ML19221A893

Reg Guide 1.68,Revision 2, Initial Test Programs for Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants

ML19221A893
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/31/1978
From:	NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
To:
References
REGGD-01.068, REGGD-1.068, NUDOCS 7907100257
Download: ML19221A893 (23)

Text

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Revision 2

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION August 1978

@ (M'vNREG ZATORY GCDE c%

e OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT REGULATORY GUIDE 1.68 INITIAL TEST PROGRAMS FOR WATER-COOLED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS A,

INTRODUCTION tested to (1) proside for safe normal operation and high tolerance for system malfunctions and trarsients, f2) en-Sectioi 50.34, " Contents of Applications: I.cchnical sure that, in the es ent of errors, malfunctions, and off-Informat on, ' of 10 CFR Part 50, " Domestic Licensir:p normal conditions, the reactor protection systems and of Prodt ction and Utih7ation Facilities,' requires, m other design features will arrest the esent or limit its part, tha: an applicant for a license to operate a produc-consequences to defined and acceptable levels, and (3) j tion or utilization facihty melude the pnneipal design ensure that adequate safety margin exists for esents of crueria for the proposed facility n the safety analysis extremely low probability or for arbitrarily postulated l'

report (SAR). De introduction to Appendix A. "Ge,-

hypothetical esents witho'ut substantial reduction in the eral DeNgn Cntena for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CI R s;fety margin for the protection of public health and Part 50 states that these principal design critena are to gre t establish the necessary design, fabrication, construc-l tion, testing, and performance requirements for strue While it is required that all stmetures, systems, and

{ tures, systems, and components important to safety, components importar.t to safety be tested, it is not re-l i.e., structures, sy stems, and components that proside quired that all of them be tested to the same stringent l reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated requirer ents. Specifically, Critenon 1 of Appendix A l without undue risk to the health and safety of itc to 10 CFR Part 50 requires, in part, that stmetures, sys-public.

tems, and components important to safety be tested to quality standards commensurate with the importance of Section XI, " Test Control, of Appendix H,

" Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants the safety functions to be perf ormed.

and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, ' to 10 CFR Pan 50 re-A graded approach is also inherent in the testing re-quires that a test program be established to ensure that quirements of Critenr VI of Appendix B to 10 CFR stmetures, systems, and components will perform satis-Part 50.

factorily in sersice. Since all functions designated in the general design entena tGDC) are important to safety, Section 50.34 of 10 CFR Part 50 sho requires, in all stmetures, suteras, and components required to pe'r_

part, that the applicant include plan, im preoperational form these functions need to be tested to ensure that testmg and initial operations in the fir.d afety analysis

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they will perform properly. Rese functions, as noted report (FSAR). Chapter 14 of Regulatory Guide 1.70, throughout the specific GDC, are those necessary to en.

" Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Re-3ure that specified design conditions of the facihty are pord for Nuclear Power Plants, ' prosides guidance on

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not exceeded during ans condition of normal operation, the informatmn per,aimng to mitial test programs to be including anticipated operational occurrences, or as a re.

included in both the preliminary safety analysis repon i

sult of patulated accident conditions.

(PSAR) and the FSAR for the NRC staff to perform its safety evaluations for constmetion permits and operat-lne GDC and this guide recognize and provide for ing licenses successise les els of plant features f.or achieving safety I

of the facility. His is to proside for a systematic ap-His guide describes the general scope and depth of proach to the " defense-in-depth" concept. h corcept initial test programs acceptable to the NRC staff for requires that the plant be designed, constn.cted, and light-water-cooled nuclear power plants. Appendix A to this guide prosides a representative listing of the plant

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tures and performance capability tests that should be complished in a cost-ette : tis e m.mner I bcu mentation !

Jemonstrated during the initial test program. No par-asweiated with testmp su ch as pnwedures and records ticular significance should be attached to the order in should be commensurate sith the importance to saf ety which the tests are listed, although, in general, those of the item bemg tested i

under t. Preoperanonal Testing 'should precede those listed unacr "2. Initial Fuel I oading and Prccritical lo panide for the des elopment and sate execution of Tests, - and so on Appendix 11 to this guide prosides the initial test program, the applicant should formulate information on inspections, relating te initial test pro-ads ance plans for the entire testing program prior to grams, that will be perf ormed by the NRC Ottice of completion of the NRC staf f's construction penmt re-Inspection and Enforcement. Appendix C to this guide siew. Ilecause of the complexity of these tests and the proudes guidance on the preparation of procedures for large amount of nunpower needed for descloping m,d the conduct of imtial test programs.

executmp the complete program, it h important for the apphesnt to pae early considet tion to the followin"o.

The Adsisory Committee on Reactor Saf7puards has been consulted concerning this puiJe and has concurred

1. Definmg the respon,ibilities of the organization in the regul atory position.

that will carry out the program. Ihis should include the degree of participatmn of principal design organizations B.

DISCUSSION in tonnulatmg test objectises and acceptance criteria.

The apphcant for a construction pernut or operating

2. Daeloping realistic schedules for the preparation license is responsible for ensunng that a suitable initial of detailed testing, plant operating, and emergency pro-(preoperanonal and startap) test nrogram will be con-cedures Schedules need to be cstablished for conduct.

ducted for the facihty. De primary objectises ot a suit-ing the nujor phases of the test program relatise to the able program are (1) to proside adddional awurance expected fuel loading date.

that the f acility has been adequately designed and, to j the extent practical, to s alidate the analytical models

3. Ihtablishing methods or plans for providing the i and to serify the correctness or conservatism of awump-necewary manpower at the tunes needed to maintam the tions used for predicting plant responses to anticipated schedules. If sersice contracts are to be used, it is transients and postulated accidents and (2) to proside necewary to hase suf ficient trained staf f for good con-anurance that constniction and installation of equip-tract management. Ilinny and traimng schedules for the l "1ent in the facility hase been accomplished ir accord-plant operating and technical staf f need to be estab-ance with design. Other key objectises are to lished so that experienced and qualified personnel will i familiarize the plant operating anJ technical stalf with be as ailable for the des elopment of testing, operating, j the operation of the facility and to senfy by 'nal use, to and emergency procedures. It is important to consider l the extent p actical, that the facility operating proce-the ettects on statting that could result f rom oscrlapping dures and the emergency procedures are adequate. Ini-mitial test progra.ns at multi-unit sites tial test programs satisfsing thne objectises should pro,ide the necewary as[urance that the facilits can be

4. Formulating administratise controls to posern the operated in accordance with design requirements and in development and conduct of the initial test program in-a manner that will not endanger the health and safety of cluding (a) controh that will provide for orderly turn-the public.

mer of plant systems and components from construc-tion forces or other pr.liminary checkout groups to the l As mentioned in the Introduction, the test program is preoperational testing group for testing and (b) controls required to include suitable 'esting of all strut tures, sys-that will ensure that general prerequisites such as com-tenn, and components important to safety. Iloth Ap-pletion cf construction, construc: ion or preliminary l pendices A and B to 10 CI R Pait 50 recognize that tests, and inspections wdl be satisfied prior to preopera-some structures, systems, and components are more tional and'or startup tests of individual systems or com-important to safety than others. For example, those ponents.

structures, systems, and components that are designated as Seismic Category ! by %gulatory Guide 1.29 Establishment > early plans for using available in-

" Seismic Design Clmification, ' are considered more formation on e Mg experience, includmg reportable imponant to safety than some of :he other structures, occurrences from aber operating power reactors, is im-systems, and components that are identified as impor-pm.fant in the deselopment and conduct of the rest pro-tant to safety in the functional design criteria of Appen-gram to help minimize recurrence of significant prob-dn A to 10 Cl R Part 50. It is not intended that the lems that could have been avoided by more complete same test requirements be established for all structures, testing. If new, unique, or first-of-a4 rd principal de systems, and components important to safety. A graded sign features will be used in the facility, the in-plant approach to testing should be implemented m order that functional testing requirements neces.ry to serify their adequate assurance, considering the importance to perfornunce need to be identified at an early date to safety of the item, is prosided that the item will perfonn permit these test requirements to be appropriately ae-satisfactorily while, ai the same time, the testing is ae-counted for in the final design.

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1.68-2

The initial test program conusts of preoperanonal and C. REGULATORY POSITION initial startup tests Preoperational testing, as used in

. % this cuide, consnts of those tests conducted f ollowine

1. Criteria for Selection of Plant l'eatures To Ik compicuon of construction and construction related m1 Tested

-e mections and tests, but pnor to f uel loadmg, to demon-Each applicant or licensee should prepare and conduct st ate, to the extent prancal, the capabihty of struc-an initial test program to demonstrate that the @t can tu rt % sy sems, and components to meet perfonnance be operated in accordance with deugn requiren$cnts im-requirements to satisfy deugn entena.

portant to atety, as defined by Appendix A to 10 Cl R Initial startup testmp, as used in this gmde, consnts Pan 50. Suitable tests should be conducted to senfy the of those test actaitics scheduled to be perfonned durine pedormance capabihties, as delineated in Appendix A and following fuel loading. These actnities include fue'l to 10 CFR Part 50 of structures, sy stenn, and compo-loadmp, preentical tests. initial enticahty, low-power nents that:

tests, and power-ascension tests that confirm the design

a. Will be used f or shutdown and cooldown of the bases and demonstrate, to the extent practical, that the reactor under nonnal plant conditions and for nuintain-plant will operate in accordance with design anJ is cap' ine the reactor in a safe condition for an extended shut-able of responding as designed to anticipated transients dow n peiiod.

and postulated accidents as specified in the S AR

b. Wdl be used for shutdown and cooldown of the The init:al test program should be designed to dem-reaoor under tranuent unfrequent or nnleratch fre-o strate the perfonnance of structures, systems, com-quent es ents) conditions and postulated accident conds-ponents, and design features that will be used durinF nons and for maintainine the reactor in a safe condition normal operations of the facility and also demonstrate for an extenJed shutJown period following such condi-the performance of standby sy stems and f eatures that nons.

must f unction to maintain the plant in a safe condition m the esent of malfunctions or accidents. It is serv im.

c. Will be used for establishing conformance with

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portam that the sequence of -tartup tests be ordered so safety limits or limiting conditions for operation that the safety of the plant is neser totally dependeit on that will be included in the f acility technical the perfonnance of untested structures, 9 stems, and specifications.

componcits

d. Are classified ai engineered safety features or will The NRC staff's safety es aluations of initial test pro _

be relied on to support or ensure the operations of en-

~ grams are based on information prosided m the PS AR gineered safety features within design limits.

This ir ornution is used to support dec"

e. Are assumed to funcuon or for which credit is and FSAR r

siorn to issue a consa tetion permit or operating hcense taken in the accident analysis of the facility, as de-The mf ormation prosiaed in SARs is also used by the scribed in the FSAR, and NRC Othee of Inspection and Entorcement as a basis for the inspection actnities associated with initial test

t. Will be used to pn> cess, store, control, or linut the progran.s. The satisfactory perfornance of approsed release of raJioactise materials.

test programs provides the confirmanon that aJequate Appe A to du.s gmh pnWes a mpmwnune mareins of safety exis' such that there is no unoue risk to the health and' safety of the public as a result of facil-ng 9 m nn t tnkd and pdonnance cap es nwnam to saf ety, a, def,.ined by Appendix its operat'on~

A to 10 Cl R Part 50, that should be demonstrated for The power-ascension test phase of the initia! test pro-bght-water-cooled nut!mr power plants flowes er, ap-gram should be completed in an orderly and expeditious p cants should also conduct in-plant testiug to serify H

manner. Failure to complete the power-ascension test the adequacy of construction, installation, and design phase within a reasonable penod of time may indicate for other 9 stems and design features not listed in Ap-inadequacies in the applicant's operating and mainte-pendit A if the 9 stems or design features meet any of nance capabilities or may result from bauc design prob-the abos e critena.

lems. Aho, deugn or construction-related problems The imual test pmeram mas be deseloped and im-dnclosed dunny power-ascen aon testing can be more plemented usme a gr'aJed approach. The graded ap-readik rectif.ieu if the reactor power pnxiuction, a%

proach 40uM ensum th k gmamst auenhon b gMn consequently the radioactise buildup, has been kept to a to the most important strut tures, systems, and compo-mmimum o tring this testing phase.13aseline data on the nents such as those considered engmeered safety fea-perf ormanc( of plant 9stenn obtained and documented early in the plant hfe wdi pernnt early determination of degradation or undesirable trends

2. Prerequisites for Testing Appendix A references exnting regulatory guides that The consimction or installation of structures, sys-are applicable to imtial test programs. The referenced tems, and components should be essentially completed O1 s

t truet ms could guides proside detailed guidan;e for particular tests.

00 e degree that cutstandin 1 M-3

not be expected to attect the s ahdity of test resulta Enf orcement appnnimately 60 day s poor to their in-i The designated construction-related inspections and tended use.

I tests should also be completed pnor to begmning preop-Prior to commencement of fuel loading, results of crational tests.

ompleted preoperational tests should be esaluated by l

Tests designated in the i SAR as preoperatmnal tests personnel or groups designated by the apphcant. Ap-

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should be completed and the results of such tests prepriate remedial actions, incluJmp retesung, should esaluated and approsed by the applicant prior to iv be taken if acceptance critena are not satisfied.

suance of the Operating 1.icense. De oser dl test pro-

5. Schedule gram should also include surveillance tests necewary to demonstrate the proper operatien of mterlocks, set-Suf ficient tins should be scheduled to perform or-j points, and other protectn e teatures, sy stems, and derly and comprehernis e testing. l he applicant 's equipment required by the technical specifications.

schedu;cs for conJucting the preoperational phase and Administratne controls should be established to ensure the initial startup phase should proside for a minimum adequate retest of systems or design features returned to time of approximately 9 months and 3 months, respec-construction custody, maintained, or modified during or tis ely.

followine preoperational testing.

6. Participatie of Plant Operat.mg and Technical

3. Scope, Testing Conditions, and Ixngth of Testing StalT Re initial test program should include 'o the extent ne apphcant's plant operating and plant technical practical, simulation of the ef fects of control sy stem and staf f should participate, to the extent practical, in the i

equipment failures or maltunctions that could rea-desclopment and conduct of the imual test program and sonably be expected to occur during the plant lif etime.

the es aluation of the test results.

De test program doulJ also incluJe testine to deter-mine that the system and component mteractmns are m

7. liial-Testing of Plant Operating and Emergenes t

edures accordan & with design To the extent practical, the plant conditions dunny the tests should simulate the a'-

Plant operatmp and emergency procedures should, to tual operating and emergency conditions to which the the extent practical, be deseloped, trial-tested, and cor-structure, system, or component may be subjected To rected dunng the ininal test program prior to iuel load.

the extent practical, the duration of 'he tests should be ing to estabhsh their adequacy.

l su f ficient to permit equipment to Nach its normal

8. Stilestones and Power lloid Po, ts m

equihbnum conditions, e.g temperatures and pres.

sures, and thus decrease the probability of failures, in-Appropriate hold points should be established by the cluding "run-in' type fadun s, f rom occurnng during applicant at selected milestones throughout the power-plant operanon ascension test phase to ensure that relesant test results

4. Procedures are esaluated and approved by personnel or groups des-ignated by the applicant pnor to progrewing with the Re initial test program should be conducted us;1g power-ascension test phase. As a minimum, hold points test pn>cedures that include appropriate checklists. id should be established for PWRs a' approximately 25';

(

signature bhicks to control test pertornunce and C.e

,e-Smi, and 75'; power lesel test conditions and for quence of resting. The test procedurc. shooM be de-IlWRs at apprepnate power to-flow test conditions.

teloped and resiewed by personnel with appropnate

.echnical background-and experience The procedares

9. Test Reports should receise final approval by pusuas tilling nesig-Re preoperational testing procedures and resul.

nated management positions within the appheam's or-shoulJ be retained as part of the plant historical recort g aii tion Acceptance critena that account for the un-A summary of the startup testine should be included in i certainties used in transient and accident analyses a startup report as discuwed in Regulatory Guide I. li.

shou:j be included as part of each test procedure. Pro-

.. Reporting of Operating Information- \\ppendn A cedures should ensure that temporary instrument cables Technical Specifications. This summary should in-and test leads used dunng the staitup test phase are clude:

routed in a manner that will not compromise electrical

, separation ente ia. Principal design organizations

a. A desenption of the test method and objectises for should participate in e,tablishing test performance re-each test.

quirements and test acceptance enteria. Available in-h A mgson M Wiable test data with the ac-formaaon on operating experience, incluJing reportable certance enteria, includine the response of the systenw occurrences at operating power reactors, should be used to major plant transients such as scram and turbine trip.

appropriately in the desch pment and execution of the test procedures. Approved test procedures f or satisfying

c. Deficiencies relating to design and construction FSAR testing commitments should be made asailable to f ound during conduct of the tests, system modifications NRC staff personnel from the Office of Inspection and and correctise act ons required to correct these deficien-

\\2b. b, I 1.68-4

l cies, and the schedule for implementing these modifica-formation to applicants regarding the NRC staf f's plans tions and correctise actions unless presiously reponed for using this regulatory guide.

to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes

d. Justification for acceptance of systems or compo-an acceptable attematise method for complying with nents not in confonnance with design predictions or specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the performance requirementt method desenbed herein wi l be used in the esaluation l

of constmetion pennit and operating license applica-

e. C,ontiusions regarding system or component ade tions docketed af ter August 15, l978 I

quacy.

If an applicant wishes to use this regulatory guide i 1 D.

IMPLEMENTATION Jesetoping submittals for applications dxLeted on or before August 15, l'DS, the pertinent ponions of the l Ihe purpose of this section is to proside f urther in-application will be esaluatei on the basis of this guide.

\\,o 27 c

z 1.68-5

APPENDIX A INITIAL TEST PROGRAM I, Preoperational Testing tures, sy stems, and components as appropriate for the facility. Preoperational tests should not be limited to f ollowing plant construction, tesong should be ac-the hsting provided in items a. through o. since addi-comphshed to demonstrate the proper performance of to I or dif ferent tests may be dictated by the par-structures, sptems, components, and design feaiures t cular pla it design and/or the nomenclature app!ied m the assembled plant. To ensure sahd test results, to plant sprems and features.

the prcoperational tests should not proceed until the con w non of the syste: has been essentially com-

a. Reactor Coolant Sptem pleted and the designated consticction tests and h reactor coolant ss stem include-all those inspn oons have been satisfactorily completcd. t on-pressure-contamine u..uponents such as pressure ses-structton and preliminary tests and inspections tspi-cally consist of items suth as initial instrument cah.-

sels, pipine, pumps, and sabes within tLe reactor coolant pressure boundary as defined in paragraph bration, flushing, cleanim:, wiring cononuity and 50.2tv) of 10 CFR Part 50 separation checks, hydrostatic pressure tests, and f ut.ctional tests of components.

(1) /ntegrored Sy sicms Te s t. Espansion and re-Preoperational tests should demonstrate that struc-traint tests to confirm acceptability of clearances and u re s, sy stems, and components will operate in ac-displacements of sesseh, pipine, pipmg hangers, and W oh hade bwort, or restraining cordance with design in all operating modes and desiees in the as-built sy stem during normal hot func throughout the lull desien operatmp rance.I.est:ne tmnal testi,g plant conditions. Hot and'or cold test-9 should include, as approp'riate, manual operan.on, op-M im ulum cem of cratmn of sy stems and components within s> >tems, auiuliary y stems.

automatic operation, og cration in all alternate or secondary modes of control, and operation and ser-( 2) Con.ponent Te3t3. Appropriate tests and meas-ification tests to demonstrate expected operanon fol-urements of the following reactor coolant sy ste m lowing low of power sources and degraded moJes for componentt which the systems are designed to remain opera (a) Pressuriter.

tional Tests should also include, as appropriate, (b) Pumps, motors, and associated power serifications of the proper functioning of instrumenta-sourcet tion and controls, permisW and prohiF.i interlocks, and equipment protectiu desiees wb.ne malfunction (c) Steam generators.

or premature actuation may shut down or defeat th(

(d) Prewure relici s abes and awociatcJ dump operation of sptems or equipment System vibration-tanks and supports and restraints f or discharge

expansion iin discrete temperature step m.a

ments),

piping.

l and restraint tests should also be conducted This (c) N1ain steam isolation sabes.

l testing should include urification by obsers aiions t and measurements, as appropriate. that piping and (t) Other sabes.

component mosements, sibrations, and expansions (g) Inst umentation used for monitoring sy stem

are acceptable for f 1) ASME Code Claw 1, 2 and 3 performance or performing permissise and prohibit j sptems. (2) other high-energy piping sprems inside interlock functions.

l Seismic Category I structures, (3) hih-energy por-(h) Reactor sessel and.nternais. mcluding reac-tions of sptems whose failure could reduce the func~

tor internals sent s abes.

1 tioning of ans Seismic Categors I plant feature to an unacceptable'lesel, and (4) Seisn.ic Category i por-(i) Safety sabes.

I j tions of moderate-energy piping sy stems located out-(J ) Jet pumps.

I side containment.

(3) Vibraimn Tests. Vibration monitoring of reac-The structures, sy stems, components, and tests for internals ' and of other components such as piping listed in items a. through o. of this section ar. repre.

sptems, heat exchangers, and rotating machinery.

sentatise of the plant features that should undergo g pg.mre h l Inte m Tc3ts. I h drosta-preoperational testing. The listing is prosided to ind'-

tic tests; obtain baseline data for subsequent ibersicc care the exten' of testing necewary to demonstrate testing.

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that the facility can be operated in accordance with design requirements. In general, items a. through o.

1L make no distinction between prewurized water reae-l tors and boiling water reactors. An apphcant may

' RcFulaton Guide 1 20 To Wernn e h auon Auew.

rnent Program for Reauor Inwouls Dunng Preoperanonal anJ j

comb.ne tests of items h.sted in this appendis and inaut stanup lesung. 'sWJ be uscJ as guid.inte for ubra-i should include preoperational tests of the listed struc-tmn rnonnonng d reator iraerna:s and other component.

I M-6

b. Reactisity Control Systems onstrate redundancy, electrical inJependence ' coin-cidence, and ute tailure on loss of power. If appio-l (1) Control Rod h ste-Test 3. Demonstrate nor-priate f or the facility design, demonstrate operibihty A

mal operation and scram capability of the control of backup scram solenoid sabes and devices, includ-rods (BWR) and control rod drise sy st, m. Demon-ing detectors, logic, and final control elements to strate proper operation of functiot such cs control protect the f acilits for anticipated transients without rod withJrawal mhibit features, runback features, rod m MTm ~

w:tndrawal seuuence control desices, and rod worth minimiters. Den'onstrate proper operation of rod po.

d. Residual or Decay lleat Remosal Systems sition instrumentation and proper interaction of the Verity operability of systems and design features control roJ drise sy stem with other sysums and de-prosided or relied on to dissipi te or channel thermal sign features such as automatie reactor power control energy f rom the reactor to the atmosphere or to the sy stems and ref ueling equipment. Demonstrate main condenser or other sy stems f ollowing of f-proper operation, including correct failure mode on normal conditions or anticipated transients, including loss of power, for the control rod drise system and reactor scram. Verify operability of sy stems and de-proper operation of sy stem alarmt sign teatures prosiJed lor makeup of coolant, to dis-sipate resiJual heat, to cool the reactor down to a (2) Chemical Control Sy stem feats. Verify proper cold shutdown condition, and to maintain long-term blending of boron solution anJ water, uniform mie coolirg. Tests should be conducted as appropriate to ine, adequae) of sampling and analytical techniques, serify redundancy and electrical inJependence ' The op'eration of heaters and heat tracing, and operation foMowing list is illustratis e of the sy stems and com-of irstrumentation, controls, interlocks, and alarms.

ponems that should be tested:

demonstrate proper rate injection into the teactor (1) Turbine bypass sabes.

coolant system and rate of dilution from the primary mtem. Venfy redundancy, electrical independence, t h Steam line atmosphene dump vahes.

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and operability of sy stem components. Demonstrate (3) Relief sabes correct tailure mode on low of power to sisten' N) Safety s ahes.

components.

(5) Decay or resiJual Feat remova! sy stem 9y (3) Standhv Liquid Control S ucm Tnto Demen-3 th) Reactor core holation cooling system.

strate proper operation of the sy stem with de-mineralized water. Verify proper mixing of solution (7) Main steam isolation sab es, branch steam and adequacy of sampling system. Demonstrate isolation sabes, and nonreturn sabes.

operability of instrumentation. controls, in terlock s, (S) Auxiliars feedwater ss stems. Testine should and alaims. \\ erify operability of heaters, air spar-include demonstrations that th'e sy stems will' meet de-

~

gers, and heat tracing. Conduct test firings of sien performance requirements at approximatelv squib-actuated s abes, and demonstrate design normal operating primary and secondary coolant sys-i injection capability. iests should be conducted as tem pressures and temperatures and oser the ranye of appropriate to serify redundane, and electrical expected steam generator lesels. Operability of sys-independence.

,em pumps, s ab es, controls, and instrumentation should be demonstrated, and, to the estent practical, ;

c. Reactor Protection System and Engineered-testing should prosiJe reasonable assurance that flow l Safety Feature Actuation Systems im tabilities, e g.

' water hammer, w ill no' accur in sy stem cornponents piping, or inside the steam Verify by test the response time of each ot the pro-generators during normal sy stem startup and tection 'chan nels, including sen sor s.- Acceptance i

criteria for the response time of the protection chan-opna t m n.

l nels should account for the respot.se time of the as-(9) Condensate storage sy stem.

! sociated hardware between the measured sariabla and (10) Emergency cooling towers.

the input to the senwr (snubbers, sensing lines, flow-limiting desices, etc.L Verify proper operation in all (11) Cooling w ater sy stemt combinations of logic; calibration and operabilits of

e. Power Cons ersion S.ystem primary sens irs; proper trip and alarm settir$gs; proper operaton of permiune, prohibit, and bypass The power cons ersion sy stem includes all compo-functions; an.: operability of bypass switche, Dem-nents prosided to channel the reactor thermal energy

' Reg ulatory juide I. ll x. "Penoda Tesu ng of I futne Power

'Regulatary buiJe 141, Prceperauonal Tesung of Redund int

@ able for r reoperano%1 tesung of protecnon dannels, and Protee mn SystemC ' proudes a test cotenon also anept.

Onsite I.lcunc Power Sy stems to Venfy Proper I.ead Group ieclud.

A ssig n me nt s.'

should be used as guidant e f or appropn ate ing sens irt te st s 125 329 1.68-7

during normal operation from the boundaries of the d.c. sy stems. Appropriate system and component reactor coolant sy stem to the main condenser and tesh should be conduc!cd to serify, to the extent those systems and components pro'ided for return of practical, that these systems will operate in accord-condensate and feedwater' f rom the main condenser ance with design to complete the cycle.

j,3 rd A f P hribusn Sun rm Appropnate sy stem expansion, restraint, and Demonstrate proper operation of protectise desices, operabihty tests should be conducted, to the atent initiating desices, relaying and logie, transfer and practical. for the following sy stenn and camponents:

trip desices, pernuwis e and prohibit interlocks.

(1) Steam generators.

instmnjentation and alarms, and load. shedding fea-turet resting should also be conducted to demon-(2) N1ain steam sy s tem strate proper operation and load-carrying capability of breakers, motor controllers, switchecar, transfor-(M N1ain steam isolation s alses.

men and cablet This testing shoulii simulate, as (O Steam generator pressure relief and safety closely as practical, actual sersice conditions, e g.

l salses fully loading motor control centers and operation of j supplied loads at rated conditions, etc. Redundancy !

(5) Steam extraction sy stem and electrical independence ' should be demonstrated I (N Turbine stop, control, bypass, and intercept where appropriate.

salses Tests shoulJ demonstrate that he integrated sys-(7) Slain condenser hotwell lesel control sy stem.

tem wW pedorm as peQnN to a Unqad oaMal,

and full loss of of fsite power sources. Fe sts uld I

'8) Condensate sy stem.

also demonstrate the design capability to trai.,fer l m on' e to o e power sourcet (9) Feedw ater sy stem.

(2) Emergency A.C. Pom er Diuribution Sy arm.

f l(D Feedwater heater and drain systemt I emonstrate proper operation of protectise desices, (1!) N1akeup w ater and chemical treatment relaying and logic, transf er and trip desices, permis-sy stems.

sive and prohibit interlocks, instrumentation and alarms, and load-shedding or stry, mg features. Test-l (12) Stain condenser auxilianes used for mam. tam-ng should also be conducted to demonstrate proper ing condec.ser ',acuum.

operation and load-carrying capability of breakers, f Waste Ileat Rejection Systems motor controllers, switchgear, transformers, and ca-bles. This testing should simulate, as clasely as prae-i T.he waste heat rejection ss stems include ss stems t cal, actual sersice conditions, e.g., fully loading and components prosided to remose the unused or motor control centers and operation of supplied loads w asted thermal energy from sy stems such as tnt at rated conditions. Tests should demom.trate that power consersion and residual heat remosal system emergency or sital loads will start in the proper se-and to channel or direu this energy to the ensiron-quence and operate under simulated accident condi-ment. Tests should be conducted as appropriate to tions with both the normal tpreferred) a.c. power scufv redundanev ar i electrical ' Jependence., Ap-

~

~

sourceh) and the emergency htandby ) power source.

l propriate sy stem operability tests snauld also be con-ducted to demonstrate, to O extent practical, that limergency loads should also be tested to dem-the following waste heat rejection systems and com.

onstrate that they can start and operate with the ponents, including associated instrumentatmn and nmimum and minimum design soltage asailable. To controls, will perform as designed:

the extent practical, the testing of emergency or sital loads should be conducted for a suf ficient period of (1) Circulating w atei sy stem.

time to proside assurance that equilibrium conditions (2) Cooling towers and associated auxiliaries.

are auainel Sy stem redundancy and electrical inde-pendence should be serified by appropriate tests. '

(1) Raw water and sersice water cooling systenn.

Loads supplied from the system, such as motor g, Electrical Systems generator (m-g) sets with fly wheels, that are designed The plant electrical ss stems i.iclude the normal to pmvide noninterruptible power to plant loads l a.c. power distribution sistem, the emergency shou!d be tested to demonstrate proper operation. li l

' a.c.

power distnbution system including sital buses, the applicable for the facility design, testing should in-t emergenes a.c. power supplies or sources, and the clude underfrequency and undervoltage relays as-

~

sociated wi:h such m-g sets. Full-load tests for sital Id usig Nmd ad emn

• Regularors Guide 1681. ' Preopen nonal ar:J initial startup Tesung of iceJuter and ConJensue Spiems f or Umbng gency sources of power supp!ies to the bus. Testing Water Reunir Poa cr Pbras.' shoulJ be uscJ as guiJance for should also demonstrate the aJequacy of the plant's artroroaic testo emergency and essentia! lighting system. Tests 1.68-8 125 550

should be condutted to demonstrate the proper opera-worth minimi/ers f or boiling water reAtors. Since tien of indicatine anJ alarm desites used :o monitor engineered saf ety f eatures s ary f or ditterent plant de-the as ailibihty of the emergeon power sy stem m the signs, the inting below is only illustratise of those control room.

commonly used to present hmit, or mitigate the con-sequences of postulated accidents. It additional or tM Tmcro w or %mun i l.

l'on r %pphev ga g

g(

g

,e Appropriate tests should be conducted for emergency s ided aWan those listed below, they should also be ac po a er su ',hes to de.nonstrate sy stem rehabil-appropriately tested Additionally, it should be noted ity / redunJancy, electrical dependence, and proper that other categories of sy stems I.nted in Section I of soltace and tretIuencs reculation under transient and this appenda include plant tenures commonh desie-steady -state conditiont.\\uxiliary sy stems such as nated as engineered saf ety f eatures that shoulo. oe ap-those used for starting, cooling, heating, s entilating, propriately tested. for cumple, emergency a.c.

lubricating, and tuchng should also be appropnately power distribution sy stem [Section 1.g (2)), emer-tested io demonstr ite that their performance is in ac-gency or standby a.c power supplies [Section 1.g cordance w uh design resting should be condacted d)], the d.c. o stem (5cction I.g (4)}, and primars f or a sutlicient,eriod of time to ensure that equihb.

and secondary containments (Section 1.1).

num conJitions are atiamed.l.esting should also demonstrate the pmper logic correct setroints for lhe testing of ergineered safety teatures should tnp desices, and proper operation of imtiatmp desices demonstrate that such teatures will perf orm satatac-and pernussise anJ proh: bit interlocks and should torily in all expected operating coniipurations or a!so demonstrate redundancy and electrical independ-modet Testing should iaciude demonstrations of y

ence ' Emergency loads supphed should be con-proper operation of entiating desices, correct logic firmed to be m agreement with oesign si/ing auump-and setpoints, proper operatmn of bypasses, proper tioas used for the power supphes ^

operation of prohibit and perminise interlocks, and prooer operation of equipment protectise desices that (41 D C ', wm Demonstrate proper cahbration could shut dow n or def eat the operation or f unction-and in settmps o f. protectn e desices. including re-ine of such features (.oncurrent testine of sistems or laying, and proper operatmn of pernuwise and pro-ygatures prosided to ensure or suppor't the ' operation hibit interlockt Demonstrate design capability of bat ~

of enemeered saf ets feat u res should also be con-tery c hargers, transfer desices and ins erters. and the ducted to demonstraie that they meet design require-conducted to demonstrate proper operation of break-emercenes 1.chtin e u stems. Testing shou!d also be ments with the minimum number of operable compo-nents asailable for which these sygems are designed ers. transf er desices, i.aerters. and cables,This test-to f unction b, amples of these types of sy stems are ing should simulate. as closely as practical, actual heating, senti'ation, and air-conditioning sy stems sers ice conditions. Demonstrate operation of in-used to maintain the ensironment within design limits trumentation and alarms and ground detection in-in the s, paces housing engineered safety features, s t ru me n t atio n. Demonstrate redundancy anJ electn-coohng w ater..nd seal injection sy stems, and pro-cal independence ' and that actual total sy stem ani-tected comprewed pas supplies. Appropnate tests perage loads are in agreement with design loads. A should also be conducted to scrits tne f unctiomne of.

discharge test of each battay bank s,hould be con-protectise desices such as leaktight cos ers, struc-ducted at f ull load and f or design duration to demon-tures, or housmes s low pressure pneumatic or s ac-strate that the batters bank soltage minimum hmit and uum testsi prosided to protect engineered utety tea-

}

indniJual cell hmits are not exceeded tures f rom flooding or keep tull sy stems used to pre-P

h. Engineered Safety Features sent water hanuner and possible damage to fluid Enemeered safets teatures are those plant design teatures prosi.kd to pres ent, knut, oi nu:igate the Tests should be conducted as appropriate to serify tonwquentes of postulated accidents that are de-rcJundancy and electncal indcpendente. ' 'l he f ollow -

scribed in 6e saf ety analy sis report. For the,.rpme ing list is illustratis e of the sy stenn and components of this cuide engineered saf ety teatures incluJe tea-that should be tested:

tures that pres ent accidents f rom occurrinc or that

' I I E'" U'M ' "' r i "d"N " *"" I K Q bounJ accident assumptions such as cold water injec-tion mterlocks for pressuri/ed water reactors and rod s ai Pt rtorm espanuon and restr.unt tests.

7 (b) 1)emonstrate opeiability ining normal and

'Re n bior3 Gwe i im.

Pe r md a Teouy ot Inesel emergenc) [ ower supphes.

Generator if nits t' sed As ()n u e t le. Inc Pow er S y sh at Nu s

(c) wn stN!e < M i ulityjuV nudes.)f ip w ic ar h +w er El e nt s sf4 alJ N uscJ as ruiJame ! r armfisah!c 5

$5I ie u s y m2 5

e / L i aI.1 (ful]C l 9

sCl1,[tiin, l )f s j { p, a nd lp3l,[jL3 9 g,,q F

f< > lbesel fie" era or ilas i sO \\ s ( )" s I les h Pow er b s

' Rey e!arory (il dc ! M Pres taonal le m r e of Ner p y u

at Wee Po 4er PM s shoold be ascJ as p in c or Core Cooh ng Sy stem ior Preuun /cd W ater R eastors. ' prm gl,t Me 'em si !cs spet d n y mJant e for pre swn /cd w ater reas tors

.I

,I 2

L

l eranon, including design pump / system runout condi-operate in accordance with design r< quirements at the

. tmns and injection at required tiow rate and prewure.

containment design peak accident pressure.

l td) Demonstrate operability of interlock. and t10) I!/nmate hein 3inA i

isolation sabes prosiJcJ tor oserpressure protection for low pressure cochne mtems connected to the man andb.econdan O, nta,nments

! reactor coolant sy st :m. '

1.

i te) Demonstrate operability, including proper Appropriate rests should be conducted to demon-flow rates, f or u stems used for dilution of boron in strate that priinary ar.d secondary containments a ill the reactor sessel during post loss-of coolant.

function as Jesigned Testing methods and accept-I accident long-term cooling.

ance enteria f or such tests should give due considera-tion to all sy stems and components that most operate (2) f urodepre n a rt:atam e stem. Testing shoulJ for the containments to f unction as destyned. In cer-mclude items such as accumulator mpacity, relief tain designs, normally operating or mtermittently

,j sabes, and operability usmp all alternate power and operating sy stems may be required to shut dow n and pneumatic supphes.

isolate to achies e omtainment isolation. l or exam-(3) Containment pmtaa ident heat irmmalyo plc, the secondary containment sentilaaon sy stem in Il W R s is required to shut dow n and isolate the tr m t Testing of the containment snray sy stem should nonnal untuation patb to permit the standby gas include demonstrations that the spras no//les, spras heaJers, and piping are f ree of debriE; chemical addi-

!reatment sy stem to perf orm its design function.

tion systems operate properly; and proper transfer to Therefore, appropriate testing should be conducted to the retirculation phase can be accomplished demonstrate the operabihty of all components, fea-tures, and ss stems reouired to operate f or the primary

14) Containment < oml u stib/c xa3 control 94 t. m or secondary containment to function properly.

tincludes the backup purge sprem). l'or containment Due consideration should W,o be ghen to plant combustible gas control sy stems located outside con-such as heating s entilation, and air-features tainment, testing should include demonstration that the containment hydrogen monitormg is functional condinoning sy enq requi ed to maintain ensiron-without the operation of the hsdrocen recombmer.

rnental conditions within -lesign limits for compo-l'or hydrogen recombiners shared between plants or nents or equipnu nt prm k ed to chect containment s ould include demonstrations that the isolation. Testing should b( suf fiaent to demonstrate sites, tests h

shared recombiner can be transported and connected redundancy, electrical independence ' requirements to the combustible pas control ustem withm the tune for isolation sabes, and p oper operation of features

~

(including proper operatit n of desices upon loss stated in the I S AR.

or failure of motise power) i ros iJed for isolation s alses I

(5) Cold n ater inter /m A s. including logic, cir-and other desices. To th estent practical, it shouhl l cuitry, and final control desices used to piesent cold be Jemonstrated that isoistion desices perform m e l water injection into the reactor s essel quired under simulated a Vdent conditions. Th

.s th) Air return fans used in ice condenser contain-ing below is illustrathe of sy stems, features, and per-formance demonstratioas that should be included in ments and suppression pool ma eup sy stems used in i

llWR Mark Ill containments.

the test program:

(1) Containment design merpressure structural (7) Ventilation, recirculation, and filter u stem s prosided to minimi/c r: Jioactise releases as a result tesM W sacuum tests dor suNunospkne contain-of postulated accidents, including fuel handling accidents "

(2) Containment isolation sabe f unctional and (8) lan6 and other sours es of water used for closure timing tests.

ECCS. Testine should include demonstrations of (3) Containment isolation sabe leak rate tests "

j proper operatiIm of associated alarms, indicators,

! controls, heating and chilhng systems, and sabes.

and inicakage tests (for subatmospheric contain-ment s t (9) Contginment recirculation fans of used as part (4) Containment penetration leakage tests '"

of postaccident containment heat remos al sy stems).

Psting should include demonstrations that fans can (5) Containment airlock leak rate tests.'"

(6) Integrated containment leakage tests.'"

'Thoc tests should be consntent wah the prm nions of Regula-tory Ginde 152, "Deugn. Tesong, and Mamtenante Cracna

,Per Loon ill of the ASW lioder anJ Preuure Vessel Code for i nymeered Safetrican re Airnmphere Cleanup Sptem Aar f iltration and Adwrpnon ifnas of laght water Cooled Nuclear

The resuirements for suth tests ce gnen in Appenda J to 10 Power Plants '

CI R Part 5n l)J 1.68-10

In general, the sequences of testing should proceed bounded by the design of control and instrumentation from the low-pressure test to the accident-pressure setems (e g., pressurizer lesel or feedw ater flow test, or su'licient time should be allowed between control). In such cases, operation of the instrumenta-tests to ensure that oujassing from concrete or com-tion and controls oser the design operating range ponent s within the contairtaent will not af fect test should be performed, and the ef fects of limiting mal-results.

tunctions or failures should be sunulated to demon-W 8 " ""

I" "

(7) Main steara line leakage seahng sy stems.

validity of accident analy sis assumptions. lests

'4) Primny and seconu ry containment is,ola tion shoulJ be conducted, as appropriate, to senfy redun-imtiation logic t%.

dancy and electrical independence.'

(9) Containment purge ss stem tests.

T he listir3 prosided below is illustratise of in-

~

strumentation and control sy stems that should be in-(10) Co n t ai n m e n t and containmc nt ar ulus cluded in the test program (some of these tests can be s acuum-breaker tests-conducted in conjuncuon with the appropriate system (l I; Containment supplementary leak collection lesel testst and exhaust sprem tests.

(1) Pressurizer pressure and lesel control sptems.

(12) Containment tir punfication and cleanup sy s-(2) Ma n, auxiliary, and emergency feedwater con-tem tests.

tral sy stems.

(13) Containment inerting sy stem '

s.

(3) Secondary sy stem steam pressure control t14) Standby gas treatment sy stem tests.

q stent (15) Containment penetratian pressurization sys.

t4) Recirculation flow control sprem.

tem tests.

(5 n Reactor coolant sptem leak detection sptems.

(16) Containmen; sentilation sptem tests.

W Loose parts monitoring sptem.

t

(!7) SeconJars containment u stem sentilation til Lea,A detection systems used to detect failures l,'

in ECCS and containment recirculating spray sptems (18) ContMoment annulus and cleanup qstem located outside containment.

@1 tests, inel monstratine the ability to maintam I

' n all' modes of operation.

Automade reactor pown conuol sptem, inte-

+ design pressure w,.

grated control sy stem, and T-nerage control system.

t19) B, pass leakage tests on pressure suppression containments.

(9) Pressure control systems used to maintain de-sign dif ferential pressures to present leakage across (20) Ice-condenser containments. Suf ficient meas-boundaries prosided to contain fission products: for

urements should be made to ensure that gross bypass example, those used to pressurite spaces between

leakage paths are not present-containn ent isolation salus.

(21) Containment penetration cooling sptem tests.

t 1()) Seismic instrumentation.

J. Instrumentation and Control Sptems (11) Trasersing incore probe sprem.

The nomenclature applied to instrumentation and t12) Failed fuel detection sptem.

control systems sanes wide y with different plant de-l signs; howeser, the primary furctions are similar for (13) Incore ar I escore neutron mstrumentation.

all reactors. The principal functions of instrumenta-Inmunwntagon and controls that ef f.ect trans-(

tion and control ssstems are to (1) control the normal as of wau supphes to auuhry Mwatu pumps, operation of the facilits within design limits. (2) pro-vide information and Idarms in the control room to pump, an contamment spray pumpt monitor the operation and status of the facdity and to (15) Automatic dispatcher conaol sprems.

permit corrective actions to be taken for of f-normal plant conditions, (3) establish that the facility is t 16) Flotwell lesel control sptem.

operating within design and license limits, (4) permit (17) Feedwater heater temperature, lesel, and by-

~

er support the correct operation of engineered saf ety pass control sy stems.

features, and $5) monitor and record important parameters during and following postulated (18) Auxiliary startup instrument tests (neutron re-accidents.

sponse checks).

In the design of nuclear power plants, postulated (19) Instrumentation and controls used for shut-acciden' assumption, are often explicitly or implicitly dow n from outside the control room.

3(- ) ) )7 1.68-11

Egn==-_-__=murwatNehrw4BwultvlKwm M*vvvwmvhwwwwasew-mem vmuw (20) Instrumentation used to dricct external and and'or proper calibration of radiation detectors and j

=

internal floodmg Londitions that could result f rom mon dort 1

i 5

such sources as fluid 9 stem piping tailures

.T he tollow me int is illustratne of the mtems.

(21) Reactor mode switch and asumated f unc-c o m po ne n t s, and teatures w hose operabihty should nont be demonstrated during the test program.

(22) Instrumentation that can be used to track the (t) 1.iquiJ radioat tn e w aste handhng 9 stemt course of postulated accidents such as containment (2) Gaseous radioattk e waste handlmi' miemt wide-range preuure indicators, reactor sessel water les el monitors, containment sump or preuure sup-(3) Sol hi w aste handling ss stenn. Sididification presuon lesel momtors, high-range radiation detec-9 stem tests should include scritication thai no trec {

tion desites, and humidity monitors.

hquids

.e present m packaged wastet j

(23) Postaccident hydrogen monitors and analy /-

(4) Isolation f eatures for steam generator blow-ers used in the tombustible yn control 9 stem.

down.

124) Annunciators f or reactor control and en-(5) Isolation teatures f or condenser ottgas gmected saf ety teaturet sy stemt (25) Process computers

((0 Isolation teatmes f or sentilanon 9 stems (7) Isolation teatures toc hquid radwaste ef fluent

k. Radiat. ion Protection S.-utenn 9 stems.

Appropnate tests should be conducted to demon-(X) Plant samphng sy stems strate the proper operation of the f ollowing ty pes of-9 stems and components used to monitor or measure

m. l'uct Storage end llandling Systems radiation 'es els, to proside f or personnel protection, Appropine tesh douM be conductM f or equip-or to control or hmit the release of radmactnity:

ment and components used to handle or cool c

(Il Protew. cnticality. cf tluent, and area radiation irradiated f uel and to handle nomrradiated f uel to monitor tests demonstrate that they will operate in accordance with design Tests should be conducted as appropnate to (2) i,ersonnel monitors and radianon suncy m-setity redundancy and electrical m. dependence.i.l'he strument tests.

tollowing list n illustratise of the equipment and (3) I.aboratory equipment used to anal;/e or component tests that should be included m the test e

measure ta hatma lesch and radioactni y concentra-program:

t tions f i n Spent f uel pit cooling q stem tests, including (4).liph 1.tticiency Particulate Air (llEPA) tiher the testing of antisiphon desices, high radiation and charcoal athorber ethe.ency and in place leak alarnn, and low water lesel alarms.

tests "

(2) Ref ueling equipment tests, including hand Tests shou:d be conducteu as appropnae to senty

'ook, power equipment, bndpe and oserhead cranes, redundancy and electneal independence. '

and grapples ~Iesting should demonstrate the opera-bihty of pr itectise interlocks and desices I, Radioacti e Waste llandling and Storage (3) Operability and Ic k tests of set tionah/mg de-h "I'""

sices and drams and leak tests of paskets or t.ellows Appropnate tests should be conducted to demon.

in the ref ueling canal and f uel storage pool.

]

strate the f unctional operahihty and design flow rates (4) Dy namic and static load testmp of cranes, of 9 stenn and components used to process, store, honts, and aw iated lif ting and necine equipment, and releaw or control the release of radioactne hq-incluJing the f uel cask handhng crarie Static testing uid, gaseous and solid w astes. Testing should dem at 1259 of rated load and full operational testing at onstrate, to the extent practical, that the pumps, g gg,4 of rated load.

~

tanks, controls, sabes, and other equipment, includ-ing iutomatic isolation and protectn e f eatures and (5) 1:uel transf er devices instiumentation and alarms, will operate and f unction

((o Irradiated f uel pool or buihhng sentilation s: s-in accordance with design.l.esting or calculations tem tests.

should include, as appropriate, serificatmn of tank solumes, capacities, holJup times, and proper opera-tion and cahbration of awociated inurumentation.

g, g..g g

g,

,s m

n Spiked samples of the typical media or sources for Nude $r Pom Pir-

' shoWJ be r sea as guMante for resh should be used where neccuary to senty operability on ungle f.ulure proof m erhead aane handing sy stenis 1.68 12 125 334

n. Ausiliary and Miscellaneous Systems (d) Ihesel generator buildings (e) Ausiliary buildings, reactor building, tur-Appropnate tests should be conducted to demon.

strate the operability of ausiliary anJ miscellaneous bine building, and radioactise w aste handling sy stems. Tests should be conducted, as appropriate, building.

to s crits redundanes and electrical inJependence.'

(f) Control room habitability spremt Testing should include, as appropriate, demonstrations of the

.lhe following int is illustratise of the types of sy s-proper operat.on of smoke and toxic chemical detec-tems or f eatures whose pcrtormance should be dem-tion ss stems and sentilation shutdown devices, in-onstrated by toting cluding leaktightness of ducts and flow rates, proper

~

(1) Sersice and raw water cooling sprems.

direction of airflows, and proper coritrol of space (2) Clmed loop cooling waier sy stems.

(15) Shie!J cooling sy stems.

(3) C,omponent cool.ing w ater sy stems.

(16) Cooling and heating systems f or the ref ueling (4) Reactor coolant makeup sprem.

water storage tank.

(5) Reactor coolant and secondary sampling (17) Equipment ami controls for estabbshing and 9 stenn mamtaining subatmospheric prewures in subatmov (6) Chemistry control systems for the reactsr cool.

pheric containmentt aat and secondary coolant sptems-(IS) lleat tracing and tree /e protection sptems.

(7) Fire protection sptems, including demonstra-

o. Reactor Components llandling Systems tions of proper manual and automatic operation of fire detection, alarm, and suppression sy stems.

Include the following:

1S) Seal w ater sy stenn.

(1) Dy namic and static loaa tes'ts of cranes, hoists, and associated hfting and rigging equipment (9) \\,ent and drain sy stems for contaminated or (e.g., slines and strongbacks used durine refueling or potentiaUy contaminated 9 stems and areas and drain the prepar'ation f or refueling). Static testing at 1259 and pumpiag systems sersing essential areas, e g of rated load and full operational testing at IO')G of spaces housing diesel geaerators, essential electrical rated load.

equipment, and essential pumps.

(2, Demondration of the operabilin of protectise

~

(10) Purification and cleanup sptems for the reac-des ites and interlocks.

tor coolant sprem.

(3) Demonstration of the operability of safety de-

, (l1, Compressed gas sy stems'2 supplying pneuma-s ces on equipment.

tic equipment, components, or mstrumentation that are required to function to support the normal opera-

2. Initial 1, vel Load, g and Precra,t, cal Tests m

i tion of the fachity or are nsential for the operation of standby safety equipment or engineered saf ety Licensees should conduct the initial fuel loading features.

cautiously to preclude inadsertent criticality. To load n this basis requires that specific safety measures be (12) Boron reemery sy stem.

established and followed such as (a) ensuring that all (13) Commumcation systems. Tests should in-applicable technical specification requirements and clude demonstrations of the proper operation of other prerequisites hase been satisfied, (b) establish-evacuation ar.d other alarms, the public adJress sys-ing requirements for continuous monitoring of the tem within the plant, systems that may be used if the neutron flux throughout the core loading so that all l p ant is required to be snut down from outside the changes in the multiplication factor are obsersed, (c) i control room, and communication sy stems required establishing requirements for periodic data-taking, bs the facility emereeney plan.

and (d) indeper%ntly scritying that the fuel and con-trol components have been properly installed.

i (14) Heating, cooling, and sentilation sy stems sersing the following:

Predictions of core reactivity should be prepared in (a) Spaces housing eni.neered 'afety features.

ads ance to aid in evaluating the measured responses to spech loading increments. Comparatise data of (b) Primary containment.

neutron detector responses from presious loadings of (c) Battery rooms.

essentially identical core designs may be used in lieu of these predictions. Licensees should establish critena and requirements for actions ta be taken if the Regulatory Ga>Je 18n, "Preoperanonal Tesony of Instrument

" ment air systems measured results de\\ iate from expect d s alues. Shut-Au sy stems,' ' proudes Jetaved guidance on teth ng of instru.

dow n margin verifications should be performed at 35[

)23[

1.68-13

.s3

b + 1)

[ ce[

- *vi-.

?_:

e-s "s

' approrna'e loading in'ervis tilWR), includmg f ull c.1 ma! tunctumal testing <

h.

ctor protection core shutdow n margm tests. It should be estabinhed sy stem to demonstrate proper to,...oints, logic, and that the required shutJow n margin custs, without operability of scram Freakers and sals es. 1 )e m o r,-

i Ahies ing enticahl:

strate operabihty of manual scram f unc' ions.

d. I inal test of the reactor co( lan system to senty To proside f urther auurante of saf e huling, licen.

sees shoulJ estabbsh req cments for the o;>crabihty that sy eni kak ram are w nhin specdied hnnis of plant sy stems and components. includmg reactnit)

c. Measurements of the water quahty and boron i I

control sy stems and ether sy stems and components concentration (PWR) of the reactor coolant sy stem.

neceuary to ensure the saf ety of plant personnel and i

the pubhe in the esent of errors or malfunctions lhe

1. Reactor cool.mt system flow tests to estabbsh minal core loadmg should be directly supen ned by a that sibration lesels are acceptable, that dif fer.ntial l

Senior 1 icenscJ Operator basing no other concunent pre uures acons the fully loaded tore and maior duties and the loaJing operation should be conducted coinponents in the reactor coolant system are in c-in stntt accordance with detailed appros ed proce.

cordance wah design wilues, and that piping reac-dures 1 s pical prerequnites, precautions, anJ details nons to transient conditions (e p.. pt up startmg and that shouId be meluded m the imnal fuel loadine and stopping) and flows are as predic#cJ f or all allowable precritical thetk procedures are desenbed in A\\ pen.

combinations of pump operation 1.o% of flow tests i

should be conducted to sucasure flow coastdown.

dn C to this guide l

tlhtferential pressure measurements across the f ully Af ter the core is f ully loaJed, sut hcient tests anJ loaded core and major components need not be re-checks should bt perior led to ensure that the facihty peated for plants using calculation models and de-of re,/meu to achies e mitial cnti-signs identical to prototype plants.)

n m a tinal sta u I

cality and to perf orm low power tests. The hst below

g. hnal calibration of source-range neutron flux j illustratn e of the ty pes of tests and s critications measunng instmmentation. Venheation of proper opera- !

is that should be wnducted donng or following initial tion of associated alanns and protectise functions of. I tuel loading:

source-and mtermediate-range monitort Shutdow n margin s erification for partially

h. Stechanical and electrical tests of incore a.

tilWR) and f ully to;Jcd core.

monitors, including trasersing incore moniton, it installed.

b. Testmp of the control rod withdrawal and insert

3. Initial Crit,cality i

speeds and sequencers, control rod position indica-tion, protectise mterlocks, control functions, alarms,.

I icensees should conduct the initial approach to and scram timing iand in. tion tesis for BWRs) of cnu alus in a deliberate and orderly manner using control rods af ter the core is fully loadcd Scram time the san.e' rod withdrawal sequences and patterns that tests should be sutticient to oroside reasonable auur-will be used during subsequent startups. Neutron flus arce that the control rods w,ll scram withm the re-lesels should be contmuously monitored and penodi-quired tune under plant conditions that bound thme cally esaluated A neutron count rate at least % count under winch the control rods nnght be required to per 'second should register on the startup thannels be-functm to achiese plant shutJown. To the extent fore th-startup begins, and the signa!-to-noise ratm I prat ucal, 'esting should demonstrate control rod shou'd be k now n to bt greater than two. All sy stems scram times at both hot zero power and cold icmper-requirad f or startup or protection of the plant, includ- )

ature conditions, with flow a,,d no-flow coni itions in ing the reactor protection system and emergency the reactor cools sy stem as req' tired to bound con shutdown system, should be operabic and in a state of ih n o n s under which scram m Pht be required f or readmeu. The control rod or poison remosal se-each test condition, those control rods w hose scram quence should be accomplished using deailed procc-tunes fall outside the two-sigma lunit of the scrar" dures approsed by personnel or groups designated by I ome data f or all control rods should be retested ;

the hcensee. I or reactors that wil' achiese initial ent-hcient number of times t - 3 times) to reasonabl' icalits by boron dilution, control rods si.ou'.d be su e proper perfonnance during subsequent plan withdraw n befoie dilution begms. The control rod in-

, eranons f or f acihties using m 're than one typv of sertion limits defined in the technical specifications control element or control rod drne dedgn, screon 40uld be obsened and comphed with.

times shoulJ be compared with identicai designs te o.

two control rods attached to a single drise Criticality predictions for boron contentration l me hamsm )

ipWR) and control rod positions should be prosided, and cnteria and actions to be taken should be estab-Additionally, the proper operation of decelerat-

. mg desites used to present mechanical damage to the msyn te aures of HwR, in maini.un uter qualay.uc dn

! control ro6 should be demonstrated during thn ussed in Heyulatory Guide 1 % %ntenante or wer Pur.

! testing.

'*'n B"*nF W " R * ' ""

12; 336

lished if actual plant conditions deviate from pre-

g. Determination of proper response of process dieted values. The reactivity addition sequence and ettluent radiation monitors. To the extent practi-should be prescribed, and the procedure should re-cal, responses of installed process and effluent radia-quire a cautious approach in achiesing criticality to tion momtcrs should be serified by laboratory present passing through criticality on a period shorter analy st, of samples from the process and/or effluent than approximately 30 seconds (< 1 decade per 9 stems.

nunute).

h. Chemical and radiochemistry tests and meas-urements to demonstrate design capability of chemi-

4. Low-Power Testing cal control systems and installed analysis and alarm Following initial criticality, licensees should con _

quenn to maintain water quality within limits in the duct appropriate low-power tests (normally at less reactor coolant and secondary coolant sy stems.

l than 59 power) to (a) confirm the design and, to the

i. Demonstration of the operability of control rod l event practical, salidate the analytical models and withdrawal and insertion sequencers and control rod serify the correctness or conservatism of assumptions withdrawal inhibit or block functions oser the reactor

( used in the safety analyses for the facility and (b) power lesel range during which such features must be confirm the operability of plant systems and design operable.

features that could not be completely tested during

.j. Demonstrati_a of the capability of primary con-the preoperational test phase because of the lack of an adequate heat source for the reactor coolant system tainment sentilation system to maintain the contain-und main steam sy stem.

ment ensironment and important components in the containment within design limits with the reactor The listing below is illustratise of the tests that coolant ss stem at rated temperature and with the

~

should be conducted it they base not been previously minimum asailability of ventilation sutem compo-

~

completed during preoperational hot functional test-nents for which the Ustem is desiened to operate.

mg Tests that are specific to one ty pe of light-water reactor are noted by the symbols PWR for pressurized

k. Demonstration of the operability of steam-water reaciors and ilWR for boiling wat r reactors.

Grisen engineered safety features and steam-drisen plant auul.ariev and power consersion equipment.

a. Determination of boron and moderatc-temper-ature reactSity coefficients oser the tempeiature and I. Demonstration of the operability, including stroke times, of main steam kne and branch steam ;

boron concentration ranges in which the reactor may initially be taken critical. (PWR) line sahes and bypass vahes used for protectne iso-lation functions at rated temperature and pressure b Measurements of control rod and control rod conditions.

l bank reactisity worths to (1) ensure that they are in

m. Demons; ration of the aperability of main steam accordance with design predictions and (2) ' confirm by analysis that the rod insertion limits will be line isolation s alve leakage control sy stem.

'dequate to ensure a shutdown margin consistent with

'9WR-dunng hot standby conditions.)

accident analysis assumptions throughout core life,

n. Demonstration of the operability or cor. trol with the greatest worth control rod stuck out of the room computer sy stem.

core. (PWR)

o. Control rod scram time testing at rated temper

c. Pseudo rod-ejection test to venfy calculational ature in the reactor coolant system, if not presiously conducted.

models and accident analysis assumptions. (PWR)

p. Demonuration of the operability of pressurizer

d. Determination that adequate oserlap of source-and mr.in steam system relief valves at rated and intermediate-range neutron instrumentation exists temperamre.

and serification that proper operations of associated protestise functions and alarms proside for plant pro-

q. Demonstration of the operability of residual or i tection in the low-power range (if not pres ously decay heat remosal systems, including atmospheric s

performed ).

steam dump sabes (PWR) and turbine bypass vahes.

r. De onstration of the operability of reactor

e. Determination of flux distribution for wmpari.

Molant quem purification and cleanup systems.

son with distribution a sumption, or predictions to rcovide a check for potential errors in the loading or

s. Vibration measurements of reactor sessel imer-enrichment of fuel elements or lumped poison ele-nals " and reactor coolant sy stem comnonents, if not i meats and to check for mispositioned or uncoupled previously conducted.

! control rods. Measurements may be performed at a

@l higher nower level depending on the sensitivity of in-

" Regulatory Gmde 120. "Comprehenme Vmration A neument core flux instrumentation.

Program for I:cactor Internah ()uring Preoperational anJ Initial Startup Testing ' shou!J be useJ as gmJante for thew meas-

f. Neutron and gamma radiation surveys.

urements 125 337

1. M-15

t. Performance of natural circulation tests of the The following list is illustrati,e of the types of per-reactor coolant sutem to confirm that the design heat formance demonstrations, measurements, and tests remosal capabi'ity exists or to scrify that flow (with-that should be in 'uded in the power-ascension test out pumpo or temperature data are comparable to phase. Parenthetical numbers following the items prototy pe designs for which equisalent tests base listed below indicate the approximate power lesels j been successf ully completed IPWR) for conducting the tests. If n

. umber follows the listed item, the test should be perf ormed at the lowest Demonstration of the operability of major or u.

practical power lesel Tests that are specific to one pnncipal plant control 9 stems, as appropriate.

ty pe ot light-w ater reactor are noted by the sy mbols PWR tor pressurized water reactors and ilWR for

5. Pow er-Ascension Tests boiling water reactors.

a. Determine that power ceactisity coefficients Licensees should complete low-power tests, as de-scribed in the I-S,\\R. and es aluate and approse the

( PWR) or pow er. s.

tiow ch,u acteristics (llWR) are low pow er test re sults prior to beginning power-in accordance with design salues ( 25'i, 50'l 75'i,

ascension tests. Power-ascenuon tests should demon-100'; )

strate that the tacility operates in accordance Aith de-

b. Deternune that steady-state core perf ormance n.

ugn both durmg normal steady 4 tate conditions and.

o measurements 1 o

in accordance with design. Sutticier to the extent practical. during and f. llowing antici-and esaluations should bt 'onducted to establish that pated transients. l.o s ahdate the analy tical modeh Sus d.istributions, local sur, ce heat flux, linear heat useJ for predictine plart responses to anticipated rate, departure f. rom nucleate boihng ratio (DNHR).

transients and postulated accidents, these tests should maumum radial and axial power peakm.'c factois, establish that measured re ponses are in accordance as erage planar linear heat generation rate with predicted responset t he predicted responses

( M A PI.H GR ),

minimum critical pow er ratio shoulJ be deseloped using real or expected salues of (MCPR), quadrant power tut, and other important nems such as beginning-of-hfe core reactisity coetti-parameters are in accordance with desien s alues cients, flow rates, pressures, temperatures, pump

,g coastdow n charactero tics, and respome times of 1254, 50' <, 754, IbON )

conditions.

equipment and the actual status of the p' ant and not those s alues or plant conditions awmed for con er-

c. Demonstrate that core limits wdl not be ex-s s atn e es ahiations of postui accidents ceeded dunny or following exchange of control rod

. Tests anJ acceptance ci that demonstrate the patterns that will be permitted during operation ithe demonstration test should be conducted at the highest ability of major or princip plant control 9 stenn to power lesel at which control rod pattern exchanges automatically control process sariables within design w dl be alloweJ during plant operation). (11%.R) knuts should be re cribed This should proside av surance that the inie, rated dy namie response of the

d. Demonstrate th-capabilities of plant teatures facility is in accordance with design for plant esents such as part-length control rods and of procedures for ;

such as reactor scram, turbine trip, reactor coolant controlhng core senon transientt Acceptance criteria j pump tnp. and loss of feedwater heaters or pumps.

for the test should account f or expected changes in i

Testmp should be sutticiently comprehensne to es-core perf ormance throughout core lif e. 1754 454) I tabbsh that the facihty can operate in all operating (PWR) Resuhs of xenon oscillation tests performed at

n. odes f or whith the facility has been designed to op-plants of essentially identical deugn can be used to erate. howes er. tests should not be conducted or substitute for or supplement this testing.

i operatine m>Jes or plant configurations estabhshed if Pseudo-roJ-ejection test to s alidate the rod ejec-they ha[e not been analyzed or it they fall utside the e

range of assumptions used m anals/ine

ulated tion accident analy siv (Greater than 10'< power with accidents in the i S AR f or the f aciliti. '

control roJ banks at the full power rod insertion linuti (PWRi This test need not be repeated tar !

Appropriate consideration should be risen 'o test-tacihties using calculational modeh and designs iden-ing at the extremes of possible operatmg modes f or tical to prototype f acilitiev tacilits sutenn Testme under simulated conditions

f. Dernonstrate that core thermal and nuclear ma\\imum and minimum equipment asailabihts of within q stenn should be accomplished it the fue:h,(

paameten se in accoMance w d pMWons wMa i single high worth rod f ully inserted anj during anJ n intended to be operated in these modes, e.g.. test.

ine with ditterent reactor coolant pump configura_

following retum of the rod to its bank positmn. (50'; )

(PWR) tmns. smgle loop reactor coolan' 9 stem operation, operation with the nununum allowable number of

g. Demonstrate that control rod sequencers, con-pumps, heat exchangers, or cor rol sabes in the trol rod worth rmninu/ers, and rod v ithdraw al block teedw ater. condensate, circulating. and other conting f unctions operate in accordante with design, if not w ater quems.

pres inusly demonstrated. t 25'; )

125 338 1.(6 16

h. Check rod scram times f rom data recorded dur-

r. Verify by review and evaluation of printouts l ing scrams that occur during the startup test phase to and/or cathode ray tube (CRT) displays that the con-determine that the scram times renuin within allowa-trol room or process computer is receiving correct in-ble limits.

puts from process sariables, and salidate that per-formance calculations performed by the computer are i

i. Demonstrate capability andz,or sens..itivity, as ap-correct. (25'i, Swl, 759,1009 ) ~

propriate for the facility design of incore and excore neutron flux instrumentation, to detect a control rod

s. Calibrate, as necessary, and serify the perform-misalignment equal to or less than the technical spec-ance of major or principal plant control systems, in-ification limits. 1509. 100'i ) ( PW R )

cluding T-aserage controller; automatic reactor con-trol sntem; boron addition systems (PWR), inte-j. \\.erify that plant performance is as expected for

~

grated control sy stem; pressuri/cr control ss stem; rod runback and partial scram.

1 reactor coolant flow control system; tr un, auuliary,

k. Demonstrate that ECCS high-pressure coolant and emergency feedw ater control systems; hotwell injection systems can start under simulated accident level control sy stems; steam pressure control sys-conditions and inject into the reactor coolant system tems; and reactor coolant makeup and letdown con-as designed. ( At a power lesel in the 259 -509 range trol sy stems. ( 259, 504, 75N,1009 )

! for BWRs with steam-driven pumps and for BWRs

t. If not presiously accomplished, verify, as ap-l with electrie-driven pumps, if not previously con-

~

t propriate, the operability, response times, relieving ducted.) (BW R) (For PW Rs, the testing should be in capacities, setpoints, an'd reset pressures f.or pres-accccdance with Regulatory Guide 1.79.,)

suriier relief sabes; main steam line relief valves;

1. Demonstrate design capability of all sy stems atmospheric steam dump sahes; turbine bypass sal-and components prosided to remose residual or decay ses; and turbine stop, intercept, and control vahes.

heat from the reactor coolant sy stem, including tur-1259 ) (During transient tests, s erify operability, set-bine bypass sy stem, atmospheric steam dump sahes, points, ai.d reset pressures of relief vahes.)

residual heat removal # RHR) sutem in steam con-u. \\, erit.v operability and mponse times of main densing mode, reactor core isol' tion cooling (RC,IC) t a

steam line isolation and bunch steam line isolation ss stem, and ausiliary feedw ater sy stem. Testing of va t F.or P

.Rs, justification for conducting this the auxiliary feedwater system should include prosi-sions that will provide reasonable assurance that ex-p at low power aMor a hpnon M hgn quab 9

cessise flow ification tests for vahes of the same site and design instabilities (e.g.

water hammer) will l

may be submitted. (254 )

not occur during subsequent normal sy. stem startup and operation. (Prior to exceeding 25G power)

v. Verih that the main steam ss ' tem and feedwa-ver systems operate in accordance wi:n design per-

m. Demonstra'e that the reactor coalant sy stem formance requirements. (25'<., 5 0'+.,, 7 5 'a.,..004 )

operates in accor :ance with design. Suf ficient meat-Demonstrate adequate beginning-of-life per-urements and esaluations should be conducted with w.

the plant

,.t steady-state conditions to establish thr.t formance margins for shiciding and penetration cool-flow rates, reverse flows through idle ioops or jet ing sy stems to proside assurance that they will be pumps, cor flow, differential pressures across the capable of maintaining temperatures of coo'ed com-core and major components in the reactor coolant sys-ponents w%in design limits with the minimum de-f tem, vibration levels of reactor coolant system com-sign capability of cooling system components avail-i po n e n t s, and other important paran eters are in able. (1001 )

acreement with design s alues, if not previousiv Demonstrate adequate beginning-of-life per-t demonstrated.

4 formance margins for auxiliary systems required to

n. Obtain baseline data for reactor coolant system support the operation of enginected safety features or loose parts monitoring sy stem, if not previously to maintain the ensironment in spaces that house en-done.

gmeered saf ety icatures to proside assurance that the 4

engineered saf ety features will be capable of perform-l

o. Calibrate instrumentation and demonstrate the ine their desien functions oser the range of design proper response of reactor coolant leak detection d

f bk mone in 6 milim sy stems, if not previously demonstrated.

ms b 50' <,1009 )

p. Conduct sibration monitoring of reactor inter-

y. Calibrate, as required, and serify the proper nals during steady-state and transient operation to estab-lish that desien ' limits are not exceeded (see Regula-operation of important instxmentation sy stems, in-ciuding reactor coolant sy stem flow; core flow, level, torv Guide II20'), if this testing has not been pre _

~

and temperature; incore and t, core neutron flux; and siously com;leted instruments and systems used to calculate thermal

@ i tion s stenn

q. Verit, the proper operation of failed fuel detec-power lesel (heat balance) of the reactor. (259 t 259,100G )

509, 759, 1009 )

1 2 5 M.- 9 1.68-17

i. Demonstrate that process and ettluent radiation initiating the pump trip or control vahe closure momtoring sy stems are responding correctly by per-should result in the fastest credible coastdow n in flow l forming independent laboratory or other anal)ses.

for the system. (1P09 )

I a.a. Demonstrate that chemical and radiochemical j.J. Demonstrate that the dy namic response of the control systems f unction in accordance with design, plant is in accordance with design for a condition of and sample to establish that reactor coolant system loss of turbine-generator coincident with loss of all and secondary coalant sy stem limits are not ex-sources of of fsite power (i.e., station blackout). (In ceeded. U54, 50'i, 754,1009 )

the 10-to-204 power range) b.b. Conduct neutron and gamn.a radiation sur-kl. Demonstrate that the dy namic response of the seys to establish the adequacy of shielding and to plant is in accordance with design for the loss of or j identify high radiation zones as defined in 10 CFR bypassing of the feedwater heater (s) from a credible Part 20,

'Stardards for Protection Against Radia-single failure or operator error that u ould result in tior. '(509, 1009 )

the most sesere case of f eedwater '

mre reduc-tion. (501, 904 :

Demonstrate that gaseous and liquid rad.ioac-c..

tise waste processing, storage, and release systems 1.1. Demonstrate that the dynami response of the plant meree in accordance with design.

is in accordance with design requirements for turbine mp. 'lhis test may be co.nbined with item n n. below dJ Demonstrate the capabihty to shut down and if a turbine trip is initiated directly by all remote-mam:.un the reactor in a hot standby condition from manual openings or autcmatic trips of the generator oute the control room, using the minimum shif.t niain breaker, i.e., a direct electrical sienal, not a crew, as well as the potential enability the reactor in a cold shutdown cendition. lr placmg secondary effect such as a turbine overspeed. (1409 )

(Greater than or equal to 109 pnerator !oad) m.m. Demonstrate that the dynamic response of the plant is in accordance with design for the case of e e. Demonstrate tnat pnmars contamment inerting and purge sy stems operate in accor trice with design, amomatg chuye of all main steam line isolation vr h es. For PW Rs, justification for conducting the if not presiously demonstrated.

test at a lower power level, while still demonstrating f.f. Demonstrate or serify that important sentila-proper plant response to this transient, may be sub-tion and air-condit oning systems, including those for mitted for NRC staff review. (1004 )

i the primary containment and stca.n line tunnel, con-n.n. Denmnstrate that the dynamic response of the tinue to maintain their sersice areas within the design i

I hmits. (57

• 100'i )

pl nt is in accordance with design f or the case of full load aejection. The method used for opening of the l g p. If appropriate for the facility design, conduct generator main breakers (by simulating an automatic i manual trip) should be selected such that the l tests to determine operabihty of equipir.ent prosided or for anticipatcd transiem without scram ( ATWS), if turbine-generator will be subjected to the maximum j not presiously done. t 257 )

credible overspeed condition. The test shoulJ be ini-l tiated with the plant's electrical dntribution system h.h. Demonstrate that the dynamic response of. he t

aligned for normal full power operatmn. t 1009 )

plant to the dcwn load swings for the facility, m-ciudmg step and ramp changes, is in accordance with o.o. Verify by obsersations and measurements, as design (254,509,75S,100G) appropriate, that piping and comps nert mosements, vibrations, and e xpansions are acceptable for i.. Demonstrate that the dynamic response of the (1) ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 ss stems, (2) other plant is in accordance with design for limitmg reactor high-energy piping systems inside Se'ismic Categors I i coolant pump trips and.'or closure of reactor coolant m

WN n m M i e of e m N sy stem flow control s ahcs WWR; Ihe method for

~

failure could reduce the functioning of any Seismic Category I plant feature to an unacceptable lesel, and (4) Seismic Category I portions of moderate-energ's

" Regulatory Guide IM? 'Inm ! Startup Test Prcgram to E E ng s} stems located outside cor" ' ment. Fe st s ii Demonstrate Remote ShutJoa n CgaNhty for w ater-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 'shoufJ be uwd as guidame for demon pe6rmd cadier in the tN program W k stranon of thn capaShty repeated.

i 125 M0 us.is

APPENDIX B INSPECTION BY THE OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT The NPC Office of !nspection and Enforcement to determine whether the applicant has established a conducts a series of inspections of the initial test pro-set of administratise procedures that will ensure that g.am beginning before preoperational testing and the programs are carried out in accordance with the continuing throughout startup. These inspections are methods described in the FSAR.

intended to determine, on a selectise basis, whether An exanunad n fs ccted jest pmdgs to the applicant's test progra.ms, as described in the FSAR, are adequately implemented and whether the re-scertain whether the tests are designed to satisf y the sults of the tests demonstrate that the plant, procc-test objectises, whether test procedures contain ap-dures, and persennel are ready for safe operation.

propriate acceptance criteria, and whether the proce-The inspection effort focuses on the manner in which dures require the d, cumentation of suf ficient mfor-the applicant has fulfilled his commitments for ensor-matWn to permit adequate evaluation of the results of l the tea Aho, an exanunatmn, on a seh'cthe %,

ine that adcquate programs hase been developed and carried out, as exemplified by the methods he has that changes to approved test procedures have been ieviewed and authorized.

used for establishing procedures and th results that the methods base produced.

3. An examination of the fuel loading and startup For the NRC to implement this inspection pro-pmcedures to ascertain whether prerequisites, pre-

' gram, the. pplicant should hase copies of the test scribed operations, and limitations are appropriately procedures asailable for examination by the NRC re-included to control the operation and whether the ap-gional personael approximately 60 days prior to the pheant has implenu'nW adnunnatM conte Wn-tified in item I abose.

schedulet eerformar.cc of the preoperational tests, and, not less than 60 days prior to the scheduled fuel

4. Confirmation that the applicant has esaluated loading date, copies of procedures for fuel loading, the results of the testing and has concluded that the initial startup testing, and supporting activities.

results are satisfactory and meet the acceptance Dratts of these orocedures should be made available criteria or has initiated corrective action.

as early as practical. Examination by NRC personnel does not constitute approval of the pmcedures. The

5. Confirmation that the applicant has resiewed possession of such procedures by NRC personnel the rewlh of the fuel loading and initial operations.

should not impede the revision, review, and refine-

6. An independent examination of the rt sul:s of ment of the procedures by the applicant-selected tests important to safety. This examiration is intended primarily as an independent, selective audit The inspections by NRC personnel generally in-to determine whether information is being app-clude the following:

priatel* documented and esaluated by the applicar,

and whether the applicant's technical conclusions are

1. An examination of methods being used for pre-valid.

paring, reviewing, and approving procedures; for controlling the performance of tests; for -ecording,

7. Witnessing parts of preoperational, fuel load-evaluating, rniewing, approving, and retaining test ing, and startup tests to determine whe.5cr they are data and results; and for identifying and correcting being conducted in the manner described in the appli-deficiencies noted in systems and pmcedures. For the cant's administrative and test pracedures and whether most part, this examination will be carried ot.c prior they are being performed in a technically competent to the start of the formal test program and is in* ended manner.

125 341 1.68-19

APPENDIX C PREPARATION OF PROCEDURES This appenda provides guidance regarding p ep-Ilow and pressure characteristics aration and content of procedures for preoperational Lubrication tests, fuel loading and precritical tests, startup-to-Acceleration and coastdow n critical low power tests, and power-ascension tests.

1 Motors and Generators Direction of rotation

1. Preoperational,Fest Procedures

\\,ibration

a. Prerequisites Thermal oserload protection, margins Each test of the operation of a system normally re-een[etpoints, and full load run-quires that certain other activities be perf ormed first, Lubncation e g.. completion of construction, construction and/or preliminary tests, ir.spections, and certain other egger or hi-pot tests i preoperational tests or operations. The preoperational Supply mitage testing procedures should include, as appropriate, P" we-to-phase checks specific prerequisites. The following are typical pre-iseutral current requisites:

Acceleration under load (1) Confirmation that constructior. activities as-Temperature rise Phase currents sociated witF the system have Seen completed and documented. Field inspections should base been Load accen+ance capability versus both made to ensure that the equipment is ready for opera-4me and load (generators) tion, including inspection for proper fabrication and (d) Piping and Vessels cleanness; checkout of wiring continuity and electri-liydrostat.c test cal protective devices; #,tment of settings on Leaktightness torque-limiting desices and calibration of instru-Cleaning, flushing, and lay up 2 ments verification that all instrument loops are oper-Clearance of obstructions able and respond within required response times; and Support adjustments adjustment and settings of temperature controllers and limit switches.

Proner gashting gg (2) Confirmation that test equipment is operable Insulation and proper!) cahbrated.

Filling and venting (3) Tests of individual components or subsystems (e) Electrica' and instrumentation and Control to demonstrate that tney meet their functianal re-Verification that sensing lines are clear quirements. Typical items to consider for common for process sensors and that instru-types of equipment are:

ment mot vahes are open (a) Vahes i Voltage Leakage Frequency Opening and closing times Current Vahe stroke Circuit breaker operation Position indication Power source identification Torque-and trasei-limiting settings Hus transfers Operability against pressure Trip settings (b) Pumps Operation of interlocks, prohibits, and i

Direction of totation permissives Vibration Operation of logic sy stems Motor load sersus time Calibration Seal or gland leakage Contral transformer settings Seal cooling Temperature effects Range checks Response t:mes

'Section XI of th( AS\\th I3 oiler and Pressure Vessel Code pro.

2 peFulatory Guide 1.37. "Quahty Assurance Requirtments for udn reyiremeras for inscruce resting c f pumps and salses in Cleamng of f luid Sy stems and Associated Comnonents of nuc%r power plants. The applicant should esamine these re-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Pf ar.ts, shou!d be used as guiL quirement, fer apphcabihty.a its preoperational test programs-ance }k2 1.68-20

b. Test Objectises interference with the proper testing of the as-built

'}**' tems tests will be intended to demonstrate that eac" Objectises of the test should be stated Many sy s-

i. Documentation of Test Results of seseral initiation esents will produce one or more expected responses. These initiating esents and the Records should identify each obserser and/or data correspondine responses should be identi ied.

we rder participating in the test, the type of observa-tion, the identifying numbers of test or measuring

c. Special Precautions equ omer.t. the results, the acceptability, and the ac-tion taken to correct ans deficiencies. Administratise S.pecul precautions needed for saf.ety of personnel procedures should specify the retention period of test or equipment or needed to ensure a reliable test result sununaries and should require permanent reten-should be highlighted and clearly de.,cnbed in *.he test tion of documented sununaries and evaluations.

procedure.

d. System Initial Conditions

2. Fuel Loading Where appropriate, instructions should be gisen This section prosides guidance on ty pical informa-pertaining to the system configuration, the compo-tion to be included in the detailed fuel loading nents that should or should not be operating, and procedure.

other pertinent conditions that might atteet the opera-

a. Prerequisites for Fuel Loading tion et this sy stem.

(1) The composition, duties, and emergency pro-

e. Ensironmental Conditions cedure responsibilities of the tuel hanJIing crew Most tests will be run at ambient conditions; now-eser, procedures should melude prosisions to test the (2) Radiation monitors, nuclear instrumentation, manual initiation, and other desices to actuate build-equipment under ensironmental conJitions as close as practical to those the equipment will experience in ing esacuation alarm and sentilatioc control should both normal and accident situations.

hase been tested and senfied to be operable.

0) The status of all sy stems required for fuel load-

f. Acceptance t,riteria ing s}.ould be,pecified.

The criteria against which the success or failure of @ the test '"'I I." ' "" P "" will be judged should be clearly identified cunains should hase been made. and should account for measurement errors and un-certainties. In some cases, t'.ese will be qualitatise (5) Nuclear instruments should be calibrated, op-criteria. In other cases, uu' a:Duise s J.ucs with ap-erable, and properly locaed (source-fuel-detector propriate tolerances shot.. be designated as accept-geometry: One operating channel should have audi-ance criteria ble ndication or annunciation in the control room.

g. Data Cohection (M A response check of nuclear instruments to a neutron source should be required within 8 hours

.The test procedures should nre.,cribe the data to be prior to loadine (or resumption of loadine, if delayed collected nd the form in which the data are to be for S hours or'more). recorded. All entries should be permanent entries. The aJministratise controls should include an accept-

17) The status of cortainment should be specified able method for correcting an entry.

and established. watto wssd should be spec-pc status of I

h. Detailed Procedures it.ied Components shou!d be either in place or out of Detailed step-by-step procedures should be pro-the s essel. as specified, to make it ready to receise sided for each test. To the extent practical, the test fu el.

procedures should use approved normal plant operat-mh I i hid be established ing procedures. .md the minimum lesel presenbed for fucl loading Each procedure should require necessary nonstan-and unloading. dard arrangements to be restored to their normal CM u Mion M M m d m e status after the test is completed. Control measures should be specified and established Precautions such uth asjumper logs and theckott hsts should tv spt:i-d pm lam hold N UW W p fied. Nonstandi.rd by passes, vals e configurations, sent deboration. and instrument settings should be identified and high-lighted for return to normal. Nonstandard arrange-(11) The emergency boron adJition sy stem (or @ ments should be carefully examined to ensuie that oiner negatis e reactnity insertion sy stem) should be temporary arrangements Lo not invalidate the test by operable. l.M-21 1 ') h $$h \\ L. a ~'

(12) Fuel handhng equi;' ment shoulJ be checked nonstandard rod patterns or with operadonal inter-and dry runs performed. locks bypassed. (13) The status of protection systems, interlocks. (9) De'ermination of the boron concentration in mode switch, alarms, and radiation protection borated reactors and frequency of determination. The equipment should be prescribed and serified. For frequency of determination should be commensura:e reactors that have operable control rods durmg fuel with the worst possible dilution capability, as deter-loading, the high-flux trip points should be set for a mined by consideration of piping systems that attach relatnely low power lesel 'normally no' greater than to the reactor coolant system. 19 of full power). (10) Actions, especially those pert ining to flux (14) Water quality should be established and limits ruonitoring, for periods w hen fuel loa 'ing is identified. interrupted. (15) Fuel loading beron concentration should be (11) The maintaining cf continuous voice com-established and serifico. munication between control room and loading station.

b. Procedure Details (12) Minimum crew required to load fuel. The The procedure should include instructions or in-

r sence of at least two persons at any location where handling is taking place should be required. A for;aation for the following areas: J Senior Reactor Operator with no other concurrent (1) The loading sequence and pattern for luel, con-duties should be in cl.arge. trol rods, poison curtains, and other components. It should also proside guidance on fuel addition incre. (13) Crew work time. If personnel are schedulce ments and snould, in general, require constituting the for consecutise daily duty, they should not normally core so that the reactisity wooh of added indisidual be expected to work more than 12 hours cut of each fuel elements becomes less as the core it assembled. 24-(2) The maintaining of a display for indicating the (14) Approvals regired for changing the status of the core and fuel pool. Maintaining appro. procedure. priate recorh of core loadmg.

c. Limitations and Actions (3) Proper seatirg and orientation of fu:1 and (1) Criteria for stopping fuel loading should be es-componentt A sisual check of each assemoly in each tablished. Some circumstances that might w arrant core position should be specified this are unexpected suberitical multiplication be-t4) Functional testing of each control rod im.

hasior, loss of communications between control room mediately following fuel loading. (BWR) and fuel loading station, inoperable source-range de-tector, and inoperability of the emergency boration (5) Nuclear instrumentation and neutron source system. requirements for monitoring suberitical multiplica-tion, includmg source or Jetector relocation and nor-(2) Criteria for emergency boron injection should malization of count rate atter relocation. (Normally a be established. minimum of three source-range monitors on a BWR (3) Criteria for containment esacuatior :hould be and two on a PWR should be operable w heneser established. operations are performed that could atteet core re ac tis it y. ) (4) Action to be followed in the event o. fuel damage should be outlineJ. W Hux momtoring, includmg counting times and frcquencies and rules for plotting ins ere multiplic.- (5) Actions to be folimed or approsals to be ob-tion and interpreting plots. The counting period for tainu before routine loading may resume after one of count rates should he specified. An imerse multipli-f.~ abuse limitations has been reached or insoked cation Ci should k nainhmed should be listed. (7) The expected suberitical multiplication behasior.

3. Initial Criticality Procedures (8) Detei.1ination of adherence to the mimmum This section prosides some specific guidance for shutdown margin and rad aorth tests m unborated the detailed procedure for operations associated with reactors and the f requencs of determination. The bringing the reactor critical for the first time. The mmimu.a shutJown marg:n should be prosed period-guidance prosided in Section 1, Treoperational Test ically durmg loading and at the completion of load-Procedures, ' of this appendix is also considered ap-ing Shutdow n margin s critications should not plicable. This procedure should include steps to en-ins oh e a planned approach to criticelity using sure that the startup will proceed in a deliberate and 1.68-22 j

orderly manner, that the changes in reactivity will be tions necessary for conducting tests. The individual procedures should hieblight these special conditions O continuously monitored, and that inverse multiplica-tion plots will be main'ained and interpreted. A criti-r.d sr.cifically provide for restoration to normal fol-cal rod position (boron concentration) should be pre-lowing the test. The overall or governing power-dicted so that any anomalies may be noted and asce':uon test plan should typically require the fol-evaluated. All systems needed for startup should be lowing operations to be performed at appropriate aligned and in proper operation. The emergency lig-steps in the power-ascension test phase: uid psison system should be operable and in readi-ness. Technical specification requirements must be

a. Conduct any tests that are scheduled at the test

met, condition or power plateau.

Nuclear instruments should be calibrated. A neut-

b. Examine the radial iht for symmetry, and sei-l ron count rate (of at least % count per second) should ify that the axial Out i; within expected values.

j register on startup channels before the startup begins, i and the sienal-to-noise ratio should be known to be

c. Determine reactor power by heat balance, greater tha'n two. A conservatise startup rate limit (no calibrate nuclear instruments accordingly, and deter-shorter than approximately a 30-second period) mine that adequate instrumentation overlap between l should be established. liigh-flux scram trips should the intermediate-and power-range detectors exists.

! he set at their lowest value (approximately 50209). high-flux trips to a value no greater than 209 beyond 4, Low-Power and Power-Ascension Procedures the power of the next level unless technical specifica-This section provides guidance for the planning tion limits are more restrictive. and preparation of procedures for conducting the ini-tial ascension to rated power. The guidance provided

c. Perform general surveys of plant systems and in Section 1, "Preoperational Test Procedures," of equipment to determine that they are operating within this appendix is also considered applicable. The pro-expected values.

gram should be planned to increase power in discrete

f. Check for unexpected radicactivity in process steps. Major testing should be performed at approxi-r ems and effluents.

mately 255, 50%, 75%, and 1009 power levels. 9 pan;sion o equipment are in accordance with design ,1. Review the completed testing r agrc.m at each 1 tests intended to serify that movements and ex_

g. Perform reactor coolant leak checks.

not conducted during hot functional tests and plateau, perform preliminary evaluations. including he delayed until generation of nuclear heat, the extrap i tion of minimum DNBR and maximum nower lesel for conducting sich tests should be i. line r heat rate values to the high-flux trip setpomt as ' as practical (approximately 59 ). for the rext power leve_, and obtain the required i L eidual test procedures should include instruc-management approsals before ascending to the next tions and precautions for establishing special condi-power lesel or test condition. 175 345 1.68-23

e UNITE D ST ATE S ~' P.UCLFAH HEGULATORY COVVf S$1CN POST A GE AND F E ES P AID W ASHINGT ON D.C.20555 ,, 5 guctgnagggggayogy g.:- C O M MIS 5 TON OF F 6 Cl A L BUSIN E SS uiM AIL PE N A L T Y f O R PRIV A T t USE, $ 300 { j O O 125 346 .}}