ML19209C585
ML19209C585 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Oyster Creek |
Issue date: | 08/31/1979 |
From: | JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML19209C579 | List: |
References | |
IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 7910160177 | |
Download: ML19209C585 (18) | |
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REPORT OF INSPECTION CONDUCTED AT OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH IE BULLETIN 79-14 (ACCESSABLE PORTIONS OF SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS) i147 039-7910160 I)l
Inspection of Safety Related Piping for Conformance to Design Documents Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station INTRODUCTION
^
This inspection was initiated in accordance with the requirements of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 79-14 and 79-14, Rev.1 dated July 2, 1979, and July 18, 1979, respectively, entitled " Seismic Analyses for As-Built Safety Related Piping Systems." This bulletin requested specific actiens to be performed by the licensee and reported to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement. JCPSL responded to Item 1 of the bulletin by letter dated August 1, 1979, in which a commitment was made to perform the inspection referred to in item 2 of the bulletin and report the results of this inspection by September 1, 1979.
This report provides the results of the inspection performed at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. As noted in the August 1, 1979, letter, the Oyster Creek plant was licensed prior to the issuance of seismic category 1 requirements; therefore, the inspection was performed to verify that the actual configuration of safety-related systems, utilizing piping 2 1/2 inches in diameter and greater, meets design requirements. The inspection as accomplished by JCPSL personnel and representatives from Burns 5 Roe, Inc., as well as Bergen Patterson, who are specialists in the field of piping stress analysis and hanger design.
SCOPE The systems which were inspe ted are those listed in Table 1 where the piping diameter was 2 1/2 inches or greater. As per IE Bulletin 79-14, Rev.1, only accessible portions (those portions accessable during norcal operation) of these systems have been inspected. The inspection consisted of comparing the as-found condition of piping, valves, supports, and restraints with the design documents used as input to the seismic analysis. Phase 1 of the program was accomplished by engineers who physically inspected the systems noting any deviations from the design documents.
Phase 2 of the inspection consisted of reviewing the results of Phase 1 and evaluating any desiations to determine whether or not a nonconformance existed. Deviations were not considered non-conformances if the installation had been modified to accommodate actual conditions in the field as long as the deviation did not prevent the installation from performing its intended function. Personnel who are specialists in the field of piping stress an-alysis and hanger design made an engineering judgment as to whether or not the existing configuration fulfilled the design objectives. Nonconformances were identified in those instances where:
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SCOPE (Continued)
- 1. The piping geometry differed significantly from design documents; or
?. Actual valve positions and weights differed signficantly from design documents; or
- 3. The engineering evaluation concluded that the existir.g configuration may not fulfill the design requirements; or
- 4. The inst.11ed hanger was a different type than specified in the design documents (i.e. rigid instead of spring, etc.); or
- 5. The installed hanger was found to be damaged; or
- 6. The installed hanger was found to be inoperable; or
- 7. The installed location of the hanger was found to be more than 2 feet from the location specified in the design documents; or
- 8. The design documents indicated a hanger 'ahere none existed; or
- 9. A hanger was installed which was not specified in the design document Phase 3 of the inspection consisted of either perfor.ning an analysis to verify that the nonconformance did not affect system operability or restoring the existing installation to conform to the design specifications.
In the event where analyses or modifications will require additional time to complete, a schedule for completion is presented in Appendix 1.
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TABLE 1 Systems Inspected
- 1. Isolation Condenser
- 5. Core Spray
- 4. Emergency Service Water 1147 042
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Summary The inspections performed on the systems listed in Table I revealed that, with the exception of core spray system II, the installations as exist at Oyster Creek meet design requirments. Although some non-conformances were found, for the most part the systems were installed as indicated in design documents used as input to the seismic analyses of safety related systems. The nonconforman es that were identified were evaluated and, with one exception, wei: 'ound to fulfill design requirements. A listing by system of all nonconformances identified is provided in the following data sheets. Where further analysis or repair is indicated, Appendix 1 provides a schedule for thu completion of such analysis / repair.
The one exception to the above occurred when inspecting core spray system II in which several hangers were found to exist in a manner that would compromise design requirements. This situation was evaluated and it was determined that system operation might be jeopardi::ed.
Accordingly, Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-219/79-27-17 for the Oyster Creek Station was sent to the NRC Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
A copy of this report is presented in Appendix 2.
Appendix 3 of the report presents a discussion of the plans for updating design documents to As-Built conditions and of the measures taken to assure that future modifications of piping systems, including their supports, will be relfected in As-Built documents.
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a System: Isolation Condenser Hanger Mark No.
Nonconformance Remarks / Resolution NE-S-H (1) Spring hangers added to Does not affect system design re-to valve stem to support valve. quirements.
NE-1-H7 (2) Snubber attached to top Further analysis required (See structure of H7. Appendix 1).
NE-1-HE1 (1) Spring hanger added to valve Does not affect system design re-stem to support vaPee. quirements.
NE-2 -HE2 (1) Spring hanger added to valve Does not affect system design re-stem to support valve. quirements.
Penetra- (1) Configuration does not con- This item is being reviewed with tion form t; design documents. General Electric to determine Snubbers knendment 50 to FDSAR in- proper configuration (See Appendex dicates design change. 1).
l 1147 044 System: Containment Sprav Hanger Mark Nonconformance Remarks / Resolution No.
NQ-2-H44 All 4 mounting studs missi', Reinstalled mounting studs. Does not affect system design requirements.
NQ-2-38A Additional deal weight spring Does not affect system design hanger installed. requirements.
Discharge Discharge piping for heat exchange Does not affect system design Piping 1-3 and 1-4 is shown as 10". requirements.
Actual piping is 14".
NQ-2-T-H1 Rigid dead weight hanger is Does r.ot affect system design 4' from design location. requirements.
e 5
System: Core Spray Hanger Mark Nonconformance Remarks /0? solution No.
NZ-1-H2 Hanger not installed. Installed missing.haneer..Does not affect system cesign requirements.
NZ-2-H15 Cantilever angle from wall found New cantilevel ang1: nicn brace to be bent. designed and installed. Does not atfect system design requirements.
368-R1 Additional plate installed as Additional plate had 6 concrete shim. fasteners instead of 4 as originally designed. Does not affect system design requirements.
NZ-2-R11 Pipe clamp not found in box Reinstalled clamp to proper position.
restraint. Does,not affect system design requirements.
NZ-2-R13 Hanger not attached to wall. '
New hanger designed andsystem de"s'ig" DguiE0menksget n re-q NZ-2-R14 Hanger not installed. New hanger, installed. Does not affect system design requirements.
NZ-2-H6A Rigid hanger not indicated on Does not affect system design re-design documents. quirements.
NZ-2-R2 Pipe clamp not found in box Reinstalled clamp in proper position.
restraint. , Does not affect system design re-quirements.
NZ-2-H58 Rigid hanger instead of spring Does not affect system design re-located 5'9" from design quirements.
position.
411-R11A Additional rigid restraint not Does not affect system design re-indicated on design documents. quirements.
NZ-2-H34 Angle cantilever changed to Does not affect systen design re-cantilever with brace. quirements.
NZ-2-H37 Rod and angle bent. Replaced with new hanger. Does not affect system design requirements.
NZ-2-25 Pipe clamp not in restraint 'ox. Reinstalled clamp in proper position.
NZ-2-RS Pipe clamp not in restraint box. Reinstalled clamp in proper position.
NZ-2-R9 Pipe clamp not in restraint box. Reinstalled clamp in proper position.
NZ-2-R7 Hanger sheared off wall. Designed and installed new hanger.
NZ-2-R4 Pipe clamp not in restraint box. in or ReinstalledclamSystemOSerposition, Does not atfect sign requirements NZ-2-R5A Not installed properly due to New hanger designed and installed.
misalignment. Does,not affect system design requirements.
NZ-2-6A Pipe clamp not in restraint box. Reinstalled clamp in proper position NZ-2-R6 Pipe clamp not in restraint box. New restraint installed.
1 1A7 A
- See Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/79-27-17 l l7i u ,4 v4
System:
Engineering Service Water Hanger Mark No. Nonconformance Remarks / Resolution Discharge Not installed as per original In both cases, additional dead weight Valve For design. and sieimic loads are within accept-Each Set able range. Does not affect system of Heat design requirements.
Exchanger < ,
SN-SN- S Hanger not attached to wall. Hanger was reattached as per design requirements. Does not affect system design requirements SW-SN-3 Hanger not contacting wall.
Hangers to be repaired (See Appendix SW-SN-4 Hanger not contacting wall.
1).
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9 APPENDIX 1 1147 048
SCHEDULE FOR ANALYSIS / MODIFICATION ITEM SYSTEM COMPLETION DATE NE-1-H7 Isolation Condenser Analysis complete by October 1, 1979 Penetration Snubbers Isolation Condenser Review complete by October 1, 1979 SW-SN-3 6
SW-SN-4 Emergency Service Modifications complete Water by September 15, 1979 1147 049
APPENDIX 2 I147 050
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.crecy Ct.ntr:.I Petter & U ht Cornpcny
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(201)455 8203 I dU Ib II August 21, 1979 lir. Boyce H. Grier, Director Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement
?.egion I '
United States !!uclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King"of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Cear !'r. Grier:
Subject:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket !!o. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence flo. 50-219/79-27-1T This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/79-27-lT in compliance with paragraph 6.6.1.a of the Technical Specifications.
Very truly yours,
..o ,,., ' , .),..
h&
id j. th-d' '
Donald A. P.oss, Manager Generating Stations-Nu-lem.
pk Enclosures cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Corenission Washington, DC 20555 tir. Willlam G. Mcdonald, Director (3 copies)
Office of Management Information and Program Control United States fluclear Regulatory Cor. mission Washington, DC 20555 1147 051
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lCn August 7, 1979, during an inspection of seismic restraints associated ;
g with Core Spray System 11, four seismic restraints, NZ-2-R5, NZ-2-R7, ;
- 112-2-R3, and NZ-2-R9, were discovered in positions other than required by j
- original design or had failed. on August 8, 1979 two more restraints, y
, !Z-2 2.6 and NZ-2-R6A, were fcund to be in a condition not representative 1
- of the original design criteria. Core Spray System 11 was considered ;
- ir.ocerable for a time until analyses were made and conditions corrected. 1 sa
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- design criteria and because of this two others were damaged due to un- ,
- restrained pipe movement in other sections of the piping. Four of the ,
l restraints were restored to their designed condition. 11Z-2-R7 des-j i g n vea s r.od i f i ed . F1Z-2-R6 will be restored to original design or relocated. ;
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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATl"G STATIC:t Forked River, Ne..' Jersey 03731 Licensee Event Report Repo, table Occurrence No. 50-219/79-27-lT Recert Date Au:ust 21, 1979 Occurrence Date August 07, 1979 Idc.--i 1 cation of Occurrence Discovery of six seismic restraints for the 6-inch core spray test line, which were either in positions other than required by original design criteria or had failed. This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.9 Cgndi:icns Prior to Occurrence The 11 ant was operating at steady-state power.
Poo:e r : Core 1909.16 MWt Electric 639 MWe Flow: Recirculating 15.2 x 10' spm Feedwater 7.143 x 105 lb/hr Stack Gas Activity: 27,900 uci/sec DesO7ictiOn of- OccurrCnce On Tuesday, August 7,1979, during an inspection of seismic restraints associated with Core Spray Systen 11, it was determined that two seismic restraint (NZ-2-R5 and R9) clamps were not in their as-built position. Additionally, one restraint, NZ-2-R7, was found to have its wall attachment bol ts sheared., rendering this restraint inoperable. The structural configuration of the fourth restraint, NZ-2-R8, was found to have been altered. All of the restraints are connected to the 6-inch test line for Core Spray System II. Because of the configuration and condition of four restraints, System 11 was considered inoperable at this tire until further analyses could be performed.
After returning the above four restraints to their as-designed status on August 8,1979, two r. ore res tra ints, NZ-2-P.6 and R6A, were found to be in a cor.dition not representative of original design criteria. The condition of these t.co restraints alone did not justify declaring System 11 inoperable at inis tire.
" 47 P00R OM
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F.et.- te?'e Oc:.rrence No. 50-219/79-27-lT Pace 2 Adus.2".,1979 6- :rcnt Cause of Occurrence Four of the seismic res traints, NZ-2-R5, R6, R6A, and R9, were found to be installed contrary to original design criteria. Because of the failure to install the above restraints properly, restraints NZ-2-R7 and NZ-2-R8 were da aced due to unrestrained pipe movement in other sections of the piping.
Analysis of Occurrence The 6-inch test piping routes water in the core spray system from the discharge of the core spray booster pumps through a motor operated test iscla tion valve 1ccated close to the core spray line, a check valve located in the area of the torus and into the torus. Failure of the restraints during a seisr.ic event could have produced a failure of the test line at some point between the motor operated test isolation valve and the check valve. The significance of this event is that core spray system
' unction would not have been impaired by the failure. Primary containment would be maintained by the reliance on a single check valve. The check is not part of the local leak rate testing program since normally it doa, not serve as a primary containment isolation barrier. Therefore, the 'ntegrity of this valve is not known.
Corrective Action All restraints were restored to their designed condition with the exception of restraint NZ-2-R7 and flZ-2-R6. NZ-2-R7 design was modified to provide easier placement of anchor bol ts. Core Spray System I was on an accelerated surveillance test schedule until System I t was declared operable. NZ-2-R6
/ will be restored to original design or relocated based on radiation levels in the reactor cleanup filter sludge tank room.
Failure Data Piping restraints designed by: Bergen Patterson Pipe Support Company Clifton, NJ h i 1147 054-
O APPENDIX 3 k
1147 055
Updating of As-Built Drawings A
Recently, responsibility for the control and updating of as-built drawings has been transferred to the Generation Engineering Department. Procedures are being developed to assure that As-Built drawings are updated to reflect modifications of piping systems in N. s a timely manner. Existing procedures require that these drawings be revised as part of the engineering effort; however, it is expected that the new organization and revised procedu.es will provide greater control of these drawings.
The results of this inspection till be incorporated into as-built documents on an expedited basis. Bt. as 5 Roe has been contracted to provide As-Built Drawings reflecting '_he information learned as a result of this inspection.
11A7 056