ML19210E194
| ML19210E194 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1979 |
| From: | Silver H NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | Vollmer R NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911300689 | |
| Download: ML19210E194 (82) | |
Text
'
MEETING
SUMMARY
DISTRIBUTION: METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THI-l SEPTE!*BER 24-27, 1979 t No. 50-289 NRC PDR Local PDR TERA NRR r/f H. R. Denton E. G. Case D. Eisenhut R. Tedesco R. Vollmer J. Collins B. Grimes T. J. Carter L. Shao W. Gamill J. Miller H. Silver S. Miner C. Nelson D. Dilanni J. Tourtellotte M. Mulkey IE(3)
P. Kreutzer. LA R. Fraley, ACRS (16)
J. R. Buchanan Licensee List Meeting Participants /NRC-MET.ED:
Jack Roe Hal Gaut Lisa N. Singer / ELD J. R. Gray / ELD Alexis Tsaggaris/ Met.Ed.
Dale Dona'dson/NRC:IE, Reg. I W1111aci H. Zewe/ Met.Ed.
Len Landry/TMI, Unit 1. Met.Ed.
1437 241 Orrice[M/TMI-1/TF suaN4uc k..HS tiver/,im.
04 rc ):. 11/1/79 NAC FORM 31819 'il NACM 0240 D U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OF#lCE; 1979-289-3697 9113 0 0 6 D L
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard H. Vollmer, Director Three Mile Island Task Force FROM:
Harley Silver Three Mile Island Task Force
SUBJECT:
MEETING WITH METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY - SEPTEMBER 24, 1979, TO SEPTEMBER 27, 1979.
EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THREE MILE ISLAND.
UNIT 1 (TMI-1)
A series of neetings between the staff and the Metropolitan Edison Comoany were held on September 25 and 26. A neeting between the staff, Petropolitan Edison and representatives of county and State government agencies was held on September 27.
On September 24, the emergency planning review team toured the T'iI-l facility. A public meeting was held during the evening of September 26. The actual agenda and a list of attendees at all the technical meetings are enclosed.
During the meeting with the public many speakers indicated that they were deeply concerned about the emergency planning at TPI.
Several members of the public provide written statements. These statements have been reviewed by the staff and are on file with the Emergency Preparedness Task Force.
During the technical meetings, the staff explained the objective of the review and described the NRR Action Plan for Promptly Improving Emergency Preparedness at Power Reactors (SECY 79-450). The staff explained pint-by-point the requirements for the upgraded emergency plans that are found in Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emer-gency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants;" Review Guideline Number One, " Emergency Planning Acceptance Criteria for Licensed Nuclear Power Plants;"
" Basis for Emer-gency Action Levels" (NUREG-610); and additional staff concerns including implementir procedures. The questions / issues discussed are enclosed.
As a result of the emergency plan review the licensee will modify the emergency plan for T?G-1 in accordance with the guidance the staff discussed in detail. The license stated that they will submit for review an upgraded emergency plan within five weeks from the end of the meetings.
Harley Silver
.Three Mile Island Task Force SC mn:
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4 November 1.1979 R. C. Arnold Mr. J. G. Hertein, Dr. Walter H. Jordon Vice President Nuclear Operations 881 W. Outer Drive Metropolitan Edison Company Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Dr. Linda W. Little 5000 Hermitage Drive Mr. E. G. Wallace, Licensing Manager Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Metropolitan Edison Company 260 Cherry Hill Road George F. Tmwbridge, Esq.
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.
Mr. G. P. Miller, Washington, D.C. 20036 Acting Supt., Unit 1 Metropolitan Edison Company Karin W. Carter, Esq.
P.O. Box 480 505 Executive House Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 P.O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Mr. W. E. Potts, Unit 1 Supt.,
Technical Support Honorable Mark Cohen Metropolitan Edison Cocpany 512 E-3 Main Capital Building P.O. Box a80 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Ellyn Weiss, Esq.
Mr. J. J. Colitz, Sheldon, Harmon, Roisman & Weiss Manager Plant Engineering 1725 I 5treet, N.W., Suite 506 Metropolitan Edison Company Washington, D.C. 20006 P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Mr. Steven C. Sholly 304 S. Market Street Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr.
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055 Jersey Central Power & Light Company Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Mr. Thomas Gerusky Morristuwn, New Jersey 07950 Bureau of Radiation Protection P.O. Box 2063 Mr. R. W. Conrad Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Pennsylvania Electric Company 1007 Broad Street Mr. Marvin I. Lewis.
Johnstown, Pennsylvania 15907 6504 Bradford Terrace Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149 J. B. Liebeman, Esq.
Berlock, Israel, Lieberman Ms. Jane Lee 26 Broadway R.D. 3 Box 3521 New York, New York 10004 Etters, Pennsylvania 17319 Ms. Mary V. Southard, Walter W. Cohen, Consumer Advocate Chairperson Department of Justice Citizens for a Safe Environment Strawberry Square,14th Floor D_A_
pu ant; Harciehuco-Dennev1vania 17177
,gr 'isburg, Pennsylvania 17108 SURNAME..
DATE,
NRC FORM 31619 76) NRC%t 32JO D'e S GOVE RN**ENT on>NTING OFFICE: 1979-289-369
h.
R. C. Arnold November 1,1979 Robert L. Knupp, Esq.
Ms. harjorie M. Aamodt Assistant Solicitor R.D. #5 Knupp and Andrews Ccatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 P.O. Box P 407 N. Front Street Ms. Karen Sheldon Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 Sheldon, Harmon, Roisnan a Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W., Suite 506 John E. Minnich, Chairman Washington, D.C. 20006 Dauphin Co. Board of Comissioners Dauphin County Courthouse Earl B. Hoffman Front and Market Streets Dauphin County Comissioner Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 Dauphin County Courthouse Front and Market Streets Robert Q. Pollard Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 Chesapeak Energy Alliance 609 Montpelier Street
- Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Baltimore, Maryland 21218 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Chauncey Kepford U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Judith H. Johnsrud Washington, D.C. 20555 Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power 433 Orlando Avenue
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Ms. Frieda Berryhill, Chairlady Washington, D.C. 20555 Coalition for Nuclear Power Plant Postponement
- Docketing and Service Section 2610 Grendon Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Wilmington, Delaware 19808 Washington, D.C. 20555 Holly S. Keck
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York Board 245 W. Philadelphia Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission York, Pennsylvania 17404 Washington, D.C. 20555 John Levin, Esq.
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Comission P.O. Box 3265 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Jordon D. Cunningham, Esq.
Fox, Farr and Cunningham 2320 N. Second Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 Ms. Kathy McCaughin
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Three Mile Island Alert, Inc.
23 South 21st Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17104 OF FIC E k..
SUANAVE.
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NRC PvRM 318 (9 76) N ACNt 324 D U.S. GOV EC'WENT PRINTING OFFICE e 1979-289 369
a NRC TASK FOP' E MEETING ON EMERGENCY PLANNING J
DATE TIME LOCATION ATTENDEES 9/24 0900 - 1200 Local Area NRC Staff Only 1300 - 1600 Three Mile Island Site Tour 9/25 0900 - 1200 Liberty Fire Co. No.1 NRC, Licensee 1300 - 1600 Liberty Fire Co. No. 1 NRC, Licensee 9/26 0900 - 1200 Liberty Fire Co. No. 1 NRC, Licensee 1300 - 1600 Liberty Fire Co. No.1 NRC, Licensee 2000 - 2200 Liberty Fire Co. No. 1 Public Comment Meeting 9/27 0900 - 1200 Liberty Fire Co. No. 1 NRC, Licensees, State / County Civil Defense 1200 - 1600 Tour of State Emer-NRC, Licensees, State, gency Operations Center Civil Defense Liberty Fire Co. No. 1 Adela and Emaus Street Middletown, Pennsylvania 1437 245
Tuesday September 25, 1979 Name Organization Jack Roe USNRC Dick Vollmer NRC/TMI Alexis Tsaggaris Met-Ed Ray J. Hallmark Energy Inc. for Met-Ed Robert Fahler Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Keita Woodard Pickard, Lowe & Garrick Len Lan:ry TMI Unit 1 Health Physicist Marvin L Smith Battelle, PNWL Richard Roberts Patriot-News Karin W. Carter Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pa.
Donald F. Cameron Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Dale Donaldson NRC Region I John Collins TMI/NRC Jane Lee Etters, ork Co.
Pat Street TMIA/ Concerned Citizens Louise Defour Limerick Ecology Action John Garver, Jr.
Middletown 1437 246
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Wednesday September 26th 1979 Name Organization Jack Rce USNRC Pat Street Londonderry Twp Jane Lee York, Pa.
M. L. Smith Battelle PNWL Dale Donaldson NRC Donald F. Cameron LASL Richard Roberts Patriot-News Ray J. Hallmark Energy Inc. for Met-Ed Keith Woodard Pickard, Lowe & Garrick Robert Fahler Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Alexis Tsaggaris Met-Ed Wm. H. Zewe Met-Ed.
Len Landy Met-Ed.
Bill Johnston Citizen Harley Silver (part-time)
s 4
Thursday September 27, 1979 Name Organization Jack Roe USNRC Rich Roberts Patriot-News Hal Gaut USNRC/SP Donald F. Cameron Los Alamos Scientific Lab.
Marvin L. Smith Battelle PNWL.
Eugene W. McPeek USNRC/OSP Michael S. Pawlowski FEMA Region III John E. Bex FEMA Region III Lisa N. Singer NRC/0 ELD J. R. Gray NRC/0 ELD J. Dougherty PEMA Kevin J. Molloy Dauphine County OEP Dick Lamison PEM4 C. A. Williamson PEMA Margaret A. O'Reilly PADER/BRP J. Lothrop PEMA C. Crowe PEMA T. Gerusky DER /BRP D. dutler DER /BP W. P. Dornsife PADER-BRP Robert Fahler Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Alexis Tsaggaris Met-Ed William A. Shaffer EMA LEB Co.
Robert E. Boyer Dir.-EMA. LEB Co.
Paul L. Leese Dir. EMD. Lane Co.
Dale Donaldson NRC:IE, Region I Les Jackson Dir. E.M. York Co.
Pat Street Londonderry Twp Jim Tourtellotte NRC/0 ELD John Collins NRC/TMI Support Jane Lee Fairview Twp - York, Co.
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SEPTEMBER 19, 1979 QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS CONCERNING UPGRADING EMERGENCY PLANNING AT THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION 1437 249
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.101 EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR PCWER PLANTS 1.
Definitions Provide definitions of any terms that are unique to the pcwer plant under consideration or are given connotations that differ from r,ormally accepted usage.
2.
Scope and Applicability (1) Define the unit, plant, station, or area to which the plan is applicable and present a summary of the plan's interrelationships with (a) its implementing procedures; (b) plant operating, radiological control, and industrial security procedures; (c) other emergency plans of the company (e.g., an overall corporate pian); and (d) emerger.cy plans of other participating agencies, particularly the responsible State agency or other governmental autnority having radiological emergency planning resconsibilities in the immediate offsite area.
3.
Summary of Emergency Plan (1) Describe the xey elements of overall emergency planning logic, incorporating graded emergency classifications ef increasing severity and their relationsnip to the particicating status of onsite and offsite personnel and agencies.
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r 1
. 4.
Emergency Conditions 4.1 Classification System (1) Describe the system of classification employed to cover the entire spectrum of possible radiological emergency situations.
(2) Define the immediate actions to be taken for each classification.
(3) Describe the classification system used by State and local governments.
(4) List the implementing procedures associated with each class of emergency.
(5) Describe the criteria for characterizing each class anc the criteria or soecific emergency action levels to be used to recognize and declare each class or subclass.
(6) Describe the methods of early warning of the public and the prcmpt initiation of protective actions within the emergency planning :ene (E?Z).
4.2 Spectrum of Postulated Accidents
(.) Describe how tne postulated accidents are encomcassed within the emergency characteri:ation classes and provide a summary analysis of their imo!ications 17 25i
a
. for emergency planning.
Include (a) instrumentation capability for prompt detection and continued assessment and (b) manpower needs in relation to the anticipated sequence and timing of events.
5.
Organizational Control of Emergencies (1) Describe the emergency organi:ation that would be activated on the site and its augmentation and extension offsite.
(2) Delineate authorities and responsibilities of key individuals and groups.
(3) Identify the communication links established for notifying, alerting, and mobilizing emergency personnel.
5.1 Normal Plant Organization (1) Describe both day and night shift staffs, indicating clearly who is in the immediate onsite position of responsibility for the plant or station and his authority and responsibility for declaring an emergency.
5.2 Onsite Emergency Organi:ation (1) Describe the onsite emergency organization of plant staff personnel for both day anc nignt shift situations.
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1
. 5.2.1 Direction and Coordination (1) Identify the position title of that person onsite who is designated to ta kt. charge of emergency control measures.
(2) Provide a specific line of succession for this authority.
(3) Provide a policy statement describing the scope of authority and respon-sibility vested in that role by the company.
(4) Describe the functional responsibilities assigned to this individual.
5.2.2 Plant Staff Emergency Assignments (1) Specify the organi:ational groups to which the following additional functional areas of emergency activity are assigned, including an indication f how the assignments are made for both day and night shifts and for plant s;aff memcers both onsite and away from the site.
I.7clude at least the f 11cwing functional areas:
1.
Plant systems operations, 2.
Radiological survey anc monitoring, 3.
Firefignting, 1437 253 4
Rescue coerations,
e 5-5.
First aid, 6.
Decontamination, 7.
Security of plant and access control, 8.
Repair and damage control, 9.
Personnel accountability, 10.
Recordkeeping, and 11.
Communications.
5.3 Augmentation of Cnsite Emergency Organization (1) Describe the two categories of offsite support assistance to the plant staff emergency organization.
5.3.1 Licensee Headquarters Support (1) Describe the headquarters management, administrative, and technical personnel prepared to augment the plant staff in the performance of certain functions required to cope with an emergency.
Include at least the following special functions:
1.
Environs monitoring, 2.
Logistics supoort for emergency personnel, e.g.,
transoortation, temocracy auarters, food and water, sanitary facilities in the field, and soecial ecuipment and sucolies pr0curement, 1437 254
3 3.
Technical support for planning and reentry / recovery operations, 4
Notification ci governmental authorities, and 5.
Release of information to news media during an emergency coordinated with governmental authorities.
(2) Specify the emergency organization status of supporting headquarters personnel, relative particularly to the person directing the plant emergency organization.
(3) Provide the nature and scope of the support services provided by a contractor.
(4) Describe the qualifications of the support services contractors.
5.3.2 Local Services Support (1) Jdentify the extension of the organizational cacability for hancling emergencies to be provided by ambulance, medical, hospital, and fire-fighting organizations.
(2) Include evidence of the arrangements and agreements reached with such organi:ations in an appendix.
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. (3) Include references to that appendix and to the parts of the plan in which the fuactions of these organizations are described.
~
5.4 Coordination with Participating Government Agencies (1) Identify the principal State agency (designated State authority) and other governmental agencies (local, county, State, and Federal) having action responsibilities for radiological emergencies in the EPZ.
(2) Provide subsections for each such agency that include:
1.
The identity of the agency.
2.
A description of the authority and responsibility of the agency for emergency preparedness planning and for emergency response, particularly in relation to those of the licensee and to those of other agencies.
3.
A 'tescription for each agency of scecific response capabilities in terms of the expertise of personnel and other organizational resources available.
Copies of written agreements with such agencies should be included in an appendix. The information should provide a clear concept of radiological response operations.
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. 4 Activation of the agency function, including titles and alternates for both ends of the communication links, and primary and alternative means of communication. Administrative control methods that will ensure the effective coordination and control of the emergency activities of support organizations should be established.
5.
The designation and location of the Emergene; Operations Center of each State / local government agency.
As an alternative method of providing the information requestad in these subsections, you may choose tr submit copies of such agencies radiological emergency response plans as evidence of acceptable coordination.
If :,his alternative is selected, provide a specific cross reference to the informa-tion requested in this section.
6.1 Activation of Emergency Organization (1) Cescribe the communication steps taken to alert or activata emergency personnel under each class of emergency.
(2) Describe action levels (based on readings from a numcer of sensors inclucing the pressure in containment, the respense of tne ECCS, etc.)
for notification of offsite agencies.
(3) Describe tne oefectives of a cessage autnentication seneme.
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9 6.2 Assessment Actions (1) Provide a description of the methodologies and techniques to be used to give reasonable assurance that the magnitude of releases of radioactive materials can be determined, that the magnitude of any resulting radioactive contamination can be determined, tha projected exposure to persons onsite or offsite can be estimated and that emergency action levels specified can be determined all in a timely manner.
- 6. 3 Corrective Actions (1) Describe the actions can be taken to correct or mitigate the situation at or near the source of the problem (for example, to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive materials or to reduce the magnitude of a release).
6.4 Protective Actions (1) Describe the nature of protective actions for which the plan provides, the criteria for imolementing these protective actions, the area involved, and the means of notifying or warning the persons or population at risk.
(2) Describe also steps tagen (a) to provide to visitors to the plant or site and (b) to inform occucants in the EPZ informatin concerning how ine emergency plans prvvide for notification to them and now they can expect to be advised wnat to do.
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~
6.4.1 Protective Cover, Evacuation, Personnel Accountability (1) Describe the plan for timely relocation of persons in order to prevent or minimize exposure to radiation and radioactive materials.
Include at least the following items:
1.
Plant Site a.
Action criteria.
b.
The means and the time required to warn or advise persons
- involved, i.e.,
(1) Employees not having emergency assignments, (2) Working and nonworking visitors, (3) Contractor and construction personnel, and (4) Other persons who may be in the puolic access areas on or passing through the site or within the exclusion area.
c.
Evacuation routes, transportation of personnel, and reassemoly areas, including alternatives for inclement -eather and hign traffic censity.
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. d.
Missing persons check.
e.
Radiological ronitoring of evacuees.
2.
Offsite Areas a.
Actions planned to protect persons in the EPZ and criteria for their implementation.
b.
The means and the time required to warn or advise the persons involved, including:
(1) Business, property owners, and tenants; (2) Schools or recreational facilities; and (3) General public.
6.4.2 Use of Onsite Protective Equipment and Supplies Describe the additional protective actions considered in emergency planning include measures for minimizing the effects of radiological exposures or contamination problems by the onsite distribution of special equipment or supplies.
Consider at least the following measures for persons within tne exclusion area include:
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. 1.
Individual respiratory protection, 2.
Use of protective clothing, and 3.
Use of radioprotective drugs, e.g.,
individual thyroid protection.
6.4.3 Contamination Control Measures (1) Describe provisions made for preventing or minimizing direct or subsequent ingestion exposure to radioactive materials deposited on the ground or other surfaces.
6.4.3.1 Plant Site (1) Describe the protective actions within the exclusion area but outside of fenced security areas where applicable:
a.
Isolation or quarantine and area access control, b.
Control of the distribution of affected agricultural products, including milk, c.
Control of water supplies, and d.
Criteria for permitting return to normal use.
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. (2) Describe the action criteria (Protective Action Guides) and responsibility for implementation of the measures planned.
6.4.3.2 Offsite Areas (1) Describe protective actions planned for the EPZ including the same elements as in 6.4.3.1 above.
6.5 Aid to Affectd Personnel (1) Describe measures that will be used by the licensee to provide necessary assistance to persons injured or exposed to radiation and radioactive material.
6.5.1 Emergency Personnel Exposure (1) Specify exposure guidelines for entry or reentry to areas in order to (a) remove injured persons and (b) uncertake corrective actions.
(2) Specify exposure guidelines for emergency persennel wno will be providing first aid, decontamination, amoulance, er medi:a1 treatment services to injured persons and a description of he's these guicelines will be imolemented.
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. 6.5.2 Decontamination and First Aid (1) Describe capabilities for decantaminating personnel, along with a brief description of first aid training and capabilities of appropriate.Tembers of the emergency organization.
6.5.3 Medical Transportation (1) Specify arrangements for transporting injured personnel, who may also be radiologically contaminated, to medical treatment facilities.
6.5.4 Medical Treatment (1) Describe arrangements made for local and backup hospital and medical services and the capability for the evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake.
(2) Incorporata in the plan for both hospital and medical service, assurance not only that the required services are available, but also that persons providing t.5em are prepared and qualified to handle radiological emergencies.
(3) Include written agreements witn respect to arrangements mace by you in the aprendix.
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. 7.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (1) Identify, describe briefly, and give the locations of items to be used or mi ntained by the licensee.
7.1 Emergency Operations Centers (1) Describe the principal and alternative locations from which effective emergency control direction is given.
(2) Describe their locations relative to the reactors, prevailing wind direction and evacuation routes.
- 7. 2 Communications Systems (1) Describe both onsite and offsite communications systems, including redundant power s's arces that would be required to perform vital functions in transmitting and receiving information througnout the course of an emergency.
7.3 Assessment Facilities (1) List monitoring systems that are to be used to initiate emergency measures, as well as those to be used for continuing assessment. The listing should be organi:ec as follows:
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. 7.3.1 Onsite Systems and Equipment 1.
Geophysical phenomena monitors, e.g., meteorological, hydrologic, seismic.
2.
Radiological monitors, e.g., process, area, emergency, ef fleant, and portable monitors anu sampling equipment.
3.
Process monitors, e.g., reactor coolant system cressure and temperature, containment pressure and temperature, liquid levels, flow rates, status or lineuo of equipment components.
4.
Fire detection devices.
7.3.2 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring 1.
Geophysical pnenomena monitors.
2.
Radiological monitors.
3.
Laboratory facilities, fixed or mobile.
7.4 Protective Facilities and Equipment (1) Describe s;ecific facilities and equipment that are inte ced to serve a prctective function, including those features that ensure their acequacy witi respect to their cacacity for accom.modating the numcer of persons
)hb}
N
/
. expected and with respect to shielding, ventilation, and inventory of supplies, including, for example, respiratory protection, protective clothing, portable lighting, and communications equipment.
7.5 First Aid and Medical Facilities (1) Provide summary description of onsite f acilities.
(2) Describe offsite medical facilities in the appendix along with the agreements providing for their use.
7.6 Damage Control Equipment and Supplies (1) Describe onsite damage control equipment and supplies.
8.
Maintaining Emergency Preparedness (1) Describe the means to be employed to ensure that the plan will continue to be effective througnout the lifetime of the facility.
3.1 Organizational Preparedness 3.1.1 Training (1) Describe the scecialized initial training anc cericcic retraining programs to be provided to eacn of the following categories of emergency ersonnel:
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t 1.
Directors or coordinators of the plant emergency organization.
2.
Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including control rocm shift personnel.
3.
Radiological monitoring teams.
4.
Fire control teams (fire brigades).
5.
Repair and damage control teams.
6.
First aid and rescue teams.
7.
Local services personnel.
8.
Medical support personnel.
9.
Licensee's headquarters support personnel.
9.1.2 Orills and Exercises (1) Describe provisions for the conduct of periodic drills and exercises to test the adecuacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and metnoos, to test emergency ecuipment, and to ensure tnat emergency organi:ation personnel are familiar with their duties.
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, (2) Provide for an initial exercise prior to loading of the first unit at any site and for annual exercises thereafter using scenarios appropri.'.tg to the Site Emergency or General Emergency classifications.
(3) Describe the provisions for coordination with and participation of offsite emergency persennel, including those of State and local government agencies.
(4) Describe the test of the communications links and notification procedures with those offsite agencies to demonstrate that capability for early warning of the public is maintained.
(5) Describe the quarterly crills for fire team (fire brigade) members, annual fire emergency drills containing provisions for a participation by an offsite fire department, and annual drills of repair and damage control teams.
(S) Describe the provisions made for critiques of all drills and e.ercises.
(7) Describe the methods to evaluate its effectiveness and to correct weak areas through feedback with emphasis on schedules, lesson plans, practical training, ano periodic examinations.
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, 8.1.3 Emergency Plannng Coordinator (1) Establish and maintain on the normal plant operating staff an Emergency Planning Coordinator whose responsibility includes the coordination of offsite emergency planning efforts.
(2) Describe the principal duties of this position.
8.2 Review and Updating of the Plan and Procedures (1) Provide for an annual review of the emergency plan and for updating and improving procedures to incorporate results of training and drillr and to account for changes onsite or in the environs.
(2) Describe means for maintaining all coordinate elements of the total emergency organization informed of the plan and revisions to the plan or relevant procedures. Describe provisions for reviewing and updating all written agreements at least every two years.
8.3 Maintenance and Inventory of Emergency Equipment and Supplies (1) Describe the provisions for performing maintenance, surveillance testing, and inventory on emergency ecuipment and sucolies.
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. 9.
Recovery (1) Describe general plans, including applicable criteria, for restoring the plant as nearly as may be possible to a safe status.
10.
Appendix (1) Include in the appendix the following items:
1.
Copies of agreement letters with offsite emergency response supporting organizations and copies or summaries of referenced interfacing emergency plans.
2.
Plots of calculated time-distance-dose for the most serious design basis accident as called for in the latest revision of Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Section 13.3-1.a, -1.b, and -1.c.
3.
A map or maps, drawn to suitacle scale and clearly legible, that reflect the information called for in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Section 13.3-6.a and -6.b., and display the exclusion area, low pcoulation zone and EPZ (10, 50 mile) boundaries.
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- 22 ~
4 Listings, by title, of written procedures that implement the plan.
5.
Listings by general category of emergency kits, protective equipment, and supplies that are stored and maintained for emergency purposes.
A detailed catalog of indificual items should not be incl.uded in the plan.
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Emergency Plannino Acceotance Criteria for Licensed Nuclear Power Plants INTRCCUCTION Confirm that you will submit updated facility plans in accordance with the format of Regulatory Guide 1.101 by (date) together with the appropriate State and local plans, which will be evaluated collectively against the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, the positions set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.101, and the acceptance criteria contained herein.
ACCE3TANCE CRITERIA I.
To assure effective coordination of emergency activities among all organizations having a response role A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Provide for an emergency coordinator at all times, including one individual onsite at the time of an accident, having the authority and responsibility to initiate any emergency actions within the provisions of the emergency plan, including the exchange of information with authorities responsible for coordinating offsite emergency measures.
(5.2.1) i437 272
2.
Provide for the augmentation of the minimum onsite emergency organfration within 60 minutes for all classes of emergencies above the " alert" level.
(5.3.X) 3.
Identify and define by means of a block diagram the interfaces between and among the onsite functional areas of emergency activity, licensee headquarters support, local services support, and State and local government response organizations.
The above shall include the onsite technical support center and the operational support center as discussed in NUREG-0578.
(5.3.X) 4.
Describe the location and role of the onsite technical support center.
See item 3 of Section 2.2.2.b of Appendix A to NUREG-0578 (e.g., communications with NRC and the offsite emergency operations center).
(7.1.X) 5.
Descr 2e the location and role of the onsite operational support center.
Section item 3 of Section 2.2.2.c of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
(7.1.X) 6.
Provide for the dispatch of a representative to the principal emergency cperations center estaclished ty the offsite agencies (not required if licensee's offsite emergency oceration centar is at the same location as that cescribed in item I.3.4).
(7.1.X) 477 773 s
. 8.
State / local plans:
1.
Identify authorities responsible for coordinating offsite emergency activities for the Emergency Planning Zones discussed in NUREG-0396. (5.4) 2.
Designate the authority and specific responsibility for each coordinating authority.
(5.4) 3.
Describe the concept of operations from the perspective of each official having a coordinating role, inclucing the operational interrelationships of all Federal, State, and loc:1 organizations providing emergency supoort services.
(5.4) 4 Identify the predetermined location of the Emergency Operations Center to be used for the coordination of all offsite emergency support' activities.
(5.4, 7.1) 5.
Describe the communication plan for emergencies, including titles and alternates for both ends of the communication links and the primary and backup means of communication (5.4).
Where consistent with the agency function, these plans will incluce:
1437 274
. a.
Provision for prompt and assured activation of the State / local emergency response network.
b.
Provision for administrative control methods for assuring effective coordination and control of Federal, Stata, and local emergency support activities.
c.
Provision for communications with continguous State / local governments within the Emergency Planning Zones (10, 50 miles).
d.
Provision for communications with Federal emergency response organizations.
e.
Provision for communications with the nuclear facility, State and/or local emergency operations centers, and field assessment teams.
II.
To assure early warning and clear instructions to the population-at-risk in the event of a serious radiological emergency A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Provice an emergency classification seneme as set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.101.
(4.1.X) 1437 275
. 2.
Establish specific criteria, inluding Emergency Action Levels (EAL) as appropriate, for declaring each class of emergency.
(4.1.X) a.
EALs for declaring a " site emergency" will include instrument readings and system status indications corre-spending to an airborne fission product inventory within containment which, if released, could result in offsite coses equivalent to the lower limit of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAG) for exposure to airborne radioactive materials.
b.
EALs for ceclaring a " general emergency" will include instrument readings and system status indications corre-spending to an airborne fission product inventory witnin containment which, if released, could result in offsite doses equivalent to the upper limit of the E?A Protective Action Guides (PAG) for exposure to airoorne radioactive mate ri a l s'.
3.
Provide a clear anc explicit methocology for relating EALs to PAGs.
(4.1) 4 Identify the onsite cacacility anc resources to procerly assess and categori:e accicents inclucing:
1437 276
Instrumentation far detection of inadequate core cooling.
a.
See item 3 of Section 2.1.3.b of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
(7.3) b.
Radiation monitors.
See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.b of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
(7.3) 5.
Provide for recommending protective actions to the appropriate State and local authorities, based on projected dose to the population-at-risk, in accordance with the recommendation set forth in Table 5.1 of the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-520/1-75-001.
Upon declaration of a " general emergency", immediate notifftation shall be mace directiv to the offsite authorities responsible for implementing protective measures within the Emergency Planning Zone as discusse in NUREG-0396 (6.4) 6.
Describe the onsite communications capacility for assuring contact with the offsite authorities responsible for implementing protective measures including a primary and backup means of communications.
(6.1) 7.
Provide for periccic dissemination of educational information to the public witnin the plum exposure Emergency Planning Zone regarding tne potential warning methodology in the vent of a serious accident.
(6.4) 1437 277
8.
State / local plans:
1.
Identify authorities having a response role within the Emergency Planning Zone as discussed in NUREG-0396.
(5.4) 2.
Designate the authority and specific responsibility fer each of the responding authorities.
(5.4) 3.
Provide for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> / day manning of communication link by authorities responsible for implementing offsite protective measures.
(5.4) 4 Proeide an emergency classification scheme that is consistent with that established by the licensee.
(5.4) 5.
Describe the resources that will be used if necussary to provide early warning and clear instructions to the populace within the Emergency Planning Zone associated with the plume exposure pathway (NUREG-0396) within 15 minutes following notification from the facility operator (e.g., tone alert systems, sirens and radio /TV).
(5.4) 6.
Provide for posting information regarding the potential warning methodology and expected resconse in areas visited by transients within the Emergency Planning Zone (e.g., recreational areas).
(5.4) 1437 278
8-7.
Identify prewritten emergency messages for response organizations and the public consistent with the classification scheme.
(5.4) 8.
Provisions for testing the overall communications link to assure that the criteria specified in item 5 above is met on a continuing basis.
(5.4)
III. To assure continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both onsite and offsite A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Identify the onsite capability and resources to provide valid and continuing assessment throughout the course of an accident including:
a.
Post-accident sampling capability. See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.a of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
(7.3) b.
In-plant iodine instrumentation.
See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.c of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
(7.3) c.
Plots showing the containment radiation monitor r?ading vs. time following an accident for incidents involving iA37 279
.g.
100% release of coolant activity, 100% release of gap activity, 1% release of fuel inventory, and 10% release of fuel inventory.
(10) 2.
Identify the capability and resources for field monitoring in the environs of the plant including te additional dosimetry specified in the revised technical position issued by the NRC Radiological Assessment Branch for the environmental radiological monitoring program.
(7.3.2) 8.
State / local plans:
1.
Identify the agencies having a radiological assessment role within the Emergency Planning Zones as discussed NUREG-0396, including the lead agency for data coordination.
(5.4) 2.
Designate the specific responsibilities for each agency having an assigned assessment role.
(5.4) 3.
Describe tne strangements established with the Department of Energy Regional Coordinating Office for radiological assistance under the RAP and IRAP programs.
(5.4) 4 Designate a centralized coordination center for the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data.
(5.4)
{)]
. 5.
Describe the methods and equipment to be employed in determining the magnitude and locations of any radiological hazards following liquid or gaseous radioactivity releases.
(5.4)
IV.
To assure effective implementation of emergency measures in the environs A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Provide written agreements with each Federal, State, and local agency and other support organizations having an emergency response role within the Emergency Planning Zones as disce.: sed in NUREG-0396. The agreements will identify the emergency measures to be provided and the mutually acceptable criteric for their implementation.
(5.4,10) 8.
State / local plans:
1.
Designate protective action guides and/or other criteria to be used for implementing specific protective actions in accordance with the recommendations of EPA regarding exposure to a radioactive gaseous pime (EPA-520/1-75-001) and with those of HEW /FDA regarding radioactive contamination of human food and animal feeds as published in the Federal Register of Decemoer 15, 1978 (43 FR 53790).
(5.4)
TA37 28I
Designate the informational needs (e.g., dose rates, projected dose levels, contamination levels, airborne or waterborne activity levels) for implementing the protective actions identified in item 1 above.
(5.4) 3.
Describe the evacuation plan and/or other protective measures for the Emergency Planning Zone associated with the plume exposure pathway (NUREG-0396) including:
(5.4) a.
Maps showing evacuation routes as well as relocation and shelter areas, b.
Population and their distribution around the nuclear facility.
c.
Means for notification of all segments of the transient and resident populaton.
d.
Plans for protecting those persons whose mobility may be impaired due to such factors as iristitutional confinement.
Provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, particularly e.
for emergency workers, including quantities, storage, and means of distribution.
g $7 ' 2
~
-u.
f.
Means of effecting relocation.
g.
Potential egress routes and their projected traffic capacities under emergency use.
h.
Potential impediments to use or g ress routes, and potential contingency measures.
4.
Describe the protective measures to be used for the Emergency Planning Zone asserfated with the ingestion pathway (NUREG-0396) including the methods for protecting t.T oublic from consumption of contaminated foodstuffs.
(5.4) 5.
Provide for maintaining dose records of all potentially exposed emergency wor.kars involved in response etivities.
(5.4)
V.
To assure continued maintenance of an adequate state of emergency preparedness A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Provide, in addition to the drills and exercises identified in Regulatory Guide 1.101, a joint exercise involving Federal, State, and local response organi::ations. The scope of such 1437 283
_ l ns as is an exercise should test as much of the emergency p a i
ticipation.
reasonably achievable without involving full publ c par ll Definitive performance criteria will be established for a i
levels of participation to assure an objective evaluat on.
This joint test exercise will be scheduled about once every (8.1.2) five years.
State / local plans:
8.
l ate Provide for emergency drills and exercises to test and eva u i
for 1.
the response role of the agency, including provis ons (5.4) critique by qualified observers.
local Provide for participation in the joint Federal, State, 2.
(5.4) and licensee exercise described in A.1 above.
Describe the training program for those individuals havin 3.
(5.4) emergency response assignment.
Provide for periodic review and updating of the emergency 4.
(5.4) response plans of the agency.
information requested Provide a specific cross reference 'n Section 5.4 for in State / local plans.
1437 284
UNITED STATEE
/
ug*,
N11Cl.FAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R EGION l
,,(
f Wa pann Avsnus d,
mina or resuss A,acnnsvLvania isees
'%, * %* /
V811f171 r1DiORN;TET FOR:.fack don. Tenm U:sdur, NRR Emmegency Plauulng Site Review Cruup FK03:
Courge it. Smith, Chief. nMES, di ST:"J.fECT:
(XtW;rts ON THRER MTT.E TAT.AND EMF.RGNCY PT.iN AND TMPTENE:TriNG c10CEDUNZ5 Enelased pur yniac rectuent are zunsueuLs ou the Titree Mlle Taland 7aergency Plan and irnplumuneing Proceduces.
- Je strongly believe that chese consuents must be addenssud diaring the ni Le vis1L 11 Une respouse capability upgtsding ubjective is to he ::r.t ef fectively, Gc rg ti. Stnith ClLef, FFMCn gnc1 ns statud VC
.f.
Gnic.?cle P00R ORilNAL g37 285
EMI:RCENCY PL AN - Appendix,1.3A Am 65 (5-11-70) of r$AR Cenera1 1.
Page 13A-4, General Emergency Conditions. What plant operating conditions (operational parameters) would bu indicaLive of a general emergency?
2 What is the basis for the equivalent of G.8 E-3 pCf/cc on the liquid efflu-ent radiation monitor as being a general emergency? Does RML-7 read out in pCi/ce? 1r not, what monitor reading would be equivalent to 6.8 t'-3 pCi/ce?
3.
What is the signi'icance of >125 mR/hr at the site boundary relative to a general emergency, i.e., what assumptions are made regarding this value in selectirg it as indicative of a general emergency? What duration of relvuse is considered, if at all?
4.
Page 13A-4, Ceneral Fmergency, Possible Actions.
Under what conditions would offsite monitoring be performed /not be performed?
5.
Page 13A-3, Site Faergency. Possible Actions. Wt,y '; ' t o f fs i te moni tor-ing listed as a possible action?
6.
Page 13A-5, para 2.2.
What are the projected in plant consequences ut the events listed in the Spectrum of Accidents?
?.
Why it., Appendia 13A cl the iSAR also distributed as another document, i.e.. Section 2 of AP 1004?
U.
Ilow are changes Lo Sect. ion 2 of AF 1004 incorporated into Appendix 13A of the FSAR? Is there any time lag?
9.
When audits of the emergency plan are performed, are the audits performed against Appendix 13A or against Section 2 of AP 1004?
10.
Are changes tn Appendix 13A and/or section 2 nf AP 1004 reviewed per 10 CF11 50. 59 prior to implementation? How ate such reviews documented?
11.
How and when are changer. to Appendix 13A reported to the Ctrisnission in accordance with 10 CFil 50.59?
- 12. Para. 3.1.2. Accident Assessment Personnel. Does accident assessment include assessment of in plant radiological condiLions? If so, by whom?
tiow?
13.
Of the accidunL assessment personnel listed, what are the areas of acci-dent assessment of each! Are Lhe " assignments" meant to indicate lead respons ib i I i Ly ? 11 so, wno works for them to gather the data /information?
14.
Para 3.1.3.
Can the RMI also perform decontamination as well as supervise?
' g"g 286 P00R ORGIN4
2
- 15. The Repair Party Team 15 composed of Shift Maintenance personnel. Which individuals possess the skills needed to perf orm operallonal related activities /cntrective actions and under whose direct. ion, control and authority do tney operate?
- 16. Para 3.1.2.
Ihv Shill Supervisor is an alternate for 3 positions.
Is this a fea,ible approach considering the nature of the 3 potential duties and the nature of a bar:kshil L response?
1/.
Para 3.1.2.
There is nc Chemistry Supervisor at TMI. What f5 the currvet.
Litle of the individual (s) who can assume these riutict? What are the duLivs?
lu. Para 4.2.1, first paragraph, next-to-last sentence. What is a "UniL" eeurgency? It is not defined as a category of emergency elsewhere in the emergency plan.
19.
Para 4.7.7.
What type of T10s are used for tl'h und how many are on site at th: perimeter and at offsite 'ocations?
20.
Para 4.4.2.
Who may authorize the acccDtance of an vowrgency exposure?
What conditions aust exist to indicate that the need for a particular action in fact should be considered as an emergency action?
- 21. Para 4.4.2.
Where are the offsite decontamination facilities incated?
Are they equipped for vehicular and personnel decontamination operations?
ls t.here sulficient communications equipment to use at the location??
~
22.
Pura 4.4.S.
What is the response time of RMC to provide these Services?
Is the response Lime rapid enough to consider the support?
23.
Para S.3.
How/what equipment will he transported to the observation center? How larg would the transport take? How is the conter equipped with communications equipment?
24 Para 5.4.
Ones the telcobonc system require an operuLor to handle mul-tiple calls?
25.
Para 5.5.1.
Is the met tower vital powered? Are there backup provisions for representative meteorological inf or naLion?
- 26. Para 5.5.4.
What two vehictus are readily available? Are they always unsile? Where are lhe Auys kapl?
2/.
Para 5.3.4.
Are laboratory facilities and spara TLDs readily available?
23.
Para b.0.
How IsmiIiar are shift maintenance personnel with the facility and various procadures related to nparation of systems and their locatioas?
79.
Are they required to participate in training o,r drills?
100R ORGINAL 4w
3
- 30. Para 6.1.1.3.
What is a ' periodic examination or assignment"? How are tne weaknesses defined and identified? If different instructors are used each time, how are weaknesses called to the attention of the next in>LrucLur Lu insure that the weakness is addres',cd in the training.
- 31. What dous iL muun LhuL "leshun pluns wiii be provid2d"?
37.
Para 7.2.
Who specifies that a particular action is considered emergency in nature? What if the individual in charge does not have an HP background?
I t
33.
The title of Para 7.3 is reentry.
This paragraph seems to imply that no reentry will be made until recovery has been entered. How and by whom is
{
accer.s controlled and exposures documented during the emergency?
34.
The escrgency plan should describe the Metropolitan Edison, CPU and CPUSC i
positions which will interface with and support the site emergency organi-Zation. The general authorities and responsibilities of these positions t
in relation to the site emergency organization should be specified.
k i
'J b.
lhe site emergency organization should contain an element for logistical i
suppurL, i.v.. manpower and equipment, and provide for continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day emergency upurations.
36.
Para 2.2.2.
What dose rates under worse case :3eteorology, are calculated to be equal t.o the f ull range ul RMA8, itP-R-214, HP-R-219? Do these pro-r cecures also provide f or cose rale calculatiuns at the LPZ and nearest resident?
(
i l
37, What is the objective of initial backshit L response?
- 38. Para 6.1.2.5.
How/who makes changes to procedures and 1.he plan that occur before the annual review? How are personnel apprised of changes?
Arc telephone numberr. (procedures) only updated based on drills and 6
training classes?
4 39.
What provisions exist for invento9fng and operationally checking emergency vyuipment?
i M.
Para 8.0.
Itow are these agreements updated?
11. Whrt provisior, (uther than drills) are there for auditing the emergency
}
planning program.
I j
.t2 Para 7.3, last sentence. Access must be documented.
43.
What general types of radiological assessment / protective instrumentation and supplies are availanle?
i P00RORIEL e
288
._--.,t._____
~
4 EMERCENCY PLAN IMPIFMFNTTNG, PROCEDtJRCS General Comments lhe IMI emergency plan implementing procucurus are Leo general in approach.
The philosophy has been that "you can't put everything in a procedure" and that "our people are trained in the details and do surveys, etc. every day."
While proceduras should not be overly deLailed, they must highlight the impor-tant details so that the user mAy refer back Lo the procedure if he is unsure of what to dn.
There is a certain amount of unne::ussary introductory material in the proca-(
dures that is of a philosuphical nature. This typa of information is best placed in the plan and not in a procedure.
v Procedure 1670.1
.L
^
Para Comment /Ouestico f
3.1 Are the " monitors" area monitors? process monitors?
.=
or both?
t y
3.2 What is a "significant increase"?
3.3 There is an
- after the word spill. What does it mean?
?
4.1.3 Who would bw notified if a backshift, holiday, weekend or othwr period when there is no Rad protection Foreman /
[
Supervisor present onsite?
?
l 4.2.2 Since it is assumed that operatiens personnel will be ful-lowing the procedures in paragraph 4.2. why isn't the basic
[
LexL of the announcement included in the procedure? Where i
should people assembla if the ECS is the affected area?
t 4.3.1 The appropriate procedurcs should be referenced. Under 1
whose direction?
4.4.1 Should reference the "On-Site Medical Emergency Procedure,"
1670.11 Procedurnif70.2 3.1 What monitor readings constitute 100 times the set points for RMA8 and HP-R-219? Is the " set point" referred to the alwrt ur alarm set point? is there an alarm associated with the 100 times value? To what site boundary /LPZ dose rates do these valuas entraspana?
?00R BulWL n37 2" L
5 3.7 What is the significance of 125 mR/hr? Does this mean exactly 125 mR/hr or can it be 124 mR/hr? Shouldn't there be a range since paragraph 3.2 of procedure 15/0.3 specifies action level of >125 mR/hr? Arc these values $, $y or Y?
Aru Lhere diffarent levels if the dose rate is due to $
l radiation? Why are they only at the security fence?
I 3.3 What is considered to be a " loss of primary coolant pres-sure"? How is the control ruum made awara of "high reactor building sump level"? WhaL is onsidered to be "high" reactor building pressure?
t k
What projected dosc(s)/ dose rale (s) or nuclide air concen-trations (and at what locations) constitute a Site emergency?
What other operational parameters, i.e., process radiation monitors may be indicative of a site emergency?
"1 4.1.4 Who performs thv,v communications activities? How do tMy
~4.1.6 record the resulLs of the notification effort?
I 4.1. 7 Who?
4.1. 8 Who?
4.1. 9 Arun't the teams dispatched by personnel in the CCS?
?
4.1.10 When is it necessary? Who notifics GPU?
I 4.1.23 Why not evacuate non.cssential personnel as a matter of course and get them out of the plunL?
Ihis will eliefnate the need to devoto valuaDiv flP resources to monitoring assembly areas and " Keep track," of conditions and people, 1
(
- 4. 2 Accident Accessment Personnel - In this whole section, 4!
operations personnel arv not directed to assess the potential for a ruleuse or evaluate the anticipated dura-tio'n of a release which may be occurring.
4.2.1.5 Auxiliary Opurators are directed to assume duties or, the.
)
[mergency Repair Party. Would they he repair party moni-Lurs or would they be assigned to perform operational actions?
They are not assigned as repair party team members anywhere else in the plan or procudures and are not trained as repair Darty team members.
($ww procudurv IG70.9, page 7.0, para 3.1.5.2; Emergency Plan, page 12A-10, para 3.1.6)
It is, however, desirable for them to be memoers of the emergency repair team.
P00R ORIGINAL 3e7 290
6 6
- 4. 2. b. 2 How are these readings recorded? Is there a form for this purpose? What is done with data once it is recorded?
4.2.6 Who supervises the in-plant radiological assessment activities and radiation protection program?
4.2.8 There is no Chemistry Supervisor at THI. Who per-
)
forms this duty? If he "superviscs" the perf ormance of chweistry activities, who actually does the work?
With whom does he coordinate and report his acLivities anej manpower needs? Why isn't he included in emer-gency plan training?
4.2.10.1 Don't they report to the Cmergency Control Center?
4.4.1.2 Couldn't there be activities other than recair? How does he determine if ropairs are necessary (wnc does he ennedinate with/take direction from)?
5
- 4. 5.1. 3 Announcements do not reflect the correct assembly area T
locations.
E 4.6.4 Can this be done with existing security procedurcs?
f Are there any contingency procedures for security.
accountability, etc.? Functional titics indicative of the emergency duties should be used.
i.e.,
LCS p
Director rather than Radiation Protection Supervisor, etc.
I Cmorgency the Radiation Protection Supervisor has too broad a OrganizaLion, span of control.
llt page 11.0
(
There is nn Chemical Supervisor at THI.
i y
The chart shows the RadiuLion Protection Supervisnr rennrting directly to the Emergency Director.
No one is shown as working with or for the Supervisor Radiation Protect.icn and chemistry.
No one is shown as working for the Chemistry Supervisor.
RadiaLion Protection Foreman does not have any assigned primary duties in an emergency.
P00RORGNAL au rn
7 Procedure 16/0.3 3.1 What is the basis for >8 R/hr? T5 this an !!P-R-214 meter r?ading value or an actual containmenL value once W meter reading has been corrected for shieltf-ing 0: Lne detector?
- 3. 7 What is the basis for selecting >125 mR/iir? This is at the site boundary whereas the value for a. i ta vmergency is the security fencv.
Are they the same?
Is this a 6 Hy. or y value?
3.3 What is rationale for 26.8 x 10~3 pCl/cc on RMt.7?
Is this a set point?
- 3. 4 Should be areater than or vuual to 25 and 5 rem respectively.
Is this for un infant, child, or adult?
~
What radionuclide concenLraLions in air constitute 4 general envergency?
What if RMA9 or HP-N-219 are offscale?
What opurational parameters, if any, would be indi-cative ol' a general emergency?
4.1. 5 to whom is this recommandation made? Who in the TMI urganization is authnri7ed to make the recommendation?
E 4.2 the duties during a general emergency may not be the same as for a site emergency,.particulcely in terms nf the sequencing of usents. Offsite monitoring will probably not be as signilicant in the initial staqcs since PAG'c Stay be excuedud before the first results of environmental surveys can be obtained and evaluated.
Prncedure is general'ly ver n.
Proepttura 1670.4 4.2 What provisions exist if the tower is inoperable?
- 4. 9.1-4. 9. 5 Who determines that the listed accidents have occurred?
What action levels are indicative of each?
Cnefusurws 1 Are the : harts for containment source terms appli-and 2 cable to the range of containment pressures up to the pressura ennn which the contaltunenL leak rates are determinert?
P00R ORGINAL
8 e
Is it feasible to add the containment projected source term to the source Lerm of the vent (especially in UniL 2)?
What about containment / meter readingh >12 R/hr?
Pages 22, 23 WhaL guidance exists for use of these graphs?
Procedure 1670.g e
General Neither tnis procedure (or any others) address on-site,
.in-plant radiation surveys.
kl The GE series survey points are not referenced nor is
[.
there a map and data sheet with the procedure.
I Functional titics applicable to the emergency organi-7ation should be used throughout the procedure.
E.
g 7.1.7 If inventories are performed properly on.a routine 6,
basis and thw kit are provided with tamper proof scals,
(
an inventory by the team would not be necessary. This 4
wastus valuable time.
Where is the walkie talkie to be obtained? Why isn't j
Lhere a raofo kept at the ECS?
l g
2.1. 3 How is the monitoring team identified during radio 3
communications? Where does the team get a radio?
g The pencadure only directs them to ubtain a radio e
for the ECS.
i
),
A communications check should be performed.
Are operational check of instrumants should be per-formed before caparc.ure.
2.1.4 Tne procudurva for performing the dose rate surveys should be specified and referenced.
Oa.a to be recurried should be specified.
3.0 1hurv should be no basic differenen between monitoring during a site or general emergency.
- 3. 2 these should all be separata procedures with greater
- 3. 3 detai1, to include data sheets and survey methods.
- 3. 4 These sections relate to procodures 1670.8, 1670.11.
- 3. 5 The procedure does not address in plant surveys.
P00R ORGML 1437 293
9 3.7.1 The instrument type should be specified. Action levels should be specified.
3.3.1 There is also an assembly area at the North Varehouse.
3.3.3 Who determir2s which washdown area will be used.
I 3.5.2 By whoin? What will they be told? Who can authorize Lhe entry ' Who will record the entry and monitor exposore?
- 3. 5. 3 How can cosur.unications be maintained if individuals are masked?
b Prucedure 1G/U.6
)
Ceneral Functional titles should be used throughout.
I g
- 1. 0 During a general emergency, the team may M be abje to provide assessment infurmation until too late.
i t
Radiation levels may be low for a long period as in
[
the case of a 30 day course or accident LOCA.
Speed g
is not always a rwallstic objective.
[.
2.1.3 Monitoring map and data sheet should be included as
(*
part of the pror:edure.
7 Instruments should be checked for nohrability prior y
to departure.
I 2.1. 4 The survey method must ba specified, i.e., window
{
open/ closed, height above ground, etc.
r*
2.1. 6 k
Hnw is air sampler operated if powerverter does not function?
}
?.1. 8 Is a Drefilter used?
~
2.1. 9 15 ft8 - 4.25 x 105 cc, not b x 106 cc.
l WhitL i Lhw rwhidencu Lima at this flow rate? What is ?.hu MUA? Why no background count?
2.1.154 Where are the spare TLDs? Are they of the r.ame type?
Are they annealed? Who at FCS will analyze the TLDs?
2.1.15d What types of TLDs are used? Are they available?
What does " sufficient" mean?
2.2.2 How are samoles markeo?
300RORBNAL
- ,7 2 4'
~
10 2.2.3 Cross activity? y isotopic?
- 2. 3 This belongs in a separate pruceduru.
This part of the procedure is such Lou vague.
What is done with runoff? What equipment is available?
What provisions exist for personnel decontamination?
In procedure 1670.5 personnel found to be contaminated are scat to thu.vashdown areas.
Ts there any communi*
~
cation betwwwn the assembly area monitors and washdown area monitors? What are the release levels for per-t sonnvl? Ilow are survey / decontamination results documented?
Procedure 1670./
General ihls procedurn is out of date. See NUNEG OG00.
P
{
Functional titles should be used throughout.
i No provisions for continbcd accountability or site
'j access control.
ei No compensatory security measures specified in the
[
event of evacuation of island.
- 2. 7 Who are search and rescue team. webers?
[
4.1 This is not 4 truw statement. How will Met-Ed make this recommendation? Who from Met-Ed will make it?
Y To wnum will the recommendation be made?
[
Procetture 1670.8 fr 2.1 lhe "rupair team" should have some scabers from the I
operations discipline.
Not all actions will be " repair" per se.
lE 2
- 2. 2 Replace job title, Radiation Protection Supervisor, with a functional amorgency organization title.
4.0 The term "should" is used.
This would imply that they "may".
Who can authorite iL?
4.3 Ry whom?
Jl gh
+
11 Procedure 1670.q Remak this into two separate procedures, one for training and one for drills.
- 3. 0 Does the Supervi:,or oC training really do this? How arm weaknesses identified? How can they be corrected?
What assurance is Lhere that enriective action is adequate?
3.1.1 This assigns Superviso. N D'otection/ Chemistry as the instructor or his designee.
1 ara 3.0 states that Supervisor ur training assigns instructor.
Isn't this conLradictory?
3.1.7.2
~
At the time or an emergency how is it known "who has received the apptcariate training? Is a listing of qualified peopln kept up to date?
3.1. 3.1 This team will also perform in planL assessment (radiological and chemistry) as well as protective F
runctions in the radiation prolaction area.
1 3.1.8 Division support is much bruader in scopa than por-l trayed here. What Mvh Ed, CPU, CPUSC people will penvide assistance. What will their training consisL of? The training should be required - rance than just an invitation.
Course conteat for Group 2 Accident Assessment does not reflect their duties.
b lhere are no test / assignments, or " hands on" with equipment.
- 3. 5 What about, key consultant groups; Porter-Gertz, RMC,
[
PP&L, etc.
E; 4.1. 4.1 What qualifications / familiarity do the observers for the areas have to have?
4.1. b. 4 Dans the Supervisor or training really do this? Under wnnse authority arv the llems tasked? Who follows tasks to complettua? Is an end cate for completion of *e corrective action assigned along with the task?
.t.1. 5. 0 He-this review documented? Who really does tne rc\\
- /
4.7 Why is 1.his drill Lhe responsibility of Supervisor, Radia-tion Prutection and Chemistry?
j e-
t L
...~. -
t 12 No critique forms, follcysp. Why doesn' t the same correc-y tive action mechanica exist for medical emergency drill 5?
I 4.3 Why is drill administervd by 55 of Operations? Scenarios are developed without management involvement.
6 f
4.3.5 I,nadequate.
It only lists the participants of that
)
partic0 Tar drill.
fullowup is loose.
I it is intended that any of thw above may be a part of the Site / General Emergency Drill and Otill meet the requiremenL?
No observers used for urill other than rad amargency. No critiques, etc.
Pacedure 1670.11
't,'
No decon guiddulce or procedure.
Procedurv 1670.12 3
Specily minimum operable.
Hava sparns.
t k
- 3. 3.
If it's not complete what time frame is allowed to
{
correct anficiencier.?,
j 3.4 Quarterly?
Invanto g Checkl_ist How does person performing the inventury know what procedures are to be in the f
honk? Ind what revi? ions are Currvnt?
e
[
CP-100 cartridges -,hould use CP-200.
,"i what type ut TL0s are these and what are they used for?
k E
What is a "high range dosimetar"?
i P00R ORGINAL
.~
ACTION PLAN FOR PROMPTLY IMPROVING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (SECY 79-450)
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPROVEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS REQUIRED FOR OPERATING PLANTS AND NEAR TERM OL'S Provide a implementation schedule for the following items:
Implementation Item CatecoryE l.
Implement certain short term actions recommended A
by Lessons Learned task force.
2.1.8(a) Post-accident sampling Design review complete A
Preparation of revised procedures A
Implement plant modifications B
Description of proposed modification A
2.1.8(b) High range radioactivity monitors B
2.1.8(c) Improved in plant iodine instrumentation A
1437 298
2-Implementation Item CategoryE 2.
Establish Emergency Operations Center for Federal, State and local Officials.
I (a) Designate location and alternate location and A
provide communications to plant (b) Upgrade Emergency Operations Center in conjunction with in plant technical support center B
I 3.
Improve offsite monitoring capability A
4.
Conduct test exercises (Federal, State, local, licensee)
I (a) Test of licensees emergency plan A
I (b) Test of State emergency plans A
(c) Joint test exercise of emergency plans (Federal, State, local, licensee)
New OL's B
All opgerating plants within 5 years U ategory Aj Implementation prior to OL or by January 1, 1980 (see NUREG-0578)
C Category A Implementation prior to OL or by mid 1980.
Category B:
Implementation by January 1, 1981.
1437 299
Additional Staff Questions Describe the principle and alternative locations for briefing the news media.
Provide a schedule of implementation for upgrading the emergency plan, procedures and equipment.
1437 500
Juiv 23, 1979 ggcy.79 tga For:
De Caneissioners
.=0 l W. &
Thru:
Executive Director for Operations /
.:C Fr:m:
ifarcia 2. Canton, Ofric:ce, Offica of Nuclear Reac::r Regulation Sub,fec::
ACTION PLAN ?Q PRCMPTI.Y TPROVING EMERGENCT PRE?ARENE33 I
Purpose:
To infors the Caenission of :he staff's ;Ians :s take insediate stags to facreve ifcansas precarsdness at all cperating ;cwer plants and for near-cars OL's.
Discussion:
While the usergency ;1ans of alt ;cwer este:se ifcansees have been rtviewed by the staff fn ce ;ast for conformanca to the general previsicas cf Appendfx ! :s 10 CFR Part 50,.
the ac.9 recant guidanca en energency 21anning, primarily that given in Regulatory Gufdt 1.101 %:ergency ?lanning for Nuclear Pcwer Plants", has nc: yet been fully implementad by.es: reec ce ifcansees. Further, thers art sane additional areas where imprevements in amargency ;Ianning have been hightigntad as partfcuiariy s1gnificant by the T7n ee Mile
/
Island ac:4 dent.
The MRR staff plans to undertake an fatensive ef!"cr: cver accut the next year to fuscr-:ve Tfcansac ;rmaredness at all egerating ;cwer reac crs and these rescurs schedaled for an acerating 11sanse decisfon within the next year.
This of"cr: will be clcsaiy ecordinatad with 4. sinflar ef"cr: by the Offica of Stata Progr ss :s fwcreve 5tsta and Tccal rescansa plans thrcugh the c:ncurnace precass and Cf!1ca cf ins:ectica and Enforcanen: ef' r 2 to verify procer faciestenta:fon of ifcansas er:ergancy ;repartdness activities.
'he safn elenants of the staf* effcc:, as 1istad fn Encicsurt 1, art as felicws:
(T) Ucgr2de Ifcansee energency ;Ians :o sa:1sfy Requi4:=ry suf ce 1.10I, vita s:acf al s :antien
- :::e deveic:=en: :f 2niform ic.icn ievel cr tarda :asac :n pian: ;ar:r.e:ars.
P00R ORGNAL wm e
e
-~
N
The Ccanissioners (2) Assure the impianentation of the est atad rec:mmanda-ticas of the l6Ut Lassens Lsarned Task Forca f avalving instranentatica to felicw the ccurse of an accident and relata the information previded by this instranentation to the emergency plan action Tevels.
This will include instementation for ;cs -acefdent samal f ag, high range radicactivity monitors, and improved in-plant radiciedtne instraentation. Tha fmplementatica of the Lessons Laarted escannendatica on instraentatten-for detaction of inadequate cars cecifng will also be factored into the energency plan action f avel critaria.
(3) Datartine that an Emergency Cceratinris Cantar for.
~
Federal, State and local personnel has been estabif shed.
with suitable ccacunications to.he plant, and that upgrading of the factlf ty in ac::rdanca with the Lassens Lsarned rec: Emendation for an in-plant technical supper.
center is iutdarway.
(4) Assure that facrewed ifcansas offsita. cnf tring capabfi-f tf es (including additional TU's or equivalent) have been pr:vided for all sites.
(5) Assess the relacenshf p ot s' tat::' local plan's to the ifcansee's and Federal plans so as to assurs the cacaoflity to take apprecefata amargency actions.
Assure that this' cacabf.1 f ty wfil te ex?.anded to a distance of 10 miles as scan as ;racticai, but not 14 tar than January 1,1981. This f tam will be per'crmed in conjunction with the Cffica of Stata
~
Programs and the Cffter.cf inspection atuf Fnfer:acent.
(5) Require tast exer:1sas of acgreved hersency.Stans (Federai, Stata, Iccal, Ifcansats), rtytew ;Ians for such exercisas, and ;articipata f a a ifsitad.u:::cer of joint exercf ses. Tests of I fcanses plans 4111 be recuired to be conductad as scen is ;rsctical for ali factifties and tafers reacter s:ar us fce.ow ifesnsats. Exer:fses of Stata plans will te ;er'crmed P00RDElMl.
d 1437 30.2
1Ne Cannissioners
. fn conjunction with the concurrence reviews of :he Office of State Progrus. Joint tast exercisas involving Federal, State, Iccal and ifcansees will be conductad at the rate of about 10 ;ar year, wnich would result in all sites being er.arcisad :nce each five years.
De staff review will be ac::molished by about 5 review tems, similar :s the c:ncact used to assure suitable impimentation of the physical sacurity provisions of 10 C?R 73.55. As a minimum, the taans
. will emnsist of a tam leader fra MR, a = ester fra Los Alamos :ientific Lab. (LASL) and, at least for field visits, a saber fra ce IE Regional of'ica. LASL will be used as the sourta of non-NRC taan = embers because of ce excertise gained and fami11arity with the plants ac:uired during 2e physical sacurity reviews. De Of vis' ton of Operating Reactars will have the res;casibil fty for c: mole ting these reviews for both ocerating reacten and near-tarm CL's.
J. R. Miller, Assist. ant Direct:r, CCR wfil be respnn.
sible f r isolmenta:1cn of de,..sen. Gen:ral ;cifcy and technical dirte:1cn will be provided by Brian Grimes, Assistant Qirs:::r, CCR.
The ffrt: sitas sc, he revic:M *y. the t.umt will in these scheduled fer cperating 'Ifcansas within the next year and those sitas fu areas of reistively high ;cculation. Majer aflestenes for the gregras ars being devaleged and will include regional meetings with licansats ts discuss tai
- mgras, site visits by the review taan, and sectings wie 1ccal officials.
Csertination:
This action plan has been discussad with the Ta[k Forca on Emergency 71'anning and the Task Force Chairman, T. F. Cartar, has advisad cat Me Task Forca deliberati:ns s data have indicatad no entson why 'RR shculd not precaed. The Office of Stata Pr: gras c:ncurs in this plan. The Office Of Inspection and Infor: ment c:nc.n-s in de ;Ian.
P00R BRIGlWL 1437 503
~
~
Ota Ccanissioners
-4 NRR expects to ;erform this task without augmencation of resourcas beyond those aut.hcrized for FY79 and Ff80.
Ah I~
Marcid R. 0anton, Ofree.or Offfes of 'tuclear Reac.or Regulatica
- nc1asurt:
Sergency Pvtgartdness Drcrevewa for Caersting Plants and : lear Ters, Ct.'s GIMI3tJT'OM C.=:n ss eners
(.==rission Staff Of*f ess xec Oir for Cpert:1cns AC.4 Fecrstaria:
P00R ORGINAL 1437 304
^
- - =,-
ENCLCSL1t! NO. 1 E?fRGENCY 79G4RGNE23 D940VOaENTS
'AND COW!**MENTS RE*UIRG FOR OpGATING :t. ANTS AND NEAR TI9M Ct.'s Diciementation item
, C,atacery L 1.
Upgrade emergency plans to Regulatory Guide i.ici A I with special attantion.s action level criaria based. :n ?! Ant paranetars.
2.
Implement cartain short tars acticas esc:nnsrufed by Lassens Laarned task forts and usa these in action level critaria.E 2.1.3(a) ?cs -accident sampifng Design review c:x:aleta A
prstar1 tion of revised precadurts A
Implement plant modifications S
- Descript'.cn d:propcsad wcdt?ie4t!ais A
7.1.3(b) Mfgh range radicactivity senitsrs S
- 2. i.3(c) Im:reved in plant fadine instr.=renta: Tan A
3.
Estab1ish E2erguncy Cgerattons Cantar far Federal,
~
Stata arm I ccal Officials I
(a) Designata Iccation at:d altamata loca:fon and A
provide c=mnunications.s plant (b) Upgr de E=negency Opert:1cns Cantar-fn 3
c:rtfunc fon with in..;iant tachafcal sut:cr cantar i/
'.naset-r A:
- ciamentati:n prder :: Oi. :P by Januar/ i, bCO (se ',ttEr,. 0573).
Cnascr/ Ai:
- .euicentation : rice : 0L :r :y.itd..isEO.
Ca:25c:/ 3:
's:Icen.atten :y January i.198i.
2/
Se f::i can.2:1:n of :?.a.as::ns
- tar Sc ;2sk f:r:a. l - -c: catf =n ':2m 2. i.2 ('..
das:--::enta:':n f:r de:act cri :f inacacuata ::rt :::1f 39, sfli a! tc ta '2:::rtc iS:: ::S ic:t:n Ia'tei Ord aria.
PlBR BRIGlWL am 6e
/
~
Implestentatien Itas Catecar-e 1
4.
Impreve offsita monitsring capability A
5.
Assure adecuacy cf Stata/1ccal plans (a) Against current critaria A
(b) Against upgraded critaria 5
5.
Conduct tast exercisas (Federal, Stata,1ocai, licansae)
(a) Test of Ifcansees emergency plan Al (b) Test of Stata emergency plans AI (c) Joint tas: exercism of energency plans (Federal,Stata,Iocal,Ifeansas)
.1ew Cf.'s S
All cparating plants
-Within 5 years
?00R OR GINAL 1437 306
~
^
~
~- -
For interim use and comment - 9/13/79 BASIS FOR BERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NUCLE.sR PC'4ER FACILITIES This document is provided for interim use during the initial phases of the NRC effort to promptly imoreve emergency preparedness at operating nuclear pcwer plants. Changes to the document can be expected as experience is gained in its use and puolic coments are received. Further, the Ccmission has initiated a rulemaking crocedure, new scheduled for completion in January 1980 in the area of Emergency Planning and Preparedness. Additional requtrements are to be excected
- wnen rulemaking is comoleted and scme modi *1 cations to this dccument may be necessary.
Four classes of Emergency Action Levels are establisned which replace the classes in Regulatory Guice 1.101, each with associated examples of initiating conditions.
The classes are:
Notification of Unusual Event Alert Site E.mergency General Emergency The rationale for tne notification and alert classes is to provide early and promot notification of minor events wnich could lead to more serious consequences given operator error or equipment failure or which might be indicative of more serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. A gradation is provided to assure fuller response preparations for more sericus indicators. The site emergency class reflects conditions wnere scme significant releases are likely or are occurring but wnere a core melt situation is not indicated based on current information. In this situation full mobili:stion of emergency personnel in the near site environs is indicated as well as fispatch of monitoring teams and associated comunications. The general emergency : Tass involves actual cr iminent subs antial core degracation or mciting with the potential for loss of containment.
Tne imedia a acticn for -his class la snel:aring (s aying insice) rather -han evacuation until an assessment :an be mace tha- (1) an evacuation is incicatac and (2) an evacuation, if indicated, can ce ::moleted prior to significant release and transcort of racicactive material :o the affected areas.
The examole initiating conditions listed after the imeciate actions for each class are o form -he casis for establishment by eacn licensee of.ne soeci#ic clant ins r. men.a-ion readings unien, if exceecec, sill initia a -he emergency
- lass.
1437 307
2 Some background information on release potential and expected frequencies for the various classes is provided in this material. Note that there is a wide band of uncertainty associated with the frequency estimates. The release potential given reflects the amount that could be released over a long time period or under favorable meteorological conditions without exceeding the exposure criteria of a more severe class. Release of these amounts in a short time period under unfavorable meteorological dispersion conditions might trigger the criteria of a more severe cla?:.
1 s
State and/us'Inc.il lillsiti Class Licensee Actions _
_Aytlpe Ily. At I lons _
Notification of unusual event 1.
Prinnptly frfona State and local oIt-1.
penvi.fc flee ne sconIly site authorities of nature of unusual assistanic if ic piesleil Class Description condition as soon as discovered
?.
Staniffey untle veelil Unusual events are in process or have 2.
Augment on-shif t resour ces closcout occurred which Indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety 3.
Assess and respond o.r_
of the plant.
4.
Close out with verbal suninary to 3.
T scalate to a nun c seven e Purpose offsite authorities; followed by class written siminary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Purpose of offsite notification is to (1) assure that the first step in any or r
response later found to be necessary CD has been carr!*d out. (2) provide 5.
Escalate to a more severe class e
current information on unusunTr events, and (3) provide a periodic unscheduled W
test of the offstte consnunicatten A
link.
Release Potential i
No releases of radioactive materf al requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless y
further degradation of safety 4
systems occurs.
Expected frequency C
Once or twice per year per unit.
M C
t" M CD C3 C2 O
m EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 1.
ECCS initiated 2.
Radiological effluent technical specification limits exceeded 3.
Fuel damage indication. Examples:
a.
Hign offgas at SWR air ejector monitor (greater than 500,000 uci/sec; corrasconding to 16 isotooes decayed to 30 minutes; or,an increase of 100,000 uci/sec within a 30 minute time period) b.
High coolant activity sample (e.g., etxceeding coolant technical speci-fications for f adine spike) c.
Failed fuel monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than 0.1". ecuivalent fuel failures within 30 minutes.
4 Abncmal coolant temperature and/or pressure or abncmal fuel temoeratures 5.
Exceeding either primary / secondary leak rate technical specification or primary system leak rate technical specification 6.
Failure of a safety or relief valve to close 7.
Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power capability 8.
Loss of containment integrity requiring shutdcwn by technical specifications 9.
Loss of engineered safety feature or fire protection system function requiring snutcown by technical specifications (e.g., because of malfunction, personnel error or procedural inadequacy)
- 10. Fire lasting more than 10 minutes
- 11. Indications or alams on process or effluent :arameters not functional in control r:om o an extent requfring plant shutcown or other significant los?.7 assessment or connunication capability (e.g., plant c:mouter, all meteorciogical ins truments:Osn)
- 12. Security :hreat or attemoted entry or attemoted saco: age
- 13. Natural ;:nenemenon being experienced or projected beyond usual levels a.
Any earthquake 3.
50 year 'locc Or low water, :sunami, nur-1:ane surge, seicne
- . :ny ::r a:o sar si a ry.ur-1:ane PDCR DMINn.
1437 310
14 Other hazards being experienced or projected a.
Aircraft crash on-site or unusual aircraft activity over facility b.
Train derailmeat on-site c.
Near or onsite, explosion d.
Near or onsite toxic or flamable gas release e.
Turbine failure
~
- 15. Other plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of State and/or Tocal offsite authorities or recuire plant shutdown uncer tecnnical s:ecification requirements or involve other than nomal con: rolled shutdown (e.g., cooldown rate eaceeding tecnnical scecification limits, pipe cracking found during operation)
- 16. Trans;crution of contaminated injured individual fecm sita to offsita nosoital
- 17. Racid decressurf:ation of P'iR secondary side.
P00ROR'SNAL 1437 311
,t State anet/or In al fillslie Class Licensee Actions
_ __A_n_t_h_or.l.e.y A t_ ion. _
N Alert 1.
Promptly Infonn State and/or local 1.
Provide flic or.renrity authoritles of alert statni and reason assistance if s equesteel Class Description for alert as soon as illscovered N*
2.
Auernent sesnut res liy ac t ivating Events are in process or have 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site near-site 101: an l any other occurred which involve an actual technical support center, on-site primary response v.entets
~
or potential substantial operations center and near-site degradation of the level emergency operations center (E00) 3.
Alert to sla,nthy slains ley of safety of the plant.
emergency per*.onnel inclinling 3.
Assess and respond monlin Inq teams anel Purpose assoc la tcil ronsmnile.a t Inns 4.
Dispatch on-site monitoring teams and Purpose of offsite alert is associated consnunications 4.
Provlila s.onf innaine y of f slie to (1) assure that emergency radiat ion iminlinring and personnel are readily available 5.
Provide periodic plant status updates ingestion pathway dose to respond if situation to offsite authorf tles (at least every projections if artnal ecleases becomes more serious or to 15 minutes) substantially exered technical perfonn confirinatory radiation specif f ration limit s monitoring if required. (2) 6.
Provide periodic meteorological assess-provide offsite authorities ments to offsite authorities and, if 5.
Halntain alert stains until current status infonnation, any releases are occurring, dose estimates verbal closcout and (3) provide possible for actual releases unscheduled tests of response or center activation.
7.
Close out by verbal siminary to of fsite
~~
authorttles followed by written sunmiary G.
Escalate lo a non e seve:c e. lass Release Potential within il hours Limited releases of up tr 10 or_
curies of I-131 equivalent or up to 104 curtes of Xe-133 8.
Escalate to a more severe class equivalent, q
Expected frequency _
3 C.7 Once in 10 to 100 years per unit.
M Q
tX c
c CL.
EXAMPt.E INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT 1.
Severe loss of fuel cladding High offgas at SWR air ejector monitor (greater than 5 ci/seci corrts;cnding a.
to 16 isotopes decayed 30 minutes) b.
Very high coolant activity sample (e.g., 3C0 uct/cc equivalent of I-131)
Failed fuel monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than it fuel failures c.
within 30 minutes or 5 total fuel failures.
2.
Rapid gross failure of one steam generator tube with loss of offsite pcwer 3.
Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes (e.g., several hunared spm primary to secondary leak rate) 4 Steam line break with significant (e.g., greater than 10 gpm) primary to sec:ndary leak rate or MSIV nalfunc:fon 5.
Primary ::alant leak rate greater than 50 gpm 5.
High radiation levels or high airtorne contamination wnich indica:e a severe degradation in the control of radica::1ve materials (e.g., increase of fac:ce of 1000 in direct radiation readings) 7.
Loss of offsite ocwer and loss of all onsite AC power 3.
Loss of all onsite 3C pcwer 3.
Coolaat pump sei:ure leading to fuel failure
- 10. Loss of functions needed for plant cold shutdcwn
- 11. Failure of the reactor protection system Oc initiate anc :: mole:e a scram wnien : rings *he reactor subcritical 12.
uel camage ac:icent wit!
elease of racicactivity :c containmen: Or fuel hancling building II. Fire potentially affect-safety systems i1 all aiar s (annuncia srs) 1ost ti.
Racic k-' cal af'1uen s ;rea ar than 10 :imes tacnni:si s:ect'ica-icn instar:anaeus
! =1 s an ' s:antanecus ra a mi:a, i' ::n-trued :ver 3 9eurs, 4cui: resu h in accu
- mr a: :ne si a bour:ary un:er average e:e:rc h gical ::r:1-icas:
15.
2 ;:' g sa:ur' y :::: :-ise P00R ORGINAL 1437 313
2
- 17. Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected a.
Earthquake greater than OBE levels b.
Flood. Icw water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche near design levels c.
Any tornado striking faciltty d.
Hurricane winds near design basis level
- 18. Other hazards being experienced or projected a.
Aircraft crash en facility b.
Missile impacts from wnatever scurce en facility Ocwn explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation c.
d.
. Entry into facility envirens of toxic or '1amable gases e.
Tureine failure causing casing penetration
- 19. Other plant conditiens exist that warrant precautionary activation of technical support center and near-site emergency operaticns canter
- 20. Evacuation of centrol recm anticipatad or required with centrol of snutdcwn systems established frem Iccal stations 1437 514
i s
" ' [, f,' i g,
' {
Class l_icr:ns.'e Actions g y Site Emergency 1.
Promptly infonn State anil/or local of f-1.
Provide any aulstanic site authorities of site-emarolency status regnesteit Class Description and reason for emergency as soon as dis-N covereil.
2-AC lI Va l" I'*"ll a l" P"h l IC A
Events are in process or have 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site
""l'II"d'I"" "I
"""9""CY status an.1 unvide polille occurred which involve actua) technical support center, on-site l
or likely inajor failures of emergency operations center and sicar-E"
"'U C "I"IdI"5 plant functions needed for site emergency operations center (LOC) 3.
An'r'w'nt sesours es I.y att Iwas Ing protection of the public, near-site Ittc and any other 3.
Assess and respond primary respona.c senters 4.
Dispatch on-site and offstte monitoring 4
HispateJe Fey enw siloin y lu imunne I Purpose of the site emergency teams and associated cormmnications I"C I"'U"'I '""' U "si n.
tranis and warning is to (1) assure'that d 5 5"C I d ' "d C'*'* '" I' d ' I""
response centers are manned, 5.
Provlile a dedicated inillvidual for plant 5.
Alert to standby status other (2) assure that monitoring teams status updates to offsite authorities eme gency peisonnel (e.g.,
are dispatched, (3) assure tliat and periodic press briefings (perhaps those nee.le.I for evainallon) personnel required for evacuation
,loint with offsite authorities) and dispate h in rsninsel to near-I of near-site areas are at duty site duty statInns stations if situation becomes 6.
Hake senior technical and management 6.
Pow ide of f s i t e nn.n H oring more serious, (4) provide staff onsite available for consultation current infonnation for and with ifftC and State on a periodic basis
[5", '
eiyn} eye.unlnHurs ei consultation with of fsite authorftles and pubite, and 7.
Proviae meteorological and dose estimales 1.
Continuously asses'. Ininima tion (5) provide possible unscheduled to offsite authorities for actual from licensee. and ut isite test of response capabilities releases via a iledicated Individual monitoring with scyaiI to in U. S.
or automated data transmission changes to pinteeiIve.u Inns J
aircady InitlateI for pufillr artil q fielease Potential D.
Provlife release and dose projections mofellising evarnation s esnin. cs g based on available plant condition U*
I I5 Releases of up to 1000 cl of information and foreseeable contingencies
',*"""'I 1,'Id'j I"] I 3
,,","l',,,
CQ 1-131 equivalent or up to 106 ci of Xe-133 equivalent.
9.
Close out or recommend reduction in and nw o ed in edend distance emergency class by briefing of offsite Q
Expected frequency' authorities at [0C and by phone followed g.
Provlire pre n liriefinns peihaps by written suninary within Il hours willi lic ensee Z
Once in one hundred to once
- 10. Maintain s He e wie iqiin y dains D
in 5000 years per unit.
or-untII closenut ur trilottinn of C
10.
Escalate to general emergency, class
"*"I9"'" T CId "
e it '
II. Israla t e t o ge;nci a l eiew e yenty s lau e
EXAMPLE _IN!? FATING CONDITIONS: SITE EMERGENCY 1.
Known loss of coolant accident greater than makeup pump capacity 2.
Degraded core with possible loss of coolable geometry (indicators should include instrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling, coolant activity and/or containmert radioactivity levels) 3.
Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes with loss of offsite power
'4.
BWR steam line break outside containment without isolation 5.
pWR steam line break with greater than 50 gpm primary to secondary leakage and indication of fuel damage
- 6. ' Loss of offs-ite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes 7.
Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes 8,.
Loss of functions needed for plant hot shutdown 9.
Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building (e.g.,
large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level)
- 10. Fire affecting safety systems
~
- 11. All alarms (annunciators) lost for more than 15 minutas and plant is not in cold shutdown or plant transient initiated while all alarms lost 12.
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 50 mr/hr for 1/2 hour or greater than 500 mr/hr W.B. for two minutes (or five times these levels to the... thyroid) at the site boundary for adverse meteorology b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g., radiation level in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure) or are measured in the environs
- 13. Iminent loss of physical control of the plant 14 Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected with plant not in cold shutdown a.
Earthquake greater than SSE levels o.
Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche greater than design levels or failure of protection of vital equipment at lower levels c.
Winds in excess of design 1evels 1437 5%
2-
- 15. Other hazards being experienced or projected with plant not in cold shutdewn a.
Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact or fire b.
Severe damage to safe shutdcwn equipment frem missiles or explosion c.
Entry of toxic or flamable gases into vital areas
- 16. Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams and a precautionary public notification
- 17. Evacuation of control room and control of shutdown systams not established frA local stations in 15 minutes 1437 517
,e
" late an.1/ni linal tillslie Class l_Icensee Actions.
_ Antinn Ily AiiInns.. _
General fmergency 1.
Promptly infonn State anil/or local of fsite 1.
Proviele any ass i lani c s e'PH sle'l co anticorf tles of general emergency status Class Description and reason for emergency ns soon as 2.
Activate Insedla8e Puhlir A
discovered (Parallel notification pf
, git i g irat ion or nwo nene y status Events are in process or have State / local) and pi ovide publli pi rl"'HC N
occurrent which involve actual uplates A
or inninent substantial core 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site 3.
Her.onsiw n I slieller iny f or / mile v
degradation or melting with technical support center, on-site radius anil 'i miles slownwin't potential for loss of contain-emergency operations center and vicar-anel ae,sess siccil in ett eint ment integrity.
site emergency operations center (f00) distane.cs 4-A"9"'""I C"'"'" ' "' I'Y d r ' I v a ' I "4 Purpose 3.
Assess and respond near-site 100 and any other Purpose of the eneral emergency 4.
Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring prinwy mponse v.culen warning is to (1 initiate pre-teams and associated conotunications 5.
Dispatch Icy co igenry ecisonnel detennined protective actions incluillnil monlior tny Icams and forpublic,(2) provide 5.
Provide a dedicated Inillvidual for associaleil ca.maininli al lons continuous assessment of Infonna-plant status updates to offsite 6.
Disp *li odier envir o ne airy tion from Ilcensee and offsite authorities anil periodic press personnoi to ilicly stat Inns wittiin measurements. (3) initiate briefings (perhaps, joint with r inf le raiHns anil ali 1 all additional measures as Indicated offsite authorities) e by event releases or potential og,,,.,g, go,,g,y gain, releases, and (4) provide 6.
Make senior technical and management staff 7.
Provide offsfle nninitoring current infonnation for and onsite available for consultation with results lo IItensee an't others consultation with offsite NRC and State on a periodic basis.
and jointly assess these authorities and pubile.
N' C""II""""'IY d ""
I"I'"*dII'"'
ProvNo meteorological and dose estlanates Release Potential to offsite authorf tles for actual I"'"' I I '""'"" d "'I " I I' U " """' I -
J releases via a dedicated indlyidual or tor nkpj,He s <w]anl lo e liasiiles w
g, y,
,,, y Releases of more than 1000 cj of automated data tran: mission I-131 equivalent or more than Inlllateil f or put Ile an.1 Z
nnhilliiny e vae uat ion re unnii s 106 ci of Xe-133 equivalent.
fl.
Provide release and dose projections Q
hased on available plant condition 9.
Itertwnen I placinq milk animals Expected frequency Infonnation and foreseeable contingencies within 10 miles on sloted Iceil and assess nenil to extend O
l.e ;s than once in about 5000 9.
Close out or reconenend reduction of distante years per unit. l.lfe threatening emergency class by briefing of offsite g
- 10. Pnivide in ess Inlelings. licoliaps doses offsite (within 10 miles) authorities at IOC and by phone followed "IU' IIC""'""
oc.ce in about 100.000 years by written sunanary within it hours d
per unit.
II. Consider telocallon lo alleinale 100 lI at:Inal.Inse ae < innulal lon in near-slie IHf. exiceds lower boinni of Il'A PN;s
- 17. flainf aln gencial enn s ee su y status uni ll e losental or icilisi.f inn of cmeineniv ilase.
EXAMELE INITIATING CONDITIONS: GENERAL EMERGENCY 1.
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels correspamiing to 1 rem /hr W.3. or 5 rem /hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual meteoroicoical conditions b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,
radiation levels in containment with leak rate approcriate for existing containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or are masured in the environs.
Note: Consider evacuation only within about 2 miles of the site boundary unless these levels are exceeded by a factor of 10 or projected to continue for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 2.
Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g., loss of core gecmetry and primary coolant boundary and high potential for loss of containment).
Note: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
It' more than gap activi y relea ed, extend this to 5 miles dcwnwind.
3.
Loss of physical control of the facility.
Note: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
4 Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amcunts of radioactivity in a short time eriod possible, e.g., ar./
core melt situation. See the specific PWR and 5WR secuences.
Notes:
a.
For sequences where significant releases are n:t yet :aking place and large amounts of fission Oroducts are not yet in the centainment at:nosphere, consider 2 mile precautionary evacua: ion.
Consider 5 mile downwind evacuation (453 to 900 sect:r) if large amounts of fission products are in :ne :entainment atmosphere. Rec: mend sheltering in other cart: of :Ne ;1ume exposure Emergency Planning Zone uncer this circums.ance.
b.
For secuences where signift:an releases are n:t yet taxing place and containment '311ure leacing o a direc: a =cs:neric release is likely in the sequence bu not imminen; and large amounts of 'ission products in addi-ion to noole ;ases are in
- ne ::ntainmen: a:.cs:nere, consicer :recau:i: nary evacuaticn to 5 miles anc IC mile :ownwinc evacua-i:n (250 c 3C sec :r.
- . Ecr 54 aerces enere 'a se a cun s :# 'iss':n Or::uc s : ner can
- e ;ases are 19
.e =n:ad-en 2: es:nere inc =r a man:
<i4:.re s acga:
- - en, ac= r: 2 e: ar <:- =:s. aries
.,are ea:e= :er- : = : e 2: :<: e --=:=
- f ac--.
y
=., a : :a -i:n.
P00RBRGINil
!437 319
2-d.
As release infonnation bec::mes available adjust these actions in accordance with dose projections, time availible to evacuate and estimated evacuation times given current conditions.
1437 520
n q
UCAMPLE PWR SECUENCES 1.
Small and large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to per'orm leading to severe core degradation or melt. Ultimate faibre of containment likely for melt sequences. (Several hours available for response) 2.
Transient initiated'by loss of feedwater and condensate systems (principal heat removal system) folicwed by failure of emergency feedwater system for extended ceriod. Core melting possible in several hours. Ultimate failure of containment likely if core melts.
3.
Transient requiring oceration of shutdown systems with failure to scram.
Core damage for some designs. Additional failure of core cooling and makeup systems would lead to core melt.
4 Failure of offsite and onsite power along with total loss of emergency feedwater makeuo capability for several hours. Would lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of containment.
5.
Small LOCA and initially successful ECCS. Subsequent failure of containment heat removal systams over several hours could lead to core melt and likely failure of containment.
NOTE: Most likely containment failure mode is meltthrough with release of gases only for dry containment; quicker and larger releases likely'for ice concenser containments for melt sequences or for failure of containment isolation system for any PWR.
1437 321
c.
EXAMPLE B'4R SE0VENCES 1.
Transient (e.g., foss of offsite power) plus failure of requisite ecre shut down systems (e.g., scram or standby liquid c:ntrol system). Could lead to core melt in several hours with containment failure likely. More severe consequences if pump trip does not function.
2.
Small or large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perfom leading to core melt degradation or melt' Loss of containment integrity may be inminent.
3.
Small or large LCCA occurs and containment performance is unsuccessful affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt in several hours without containment boundarf.
4 Shutdown occurs but requisite decay heat renoval systems (e.g., RHR) or ncn-safety systems heat removal means are rendered unavailable. Core degradation or melt could occur in acout ten hours with subsequent containment failure.
5.
Any major internal or external events (e.g., fires, earthcuakes, etc.) wnich could cause massive common camage to plant systems resulting in any of the above.
.