ML19220C423
| ML19220C423 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1974 |
| From: | Harold Denton US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Moore V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905010284 | |
| Download: ML19220C423 (18) | |
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ecora, Assinaat J1 rector for sig..t Wa cr neactora, Group 2, L "2 "" ' ISLA:.J t.2:Ir 2 ACCCPTJJ:C REVI'~J ELJ ;T d!I: Thrac Ilile Island Unit IJ.L.:S IX G SIA.,:
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CC 2.1 Subc.R: 5v-32tt rJS M!2 OLL S E Cd; da 2-2 F10JEC /.A GGua: 3. 'r;. Washburn RIQin STED CO.2I.IIIeN LaII: Marca 5, 1974 71VIsf ST E;S: Accident Analysis oranch Acceptance 2.aview Complace Enclosed is our acceptance review report for Ihrec Mile Island Ur.it 2.
The infor matica supplied concernin;; iodine re. oval by the spray system 1.s only about IC conplete. he spray re.wial function chould be considered an air cleanup systan, and should be described in Section 6.2.3 of tua enclosca questica list. The sections relating to Control Econ habitaoility are about 30% cc:spletn. All otaer secticus la
.iA3 review arena are substantially complete.
Aircraf t censideraticus for Unit 2 were included in tne Unit I review and vill not be reanalyzed unicss a specific request
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is received from Reactor Projects in this regard. idkawise, tornsdo missiles vill not b= reviewed as it is our judgenent that proviaiens for hardening against large aircraft vill preclude any hazard from tornaco-generated miss11ec.
This reviev was coordinated by Charles Ferrell, Sita Analyst, Accident A alysis branch, for this facility.
The Accident Analynis 3 ranch staff members who perforned this review are:
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,eography & Ze o5:a,.uj G. FerreA-3.3 Evaluatious F.. Ioateci.Aa,
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1.5. 0 Accident Analysis
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C. Ferrell iie reco:xw.nd that t11.3 application be accepted proviced t'ac appli m e rssponds within 30 days of doc;.eting to the ite::e =nrkcc th an asterisic in m anclosura:
0.s vJ n.= =J ' a IL a. De c a Earold R. Denton, Assistant Director for Site Safety Directorate of Licecaing
Enclosure:
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Accident Analvsis Branch Acceotance Review Cuestions Three Mile Island Unit 2
- Section 1.2 Provide a plan view drr.dn3 of the control room layout si=ilar to those shown in Figurt 11.2 -17.
- S.:ction 2.1 Provide a nap which clearly shows the distances between release points of gaseous radioactive effluents and the site boundary.
Section 2.2 Pigure 2.1-3 indicates that the Pennsylvania railroad line is located approxi=ately 2000 feet (0.4 miles) east of the Three Mile Island nuclear facility. This plot plan further shows a railroad siding entering the site via a bridge from the north east direction. Provide the following information with respect to rail traffic on both of these lines:
1.
Type, quantity and frequency of toxic gases that nay be transported near the site.
2.
Provide an analysis of the effects of an accident involving any ha:ardous =aterials regularly transported near the site on the safe operation of the nuclear facility.
Include the following:
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- Required for accgptance.
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. (1) Effects of delayed ignition of a cloud of propane gas on both reactor structures and components and the operation of the diesels.
(2) release of toxic airborne chemicals on control room personnel including the ability to isolate the control room on detection of the particular substances which might be released.
(3) Indicate the method for controlling the shipment of hacardous materials on the railroad siding leading to the plant site, (e.g., using the siding as a switching facility.
- Section 6.2 Please supply the information requested in Regulatory Guide 1.70.2 relating to filtration system and sump design.
- Section 6.2.3 Containment Sorav Svstems A detailed description of the fission product removal function of the Contain=ent Spray Systen should be provided in this section if the system is relied on to perform this function following a design basis accident.
- Section 6.2.3.1 Desien Bases This see:1on should provide the design bases for the fission product removal function of the containment spray system, including, for example:
- Required for ac.eptance.
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(1) The postulated accident conditions and the extent of simultaneous occurrences that deter =ine the design require:ents for fission product scrubbing of the containment atmosphere; (2) A list of the fission products (including the species, of iodine) which the syste is designed to re=ove, and the extent to which credit is taken for the cleanup function in the analyses of the radiological consequences of the accidents discussed in Chapter 15 of the SAR; (3) The base-employed for sizing the spray syste= and any components required for the execution of the atmosphere cleanup function of the syste=.
- Section 6. 2. 3. 2 Svstem Desirn (As Af fected bv rission Prcduct Re= oval FunctienT This section should provide a description of syste=s and components employed to carry out the fission product renoval function of the spray syste=, including the method of additivs injection (if any) and delivery to the containment. Detailed Lafor=ation should be provided in this section concerning:
(1) Methods and equipment used to ensure adequate delivery and mixing rf the spray additive (where applicable).
(2) Source of water supply during all phases of spray system operation.
(3) Spray header design, including the nunber of no::les Required for acceptance.
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per header, no :le spacing and orientation (a plan view of the spray headers, showing no::le location and orientation, should be included. )
(4) Spray no::le design, including the drop size spectrum produced by the'no :le.
Source of the data, methed of measurement, and expected accuracy should be discussed.
(5) A description of the operating codes of the systec should be given including the time of systes initiation, time of first additive delivery through the no::les, length of injection period, time of 'iniciation of recirculation (if applicable), and length of recirculation operation.
Spray and spray additive flow rates should be supplied for each period of operation, assuming minimum spray operation coencident with =axi=us and minimum safety inj ection flow rates, and vice versa.
(6) The regions of the contain=ent covered by the spray. List the contain=ent volu=es not covered by the spray, and estimate the forced or convective post-accident ventilation of these unsprayed volumes.
Indicate the extent to which credit is taken fcr the operability ef duct work, da=pers, etc.
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- Section 6.2.3.3 2esign Ev21uatien Provide an evaluation of the fission product renoval function of the centainment spray system. The syster should be evaluated for fully effective and =ini u safeguards operatien, includin g the condition of a single failure of any active cc penent.
If the calculation of the spray effectiveness is perforced for a single set of post-accident conditicas, attention should be given to the ef fects of such parameters, as temperature, spray and su=p pH, (and the resulting change in iodine partition),
drop size, and pressure drop across the noccle, in order to ascertain that the evaluatica has been perforced for a conservative set of these parameters.
- Section 6.2.3.4 Tests and Inspections Provide a cascription of provisions cade for testing all essential functicas required for the iodine re= oval effectivenss of the system. In particular, this sectica should contain:
(1) A descriptica of the tests to be perforced to verify the capabili:y of the systers, as installed, to deliver the spray solution with the required concentration of spray additives :o be used for iodine re= oval.
If the test fluids are not the actual spray additives, describe the liquids of sis 11ar density and viscosity to be
- Required for acceptance.
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(' s V e= ployed, and discuss the correlation of the test data with the des 4,. recuirecents.
(2) A description of the provisiens cade for testing the containment spray mor les.
(3) The provisiens =atl~tui periodic testing and surveillance of the content of the spray additive tank (s).
Provide the bases for surveillance, test procedures, and test intervals deemed appropriate for the system.
- Section 6.2.3.5 Instrumentatien ?.aquirements This sectica should include a description of any instrumentatica of the spray system required for actuation of the system and monitoring of the fissicn product re=cval function of the system.
- Section 6.2.3.6 Materials Specify and discuss the chemical cc=pesition, concentrations in storage, susceptibilit5 to radiolytic or pyrolytic deco = position,
corrosion properties, etc., of the spray additives (if any), the spray solution, and the contain=ent su=p solutien.
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- Section 6.1 Control Roon a
1.
The flow rate of unfiltered air leaking-into the Control Room should be calculated for the condition of control rocs isolation. The ISAR should include a clear description of the assu=ptions used in the analysis includidg:
a.
Identification of leakage paths (doors; duct, pipe, and cable penetrations; dampers; etc.)
b.
Leakage path characteristics (pressure differential / leakage flow rate relationship) c.
Estimate of pressure differentials (caused by wind effects, stack effects, barometric pressure variations, ventilation units servicing spaces adjacent to the control room, negative pressures at suction side of f ans). A 1/8" Wg presture differential for all leak paths (except those exposed to the negative pressure on the suction side of fans) is normally considered adequate to account for these effects.
d.
Leakage contribution from all pathways (filtered and unfiltered leak rates should be reported separately).
- Required for acceptance.
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Identification shculd be made of toxic caterials (quantities, method of storage, etc.), such as chlorine, that =ay be stored on or in the vicinity of the site, which, assuming a container rupture, =ay interfere with control roca operation.
In the event of a chlorine release, the time period between chlorine detection and a buildup of chlorine concentri. tion within the control roco to dangerous levels can be relatively short. Consequently (see Enclosure on chlorine protection) it is necessary to have automatic actuation of an appropriate protection action for the control As outlined in the enclosure, plants with a single room.
fresh air inlet should have an automatic control roca isolation capability in conjunction with a chlorine detector signal.
Compare your plant design against the enclosed design recoc=endations and provide us with the results of your review and a description of any changes that may be necessary to achieve a degree of protection equivalent to that which is described in the enclosure.
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_ *Section 15 1.
An analysis of the thyroid, beta skin, and whole body ganea doses received by control room operators during accident situations should be provided. The dose contribution from each separate source of radioactivity should be tabulated.
'a' hen evaluating the effectiveness of the control room protection features, all types of accidents should be considered; however, only the limiting accidents need be analyzed in detail. As a =ini=us, calculate the doses received by the control roon operators fros a main steam line break accident, a loss-of-coolant accident, and a fuel handling accident.
In the case of the LOCA, allcwances may be tade fer control room occupancy factors of 1.0 between 0-24 hours, 0.6 between 1-4 days, and 0.4 between 4-30 days.
The nethod used to calculate the doses should be provided.
A cc=plete list of assempticas and input data should be provided including:
a.
The source ter=s used for each point of release.
All potential sources of radioactivity including contain=ent leakage, exfiltration if aay, vent and stack releases,
- Required for acceptance.
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p penetration leakage and activity which may be transferred directly to the control rcco frc= the radwaste and turbine buildings and f rce other portions of the control building should be considered (See ites c.)
b.
The distances between the points of radioactivity release for each design basis accident and the air intake to the control rocs.
An evaluatica of the potential for radicactive sacerial, c.
noxious gases, or steam to be transferred directly into the control rec = frcs adjacent areas and buildings.
This should include a descriptica of all potential paths for transport such as the duct work, corriders, doorways, elevator shafts, etc.
d.
The expected dilution f actors between the expected release points and the control room air intake (or other appropriate opening). Assumptions as to wind speed and exposure frequency made during the course of the accident shculd be clearly stated.
Technical references and/or experimental data to justify the f actors used in the analysis shculd be provided.
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It is stated on page 15.1.14-2 that an analysis of potential leakage from the engineered saf ety features during a saxinum hypothetical accident is presented in Chapter 6 of the final safety analysis report.
Please indicate = ore precisely where this infor ation is located as we were unable to find this analysis in Chapter 6.
The analysis should ine'.ude the following:
(1) Assu=e that in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident that equipment outside containment is leaking at a =aximus operational leakage rate (i.e., postulate a da= aged seal, or packing, or sete other leakage path in which leakage would be at a naximun but not great enough to cause the pu=p or equipment to be inoperable). Calculate the radioactive release to the envirotsent and resulting doses from the RHR, containment spray syste=s, etc. over the 30-day period of operation.
State all of the assumptions that were used in your analysis and verify that they are conservative.
Include the following parameters in your analysis:
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Concentration (uc/c:) of iodine and noble gas activity in the pri:ary containment sump water following a LOCA using the source terns specified in Regulatory Guide 1.7.
b.
Temperature curve vs. ti=e for water being circulated thru pu=ps following a LOCA.
c.
Expected maxi =u leak rate (cc/hr) thru pu=ps seals, flanges, valves, etc.
d.
Partition factor for iodine.
e.
Adsorption and filtration efficiencies of the filter train used on the exhaust system for the engineered safety features area and whether these syste=s
=cet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
(2) Provide an estimate of the total a=ount of leakage that could occur prior to isolation of failed equipment assu=ed (1) a pu=p seal failure and (2) a line severance several hours after the LOCA event.
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Provide a table of data used for your loss of coolant accident analysis as illustrated in Table 15-2 of the
" Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plant," (Revision 1), October 197 2.
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o, PROVISIONS FCR ADEOUATE PROTECTION ACA!NST A CHLORINE RELIASE Adequate protectica of the centrol roc = against an on-site chlorine release vill be achieved if provisions are included in the plar.m design to isolate the con:rol roca autc=a:ically to limit the potential build-up of chlorine within the ccatrol roca, and if equipment and procedures are provided to assure in=ediate use of breathing apparatus by the control roca operators.
Similar precautions veuld help =itigate consequences of =cs: postulated toxic gas releases.
To acco:plish the autecatic isolation quick-respense chlorine detectcrs should be 1ccated in the f resh air inlets to the control roc =.
These detectors should be abic to detec't and signal a step increase in chlorine concentration within a ti=e period not to exceed 3 seconds.
The detectors shculd be capable of signaling a step increase frca cero to 15 pp= of chlorine by volume or greater. Detectors should be provided at the centrol rcen fresh air inlet for all plants tha:
have storage facilities that =ight accidently release a total of fC0 pounds of chlorine. Additional detectors should be provided at chlorine storage locations that are less than 100 =eters frc= the control roc = or that =ay release more than 3 tons of chlorine as a result of any postulated accident. These detectors should be placed, and the detecter trip point adjusted, so as to assure detecticn af a leak nr a centainer rupture. Detec:or trip signals should initia:c aute 2 tic isolation of the ccatrol roca and provide an audible alar:
to the operators.
The means used to initia:a automatic isolation should teet single active failure and scistic criteria.
Control roca isolation should be acce=plished within about seven seconds after detector trip. Adequate isolatica requires all openings to the control room to have low leakage characteristics.
This vould include doors, dampers. and penetrations.
Total in-filtration into the isolated control roco should be less than 100 cf:
assuming a 1/3" water gage pressure differen:ial across all cpenings and the maxicum operating dif ferential across the isolation dampers upstress of recirculating fans.
This leakage limit should be reduced to 25 cfm if chlorine storage is within 100 =eters of the control room or if more than 3 tons of chlorine can be released as a result of any postulated accident.* Normal fresh air make-up should be limited to no more than 1 to 1 1/2 air changes per hour.
An administrative procedure should provide all.dcors leading to the control rec = be kept closed uhen not in use.
- These leakage rates are based en a control rcon volume of 100,0C0 cubic feet and thus shculd be adjusted as directly propor:icnal to actual con rcl roc volunc.
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Control rec isolatica shculd be fc11 cued 4--adiately by the start-up and operation of the erergency recirculating ch2recal filter or equivalent equipment designed to recove or otherwise limit the accumulation of contamination within the control roce.
Under cer:ain meteorological cor.di:icas control race isolatica cay not be sufficient by itself te limit chlorine concentrations to levels belce those which cause physical disccafert or d'sability.
Therefore, the use of self-ccatained breathing apparatus shcu'd
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considered.vhen develeping a chierine release emergency plan.
Since calculations indicate that rapid increases in chlorine concen: rations are possible, emergency plan provisions and rehearsal of these provisions for immediate danning of breathing apparatus on detection of chlorine release are necessary.
S:crage provisicas for breathing apparatus and procedures for use 'should be such that operators can begin using the apparatus within two =inutes after an alara. Denning of breathing apparatus should be sanda cry prior to the determination of the cause of an alare.
A toxic environment ay be presen: for several days or Icager if a chlorice leak cannot be fixed er the leaking container recoved.
In any event, adequate bottled air capacity (at least six hcurs) should be readily available on-si:e to assure that sufficient tire is available to locate and transpcrt bottled air from off-si:c locations. This off-site supply shculd be capable of delivering several hundred hours of bottled air to the ce bers of the energency crew.
Isolation and air supply equipment relied on shculd ace;nnedate a single failureuaf an active component and still perfor the required functica.
(In the case of self-c:ntained breathing apparatus this cay be accomplished by supplying cne entra unit for every three units required.)
Protection requirements for plan:s located nearby other facilities that store significant quanti:ies of chlorine or plants located nearby =ajor chlorine transpor:atice routes will be determined on a case-by-case bas 4s.
s -',' y p., ants having storage facilities tha: might accidentall,, relecse a total of SCO pcunds of chlorine or less vill be revieued on a case-by-case basis to deter-
=ine need for protectica.agains: accicen:al release.
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