ML19209B238

Requests Addl Info Re Alternate Safe Shutdown Capability in Safety Evaluation for Fire Protection Supporting Amend 23 to License DPR-72.Forwards NRC Position Re Safe Shutdown Capability

ML19209B238
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	09/11/1979
From:	Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Stewart W FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 7910090366
Download: ML19209B238 (9)

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September 11, 1979 Docket No. 50-302 Mr. W. P. Stewart Manager, Nuclear Operations Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 14042, Mail Stop C 4

.St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

Dear Mr. Stewart:

In the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for fire protection sucporting Amendment No. 23 to Facility Ccerating License No. DPR-72 for the Crystal River Unit No. 3, Alternate Safe Shutdown Capability was identified as a modification for which additional infomation was required in Section 3.1.

To expedite the com-pletion of our review of this item, we are enclosing our position entitled, " Safe Shutdown Capability". Section 8 of this document specifies the infomation we require to complete our review. Please provide this information within 90 days of the date of this letter.

If some of the infomation is already available in a previous submittal, you need 'nly reference that material.

Sincerely, Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:

Staff Position -

Safe Shutdown Capability cc w/ enclosure:

See next page 7910 0 90 J (g.

1114 046

l Florida Power Corporation

,cc:

Mr. S. A. Brandimore Vice President and General' Counsel P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Generation Division S!'ite 420, 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Crystal River Public Library Crystal River, Florida 32629 Mr. Jack Shreve Office of tne Public Counsel Room 4, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

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1114 047 3

Enciesura STAFF POSITION

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SAFE S iUT:CWN CAPA5ILI"Y Staff Concem Daring the ' staff's evaluation of fire pre:ection pregrar.s at operating plants, cne er mere specific plant areas may be identified in which ee staff does net have adequate assurance that a pcstulated

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fire will net damage both redundant divisiens of shutd:wn systems.

This lack of assurance in safe shutdewn capability has resulted fr:m ene er both of de feilewing situati:ns:

Case A: The licensee has not adequately identified the syste=s and c:::enents required for safe shutdown anc their locatien in s;ecific fire areas.

Case 5: The licensee has ne: demenstrated tha-.he fire protecticn for specific plant areas w';1. prevent damage :: both reduncant divisiens c~ safe shutdown c:=:enents identified in these areas.

Fcr Case A, ne staff has re:uired that an adecuate sa'e shute:w{.

analysis be ;erfor ed.

This evaluatien includes the icentifica:100 cf :ne syste :s required fer safe shu:dewn and the 1 cati:n of the system c:m:enents in the plant. Where it is determined by this evalva-icn hat safe snu:d:wn c::;:nents of be:n recuncan: divisiens are 1 :ated in :ne same fire area, :ne licensee js e uired :: dem:nstrate that a ;cstulated fire will ne damage both divisiens er pr: vide alternate shutdewn capability as in Case 3.

For Case E, the staff may have required that an al emate, shu:dewn ca;a:ility be previced with is independen: =f the area c. c:ncern er :ne licensee =ay have pre; sed such a capability in lieu c-certi.in additional fire prc ection ecdifications in the area. The specific =edifica icns associated with the area cf concern along w1,.h c:ner systems and equipment already incependent of the area form the alter. ate shutdown capability.

For each plant, the m=dificatiens needed and ce c:mcinatiens f systec:s which provide ce shutdown functions may be unicue for each :-itical area; hcwever, the shutdcwn func 1cns provided shculd maintain plan para eters within the beunds of the limiting safety cease cences deemed ac:eptable fer the design basis event.

Staf' %siti:n Szfe snu-dr n :a:abili y shculd be ce.:nstrated (Case A) Or

a. e.a a s..u ::-r :1:a:ility : :vi ed (Case d 'n a:::Mance w :,

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2. Limitine. Safety C:nsecuences and Re:uired Shutdown Functicns 2.1 Ne hssica product beunda y in egrity shall be affected:

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a.

No fuel clad damage; b.

Ne rupture of any primary c: clan bcundary; c.

No rup*urt Of the ::ntainment beundary.

2.2 The re.act:r c:clant system pr: cess variables shall be within these predicted-f:r a less of normal ac power.

2.3 Tha alternate shutd:wn capability shall be able : achieve and maintain subcri-ical c:nditiens in the aact:r, maintain reacter c: lant invent:ry, achieve and cair.zin he:

standby

• c:nditiens (het shutdewn' fer a 5 A) for an extended paried of time, achieve c 1d shutdown' c: ditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain ::1d snu:dewn c:nditi:ns thereafter.

As defined in the Standard Techni:a15;ecificaticas.

3. Ferferrance Geals 3.1 The. reactivity c:ntr:1 functicn snall be ca:able f achieving and':aintaining ::1d shutdown reactivity c:nditiens.

3.2 The react:r c clan: makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor.ceplant level abcve the t:p of the c=re for 5WR's and in the:pressuri:er f:r FWR's.

3.3 The react:r heat remeval functicn shall be capable cf achieving and =aintaining decay heat removal.

3.4 The process monit: ring functicn shall be capable ef previ4i:9 direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and c:ntrol the above functions.

3. 5 The su;;cr:ing function shall be capable of providing th'e process c: cling, lubricati:n, e :. necessary to per=it

he cpera:icn of :he equi;cen; used for safe shutdcwn by the systems identified in 3.1 - 3.4 3.5 The e:ci: ment and systers used :: achieve and maintain het stancby c:ndi:icns (h:: snutd wn f r a 5WR) sh:uld be (i) 'ree :f #i e damage; (2) 02:able of.ai.taining such

nci icns f:r an ex ance: : ire ;eri:: lenger than 72 neurs

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3.8 Tnese systems need ne be designed te (1) seismic category I criteria; (2) single failure criteria; Or (3) cepe with other plant accidents such as pipe brerks er stuck valves

( A:;endix A BTP 9. -l-), except these pcrtic..s Of these existing safety systems.

systers which interf ace with =r im:at

4. FVR Ecui:nent C-enerally Necessarv Fer Het Standhv

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'(1) Reactivitv Cen r:1 Reactor t.i; capability (scram).

Bert:icr :a;atility e.g.,

charging ;um:, makeup pt..o er high presse a injectien' pump taking suction fr:m c:ncentrated berated sater supplies, and letpown systec if required.

(2)

leacter C: clan: Makeu Reacter c: clan makeu ca;: ability, e.g., charging ;;=:;:s Power ::erated relief er the high pressure injecti:n pu=:s.

va, ves may be recuired :: reduce pressure :: allew use of the 1

high pressu-e injecti:n pu: :s.

(3)

React:r C: clan: System Pressure Cent-ci React:r pressure cente:1c capability, e.g., charging pu::::s er pressuri:er heaters and use of the 1e:d:wn syster:s if required.

(t.)

Deciv Heat Receval Decay heat re=cval capability, e.g., pcwer coerated relief valves.(steam generat:r) or safety relief valves for hea-removal with a water su ply and ere gency er auxiliary Set vice feedwater pu:::::s for rakeup :2 the steam generator.

water or other purcs may be required : pr: vide water for auxiliary

. feed pum; sucticn if the condensate st: rage tank capacity is not acequate !cr 72 hcurs.

(5)

Frecess M nit:rine Instrumenta ien Pr: cess :: nit: ring ca:: ability e.g., pressurizer pressure and level, s: car gene-a::r l eve '..

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5. PWR E:ui: rent Generally Necessarv For Cold Shutdee.*

(1) Reacter C clan: System Pressure Redue:ien is Residurl Heat Receval Svstem tAnR) Caca:1sity React:r c clant system pressure reducti:n by c:cidewn using steam generater pcwer operated relief valves er a:mespheric dump valves.

(2)

Decav Mee: Re-eval Decay heat ren: val ca: ability e.g., residual heat removal system, com;cneht c: cling water system and service water remcval heat and maintain c:ld shutd wn.

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(3) Suceert Sup;ce: ca; ability e.g., ensite ; ewer seurces ( AC & OC) r effsite after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and the associated electrical cistribution system ::. su:;1y the above equi; ent.

• ~ Equi; ment necessa y in addition :: that i.1 ready ; eviced := maintain hc: s:andby.

6. BVR Eeui: ment Gener 11v Necessarv For Het Shutdewn (1)

Reactivity Centrei Reacter trip capability (scram).

(2)

React:r teclan: Maketo.

Reactor coolant inventory makeu; capability e.g., reacter c:re isciatien c cling system (RCIC) er the high pressure ecolant injecti:n system (h?CI).

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(1)

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y (6) Su ver Suppert capability e.g., ensite ;cwer s urce (AC & DC) and their associated cistributien systems to previde f:r the shutdown equipment.

7. 3R Eevi: men: Genera 11v Necessa-v Fer Celd shutdewn' At this ;cin: the equiprent ne:essary for h:: shutd>n has reduced where the ER the primary system pressure tnd tem;erature ::

' system may be piaced in service in ER caeling rede.

(1) Decav Heat Remeval

• Residual heat re:cval system in the ER c: ling =cde. service water system.

(2) Se::cet Onsite scur:es ( AC & CC) er effsite af ter 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and their asscciated cistributien systems

pr: vide fcr shu down equipment.

Equipment pr: viced in adcitica :: that for achievi.; ne shutdown.

8. Inf:rmatien Recui--d F:r Staf# Revi ew Descri; icn of the systems or pertiens thereof used to (a) provide -he shutdown ca: ability and modifica icns required

. = achieve the alternate shutd wn capability if recuit td, System design by drawings which show ner a1 and alternate (b)

. shutdown centrol and pcwer circuits, location of ce= enents, and that wiring which is in the area and the wiring which is cur of the area that recuind the alternate system.

(c)

Denonstrate that changes to safety systems will not degrade safety sjsta=si.

(e.g.,neEiscla: Fen switches '- W --

and centrol switches sheuld meet design criteria and F-

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standar:s in F5AF. fer electrical ecui; rent in the system tha: the switch is to be insta11ec; cabinets tha: the swit:hes are :: he ::ented in sh uld als: meet the sare criteria ( 5AR) as ::her safety rela ec ca:inets anc avoid '.a nrient iscla-icn '-= -ne c:nt-c1 aneis;.:

=, @e iscla:ica sws::nes sacui: he keyi::krc, Or ala-ec i

ne ::n- :1 r::: i' in :ne "10:31" er "is: lated" ::siti:n;

eri::i: :necu shevi: be mace :: verify s-it:n is in :ne

::e- ::siti:n f:r.:- a ::e 1:i cn; and a si n;'.e transfer s-1 :- :r : ner e-ce.d:e sn:;':.:: :s a s:gr:e f:r a i ;Ie faiI4re :*. ause I:E s *f e:an;!r 11f ety syste'.s ).

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Demonstrate that alternate shutdown pcwer scurce., including (e) all breake-s, have isolation devices en c:ntr:1 circuits that cre routed through the area ts be avoided, even if the brtaker is to be operated manually.

Demonstrate that licensee pr:cedure(s) have been develcped (f) which describe we tasks to be par'er-ed to effect the shutdown re thod. A sumary cf these pr:cedu es shculd be reviewed by the staff.

Demonstrate that sparn fuses are available'for c:ntrol

(.9) cir:vits where these fuses,may be required in supplying pcwer to c:ntr:1 circuits used for the shutdewn mathed anc may be blewn by the effects of a :able spreading rocm fire. The spare fuses should be loca* :d c nvenient to the existing fuses. The shutdown procs.ure shculd inferm the cperat:r to check these fuses.

(h)

Demensthate that the man;cwer required :: perf rm the shutdown functions using the precedures Of (f) as well as to previde fire brigade : embers to fight ce fire is availabla as requi-ed by the fi e brigade technical s peci fi caticns.

(i) Demonstrate that acecuate acceptance tes*s are per#cced.

ecuip en. c erates from the These shculd verify inat:

local c:ntrol statien when the transfer or is:1atien switch is placta in ce "1ccal" ;;esitien and that the equipment canne'.; he operated frem the centrol rec =; and that equip-2 rert operates frem the c:ntrol reem but cannet be operated at the local c:ntrol station when the transfer er isolatica switch is in the "remete' position.

Technical Specifications cf the surveillance requirements (j) and li=iting c:nditiens for cperatien fer that equipment Fer exz=ple, not already c:vered 'by existing Tech. Specs.

if new isolatien and c:ntrol swit:hes are added to a service water system, the e.:isting Tee:h. Spec. surveillance require-ment.s en the service water system should add a statement.

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"Every third ; ump test shculd also ve-ify that the pu=p sta-ts frem te alternate shutdewn statien after moving the iccal all se-vice -a.ar system isclatien switenes ::

c:n:r:1 : siti:n."

,O Cem nstrate nat ce syste s available are adecua e t: :erfe-m ne.ecessa y snute:wn functi:ns.

~he funct::ns recuired s uid :e basac :n :revi:us analyses, if ::ssible (e.g..

- e : ;;, su:r as a 1:s s Of.:-.11 a. :. ~;;-tr er shutd:-n

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Demonstrate that repair precedures for cold shu:devn systems are develeped and e.aterial for repairs is raintained :n site.

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