ML18289A396

Annual Submittal of Technical Specifications Bases Changes Pursuant to Technical Specification 6.4.J

ML18289A396
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/11/2018
From:	Garver R Dominion Energy Virginia, Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
18-393
Download: ML18289A396 (7)

Text

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 OCT 11 201'8 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.18-393 Attention: Document Control Desk SPS-LIC/CGL RO Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket Nos. 50-280 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 DPR-37 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 ANNUAL SUBMITTAL OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGES PURSUANT TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.4.J Pursuant to Technical Specification 6.4.J, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program,"

Dominion Energy Virginia hereby submits a change to the Bases of the Surry TS implemented between October 1, 2017 and September 30, 2018.

A Basis change to the TS that was not previously submitted to the NRC as part of a License Amendment Request was reviewed and approved by the Facility Safety Review Committee. It was determined that the change did not require a revision to the TS or operating licenses, nor did the change involve a revision to the UFSAR or TS Bases that required NRC prior approval pursuant to 10CFR50.59. This change has been incorporated into the TS Bases. A summary of this change is provided in Attachment 1 .

For the period between October 1, 2017 and September 30, 2018, there were no changes that were incorporated into the TS Bases associated NRC-approved License Amendment Requests.

Current TS Bases pages reflecting the change discussed in Attachment 1 are provided in .

If you have any questions regarding this transmittal, please contact Mrs. Candee G. Lovett at (757) 365-2178.

Very truly yours, Rob M. Garver II Director Station Safety and Licensing Surry Power Station

Serial No.18-393 Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281 Page 2 of 2 Attachments:

1. Summary of TS Bases Changes Not Previously Submitted to the NRC

2. Current TS Bases Pages Commitments made in this letter: None.

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 State Health Commissioner Virginia Department of Health James Madison Building - ih Floor 109 Governor Street Room 730 Richmond, Virginia 23219 Ms. A. Schiller NRC Project Manager - Surry U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 07 E-5 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 Mr. J. R. Hall NRC Senior Project Manager - North Anna U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 08 G-9A One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station

Attachment 1 Serial No.18-393 Summary of TS Bases Changes Not Previously Submitted to the NRC

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Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power C_ompany (Dominion Energy Virginia)

Serial No.18-393 Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281 Attachment 1

SUMMARY

OF TS BASES CHANGES NOT PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TO THE NRC TS 3.7 Basis Revision (TS Basis Pages TS 3.7-6 and TS 3.7-6a)

A revision was made in the TS 3.7 Basis. The TS 3.7 Basis revision defines the operability requirements for the Open Phase Isolation System. This TS 3.7 Basis revision is related to the TS 3. 7 and TS 4.1 revisions for Open Phase Protection approved by TS Amendments 292/292. TS Amendment 292/-- was implemented on Unit 1 on May 23, 2018.

The TS 3.7 Basis change was approved on October 17, 2017 and implemented on Unit 1 on May 23, 2018.

Page 1 of 1

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Attachment 2 Serial No.18-393 Current TS Bases Pages Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion Energy Virginia)

TS 3.7-6 10-17-17 reduces the consequences of a steam line break inside the containment by stopping the entry of feedwater.

Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation The automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators by instruments identified in Table 3.7-2 ensures that the Reactor Coolant System decay heat can be removed following loss of main feed water flow. This is consistent with the requirements of the "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report," NUREG-0578, item 2.1.7.b.

Loss of Power - 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Negative Sequence Voltage (Open Phase)

[This discussion applicable to Unit I only.]

The Open Phase Isolation System (OPIS) must be operable when an Emergency bus is required to be operable and is fed from an offsite source. Normally, offsite power is provided to the Emergency buses through the Reserve Station Service Transformers (RSSTs); therefore, the OPIS must be operable any time a required Emergency bus is fed from an RSST. With the generator ojfline and ojfsite power pro~ided to an Emergency bus through a Main Step-Up Transformer (i.e., back-feed configuration), the OPIS will detect open phq,se conditions and initiate a transfer of an Emergency bus for specific open phase conditions. Therefore, the OPIS must be operable any time a required Emergency bus is jedfrom a Main Step-Up Transformer during backfeed.

OPIS relays are installed on each Emergency bus. The OPIS relays are designed with logic which disables protection when the respective Emergency bus normal feeder breaker is open. Thus, the OPIS protection is passive and is not required to be active when an Emergency bus is not being fed from an offsite source (e.g., being powered by an eme.rgency diesel generator.)

Setting Limits

1. The high containment pressure limit is set at about 8% of design containment pressure.

• Initiation of safety injection protects against loss-of coolantC 2) or steam line breakC3) accidents as discussed in the safety analysis.

Amendment Nos. Bases

TS 3.7-6a 10-17-17

2. The high-high containment pressure limit is set at about 21 % of design containment pressure. Initiation of containment spray and steam line isolation protects against large loss-of-coolantC2) or steam line break accidentsC 3) as discussed in the safety analysis.

3. The* pressurizer low pressure setpoint for safety injection actuation is set substantially below system operating pressure limits. However, it is sufficiently high to protect against a loss-of-coolant accident as shown in the safety analysis.C 2) The setting limit (in units of psig) is based on nominal atmospheric pressure.

4. The steam line high differential pressure limit is set well below the differential pressure expected in the event of a large steam line break accident as shown in the safety analysis.C3)

5. The high steam line flow differential pressure setpoint is constant at 40% full flow between no load and 20% load and increasing linearly to 110% of full flow at full load in order to protect against large steam line break accidents. The coincident low Tavg setting limit for SIS and steam line isolation initiation is set below its HOT SHUTDOWN value. The coincident steam line pressure setting limit is set below the full load operating pre~sure. The safety analysis shows that these settings provide

. . m protection . the event of a 1arge steam

. 1*me break ,C3)

Amendment Nos. Bases