ML18193B045
| ML18193B045 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/2018 |
| From: | Tom Gurdziel Public Commenter |
| To: | Echols T, Kristine Svinicki NRC/Chairman, State of GA |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18193B046 | List: |
| References | |
| LTR-18-0283 | |
| Download: ML18193B045 (5) | |
Text
CHAIRMAN Resource From: Tom Gurdziel <tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com>
Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2018 11:09 PM To: 'Tim Echols' Cc: Bridget Frymire; CHAIRMAN Resource; kormanr@enr.com; judys@enr.com; 'Ed Stronski'; 'Kim Edwards'; Holden, Tammy L:(GenCo-Nuc); Lyon, Jill:(NMP); qainfo@nsr.goJp; falcionij@asme.org
Subject:
[External_Sender] RE: Surety Bonds & V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 Attachments: McMaster #7.docx Good morning Commissioner Echols, I don't have a social media account so, (my daughter has told me), I won't be able to retweet it. I hope this e-mail will be acceptable . If you can, please send it wherever that retweet would have gone .
I have read your article twice . It is very nicely presented. And the idea to make something useful that is no longer useful, (in fact is a threat), is appealing. However, I believe there are a few non-apparent problems with our overall implementation . Noting that it has been many years since I attended an licensed (senior) reactor operator requalification class on nuclear fuel and that I have NO experience operating a US commercial nuclear powerplant with MOX fuel, let me begin . (That means, of course, that I have not moved MOX fuel with the refueling bridge either, as I have new and spent fuel.)
My recollection is that a bundle of nuclear fuel was used for three cycles. In our BWR, (not PWR), we started with 3% or so enriched, (U235), uranium . The fission process results in a decreasing amount of enriched uranium fuel and an increasing amount of plutonium, which is also a fuel. Here is the first problem . We have a good number of control rod blades, (which contain boron, a neutron absorber) between the fuel bundles to allow control of the fission reaction. They can individually be moved a small distance at a time, or all can be inserted quickly when needed . This is usually referred to as a " scram ." It has to happen within a specified amount of time, I think maybe about inside 6 seconds. That is for a normal, (non-MOX) fuel load . However, with increasing amounts of plutonium, the time necessary to safely shutdown decreases. After the third cycle of use, the needed time to safely shutdown the reactor would be SHORTER than the installed control rod blade drives can physically insert during a scram . So, we didn' t use the fuel anymore . It would be my guess that using MOX fuel provided for free might still be more costly to the plant operator if a complete rep lacement of the original control rod blade drives is necessary.
Some time, a number of years ago when I was first starting to hear the term " MOX", I asked a Headquarters NRC staff membe r if there were any differences that needed to be addressed when using MOX fuel. He said that there were none. I didn't believe this for one minute . (It was just too convenient.) So, another possible problem is the other things that need to be changed to safely run MOX fuel (that are unknown to me .) Incidentally, realize that the term MOX is used to hid the fact that " mixed oxide fuel " is another term for "plutonium fuel", but doesn't use the word " plutonium ."
Then there is one more big problem . It is about the construction of the MOX facility in South Carolina . I have attached my letter number 7 to the Governor of the State of South Carolina to express my views about any big construction project in South Carolina .
Thank you, Tom Gurdziel Member, ASME From: Tim Echols [1]
Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2018 3:45 PM To: Tom Gurdziel
Subject:
RE: Surety Bonds & V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 1
Tom, if you haven't had a chance to look at my Op-Ed in the Washington Times today, please do. It is in the paper edition and online at the link below.
I would especially appreciate you retweeting it from the top of my feed
@timechols Let me know your thoughts as I hope that our Generation 3 Reactors here in GA will one day use the fuel, which will be free from the DOE.
https: //m.washingtontimes.com / news / 2018 / jul / 10 / how - the - us - and - russ i a - negotiate-a - solution-for-plu /
Commissioner Tim Echols
@timechols Cell 706-340-0773 244 Washington St SW Room 232 Atlanta, GA 30334 Office 404-656-4515 From: Tom Gurdziel [tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 08, 2018 6:21 PM To: Tim Echols
Subject:
RE: Surety Bonds & V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 Thank you Tim . A very nice piece of writing.
Tom From: Tim Echols [ mailto:techols@psc.state.ga .us]
Sent: Sunday, July 08, 2018 7:23 *AM To: Tom Gurdziel
Subject:
Re: Surety Bonds & V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 My turn to send you something.
This testimony says it all.
RANDY BEALL appeared as a PUBLIC WITNESS herein and made the following comments:
MR. BEALL: That's correct, thank you.
Good morning, Commissioners, my name is Randy Beall, I represent the Atlanta and North Georgia Building Trades.
Today, I'm speaking on a broader interest of the men and women that are working around the clock at Plant Vogtle, for mine and your future energy needs. With all due apologies to my high school literature teacher and Charles Dickens, I would like to tell you a tale of two cities. It is the best of times and the worst of times, depending on which side of the state line you live on. This is certainly true of the men and women with the skills and ambition to see a nuclear project completed.
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In construction, the dignity of a job well done is to see it to completion, it is our satisfaction. In J enkinsville, South Carolina, the smallest town in the state, times are tough. Nearly 11 months after two South Carolina utilities abandoned their effort to build the V.C. Summer nuclear units, there is little hope ofre-starting construction. In one day at a project site and in a humiliating fashion, employees badges were collected from thousands of workers, denying them the dignity of seeing their work completed.
It has also been a gut kick to the surrounding communities, and has -- it has been to ever family that is dependent on that project for their livelihood. Broader than that, the South Carolina legislature, the utilities that canned the project, their PSC, and the energy customers of the state, are left with a rusting hole that provides no jobs, no energy, and no supports for the future growth. This is in addition to a bill that still must be paid, it is truly the worst of times for all.
Then there's Waynesboro, Georgia. I was in this very hearing room on December 21st, 2017, when this Commission unanimously wrote a different tale for a community in Burke County. By defining clear targets and accountability for completions, each one of you made a difference for Georgia, its economic future, and most importantly, for the men and women who will eat a sandwich out of a lunchbox today and tonight at a construction project on the edge of Waynesboro. These workers have an opportunity to see the job to completion, displaying the true craftsmanship that they are proud of. Admittedly, just like me, these workers have a self-interest in supporting this project. There is a link between our support of nuclear energy and the jobs it provides, and the means of how it gets paid for. However, with the exception of five board members in this room, everyone in this room supports their own self-interest, no matter what position they take. Your job, however, is to consider and balance all the priorities around Vogtle Project and to take action on behalf of the citizens of Georgia that you serve. You did just that last December.
As a whole, I believe your decision served the best interests of the citizens of Georgia and the future of Georgia. I am here this morning to report that since your decision to go forward, the labor force has been about seeing the project through. Based on what I've been told, we have seen a marked improvement in productivity since December, and we are committed to doing our part, literally around the clock. For the men and women that are working there, without too much exaggeration, it is a far, far greater thing that they perform mightier than they have ever done before. Thank you for not denying them the pride of a job well done, thank you for allowing them the opportunity to see their craftsmanship complete a project, and the satisfaction that it brings. And lastly, thank you for also allowing Waynesboro to be a better tale than Jenkinsville these days. Thank you.
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Commissioner Tim Echols 706-340-0773
@timechols Sent from my iPhone On Jul 6, 2018, at 10:21 PM, Tom Gurdziel <tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com > wrote:
Good morning, I hope to mail this letter out with the picture showing some of my heavy construction experience by Tuesday morning. Looking northeast, I took this picture from the top of one of two oil-fired boilerhouses. Foundation rings for fuel oil storage tanks are to the right. The coal-fired Danskammer Point plant is just left of center. Going down the Hudson River, (to the right), will take you to New York City. The year is 1971, or maybe, 1970. This is the "Roseton" (New York) job.
Thank you, Tom Gurdziel Member, ASME D Virus-free . www.avast.com
<McMaster #9 .docx>
<259.jpg>
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9 Twin Orchard Drive Oswego, NY 13126 May 15, 2018 The Honorable Henry McMaster State House 1100 Gervais Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Dear Governor Henry McMaster:
I think that I can superficially draw a very disturbing conclusion about big construction projects in the State of South Carolina. I have just read an article attributed to the Associated Press and dated 2018-05-12 provided to me by e-mail from "ENR, Engineering News-Record". The title is:
"Energy Sec. Perry Formally Ends MOX Project at Savannah River Site".
The article tells me that this project was to have started in 2004 and been completed in 2016, (which it wasn't). The present completion date is 2048. As I figure it, this job has been lengthened to 3.6 times the original scheduled length. I guess that is not so bad in comparison to the cost. The original cost was 1.4 billion dollars but the present estimate is 17. billion dollars+. That figures out to at least a 12 times increase.
Now I don't have good figures in front of me for scheduled time to completion for the two V.C.
Summer units, but I do think that an estimate of cost increase there is close to 2 times.
Wouldn't you have to say that, in comparison to the "performance" at the Savannah River site, it looks, relatively, like those contractors at Summer did a better job (while still noting that each project cost an awful lot of money and each project is a total failure)?
The disturbing conclusion would appear to be that big projects cannot be built presently in South Carolina on time and that big projects cannot be built presently in South Carolina on budget.
Am I missing something?
Very truly yours, Thomas Gurdziel