ML19220C241
| ML19220C241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1978 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19220C233 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR TM-0167, TM-167, NUDOCS 7904300090 | |
| Download: ML19220C241 (3) | |
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6 LiCAnGe.:0. Lei'-73 e..cclear.-eplatory Cccr.insien (tne cc. mission) nas fcuna tnat:
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.r.a i;;a.ce of tnis licen e re~.vn* cacclies witi rne stan;aras anu require. rents of rne Atoc.ic 2.ergy.i;t ci 1354, as rensa (r;.e
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..;x. tae Carc.i;sion's rules anc reJulaticas set :ceta in la CJa Crcter I; a.
2p tact 1ity wil1 c erate in cenicriaity.Jita tne 1icence, :s :.;rn.m.:,
tne crevisions of tne ;.ct, and cne rules ana regulations of t p C,xuinn icn; C.
Tnere is ressenecle assur nce (i) enat tne a. tivities autner i:aa ay tnis c.wncmnt can ce concuctec witncut enor.gerin; tae ceair.i are.i sarety of tne,cualic, arc (ii) raat suca activities..'ili ce conocctec in cor aliance with tne Ccc:aission' ~ regulations; D.
2p istua:.ce or this ca.en:nent will not.;e inimical to tae cea se.1 ckfense anu cecurity cr to tne naalta and carety of t.la :uctie; ano 2.
ine issaance of tnia ac:erment is in accctuance wit.; 10 CF.. ear t 51 of rne C c.i.;sicn's re-gulations cna all agalicaale require::ents nave ceen :stiatie.
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.'s:crciryly, tne a.enceo Facility @ rating wicense.a.
09:-73 ta nerecy c cence i cy cnanging tne X.nical 5pecificaticna as indicar.N in tne att cn. rent to tais license rennent.
Ecragray1 2.C. ( 2) of a.r.enuec facil it/ 3:orstirn Lic>nse :c. 20.-7 3 is hereof aanced to re.2 as tc110m:
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rev::ec rnrcuga i.:.snu.ont..o. a ere.erecj inecrgrat s in t..e licenoe..etr:..olitan :uic.ca..- cc.y mai l opr re t..e f acit t e,-
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a introcuction
- y letter datec may is, IR, trans:.:itting Tecnnical 5;2cificctien Lhan;c
'eiuest he. Uu),. etropolitan Edison Ccepany (.'et Ed) re; tested at..ca..;en-af,'ypencu n tu Facility Uperating Licensa av. UM-/3 for Tii. ee cille Islanc huclear Station, Unit ?. (i.4I-2).
The ret;uestec chenge would e.<..eM tne Technical Specifications to perait a a:cre effective n.ethod of seal lear. age verification.
Jiscussion Ine pr esent nording of the T,il-2 Tecnnical Specifications requires tnat contairment air lcca, seal lean rate testing se performed 'Oy pressure decaj wr.en tne volume octween the coor seals is pressuri:cc to _>l5,asig...'
Ina acceptance criteria specified, (Leakage f.U.01 La) translates to a crassure crop of 10 psig in a period of io seconds. bis is inconsistent alta tne additional requirenent to maintain dcor seals pressurizac :, > la psig for at least 15 minutes.
In acJition occause ;;ae c.anuf acturar has_
inoicatea that the valu:".e between the dcor seals shoulc not ce pressuri tc aacve lu psig, aac because the volic.:a cet:een the cocr seals is cuite small s
t u.ud cu. ft.), met Ec states -hat it is not pcssinle te ;e form tae survaillance using tne pressure cecay.netnoc.
The pre,;ccau ;crdiag af t..a fecnnicai specifications would allow measursent of lear. rate tasting %.
anonner nethcd (e.3., the ficw cocitario.; ceti.od). This prcrosec caen e a
deletas tne requirement to measure seal leaxage by a pressure drop tast i.:ethod, and specifies the pressure at wuich tne seal ieat rate is o ;e dete.:.ined using a flow ceter.
The udsis of tne surveillance require ent is te ;rovice as t.ranc1 that t.%
containment leakage rates of Liraitin; Ocncition far Lperati;n.
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-L-Tae pro,cosau Technical Specifica ian Chanje c;es not cha"Ja the 11.dt estaalls.,uu for clicwaule leexage tnrougn tna duur seal;.
inis limit re.:ains <_.u.J1 Lc (1 percent of the total allowaole cantainc.;ent leak ra:a).
Avaluatien de nave revienec tne inter: nation provided ay the licensee as well as acuitional information frca cur uffice of Inspection anu Entercu; cent dn0 find tnat the proposed methcd Of sedl leakhje nadasure:.:ent is effective (in fact, for tnis particular application, it is more ef fective than that required ay the present Technical 5pecifications) satisfies :n: intan; and the basis of the Technical Specificaticn, anc theretcre provices equal or greater assurance tnat seal leaka e will be within acceptable limit:.
u dased on the accve, we conclude that the croposec change per.ait: ins an alternate method of a;easuring containment air lock seal ieakage is accepti;1a, and that the facility operating licensa can oc amenceu by changing the Tecnnical Specifications as shown in the attach.aent to this license amendaent.
Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature c.
Intrccucticn By letter cated June 5,1978 transmitting Tecnnical Specification Change Request.io. Oll, Metropolitan Edison Company (Mot Ed) requested amenement of Appendix A to Facility Operating License.'io. OPR-73 for Tnree tiile islanc :tuelear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2).
The requestec change would amend tne Tecnnical Specifications to permit plant operation with temperature of the Susquehanna River (the ultimate heat sink) in excess of tne present limit of cdoF.
61scussion Tha present Tecnnical Specifications recuire shutacwn of TMI-2 wi nin au h:urs if heat sink (Su:quehanna River) tenperature excaeds 550F.
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0;arating experience sncws that river water temcerature iacy exceed d60F curing the sun.:er mcnths.
Ine licensee nas stated that witn one exception, sufficient margin exists in tne design of all safety-relatea equip.nent waien uculd reject neat to the ultima:a heat sink, such tnat tha 2qaipc.;ent will operate acceptacly witn the heat sin'r temperature up to 950F.
The exception is the cen:rci cuilding air conditioning equipment, anien can operate satisfactorily wi;a hea; sing temperatures up to 9GoF.
aitn increased ficw, wrica will ce availacle after replacement of tne ccntrol building acoster pump in.;cller:,
- nis equipment will also operate satisf actoril;. at nea; s1:a tr.:peraturus up :2 loi.
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NRC EGRM 313 (9.*6) NRCM 0240 W un e. mova=weenwv pmariae orvic as ie7e - esa4a4
9 Tne licensea ne: prcvicac results of :neir analyses and accitional inforratica to confir-a tnat eaca safetyrelatec cc.aponent will opera:e witoin i;; desi;n para.ceters anu will not suffer at,radation of perfunnar.ce or impain,ent in perfonaanca of its safety func: ion for the proposed increasea aeat sink te.Luratures.
Evaluation basec on car evaluation of the results of the licensee's analyses of component parfor:ance anc on our calculations ena estimatas af systa:. perforuance cased on ccmponent cesign temperatures, we fina reasonucle assurance that safety-related components will operate within their design par: meters ano aill suffer impairment in perfor:aence of :neir safaty f uncticns at the proposac not increaseu ultimate heat sink temperatures.
.ie tnerefore finc that cperation at tne proposeu neat sink temperatures will not cause a significant cecrossa in tne performance margins of safety-related systems, anc that sucn operation is aCCepta3le.
dased on tne above, we conclude nat tne facility operating license can be amended by changing the Technical Specifications as scoan in the attacreent to tnis license aa.cndacnt.
3.
Grif'. u Rod and Burnable Poison Rod Assenclies Introduction 3y letter cated July 7,197G transmitting Technical specification Change dequest.io. 014, Metre;olitan Edison Company (Xet Ec) requestea ar.endi.ent of Appendix A to Facility Operating License 30. uPR-73 for Three dila Island nuclear Station, unit 2 (D1I-2).
The recuestec changes would eaanc tne Tecnnical Specifications to perait rataoval of all but two orifica rco assamblies (0RA's) and installation of retainers on the re.maining two GRA's and on the burnable poisen rce assemalies (dPRA's). Thesc Chdnges are proposed because of the concern over WCar of the fucl asse;alj holddown latch assemolies as found in c:ner plants, causea Dy levitation anu vibration of *.he ORA's anc 3PRA's.
Accitional changes covered by this change request are the follo. sing, unicn whien are not related to thA renoval or d?RA installation:
Increase in RCS pressure - low trip setpuint oy 10U ps1; and corresponoing increase in tne high pressure trip curing startup in snu:ccwn cypass.
Carrection of rea ocw penalty to correctly reflect the.dc r:c tow model.
Acc1 tion of allcwaale values for Cac nnel faaction :1 Test ta L
accuunt Jr instrument errars.
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u; a's nec ceun prcviced in guide tuces not canteining centrol roa asseaalies or axial po'.er snapinj red asser.;olies to liuit reactor coclant eypass flow cnrougn atnarwise e-pty guide tuaes. SPKA's are used ta provide partial contral of slealy ccurring negative reactivity craa as and to s
flatten t.'.c radiol power cistribution.
A acenable poison rea assea.bly (3?RA) was ejected frca ths ccre at une of U3.i s har( b plants. euW analyzed tne probica and determinec it :o Da caused by levitation of the sPkAs during four-puup operation ana sucsequent fretting wear ia the noledcun latching mechanis.... After the initial inspection of fuel assemolies at the affectad plant, LL..also caservec visual ind cations of wecr at other plants in the icential lat ning machanis..is of JPhAs, asserolies that held orifice recs (uRAs), and sourca or.accified crifice rud assemblies (r~ ras). To resolve tn1s pecole:a ia E1!-2, the licensce proposes installation of retainers on the dPdA's anc cn two modified 0:tA's, and renoval of the reaaining thirty-eisat CAA's.
Information supporti 19 :his proposal, attachec or referenced in the subsittal of July 17, 197e, incluces:
B&W letter to asC datec June 7,1973, Taylor to Varga S AW-1490 "BTRA Retainer Design Report," May 1973 SAW-1497, 'Justificatien for Removal of Grifice Aou Assemblies in Three Mile Island Unit 4, Cycle 1," June,197d.
The sutaittal states that installation of tne retainers uculd reduce reactor coolant system (RCS) flow ' f less than 1 percent and removal cf the JAA's o
..culd incraase b3 pass fica in tne hot assecoly oy 1.5 percent.
To caa;en;ata for cora flow distribution effects caused by tnc changes, the licensee proposed increasing the pri. nary system ficw rate (ficw requirement increase of 2 percent). The present margin in flow rate between measured and tecr.nical specification require: cent (5 percent) would be recucec. 32cause this ccerating margin is reducca froa 5 percent to 3 percent, flu.4 instre:.:entation was evaluated to assure that its accuracy is within the range of the :nargin.
The flow scosuree.ent system anc its calicration were icantified by tne licensee to oc identical to the system for Three. ila Islanc, Unit I unich M
has previously been shown to have a measurecent uncertainty of aoout 1.5 parcant.
This uncertainty is within tne 3 pcreent margin availab'e.
The limiting fuel assecoly caes not contain a 3PRA auring cycle 1 operatic:..
Tr.ougn tnis woula furtner increase flow in tne hot assemalj, oc crecit was taken for it.
The net effect of the increased flow anc bycass penalties is a siignt increase in C BR's.
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U.+4 Vaides of 1.va f ur *"a 9-paap cuestaa.,a event anc i.a ror a taccuater ".c.acrstare accrease evcat ucre calculated.
Tns 1-;uip coast-cu.,a tre.12-pu..p spers:ivn was icer.tifiac te ve ti.e most limiting fic.. :cansient eecause i: 1s ascc
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- nat tha u.tdd for tne 1-pu.np coastuc,n is 1.43.
a retainer device nas been designed and tasted by oc.i :a ensure positive nolade cn of OPRAs, uans an; ntnAs curing reactor operation.
The casijn and the tes; results were reported to.eC in Ser.-14)d anc tne cacve-referance.
letter of June 7, 1373.
For continued operation of TJI-2,.-etrsvalitan cdison Cu.wany proposes to install tne retainer eevices cn de dPaas ana 4 4:Lxns. All regular e;ns (3d) will ce rur.avec f r u the ccre.
These chanjas a ply only for the re;ainder of :ne current cycle, Gjcle 1, at wnich ti~e r
- PxAs are usually withdrawn from, tne core.
Inc potential consequer:ces of a retainer failure have alsu acen accresses al:ncush failure is consicerac unlikely. Tne neutrcnic and thermal-mjcraulic consequences arc consicerec small.
Intcrference with control rec notion, for exar..ple, woula not, accurding to analysis of stuck-out control red transients for daa 177-FA plants, prevent safe shutdown of tne piant.
Ine :aajor concern associated with retair.er failure is plant cama:c, primarily in the stea.a generat:rs, and potential cutages for repair.
Inis damage sncule be precludeo of tne Loose Parts ::cnitoring Syste.1 (Lb:5).
The LRt'i is designec to detect a failed retainer in either the reactor vessel or stea.a generator. Even tnough tna retainer cevice is uesigned for only one cycle of oper?. tion, add nas stated that it will reccinend :nat surveillance inspections be raace following retainer use.
This shoul provide adciticnal confirr.ation of acceptacle operation. Sud has ;lso stated tna; definita plans rejerning surveillance will be providea to :%C as they are fc.caulatec.
Ine first of tne additional cnanges is the increase in xCS Pressur? - 10w trip setpoint freu 1600 psis to 1900 psi 9 Inis change is being..ada tar 3reater operating flexiofiity and to increase ne..urgin 0 hign pressure injection U!PI) so that a rapid depressuriza:icn will not unnecessarily cause HPi as frequently as would cccur wit.. less carjin. As a result of :nis increase in tne RCS pressure - low trip setpoint, it is correspondingl;.
necessary to increase the-manual oypass oy 100 psi to >_ IJE0 psi 3 :o incorporate 1820 psig as tne new hign pressure trip during startup in sautacwn oypass. Tnis will enaale startup to be perfsrmed..cre easily will continue to maintain the same margin ;revicusly used to ;Ilc.v and rur instrument errors.
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Ihe crijindl Tucnni;al Spaci/1C30i0n was preparac using the c2n FOG aow Coucl and durin3 in/esti'Jation intJ t.le P740 Val Cf Ode LdAS dds cisccvereu ana is ccrrectea herein.
niso inccrporate2 in this change is the acGition of tue alicwable values for the Unannel Fanctional Test which previously were not includec in t!.a lacanical Specifications. These values hove bcen added to acccLat for instrument calibration error, instrut.:ent crift an0 instrument error.
Ev31uatico
<.e nave reviewe tne eficct on cara ficw of installation af retainers cn i.ne MCr# 3 and SPW s end en core bypass flow of re:acval of tne %'s.
dased on our review of tne sumaittcc cata anc on our cdiculations an siailar changes previously approved for uavis 6 esse Unit 1, we fine tnat the calculated r0 duction in C0re flow of I percent and increase in aypass flou of 1.o percent are reasonable and acceptaule.
Basec on tne similarity of flew instrumentation to that on THI-1, and cur previcus evaluation of the flow =casurement uncertainty for til-1, we find tnat ' Unit 2 flow measurecent instrumentation accuracy is axpectec to be within tne 3 percant operating margin between measurea and technical specificatica ficw rates. We have reviewec the acequacy of the acettional 2 percent RCS flow to compensate for tne 1.6 percent increase in core DyWass intr 0cuCec by the Core modifications.
It is estimatec tnat One RC5 flow increase woulc provice an additional 1.d percent ;1CS flos tt rou n u
tne core, wnich is greater than tne 1.6 percent recuction Jecause cf tne URA bypass.
Since there is no significant recuction in safety margins, we fina the proposeo core modifications accaptaale,
.ie have reviewea the Ohdh evaluaticas for the 4-pu..:p coastucun, the feecwater temperature decrease event, and the one-puup coastcown frua 4-pump operatien, and find that the results for these limiting transiunts are acove the cycle 1 Dacd criterion of 1.41, ana are accepta !e.
aith regard to the OkA and 3PRA retainers, cased on (1) design analyses and test results on tne retainer cevice, (2) analyses whicn incicate tnat failure of the retainers, however unlikely, wou;u not prevent shutcev.n and (3) failure cetection capanility of the Loose Par:s.9anttoring Systen, we find that thare is reasonacia assurance that the retainers will provice acequate holeccxn force on the SPRAs and MCRAs and that tne proposeu use cf the retainer devices in E41-2 is acceptacle.
se nave reviewed tne prcposec increase in the RCS pressure-lcw ;ria sat potat and tha associatec increase in tne hign pressure trip cur' starta r, and tir.d taat since tnesa ir. creases result in tae sane or lar -
-fa.j aarjins, the/ are acceptacle.
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The criginal calculaticos for a rca Ocwing paqalty hac seen erfo r..ac.,i t..
r a.ua red tow.acGal tnat we founc unaccepta;le.
sc have verified that tr.e ravised row cow 'nejel as presentaa in tne cn.5nge request conicras stith tne eaC-aoproved red cow equation tar GJW plants.
Therefore, we rinc nis change acceptacle.
The allasaale values for channel functional test in Technicai Specification Taale -.2-i reasonacif account for various instrument errors, and we tnerefore find tnese changes acceptacle.
In sw.: mary, we nave evaluatac tr.e proposec changes in Technical 5 pacification Change daquest !.a. 014, and having four.a thca all acceptaale, we conciuue that tne facility operating license can ce ac.enuac ay cnanging tne Technical 5pecifications as snewn in the attacierent tc :nis license amene::ent.
'lain Stee: Safety '.'alves 4.
I ntr0GdCti ca Sy letter dated July 24, 1973 transaitting Technical Specification Cnange Raquest iio. 015,.ietropclitan Edison Companj (Met Ec) requested amenaaent of Appendix A to Facility Operating License lio. GPR-73 for Three Mile Islanc inuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2).
Tne requested change would amend tha Tecnnical Specifications to permit replacement of the original 12 dcal discharge part main steam safety valves with 20 son:eunat smaller single discharge port valves.
Discussion curing a previous event at THI-2, scae of the original main steen safety valves failec to close at an appropriate pressure after actuation.
Effarts to modify tne valves to eliminata tne proolem were unsuccessful, and tne licensee electec to replace the valves.
These Tecnnical ;;acificaticns enanjes are required to reflect tnis design chcnge.
The new safety valves provide a relief capecity of 120 percent of the total seconcary steam flew compared witn 114 percent provicec by the original valves.
The licensee states tnat all system modifications conform with requirements of appropriate sections of the AS*.E Coce and with criteria previously accepted in tne Final Safety Analysis Report (F5AR).
Evaluation oc nave evaluatea the information provicec cy tne licensee and fine tFat sinca taa relieving capacity of tne new nain steaa safety valves exceecs taat crisinally provicec, the proposec cnange is in the conservative cirectiaa ind is Enerefore accepteaie.
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further finc acceptacle L:.e licensee's stateaants regarcing conf ar.aonce
,e of all i..ccifications uita na.t cece and FSAn critaria.
Anans taa changas prc00sec cy the licensee is a revision of the equation on page d 3/4 7-1 of tne Tecanical apecifications for detertaining racuccd auclear Overpc-er Trip 3etpcin; for inoperacle safety valves.
Tne prcposau equation is essentially icentical numerically to t6e crijinal, ana.<a ce na; fina suf ficient ;ustification to :.uku the proposeu cnange.
vaJec on tna a Ove, we ccnclude that tiu proposac changes in the Technical Lpecifications coverimj the naw main steaa safety valyc5 are acceptaale, exccpt as notec aJcve, and Inat the facility cperating licensa can oc a.aendeu cy caanging the Technical 3pecif1 cations as shcwn in tna attacn':.ent ta this license acent". cat.
invironmantal Consideration ae have ceterminec tna; the amendment does not authcrire a change in affluent types or total enounts nor an increase in poaer level anc will not result in any significant environmental impact..iaving :1ade tais determination, we have further concluded that the amenda:ent involves an dCtion WniCh is insijnifiCant fr3m the stancpoint of environmental iUpact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 3dl.d(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or nesative declaration ano environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amencment.
Conclusica he have concluced, based 0.1 the consideraticns ci: cussed accve, that:
sl) cecause the Unencment Jces not involve a significant increase in the precocility or consequences of accidents previously considered an: cces na; invc1ve a significant cecrease in a safety margin, :ne amendmei.t does no: inicive a sisnificant hazards consideration, (2) tnere is reasona:le assurance tnat the nealth anc safety of the puclic will not ce endangerac
- y operation in Ine proposed manner, anc (3) such activities will oc conductac in coapiisace witn the Cou;ission's regulations and the issuance of tnis amendment will nct ce inimical to the common cefense and security or to tne heil;n and safet/ of the public.
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