/or criteria which was used to select the setooints for the thermal overload protection devices for valve motors in safety systems and the details as to how these devices will be tested.
77.
E cui tment arc F Iccr D rainage System - ( 9. 3. 2 )
Sufficient inf;rmation has not been provided on the ability of the level monitoring and alarm systems to meet the single failure criterion with regard to orotection from flooding in safety-related areas, or on the capability of the systens to handle flooding due to pipe breaks.
73.
Ccntrol R ccm Heating, V entilation, and A ir C cnditioning System - (9.4.1)
The isolation of the control room area from racicactive materials and toxic gases does not meet the single f ailure criterion in that both motor operated isolation valves receive a signal to close from the same control circuit. A failure of that control circuit could result in radioactivity or toxic gases entering the control area.
79.
F ire P rotecticn - (9. 5)
We have not completed our i eview of fire protection. 2b2 nL 3L 80. D iesei G eneratcr A uxiliary Systems - (9. 6.3) The Stancard, ANSI N-195, is not referenced in the FSAR in accordance with Section 9. 5.4 of SR P. Le require ccnformance to this standard or j ustification for any deviations frco this standard. 31. I nitial T est P rograr s - (14 ) ( a) Sufficient information has not been provided to ccrcl ude that testing will be performed in accordance to Regulatory Guides 1.20, 1.68,
- 1. 6d. 2 a nd 1.80.
( b) he have not ccH a* ed our review of test plans for systems and components t: liuigate ATWS. ( c) Responses to our positions were not satisfactorily and additional inforration is required. ( c) Additional information is recuired for 30 preoperat:cnal tests and 16 sti'rtup tests austracts. 82. F ailure of the Feecwater Centroller - ( 15.1 ) The applicant's analysis for the f ailure of the feedwater controller indicates that the temcerature drop is no greater than 100 F. At a domestic boiling water reactor an actual feedwater temperature occurred which demonstrated a temperature difference of 150 F. The applicant must justi'j the decrease in temperature deco used for this event or recalcul ate the transient by using a J ustified temperature decrease to assure conformance with applicable criteria. 83. P urro C castdcwn C haracteristic - (15.1) For the transient analysis of power loss to both recirculatior, pu ps, the applicant assumes pump CoastCown Characteristics. We require that these pump coastdown characteristics be verified during preoperational testing. Any deviations which would suggest a nonconservative analysis of transient or accidents must be explained. 84 U se of N onrealible E cu crent ir A ntici;ated O cerational 'ransients - (15.1) d In analyzing anticipatec cperaticnal transients, the applicant took credit for equipment which has not been shown to be reliabla. Cur position is that tnis equiprent be identified in the technical specifications with regard to availability, setpoints and surveillance testing. The applicant must submit its plan for implecenting this requirement along with any syster modification that may be required to ful fill the requirement. '0b ,? 0 } . y 4 u t. .s
.. 8 S. U se of M on-S afety G race E cuicment in S haft S eizure - Accident ,15.2) The applicant inc' uded the use of non-safety grade ecui;clent in hi' analyses for shaft seizure and shaft break accidents. We require _ at these accidents be reanalyzed without allowance for the use cf non-safety grade equi prent. 36. AT kS - ( 15,2.1 ) We require that the applicant agrees to implement pl ant modifications on a schedular basis in conformance with the Connission's final resolution o f A TW S. In the event that La Salle starts operation before necessary plant modifications are inplemented, we require sore interin actions be taken by La Salle in order to rcduce, further, the risk from ATWS events. The applicant will be required to: (1) Develop emergency procedures to train operators to recognize an ATWS event, including consideration of scram indicators, rod position indicators, fl ux moni* ors, vessel level and pressure indicators, relief valve and isolation valve indicators, and containment temperature, pressure, and radiation indicator.. (2 ) Train operators to take actions in the event of an ATWS incl uding consideration of immediately mar.ual scramning the reactor by using the manual scram buttons followed by changing rod scram switches to the scram position, stripping the feeder breakers on the reactor protection systen power distribution buses, ccening the scram discharge volu:le drain valve, prompt actuation of the standby liquid control systen, and prompt placement of the RHR in the pcol cooling made to reduce the severity of the containment conditions. d 7. Technical S cecifications - (16 ) .,e have not completed our review of Technical Scecifications. 38. Q uality A ssurance - ( 17.0 ) ( a) The applicant's response to our pcsitions for the quality assurance program for fire protection i; inconplete. ( s) A descripticc of wnich acceptable revision nunber of tocical recort for quality asserance for the Common Wealth Edison Company intended to apply to La Salle has not been clearly crovided. Cur reccmendations are for La Salle to comit to Revision 6. ( c) The applicant has not provided specific comit'lents or acceptable alternatives to Regulatory Guides and ANS: Standards for the operation phase. < r. jF ,l. a &a u> } .no
. (c) Adequate justification to incl ude the dryers, steam separators and certain reactor components ( feedwater soarger, jet puno instrumentation) from being under the cantrol of the La Salle quality assurance program f cr maintenance and cudification during cperation phast has not been described. ( e) Any exceptions taken by the La Salle,uality assurance progran from the Commonwealth Edison Company Topical Report on quality assurance should be enumerated in Section 17 cf the FSAR.
- 89. F inancial Q ualifications - (20)
We have not ccapleted our financial qualifications review. ') 'i,5 .n -l 4UJ mor ju}}