RA-19-011, Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1 Concerning On-Site Property Damage Insurance and Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4), Concerning Offsite Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1 Concerning On-Site Property Damage Insurance and Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4), Concerning Offsite Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance

ML19094B776
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	04/04/2019
From:	Gallagher M Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RA-19-011
Download: ML19094B776 (32)

Text

Exelon Generation Michael P. Gallagher Exelon Nuclear Vice President License Renewal and Decommissioning RA-19-011 April 4, 2019 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 610 765 5958 Office 610 765 5658 Fax www.exeloncorp.com m1chaelp.gallagher@exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.12 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 10 CFR 140.8 10 CFR 140.11(a}(4)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 NRC Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w}(1 ), Concerning On-Site Property Damage Insurance and Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4),

Concerning Offsite Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance

References:

1)

Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station -

Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), Concerning Onsite Property Insurance (EPID L-2018-LLE-0004)," dated December 19, 2018, (ML18228A852}

2)

Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station -

Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), Concerning Offsite Primary and Secondary Insurance (EPID L-2018-LLE-0003)," dated December 19, 2018, (ML18229A005)

3)

Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

"Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated September 25, 2018 (ML18268A258)

4)

Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request -

Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defue/ed Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated October 22, 2018 (ML18295A384}

5)

Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request Supplement - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCNGS Request for Exemption Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 April 4, 2019 Page2 License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defue/ed Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated November 6, 2018 (ML 1831 OA306)

6)

Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

"Response to Request for Additional Information (RAJ) and Supplemental Information Regarding Request for Changing Emergency Preparedness License Amendment No.

294 Effective Date (Change to Adiabatic Heat-up Calculation) (EPID: L-2018-LLA-0305)," dated February 13, 2019 (ML19044A643)

7)

Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Issuance of Amendment Re: Changes the Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme (GAG NO. MG0160; EPID L-2017-LLA-0307)," dated October 17, 2018(ML18221A400)

8)

Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation (CAC NO. MG0153; EPID L-2017-LLE-0020),"

dated October 16, 2018 (ML18220A980)

Pursuant to 1 O CFR 50.12 and 1 O CFR 140.8, "Specific exemptions," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requests exemptions from the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4) for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). Exemptions to 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4) were previously approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) for OCNGS (References 1 and 2), the purpose of this letter is to request an earlier effective date.

By letters dated December 19, 2018, the NRC granted exemptions from the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) (Reference 1) and 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4) (Reference 2) for OCNGS (insurance exemptions). The exemption in Reference 1 permits OCNGS to lower the minimum required onsite insurance to $50 million. The exemption in Reference 2 permits OCNGS to reduce the required level of primary offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million and to eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial protection. Both exemptions as approved become effective 12 months (365 days) after the certification of permanent fuel removal from the OCNGS reactor vessel under 1 O CFR 50.82(a)(1 ), which would be September 25, 2019, based on the submittal of Exelon's 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) certification letter (Reference 3).

This submittal requests the same regulatory exemptions previously approved in References 1 and 2 with the exception of an earlier effective date based on a revised OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis. The~e are no other changes to the previously approved insurance exemptions. An earlier date would allow Exelon to implement the insurance exemptions approved in References 1 and 2 at 9.38 months (285 days) from the date of permanent shutdown based on the revised "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool, C-1302-226-E310-457" (OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis) submitted as in Reference 6.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCNGS Request for Exemption Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 April 4, 2019 Page 3 By letter dated October 22, 2018 (Reference 4), and supplemented on November 6, 2018 (Reference 5), and February 13, 2019 (Reference 6), Exelon submitted a request to revise the implementation and effective date of Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) and Emergency Action Level (EAL) Scheme for the Permanently Defueled Condition (AMO No.

294) (Reference 7) and the approved exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 1 O CFR Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV (EP exemption) (Reference 8), based on revision of the OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis. Revision of the Zirconium Fire Analysis resulted in a reduced required spent fuel decay period to the end of the zirconium ignition period from 12 months (365 days) to 9.38 months (285 days) after the final reactor shut down.

The approvals of the two insurance exemptions (References 1 and 2) and AMO No. 294 (Reference 7) were predicated upon the approval of the EP exemption approved in letter dated October 16, 2018 (Reference 8), "Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related.Safety Evaluation." The basis for the EP exemption provided a site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis that showed that fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) would not reach the zirconium ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> from the time at which an assumed loss of water and air cooling of the spent fuel occurred (adiabatic heat-up). As noted above, the revised OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis resulted in a reduced required spent fuel decay period from 12 months (365 days) to 9.38 months (285 days) after the final reactor shut down.

Revision 2 of the OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis was submitted to the NRC in Reference 6.

Exelon is requesting an exemption to 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for OCNGS that would reduce the minimum coverage limit of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to $50 million for OCNGS to be effective at 9.38 months (285 days). This submittal requests the same regulatory exemption as previously approved except for an earlier effective date. The exemption request is provided in Attachment 1 to this letter.

Exelon is requesting an exemption to 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4) for OCNGS that would reduce the required level of primary offsite liability insurance to $100,000,000 and eliminate the requirement for OCNGS to carry secondary financial protection to be effective at 9.38 months (285 days). This submittal requests the same regulatory exemption as previously approved except for an earlier effective date. The exemption request is provided in Attachment 2 to this letter.

The requested exemptions are permissible under 1 O CFR 50.12 and 1 O CFR 140.8 because they are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, are consistent with the common defense and security, present special circumstances, and is otherwise in the public interest (as further provided in Attachments 1 and 2).

Based on the permanent shutdown of OCNGS on September 17, 2018 (Reference 3), the decay period of 9.38 months (285 days) will occur June 29, 2019. Therefore, Exelon is requesting approval of this exemption request by June 1, 2019, with an effective date of June 29, 2019. With a 30-day implementation date no later than July 29, 2019. The approval date of June 1, 2019 will permit sufficient time to arrange for the reduced offsite liability insurance coverage allowed by the exemption.

Exelon also requests that Indemnity Agreement No. B-37 be amended to reflect the earlier effective date of June 29, 2019. Based on the previously approved exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4), Indemnity Agreement No. B-37 was amended (Amendment No. 17) to (a) delete Article VI II in its entirety and substitute therein the requirements of the exemption permitting a

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCNGS Request tor Exemption Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 April 4, 2019 Page4 reduction in primary financial protection from $450,000,000 to $100,000,000, and withdrawal from participation in the secondary layer of financial protection; and (b) delete Item 2.a of the Attachment and substitute "$100,000,000." Amendment No. 17 has an effective date of September 25, 2019. A form of' amendment is provided as Attachment 3 which reflects an effective date of June 29, 2019 consistent with the requested earlier effective date of 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4).

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Paul Bonnett at (610) 765-5264.

Respectfully, Michael P. Gallagher Vice President, License Renewal & Decommissioning Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments: 1) Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) Concerning Onsite Property Damage Insurance

2) Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4) Concerning Offsite Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance

3) Form of Indemnity Amendment

4) Comparison of Input Parameters in NUREG/CR-6451 to OCNGS cc:

w/ Attachments Regional Administrator - NRC Region I NRC Project Manager, NMSS/DUWP/RDB - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Director, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering - New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Mayor of Lacey Township, Forked River, NJ Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1)

Concerning Onsite Property Damage Insurance Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-1 of A1-12 1.0 SPECIFIC EXEMPTION REQUEST By letter dated December 19, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) granted an exemption from the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) (Reference 1) for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) (onsite insurance exemption). The exemption permits OCNGS to lower the minimum required onsite insurance to $50 million. That exemption would become effective 12 months (365 days) after the certification of permanent fuel removal from the OCNGS reactor vessel under 1 O CFR 50.82(a)(1 ), which would be September 25, 2019, based on the September 25, 2018, submittal of Exelon's 1 O CFR 50.82(a)(1) certification letter (Reference 2).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requests a permanent exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) for OCNGS similar to the exemption recently issued in Reference 1. There are no changes to the exemption with the exception that the effective date would be revised from 12 months (365 days) after certification of permanent cessation of power operations under 1 O CFR 50.82(a)(1 ), as stated in Reference 1, to 9.38 months (285 days) after the final reactor shut down based on a revised OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Reference 3). An earlier date would allow Exelon to reduced onsite insurance coverage commensurate with the significantly reduced risks associated with the permanently defueled condition.

The requested exemption is permissible under 1 O CFR 50.12 because it is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, is consistent with the common defense and security, and present special circumstances.

2.0 BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2018, OCNGS permanently ceased power operations and by letter dated September 25, 2018, (Reference 2), Exelon certified that all fuel had been permanently removed from the OCNGS reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP).

By letter dated October 17, 2018, the NRC approved License Amendment No. 294, OCNGS Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) and Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Levels (EAL) Scheme (AMO No. 294) (Reference 4). The PDEP and Permanently Defueled EAL scheme were predicated on approval of requests for exemptions from portions of 1 O CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, (EP exemptions) which were approved on October 16, 2018 (Reference 5). In the EP exemption request, Exelon provided Revision 0 of the "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool, C-1302-226-E310-457" (OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis) showing that 12 months after shutdown irradiated fuel had decayed to where sufficient time was provided for operators to recover SFP water inventory prior to reaching a temperature of 900 degrees Celsius

(°C) where oxidation of the spent fuel and cladding could commence.

By letter dated December 19, 2018, the NRC granted an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) (Reference 1) for OCNGS. That exemption becomes effective 12 months (365 days), after the certification under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) of permanent fuel removal from the OCNGS reactor vessel or September 25, 2019. That approval was predicated upon the OCNGS Zirconium Fire (adiabatic heatup) Analysis (Revision O) that was provided in Reference 6.

By letter dated October 22, 2018 (Reference 7), and supplemented on November 6, 2018 (Reference 8), and February 13, 2019 (Reference 9), Exelon submitted a request to revise the Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w}{1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-2 of A1-12 implementation and effective date of AMO No. 294 and the EP exemption to an earlier date.

Exelon revised the OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 0) provided in Reference 6 which resulted in a reduction of the necessary decay period of the spent fuel from 12 months (365 days) to a period of 9.38 months (285 days) for the zirconium ignition period after the final reactor shut down. Revision 2 of OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis has been provided to the NRG in Reference 9 (as Attachment 2). The earlier effective date of this exemption request is predicated upon NRG approval of Exelon's request to revise the effective date of AMO No. 294 and the EP exemption to an earlier date (References 7, 8, and 9).

3.0 BASIS FOR EXEMPTION REQUEST As discussed above, Exelon is requesting the same exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) that was previously approved in Reference 1 except for the earlier effective date of 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent shutdown. This request solely involves changing the schedule for implementing the previously approved 1 O CFR 50.54(w}{1) exemption based on the revised calculated time to the end of the zirconium fire period.

The underlying purpose of 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to require sufficient property damage insurance to ensure adequate funding of onsite post-accident recovery, stabilization and decontamination costs following an accident at an operating nuclear power plant. The requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) were developed taking into consideration the risks associated with an operating nuclear power reactor, including the potential consequences of a release of radioactive material from the reactor.

This regulation does not take into consideration the reduced potential for, and consequences of, such nuclear incidents at permanently shutdown and defueled facility, such as OCNGS. For a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor, nuclear accidents involving the reactor and its associated systems, structures and components are no longer possible. Furthermore, reductions in the probability and consequences of non-operating reactor nuclear incidents are substantially reduced because; 1) the decay heat from the spent fuel decreases over time, which reduces the amount of cooling required to prevent the spent fuel from heating up to a temperature that could compromise the ability of the fuel cladding to retain fission products, and 2) the relatively short-lived radionuclides contained in the spent fuel, particularly volatile components like iodine and noble gasses, decay away, thus reducing the inventory of radioactive materials available for release.

The NRG staff has generically evaluated the legal, technical, and policy issues regarding the financial protection requirements for large nuclear power plants that have been permanently shut down. The results of these evaluations were summarized in SECY-96-256, "Changes to Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11" (Reference 10). An exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) allows a reduction in the level of onsite insurance coverage to a level that is commensurate with the permanently defueled status and the underlying purpose of the rule. As provided in the NRG approval of the original insurance exemption (Reference 1 ), the reduction in the level of onsite insurance coverage to $50 million is consistent with the evaluation in SECY-96-256 and provides an adequate level of onsite property damage insurance for a decommissioning reactor, once the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer susceptible to a zirconium fire.

Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w){1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-3 of A1-12

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

As discussed above, apart from requesting an earlier effective date based on a revised analysis of Zirconium Fire Analysis, Exelon is requesting the same exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w){1) that was previously approved in Reference 1. This request solely involves changing the schedule for implementing the onsite insurance exemption to be based on the end of the zirconium fire period.

During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. Exelon's original exemption request dated March 29, 2018 (Reference 11 ), as supplemented by letter dated May 8, 2018 (Reference 12), discussed both design basis and beyond design basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP).

The only incident that might lead to a significant radiological release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond design basis accident scenario that involves loss of water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time after the permanent shut down.

To support approval of the exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w){1), Exelon provided a site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis that showed that the fuel stored in the SFP would not reach the zirconium ignition temperature (zirconium fire) in fewer than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> from the time at which it was assumed a loss of both water and air cooling of the spent fuel. The Zirconium Fire Analyses (Revision O}

provided in support of the original 1 O CFR 50.54(w){1) exemption, was provided in Reference 6.

That Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 0) calculated that 12 months after permanent cessation of power operations, the spent fuel stored in the SFP will have decayed to the extent that the requested exemptions may be implemented at OCNGS.

Subsequently, Exelon reconsidered several key assumptions the original OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis and has revised the analysis (Reference 3), which has been submitted to the NRC as in Reference 9. When the original Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 0) was submitted, OCNGS was scheduled to shut down no later than the end of December 2019 (Reference 13) and a refueling outage was scheduled in October 2018 to load fuel for Cycle 27.

However, Exelon decided to reschedule the final shutdown to no later than October 31, 2018 (Reference 14), at the end of the current two-year operating cycle (Cycle 26). The revised OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 2) (Reference 3) no longer includes Cycle 27, such that, Cycle 26 becomes the final and bounding reload in the analysis. Additionally, the revised Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 2) credits the mass of components adjacent to active fuel. The masses credited include the uranium dioxide (U02) fuel, cladding, water rods, pin spacers, and the channel box (excluding the corner thickness) in the horizontal area of active fuel. Fuel and cladding specific heat values were also adjusted to account for changes that occur as temperature increases. The results of the revised OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 2) indicate that the decay period may be reduced to 9.38 months (285 days) after the final reactor shut down.

Significant conservatisms remain in the calculation. Additional information regarding OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 2) is provided in Reference 9.

Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-4 of A1-12 Following the termination of reactor operations at OCNGS and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, the postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor and supporting structures, systems and components are no longer applicable.

1. Consequences of Design Basis Events Exelon's evaluation of the design bases accidents remains unchanged from the information provided in the original exemption request submittals (References 11 and 12).

The postulated design basis accident that will remain applicable to OCNGS in its permanently shutdown and defueled condition is the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) in the Reactor Building where the SFP is located. An analysis based on the FHA was performed to determine the dose to operators in the control room and the public at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) as a function of time after shutdown. The analysis shows that the dose at the EAB 33 days after shutdown (with no credit for containment) is less than 1 rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and 5 rem Thyroid, which are the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) thresholds for recommended evacuation (Reference 15). In approving the original exemption, the NRG concluded that no reasonably conceivable design basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release greater than the EPA PAGs (Reference 1). Based on the permanent shutdown of OCNGS on September 17, 2018 (Reference 2), the 33-day period has passed.

2. Consequences of Beyond Design Basis Events (BOBE)

Hottest Fuel Assembly Adiabatic Heatup The OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Reference 3) provided with Reference 9 compares the conditions for the hottest fuel assembly stored in the OCNGS fuel pools to the criteria proposed in SECY-99-168 "Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants" (Reference 16), applicable to offsite emergency response for the unit in the decommissioning process. This criterion considers the time for the hottest assembly to heat up from 30 degrees Celsius (°C) to 900°C adiabatically. If the heat up time is greater than 1 O hours, then offsite emergency preplanning involving the plant is not necessary.

Based on the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis presented in the Reference 3 analysis, at 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations (9.38 months decay time), the time for the hottest fuel assembly to reach 900°C is greater than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the assemblies have been uncovered. As stated in NUREG-1738, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants" (Reference 17), 900°C is an acceptable temperature to use for assessing onset of fission product release under transient conditions (to establish the critical decay time for determining availability of 1 O hours to evacuate) if fuel and cladding oxidation occurs in air.

Because of the length of time it would take for the adiabatic heatup to occur, there is ample time to respond (2:1 O hours) to any drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup, or providing spray. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is not deemed credible.

Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Exelon's evaluation of the loss of fuel pool cooling remains unchanged from the information provided in the original exemption request submittals (References 11 and 12).

Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-5 of A1-12 OCNGS analyzed a drain down event of the SFP to determine a dose rate curve at the EAB and Control Room. NUREG-0586, "Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," (Reference 18} Supplement 1, Section 4.3.9, identifies that a SFP drain down event is a beyond design basis event. Although the OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Reference 3) described above, demonstrated a significant release of radioactive material from the spent fuel is not possible in the absence of water cooling after 9.38 months (285 days) following permanent cessation of power operations, the potential exists for radiation exposure to an offsite individual in the event that shielding of the fuel is lost. The SFP water and the concrete pool structure serve as radiation shielding. A loss of water shielding above the fuel could increase the offsite radiation levels because of the gamma rays streaming up out of the SFP being scattered back to a receptor at the site boundary. The offsite and Control Room radiological impacts of a postulated complete loss of SFP water were assessed in Calculation C-1302-226-E310-458, "Dose at Exclusion Area Boundary and Control Room Due to Shine from Drained Spent Fuel Pool During SAFSTOR" (Reference 19). It was determined that the gamma radiation dose rate at the EAB would be limited to small fractions of the EPA PAGs. The EPA PAGs were developed to respond to a mobile airborne plume that could transport and deposit radioactive material over a large area.

In contrast, the radiation field formed by gamma scatter from a drained SFP would be stationary rather than moving and would not cause transport or deposition of radioactive materials. The extended period required to exceed the EPA PAG limit of 1 Rem TEDE would allow sufficient time to develop and implement onsite mitigative actions and provide confidence that additional offsite measures could be taken without planning if efforts to reestablish shielding over the fuel are delayed.

Air Cooling Analysis Exelon has compiled data in Attachment 4 comparing the input parameters to NUREG/CR-6451, "A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants," (Reference 20) to the data for OCNGS. An ORIGEN-ARP analysis comparing NUREG/CR-6451 demonstrates that OCNGS hottest fuel would have approximately 10% less decay heat generation than that analyzed in the NU REG. This accounted for a higher burnup offset by lower assembly power and longer decay. The rack dimensional differences were reviewed and determined to be insignificant to the heat removal mechanisms occurring when the pool is drained. As a result, the OCNGS SFP conditions are bounded by the NUGREG/CG-6451 benchmark and that the OCNGS spent fuel would be air coolable at 9.38 months after permanent shutdown.

5.0 JUSTIFICATION FOR EXEMPTIONS AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 1 O CFR Part 50 when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances listed in 1 O CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-6 of A1-12 5.1 Exemptions A. The exemptions are authorized by law 1 O CFR 50.12 allows the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to grant exemptions from the requirements of 1 O CFR Part 50.

This exemption was previously approved for OCNGS by the NRC on December 19, 2018 (ML18228A852). In addition, the requested exemption is consistent with the guidelines presented by the NRC staff in SECY-96-256, "Changes to the Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 1 O CFR 50.54(w) and 1 O CFR 140.11" (ML15062A483). The proposed exemption is not contrary to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.

B. The exemptions will not present an undue risk to public health and safety The requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating. However, OCNGS permanently shut down on September 17, 2018, and certified that the reactor had been permanently defueled on September 25, 2018 (ML18268A258). The permanently defueled status of the facility results in a significant reduction in the number and severity of potential accidents, and correspondingly, a significant reduction in the potential for and severity of onsite property damage.

The purpose of this exemption request is to request an earlier effective date of the exemption from the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) for OCNGS as previously approved by the NRC (ML18228A852). There are no changes to the previous application and supplements, submitted in support of the previously NRC approved onsite insurance exemptions with the exception of those that support the earlier requested effective date. Exelon is requesting that the effective date for the approved onsite insurance exemption (ML18228A852) be changed from 12 months (365 days) after certification of completely defueling the reactor at OCNGS, to 9.38 months (285 days) after cessation from power operations based on a revised Zirconium Fire Analysis. The revised Zirconium Fire Analysis has been submitted to the NRC as Attachment 2 to Reference 9 (ML19044A643).

The onsite insurance exemption does not impact the radiological consequences of accidents that remain possible at OCNGS in a permanently defueled condition. Thirty-three days after shutdown, it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident at OCNGS to exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary (EAB).

The proposed reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage and the proposed reduction in the zirconium fire period does not impact the probability or consequences of potential accidents. The proposed level of insurance coverage is commensurate with the reduced risk and reduced cost consequences of potential nuclear incidents at OCNGS in a permanently defueled condition. Therefore, granting the requested exemption will not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w}(1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-7 of A1-12 C. The exemptions are consistent with the common defense and security The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely affect OCNGS's ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. Physical security measures at OCNGS are not affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption is consistent with the common defense and security.

5.2 Special Circumstances Pursuant to 1 O CFR 50.12(a)(2), the NRG will not consider granting an exemption to its regulations unless special circumstances are present. Exelon has determined that special circumstances are present because the plant has been permanently shut down and defueled and the radiological source term at the site has been reduced from that associated with reactor power operation. With the reactor power plant permanently shut down and defueled, the design basis accidents and transients postulated to occur during reactor operation are no longer possible. In particular, the potential for a release of a large radiological source term to the environment from the high pressures and temperatures associated with reactor operation no longer exist.

A. Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. (10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii))

The underlying purpose of 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to require sufficient property damage insurance to ensure funding of onsite post-accident recovery stabilization, and decontamination costs following an accident at an operating nuclear power plant. The requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were developed taking into consideration the risks associated with the operation of an operating nuclear power reactor, including the potential consequences of a release of radioactive material from the reactor. However, the regulation does not take into consideration the reduced potential for, and consequences of, nuclear incidents at permanently shutdown facilities.

The NRG staff has generically evaluated the legal, technical, and policy issues regarding the financial protection requirements for large nuclear power plants that have been permanently shut down. The results of these evaluations were summarized in SECY-96-256, "Changes to Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)( 1) and 10 CFR 140.11" (ML15062A483). An exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) allows a reduction in the level of onsite insurance coverage to a level that is commensurate with the permanently defueled status and the underlying purpose of the rule.

As provided in the NRG approval of the original insurance exemption (ML18228A852), the reduction in the level of onsite insurance coverage to $50 million is consistent with the evaluation in SECY-96-256 and provides an adequate level of onsite property damage insurance for a decommissioning reactor, once the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer susceptible to a zirconium fire.

The proposed reduction in the level of onsite insurance coverage from $1.06 billion to

$50 million would continue to serve the underlying purpose of the rule by requiring a level of financial protection commensurate with the significant reduction in the probability and consequences of nuclear incidents at OCNGS. Consistent with the NRC's conclusions documented in SECY-00-145, "Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-8 of A1-12 Decommissioning" (ML003721626), the proposed reduction in the level of onsite insurance coverage would continue to require sufficient property damage insurance to ensure funding for onsite post-accident recovery, stabilization, and decontamination costs in the unlikely event of an accident at OCNGS.

Therefore, application of the requirement in 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of this rule and special circumstances are present as defined in 1 O CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii).

B. Compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated. (1 O CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii))

Continued application of the requirement in 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage for OCNGS would result in undue hardship and costs being incurred by the OCNGS decommissioning trust fund for the purchase of unnecessary levels of onsite insurance coverage.

This exemption was previously approved for OCNGS by the NRC on December 19, 2018 with an effective date of 12 months after docketing of the certification of permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel (ML18228A852}. As provided herein and further supported by a revised Zirconium Fire Analysis provided to the NRC on February 13, 2019 (ML19044A643),

Exelon is requesting that the effective date of the previously approved exemption be revised to be 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent shutdown of the reactor at OCNGS, which would shorten the period where the burden of unnecessary additional insurance costs would be needed.

Therefore, compliance with the rule would result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated and the special circumstances required by 1 O CFR 50.12(a}(2)(iii) exist.

6.0 PRECEDENT This exemption was previously approved for OCNGS by the NRC on December 19, 2018 (Reference 1).

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT The proposed exemption meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 1 O CFR 51.22(c)(25), because the proposed exemption involves: (i) no significant hazards consideration; (ii) no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; (iii) no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) no significant construction impact; (v) no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which the exemption is sought involve: (H) surety, insurance or indemnity requirements.

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed exemption.

Request for Exemption from 1 o CFR 50.54(w)(1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-9 of A1-12 (i) No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Exelon has evaluated the proposed exemption to determine whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved by focusing on the three standards set forth in 1 O CFR 50.92 as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed exemption involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed exemption is administrative in nature. It has no effect on structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and no effect on the capability of any plant SSC to perform its design function. The proposed exemptions would not increase the likelihood of the malfunction of any plant SSC.

When the exemptions become effective, there will be no credible events that would result in doses to the public beyond the exclusion area boundary that would exceed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs). The probability of occurrence of previously evaluated accidents is not increased, since most previously analyzed accidents will no longer be able to occur and the probability and consequences of the remaining Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) are unaffected by the proposed amendment.

Therefore, the proposed exemption does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Do the proposed exemptions create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed exemption does not involve a physical alteration of the plant. No new or different type of equipment will be installed and there are no physical modifications to existing equipment associated with the proposed exemption. Similarly, the proposed exemption will not physically change any SSCs involved in the mitigation of any accidents. Thus, no new initiators or precursors of a new or different kind of accident are created. Furthermore, the proposed exemption does not create the possibility of a new accident as a result of new failure modes associated with any equipment or personnel failures. No changes are being made to parameters within which the plant is normally operated, or in the setpoints which initiate protective or mitigative actions, and no new failure modes are being introduced.

Therefore, the proposed exemption does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed exemptions involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-10 of A1-12 The proposed exemption does not alter the design basis or any safety limits for the plant. The proposed exemption does not impact station operation or any plant SSC that is relied upon for accident mitigation.

Therefore, the proposed exemption does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Exelon concludes that the proposed exemption presents no significant hazards consideration, and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

(ii)

There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

There are no expected changes in the types, characteristics, or quantities of effluents discharged to the environment associated with the proposed exemption. There are no materials or chemicals introduced into the plant that could affect the characteristics or types of effluents released offsite. In addition, the method of operation of waste processing systems will not be affected by the exemption. The proposed exemption will not result in changes to the design basis requirements of SSCs that function to limit or monitor the release of effluents. All the SSCs associated with limiting the release of effluents will continue to be able to perform their functions. Therefore, the proposed exemption will result in no significant change to the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure.

The proposed exemption does not involve any physical alterations to the plant configuration or any changes to the operation of the facility that could lead to a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

(iv) There is no significant construction impact.

No construction activities are associated with the proposed exemption.

(v)

There is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents.

See the no significant hazards considerations discussion in Item (i)(1) above.

(vi) The requirements from which exemption is sought involve: (H) surety, insurance or indemnity requirements.

The requirements from which the exemption is sought involve financial protection and for the indemnification and limitation of liability of licensees pursuant to Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended and 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1 ).

8.0 CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the provisions of 1 O CFR 50.12, Exelon is requesting a permanent exemption from 1 o CFR 50.54(w)(1) for OCNGS. Based on the considerations discussed above, the requested Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54{w)(1)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-11 of A1-12 exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. In addition, special circumstances are present as set forth in 1 O CFR 50.12.

9.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1 ), Concerning Onsite Property Insurance (EPID L-2018-LLE-0004)," dated December 19, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18228A852)

2. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated September 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18268A258)

3. C-1302-226-E310-457, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool," Revision 2, dated February 8, 2019

4. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Issuance of Amendment RE: Changes to the Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme (CAC NO. MG0160; EPID L-2017-LLA-0307)," dated October 17, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18221A400)

5. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation (CAC NO. MG0153; EPID L-2017-LLE-0020),"

dated October 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML 182220A980)

6. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Request for Exemption from Portions of 1 O CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E," dated August 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17234A082)

7. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated October 22, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18295A384)

8. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request Supplement - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Oefueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated November 6, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 1831 OA306)

9. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) and Supplemental Information Regarding Request for Changing Emergency Preparedness License Amendment No. 294 Effective Date (Change to Adiabatic Heat-up Calculation)

Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1}

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A1-12 of A1-12 (EPID: L-2018-LLA-0305}," dated February 13, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19044A643}

10. Commission Paper, SECY-96-256, "Changes to the Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 1 O CFR 50.54(w} and 1 O CFR 140.11," dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483}

11. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w}(1 }, Concerning On-Site Property Damage Insurance," dated March 29, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18088A237}

12. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

"Supplement to Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w}(1 }, Concerning On-Site Property Damage Insurance and Supplement to Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4}, Concerning Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance," dated May 8, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18128A291}

13. Letter from Keith R. Jury, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Permanent Cessation of Operations at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated January 7, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110070507)

14. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated February 14, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18045A084}

15. Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, Draft for Interim Use and Public Comment, dated March 2013

16. Commission Paper, SECY-99-168, "Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants," dated June 30, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML992800087}

17. NUREG-1738, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," dated February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066}

18. NUREG-0586, "Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," Supplement 1, published November 2002

19. C-1302-226-E310-458, Dose at Exclusion Area Boundary and Control Room Due to Shine from Drained Spent Fuel Pool During SAFSTOR," dated June 16, 2017

20. NUREG/CR-6451 "A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants," dated April 1997

21. SECY-00-145, "Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning,"

dated June 28, 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003721626}

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)

Concerning Offsite Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-1 of A2-1 O 1.0 SPECIFIC EXEMPTION REQUEST By letter dated December 19, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) granted an exemption from the requirements of 1 O CFR 140.11(a)(4) (Reference 1) for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) {offsite insurance exemption). The exemption permits OCNGS to reduce the required level of primary offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million and to eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial protection. That exemption would become effective 12 months {365 days) after the certification of permanent fuel removal from the OCNGS reactor vessel under 1 O CFR 50.82{a){1 ), which would be September 25, 2019, based on the September 25, 2018 submittal of Exelon's 1 O CFR 50.82{a)(1) certification letter

{Reference 2).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, "Specific exemptions," Exelon Generation Company, LLC {Exelon) requests a permanent exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 {a)(4) for OCNGS similar to the exemption recently issued in Reference 1. There are no changes to the exemption with the exception that the effective date would be revised from 12 months {365 days) after certification of permanent cessation of power operations under 10 CFR 50.82{a)(1), as stated in Reference 1, to 9.38 months {285 days) after the final reactor shut down based on a revised OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis {Reference 3). An earlier date would allow Exelon to reduced offsite insurance liability coverage commensurate with the significantly reduced risks associated with the permanently defueled condition.

The requested exemption is permissible under 1 O CFR 140.8 because it is authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.

2.0 BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2018, OCNGS permanently ceased power operations and by letter dated September 25, 2018 {Reference 2), Exelon certified that all fuel had been permanently removed from the OCNGS reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool {SFP).

By letter dated October 17, 2018, the NRC approved License Amendment No. 294, OCNGS Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan {PDEP) and Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Levels (EAL) Scheme {AMO No. 294) {Reference 4). The PDEP and Permanently Defueled EAL scheme were predicated on approval of requests for exemptions from portions of 10 CFR 50.47{b), 1 O CFR 50.47{c)(2), and 1 O CFR Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV, {EP exemptions) which were approved on October 16, 2018 (Reference 5. In the EP exemption request, Exelon provided Revision O of the "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool, C-1302-226-E310-457" (OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis) showing that 12 months after shutdown irradiated fuel had decayed to where sufficient time was provided for operators to recover SFP water inventory prior to reaching a temperature of 900 degrees Celsius

(°C) where oxidation of the spent fuel and cladding could commence.

By letter dated December 19, 2018, the NRC granted an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a){4) (Reference 1) for OCNGS. That exemption becomes effective 12 months

{365 days), after the certification of permanent fuel removal from the OCNGS reactor vessel under 1 o CFR 50.82(a)(1) or September 25, 2019. That approval was predicated upon the OCNGS Zirconium Fire (adiabatic heatup) Analysis {Revision 0) that was provided in Reference 6.

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-2 of A2-1 O By letter dated October 22, 2018 (Reference 7), and supplemented on November 6, 2018 (Reference 8), and February 13, 2019 (Reference 9), Exelon submitted a request to revise the implementation and effective date of AMO No. 294 and the EP exemption to an earlier date.

Exelon revised the OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision O) provided in Reference 6 which resulted in a reduction of the necessary decay period of the spent fuel from 12 months (365 days) to a period of 9.38 months (285 days) for the zirconium ignition period after the final reactor shut down. Revision 2 of OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis has been provided to the NRC in Reference 9 (as Attachment 2). The earlier effective date of this exemption request is predicated upon NRC approval of Exelon's request to revise the effective date of AMO No. 294 and the EP exemption to an earlier date (References 7, 8, and 9).

3.0 BASIS FOR EXEMPTION REQUEST As discussed above, Exelon is requesting the same exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4) that was previously approved in Reference 1 except for the earlier effective date of 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent shutdown. This request solely involves changing the schedule for implementing the previously approved 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4) exemption based on the revised calculated time to the end of the zirconium fire period.

The underlying purpose of 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4) is to require sufficient liability insurance to ensure adequate funding of any claims resulting from a potential nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation associated with an individual power reactor. The financial protection limits of 1 O CFR 140.11 were established to require that licensees maintain sufficient insurance to cover the costs of a nuclear incident at an operating reactor. The proposed exemption would allow a reduction in the level of offsite liability insurance coverage to a level that is commensurate with the planned permanently defueled status of OCNGS and the underlying purpose of the rule.

This regulation does not take into consideration the reduced potential for, and consequences of, such nuclear incidents at a permanently shutdown and defueled facility, such as OCNGS. For a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor, nuclear accidents involving the reactor and its associated systems, structures and components are no longer possible. Furthermore, reductions in the probability and consequences of non-operating reactor nuclear incidents are substantially reduced because; 1) the decay heat from the spent fuel decreases over time, which reduces the amount of cooling required to prevent the spent fuel from heating up to a temperature that could compromise the ability of the fuel cladding to retain fission products, and; 2) the relatively short-lived radionuclides contained in the spent fuel, particularly volatile components like iodine and noble gasses, decay away, thus reducing the inventory of radioactive materials available for release.

The NRC staff has generically evaluated the legal, technical, and policy issues regarding the financial protection requirements for large nuclear power plants that have been permanently shut down. The results of these evaluations were summarized in SECY-96-256, "Changes to Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 1 O CFR 140.11" (Reference 10). An exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4) allows a reduction in the level of offsite liability insurance coverage to a level that is commensurate with the permanently defueled status and the underlying purpose of the rule. Additionally, SECY 127, "Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning," (Reference 11) concludes that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-3 of A2-1 O hazards exist after termination of operations (and removal of the rated capacity), the Commission has the discretion under the Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) to reduce the amount of insurance required of a licensee undergoing decommissioning. As provided in the NRC approval of the original insurance exemption (Reference 1), the reduction in the primary insurance level to $100 million, and withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance pool for offsite financial protection, is consistent with the policy established in SECY-93-127, "Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning, once the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer susceptible to a zirconium fire.

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

As discussed above, apart from requesting an earlier effective date based on a revised analysis of Zirconium Fire Analysis, Exelon is requesting the same exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4) that was previously approved in Reference 1. This request solely involves changing the schedule for implementing the onsite insurance exemption to be based on the end of the zirconium fire period.

During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. Exelon's original exemption request dated March 29, 2018 (Reference 12), as supplemented by letter dated May 8, 2018 (Reference 13), discussed both design basis and beyond design basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP).

The only incident that might lead to a significant radiological release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond design basis accident scenario that involves loss of water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time after permanent shut down.

To support approval of the exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4), Exelon provided a site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis that showed that the fuel stored in the SFP would not reach the zirconium ignition temperature (zirconium fire) in fewer than 1 O hours from the time at which it was assumed a loss of both water and air cooling of the spent fuel. The Zirconium Fire Analyses (Revision O) provided in support of the original 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4) exemption, was provided in Reference 6.

That Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 0) calculated that 12 months after permanent cessation of power operations, the spent fuel stored in the SFP will have decayed to the extent that the requested exemptions may be implemented at OCNGS.

Subsequently, Exelon reconsidered several key assumptions the original OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis and has revised the analysis (Reference 3), which has been submitted to the NRC as in Reference 9. When the original Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 0) was submitted, OCNGS was scheduled to shut down no later than the end of December 2019 (Reference 14) and a refueling outage was scheduled in October 2018 to load fuel for Cycle 27.

However, Exelon decided to reschedule the final shutdown to no later than October 31, 2018 (Reference 15), at the end of the current two-year operating cycle (Cycle 26). The revised OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 2) (Reference 3) no longer includes Cycle 27, such that, Cycle 26 becomes the final and bounding reload in the analysis. Additionally, the revised Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 2) credits the mass of components adjacent to active fuel. The masses Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-4 of A2-1 O credited include the uranium dioxide (U02) fuel, cladding, water rods, pin spacers, and the channel box (excluding the corner thickness) in the horizontal area of active fuel. Fuel and cladding specific heat values were also adjusted to account for changes that occur as temperature increases. The results of the revised OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 2) indicate that the decay period may be reduced to 9.38 months (285 days) after the final reactor shut down.

Significant conservatisms remain in the calculation. Additional information regarding OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Revision 2) is provided in Reference 9.

Following the termination of reactor operations at OCNGS and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, the postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor and supporting structures, systems and components are no longer applicable.

1. Consequences of Design Basis Events Exelon's evaluation of the design bases accidents remains unchanged from the information provided in the original exemption request submittals (References 12 and 13).

The postulated design basis accident that will remain applicable to OCNGS in its permanently shut down and defueled condition is the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) in the Reactor Building where the SFP is located. An analysis based on the FHA was performed to determine the dose to operators in the control room and the public at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) as a function of time after shutdown. The analysis shows that the dose at the EAB 33 days after shutdown (with no credit for containment) is less than 1 rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and 5 rem Thyroid, which are the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) thresholds for recommended evacuation (Reference 16). In approving the original exemption, the NRC concluded that no reasonably conceivable design basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release greater than the EPA PAGs (Reference 1). Based on the permanent shutdown of OCNGS on September 17, 2018 (Reference 2), the 33-day period has passed.

2. Consequences of Beyond Design Basis Events (BOBE)

Hottest Fuel Assembly Adiabatic Heatup The OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Reference 3) provided with Reference 9 compares the conditions for the hottest fuel assembly stored in the OCNGS fuel pools to the criteria proposed in SECY-99-168 "Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants" (Reference 17), applicable to offsite emergency response for the unit in the decommissioning process. This criterion considers the time for the hottest assembly to heat up from 30 degrees Celsius (°C) to 900°C adiabatically. If the heat up time is greater than 1 O hours, then offsite emergency preplanning involving the plant is not necessary.

Based on the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis presented in the Reference 3 analysis, at 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations (9.38 months decay time), the time for the hottest fuel assembly to reach 900°C is greater than 1 O hours after the assemblies have been uncovered. As stated in NUREG-1738, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants" (Reference 18), 900°C is an acceptable temperature to use for assessing onset of fission product release under transient conditions (to establish the critical decay time for determining availability of 1 O hours to evacuate) if fuel and cladding oxidation occurs in air.

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-5 of A2-1 O Because of the length of time it would take for the adiabatic heatup to occur, there is ample time to respond (~1 O hours) to any drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup, or providing spray. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is not deemed credible.

Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Exelon's evaluation of the loss of fuel pool cooling remains unchanged from the information provided in the original exemption request submittals (References 12 and 13).

OCNGS analyzed a drain down event of the SFP to determine a dose rate curve at the EAB and Control Room. NUREG-0586, "Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," (Reference 19) Supplement 1, Section 4.3.9, identifies that a SFP drain down event is a beyond design basis event. Although the OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis (Reference 3) described above, demonstrated a significant release of radioactive material from the spent fuel is not possible in the absence of water cooling after 9.38 months (285 days ) following permanent cessation of power operations, the potential exists for radiation exposure to an offsite individual in the event that shielding of the fuel is lost. The SFP water and the concrete pool structure serve as radiation shielding. A loss of water shielding above the fuel could increase the offsite radiation levels because of the gamma rays streaming up out of the SFP being scattered back to a receptor at the site boundary. The offsite and Control Room radiological impacts of a postulated complete loss of SFP water were assessed in Calculation C-1302-226-E310-458, "Dose at Exclusion Area Boundary and Control Room Due to Shine from Drained Spent Fuel Pool During SAFSTOR" (Reference 20). It was determined that the gamma radiation dose rate at the EAB would be limited to small fractions of the EPA PAGs. The EPA PAGs were developed to respond to a mobile airborne plume that could transport and deposit radioactive material over a large area.

In contrast, the radiation field formed by gamma scatter from a drained SFP would be stationary rather than moving and would not cause transport or deposition of radioactive materials. The extended period required to exceed the EPA PAG limit of 1 Rem TEDE would allow sufficient time to develop and implement onsite mitigative actions and provide confidence that additional offsite measures could be taken without planning if efforts to reestablish shielding over the fuel are delayed.

Air Cooling Analysis Exelon has compiled data in Attachment 4 comparing the input parameters to NUREG/CR-6451, "A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants," (Reference 21) to the data for OCNGS. An ORIGEN-ARP analysis comparing NUREG/CR-6451 demonstrates that OCNGS hottest fuel would have approximately 10% less decay heat generation than that analyzed in the NUREG. This accounted for a higher burnup offset by lower assembly power and longer decay. The rack dimensional differences were reviewed and determined to be insignificant to the heat removal mechanisms occurring when the pool is drained. As a result, the OCNGS SFP conditions are bounded by the NUGREG/CG-6451 benchmark and that the OCNGS spent fuel would be air coolable at 9.38 months after permanent shutdown.

Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-6 of A2-1 o 5.0 JUSTIFICATION FOR EXEMPTIONS AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, "Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulations of Part 140 which are authorized by law and are otherwise in the public interest. As discussed below, this exemption request satisfies the provisions of Section 140.8.

5.1 Exemptions A. The exemptions are authorized by law 1 O CFR 140.8 allows the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 140.

This exemption was previously approved for OCNGS by the NRC on December 19, 2018 (ML18229A005). In addition, the requested exemption is consistent with the guidelines presented by the NRC staff in SECY-96-256, "Changes to the Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54{w) and 1 O CFR 140.11" (ML15062A483) and SECY-93-127, "Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning" (ML12257A628). The proposed exemption is consistent with the requirements,of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended (Price-Anderson Act), which requires that power reactor licensees maintain some level of public liability financial protection.

8. The exemption is otherwise in the public interest Approval of the exemption request would result in more efficient use of funds in the OCNGS decommissioning trust fund. The reduction in offsite financial protection from $450 million to

$100 million and elimination of the requirement to participate in the secondary insurance pool would continue to require a level of financial protection commensurate with the underlying purpose of the rule while eliminating an unnecessary financial burden. Therefore, the proposed exemption is otherwise in the public interest.

6.0 PRECEDENT This exemption was previously approved for OCNGS by the NRC on December 19, 2018 (Reference 11).

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT The proposed exemption meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 1 O CFR 51.22{c)(25), because the proposed exemption involves: (i) no significant hazards consideration; (ii) no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; (iii) no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) no significant construction impact; (v) no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which the exemption is sought involve: (H) surety, insurance or indemnity requirements.

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22{b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed exemption.

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-7 of A2-1 o (i) No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Exelon has evaluated the proposed exemption to determine whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved by focusing on the three standards set forth in 1 O CFR 50.92 as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed exemption involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed exemption is administrative in nature. It has no effect on structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and no effect on the capability of any plant SSC to perform its design function. The proposed exemptions would not increase the likelihood of the malfunction of any plant SSC.

When the exemptions become effective, there will be no credible events that would result in doses to the public beyond the exclusion area boundary that would exceed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs). The probability of occurrence of previously evaluated accidents is not increased, since most previously analyzed accidents will no longer be able to occur and the probability and consequences of the remaining Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) are unaffected by the proposed amendment.

Therefore, the proposed exemption does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Do the proposed exemptions create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed exemption does not involve a physical alteration of the plant. No new or different type of equipment will be installed and there are no physical modifications to existing equipment associated with the proposed exemption. Similarly, the proposed exemption will not physically change any SSCs involved in the mitigation of any accidents. Thus, no new initiators or precursors of a new or different kind of accident are created. Furthermore, the proposed exemption does not create the possibility of a new accident as a result of new failure modes associated with any equipment or personnel failures. No changes are being made to parameters within which the plant is normally operated, or in the setpoints which initiate protective or mitigative actions, and no new failure modes are being introduced.

Therefore, the proposed exemption does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed exemptions involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-8 of A2-1 O The proposed exemption does not alter the design basis or any safety limits for the plant. The proposed exemption does not impact station operation or any plant SSC that is relied upon for accident mitigation.

Therefore, the proposed exemption does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Exelon concludes that the proposed exemption presents no significant hazards consideration, and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

(ii)

There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

There are no expected changes in the types, characteristics, or quantities of effluents discharged to the environment associated with the proposed exemption. There are no materials or chemicals introduced into the plant that could affect the characteristics or types of effluents released offsite. In addition, the method of operation of waste processing systems will not be affected by the exemption. The proposed exemption will not result in changes to the design basis requirements of SSCs that function to limit or monitor the release of effluents. All the SSCs associated with limiting the release of effluents will continue to be able to perform their functions. Therefore, the proposed exemption will result in no significant change to the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure.

The proposed exemption does not involve any physical alterations to the plant configuration or any changes to the operation of the facility that could lead to a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

(iv) There is no significant construction impact.

No construction activities are associated with the proposed exemption.

(v)

There is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents.

See the no significant hazards considerations discussion in Item (i)(1) above.

(vi) The requirements from which exemption is sought involve: (H) surety, insurance or indemnity requirements.

The requirements from which the exemption is sought involve financial protection and for the indemnification and limitation of liability of licensees pursuant to Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended and 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4).

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-9 of A2-1 o

8.0 CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the provisions of 1 O CFR 140.8, Exelon is requesting a permanent exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4) for OCNGS. Based on the considerations discussed above, the requested exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.

9.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Exemption from the Requirements of 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4), Concerning Offsite Primary and Secondary Insurance (EPID L-2018-LLE-0003)," dated December 19, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18229A005)

2. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated September 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18268A258)

3. C-1302-226-E310-457, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool," Revision 2, dated February 8, 2019

4. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Issuance of Amendment RE: Changes to the Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme (CAC NO. MG0160; EPID L-2017-LLA-0307)," dated October 17, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18221A400)

5. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation (CAC NO. MG0153; EPID L-2017-LLE-0020),"

dated October 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML 182220A980)

6. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Request for Exemption from Portions of 1 O CFR 50.47 and 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E," dated August 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17234A082)

7. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated October 22, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18295A384)

8. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request Supplement - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated November 6, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 1831 OA306)

9. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) and Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A2-10 of A2-10 Supplemental Information Regarding Request for Changing Emergency Preparedness License Amendment No. 294 Effective Date (Change to Adiabatic Heat-up Calculation)

(EPID: L-2018-LLA-0305)," dated February 13, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19044A643)

10. Commission Paper, SECY-96-256, "Changes to the Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 1 O CFR 50.54(w) and 1 O CFR 140.11," dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483)

11. Commission Paper, SECY-93-127, "Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning," dated May 10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12257A628)

12. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4), Concerning Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance," dated March 29, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18088A849)

13. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

"Supplement to Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 50.54(w)(1 ), Concerning On-Site Property Damage Insurance and Supplement to Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11 (a)(4), Concerning Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance," dated May 8, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18128A291)

14. Letter from Keith R. Jury, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Permanent Cessation of Operations at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated January 7, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110070507)

15. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated February 14, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18045A084)

16. Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, Draft for Interim Use and Public Comment, dated March 2013

17. Commission Paper, SECY-99-168, "Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants," dated June 30, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML992800087)

18. NUREG-1738, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," dated February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066}

19. NUREG-0586, "Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," Supplement 1, published November 2002

20. C-1302-226-E310-458, Dose at Exclusion Area Boundary and Control Room Due to Shine from Drained Spent Fuel Pool During SAFSTOR," dated June 16, 2017

21. NUREG/CR-6451 "A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants," dated April 1997

ATTACHMENT 3 FORM OF INDEMNITY AMENDMENT

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Docket Nos. 50-219 72-15 AMENDMENT TO INDEMNITY AGREEMENT NO. B-37 AMENDMENT NO. 18 Effective June 29, 2019, Indemnity Agreement No. B-37, originally between Jersey Central Power & Light Company and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated October 3, 1967, as amended, is hereby further amended as follows:

Article VIII of the Indemnity Agreement is deleted in its entirety wherever it appears in the Indemnity Agreement, and is substituted therein by the requirements of the exemption permitting a reduction in primary financial protection from $450,000,000 to $100,000,000, and withdrawal from participation in the secondary layer of financial protection.

Item 2a of the Attachment to the Indemnity Agreement is deleted in its entirety and the following substituted therefor:

Item 2 -

Amount of financial protection

a. $100,000,000 (From 12:01 a.m., June 29, 2019).

FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Anthony Bowers, Chief Financial Projects Branch Division of Licensing Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Accepted _______, 2019 By ___________ _

Exelon Generation Company

ATTACHMENT 4 COMPARISON OF INPUT PARAMETERS IN NUREG/CR-6451 TO OCNGS Request for Exemption from 1 O CFR 140.11 (a)(4)

Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A4-1 of A4-1 Spent Fuel Zirconium Fire Comparison Parameter NU REG/CR-OCNGS Difference 6451 1 (Reference 5)

Plant Data Power 1155 MWe 650 MWe (3300 MWt)

(1930 MWt)

Assemblies 764 560 204 less hot assemblies MWt/ Assembly 4.3 3.4 21 % lower pwr density Spent Fuel Pool Capacity 3300 Capacity 3035 Less bundles adding heat Storage Data All slots filled 2433 filled More air flow passaoes SFP Rack Design Design High Density High Density Material Stainless Steel Stainless Steel Pitch 6.255" 6.208" Boraflex (1 O racks) 0.047" closer 6.106" Bora! (4 racks) 0.149" closer Orifice size 4"

3.75" Rack orifice of 3.75" is bounded by fuel orifice of 3.5" Fuel ORIGEN-ARP case Design compared NUREG/CR-6451 Max Assembly 40 GWD/MTU 48.76 GWD/MTU at higher assembly power, Burnup lower burnup, and less Source Term 7 Months 9.38 Months decay with OCNGS lower Decay assembly power, higher burnups, and more decay and determined decay for OCNGS is approximately 10% less heat generation.

Zirconium 565° c 565° c Same Oxidation Temperature Limit Power Density Comparison Parameter NUREG/CR-6451 and OCNGS Reference 6 Power Per Assembly (MWt) 4.3 3.4 Fuel Assemble L/W (inches) 5.28 5.26 Fuel Active Heioht (inches) 145.24 145.24 Active Volume (in3 [m3])

4049.1 [0.06641 4010.4 ro.os59l Power Density (MWt/m3) 64.8 51.6 Uranium Mass per 0.181368 Assembly (MTU) 1 NUREG/CR-6451 "A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants," dated April 1997