ML19208B140
| ML19208B140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/1979 |
| From: | Thompson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Mattson R NRC - TMI-2 LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B141 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909190110 | |
| Download: ML19208B140 (4) | |
Text
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JUL 0 51979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Roger Mattson, Director, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Ta n Force FROM:
Dudley Thompson, Executive Officer for Operations Support, IE
SUBJECT:
TASK FORCE REVIEW 0F INCIDENT RESPONSE This is a followup to the meeting on June 27 of the Lessons Learned Task Force which was atterded by Bernie Weiss and me from IE and by Tom Carter and Charlie South frcm NMSS, representing the Emergency Planning Task Force.
In addition, I have included some responses to your June 19, 1979 memorandum to Vic. Stello, subject as above.
We agree with the goal of a coherent response to Commission concerns in the area of emergency planning.
As you know, IE has been pressing for improve-ments to NRC's incident response capabilities, in efforts that long predate the TMI accident.
These efforts are continuing.
We concur with the planned July 10 meeting at which the Lessons Learned Task Force and the Emergency Planning (Carter) Task Force work can l'e discussed as weil as the work of the internal IE Task Force on possible incident center modifications.
During the June 27 meeting, we were surprised and somewhat discomfited to learn of the relatively wide-spread lace of familiarity with some fundamental NRC emergency planning documentation that appears to be present in the Lessons Learned Task Force.
To assist in alleviating that problem, I have enclosed copies of both NRC Manual Chapter 0502 and the NRC Headquarters Incident Response Plan.
Seven copies of the current revision to the Plan were pro-vided to NRR on January 15, 1979 (two copies each to Denton, Stello and Miller; one to Knighton).
The following comments apply to the areas of concern addressed in the enclosure to your 6/19/79 memorandum:
We agree with the general observation in the enclosure to your 6/19/79 memorandum that it is extremely important that NRC's role in responding to incidents at licensees facilities needs to be clarified before definitive planning for improvements can proceed very far.
Nevertheless, we also agree that a number of interim steps can be taken regardless of which way that decision goes.
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i Roger Mattson JUL 0 51979 Notification We note that the Lessons Learned Task Force requests an IE discussion of notification requirements and changes effected or proposed. The notification requirements levied on licensees are, of course, set by NRR. As you know, a number of changes in licensee notification requirements were set by the series of IE Bulletins issued in the post-TMI period.
In addition, Commission interest has been expressed in tightening the. timeliness requirements on reporting of events, both by licensees and within the Commission after notification has been received.
We are pursuing this matter in the form of a Com-mission paper outlinin9 the criteria for the reporting of events to Commissioners and others via PN's.
The subject of licensee reporting requirements is are on which NRR
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should lead, in coordination with other officas.
(NMSS also has some work here, of course, but that is not particularly germane to the LLTF.)
The notification chains involved in incident notification and Operations Center activation are set forth in the NRC Headquarters Incident Response Plan.
However, these procedures do not cover intra-office notification and each office must develop its own internal notification and alerting system once they receive notification of an incident.
Initial Response We agree that the question of the timing and extent of response by NRC to an incident site needs reexamination, particularly based on what decision may be made in the broader context of NRC responsibility for emergency response.
In terms of the isitial response within the Headquarters staff, we are not sure that the plans need revision as contemplated by the Lessons Learned Task Force.
We recommend a review of the existing provisions of MC 0502 and the Incident Response Plan before the Task Force locks into this position.
Orcanizatign_
In this area as well, we recommend review of MC 0502 and the Incident Response Plan by the Lessons Learned Task Force before affirming the position set forth in your 6/19/79 correspondence.
Nevertheless, we agree that some examination of the incident response organization is appropriate, particularly in light of our comments concerning the carryover of organizational loyalties and responsibilities, and the training and discipline required for implementation.
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Roger Mattson JUL 0 51979 Communications As discussed in our 6/27 meeting, we agree that communications requires attention.
As you know extensive effort has already been completed in this area and more is contemplated. We look forward to further discussions on the subject.
Facilities We agree that more space and better layout is appropriate for both Headquarters and site response. We urge, however, that consideration be given to cost and utilization factors in determining how far we should go.
Information Resources Both the Lessons Learned Task Force and IE appear to have substantial agreement in this area. The question of how detailed the information needs might be for reactors is one we believe NRR should address.
In this connection, I am enclosing copies of earlier correspondence dating back to 1976 in which requests to NRR concerning information resources to be available at the Center are addressed.
Technical Support As in some other areas, we recommend a review of MC 0502 and the Incident Response Plan prior to the Lessons Learned Task Force taking a firm position on this question. As we explained, the present concept (which is developed in MC 0502) gives IE the responsibility for developing an umbrella under which the various Offices operate in an incident and pro-vide expertise. However, each Office must structure its own response in terms of how it will respond, who will ba available, wnat responsibilities they will have, and whether they respond to the Center or work elsewhere.
Administrative Succort We raise only the question of the extent to which prearrangements should be made for administrative support. We agree that the extent to which preplanning can be accomplished has an impact on the timeliness of response to administrative needs expressed by the technical staff during any emergency.
Our impression remains that overall the administrative support was acceptable, considering the escalating nature of our response to the TMI event.
Information Dissemination You will recall that during my briefing of the Commission:I intentionally avoided any discussion of public information dissemination.
I believe it is inappropriate for the technical staff to become heavily involved
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Roger Mattson JUL 0 5195 in the way Public Affairs conducts its business.
In this connection, I again refer you to MC 0502 and the Incident Response Plan for infor-mation concerning the extent of preplanning previously accomplished in this area.
We look forward to continued cooperation among the Lessons Learned Task' Force, the Emergency Planning Task Force and IE in this important area. As I mentioned at the 6/27 meeting, I believe it is important that we avoid further fingerpointing and proceed with the task at hand.
udley T,...ps Execu ve Officer for Operations Support, IE
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosure 3 only:
V. Stello, IE T. Telford, NRR R. Minogue, SD E. Case, NRR H. Denton, NRR R. Boyd, NRR D. Ross, NRR F. Schroeder, NRR D. Eisenhut, NRR S. Levine, RES K. Cornell, ED0 R. Ireland, DSS PDR Division Directors, IE Regional Directors, IE Executive Officers, IE J. Fouchard, PA T. Carter, NMSS C. South, HMSS q[
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