ML18153C326
| ML18153C326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1990 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Holland W, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153C324 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-21, 50-281-90-21, NUDOCS 9008080251 | |
| Download: ML18153C326 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1990021
Text
L
Report Nos. :
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
50-280/90-21 and 50-281/90-21
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company.
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
June 3 through June 30, 1990
Inspectors:
7 ~
-JJ.
w.*E. Ho~d, Senior Resident Inspector
y~ :/'/ ~,;'
J. W. Yo~jfgTuent i'Ws~;~tor
S. G.fo~sidentlnspector
Accompanying Inspector:
A. Ruff
Approved by*~ /;.,,,,,12A
/i1<-.
-~~on, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
o£t1f~d
&Av
Da'te Signed
~r:/£c
O,.ate sf gned
Date Signed
1This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant
operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, licensee event report
reviews, action on previous inspection findings, and 10 CFR Part 21 closeout.
Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on June 9, 10, 16, 17, 26, 27, and
29.
Results:
During this inspection period, a violation was identified for failure to follow
procedure while testing the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump
(paragraph 5.b).
This violation was similar to violation 280/89-24-01
discussed in NRC Inspection Report, dated September 28, 1989.
Also a non-cited
violation was identified for failure to accomplish a periodic test (PT-24.38)
within the Technical Specification frequency requirements (paragraph 5.e).
An unresolved item was identified involving the re~iew of proper classification
of safety related parts (paragraph 4.b).
9008080251 900723
ADOCK 05000280
Q
9oo'3'o~~sl
2
I~ the area of engineering/technical support, strengths were noted involving
system engineer knowledge of their systems and review of completed periodic
test procedures (paragraphs 3.d and 5.b).
In the area of safety assessment/quality verification, a strength was noted in
the licensee's evaluation of the Unit 1 low pressure heater drain system pipe
leak due to excessive pipe wall thinning (paragraph 6).
The licensee's task
team report was very comprehensive in scope and made recorrunendati ons which
would minimize recurrence of the event .
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
- H. Collar, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
J, Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
W. Gross, Supervisor, Shift Operations
- R. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. Hartka, Staff Engineer, Licensing *
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
T. Kendzia, Supervisor, Safety Engineering
J, McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
- A. Meekins, Supervisor, Administrative Services
A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- K. Sloane, Supervisor, Operations Support
E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- R. Thornsberry, Supervisor, Scheduling
- L. White, Senior Fire Protection Specialist
- Attended exit interview.
Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
Unit 1 and Unit 2 began the reporting period at power.
Both units
operated at power for the duration of the inspection period.
l..
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707 & 42700)
a.
Daily Inspections
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator
adherence to approved procedures, TS, and LCOs; examination of panels
containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system
elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review
of control room operator logs, operatfog orders, plant deviation
reports, tagout logs, temporary modification logs, and tags on
2
components . to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The
inspectors also routinely accompanied station management on plant
tours and observed the effectiveness of their influence on activities
being performed by plant personnel.
b.
Weekly Inspecti9ns
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
operability verification of selected ESF systems by valve alignment;
breaker positions, ccindition of equipment or component, and
operability of instrumentation and support items essentfal to system
actuation or performance.
Plant tours were conducted which included
observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection
and preventative measures, control of activities in progress,
- radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant
housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazards.
The*
inspectors routinely noted the temperature of the AFW pump discharge
piping to ensure increases in temperature were being properly
monitored and evaluated by the licensee.
c.
Biweekly Inspections
.
.
.
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagouts in effect;
review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant
samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid ~nd gaseous samples);
observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation
of the plant problem identi'fication system*; verification of selected
portions of containment isolation lineups; and verification that
notices to workers are posted as required by.10 CFR 19.
d.
Other Inspection Activities
Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital
battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms,
diesel generator rooms, control room, auxi.liary building, cable
penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level
intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit areas.
RCS leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected
leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated;
and that appropriate actions were taken, if required~
The inspectors
routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC
Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular
basis, RWPs were reviewed, and specific work activities were
monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWPs.
Selected
radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, * and
equipment operability and calibration frequency we.re verified .
During this inspection period, the inspectors walked down the SW,
CCW, FW, CH, CS, SI, EDG, MS, ventilation, UPS, radiation monitoring,
reactor protection, and electrical systems with the respective system
3
engin~ers.
The inspectors noted that the system engineers*
experience. levels varied~ but overall they appeared to be
knowledgeable on their systems which was identified as a strength.
e.
Physical Security Program Inspections
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review
of the licensee
I s physical security program.
The performance of
various shifts *of the security force was observed in the conduct of
daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access
controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge
issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and
compensatory posts.
No discrepancies were noted.
f.
licensee 10 CFR so.12* Re~orts
On June 7, 1990, the licensee made a report to the NRC withdrawing a
10 CFR 50.72 report that was made on May 13, 1990.
That report
addressed a condition concerning IRPI.
The withdrawal was based on
additional licensee reviews which concluded that the condition was
~ot unanalyzed due to their conclusion that rods remained operable
throughout th.e event and that TS 3.12.E.3 was applicable to this
condition.
Within the areas inspected; no violations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors re~iewed maintenance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures.
- Inspection areas included the following:
a.
Repair of ESW Pump lA Fuel Oil Line
On June 12 the licensee atte~pted to adjust the governor of ESW pump
lA in order to correct a lower than normal speed which had been
identified during past periodic testing.
This attempt by* a vendor
representative was unsuccessful, and it was concluded that a
distorted fuel line may have*been limiting fuel oil flow to the
diesel engine.
The license~ then processed a work request to replace
the distorted fuel line and completed the maintenance activity on
June 15.
After completion of work, ESW pump lA was satisfactorily
tested and returned to an operational status.
The testing was
reviewed by the inspector and is discussed in paragraph 5.a.
The inspector monitored licensee's activities associated with the ESW
pump lA repairs, including a review of initial conditions and
prerequisites to accomplish the work, material and testing
requirements, discussions with the system engineer, and periodic
trips to the low level intake structure to evaluate corrective
actions and monitor maintenance activities.
A review was also made
4
of the completed work order and associated documentation for the
maintenance activity.
No discrepancies were identified.
b.
Replacement of Unit 2 SI Test Switch
On June 26 the licensee replaced the Unit 2 Train A, Channel III,
high steam flow SI test switch.
This work was accomplished on work
order 3800092251 and was witnessed by the inspectors from the Unit 2
switchgear room.
Temporary jumpers were required to be installed for
this maintenance.
The inspectors reviewed the work order, the
temporary modification log, and the electrical schematics.
Since
the work order indicated the switch to be a non-safety related
component, the inspectors questioned the system engineer as to this
classi-fication. The system engineer did not have an immediate answer,
but did initiate action to verify the switch's classification. After
the switch was i nsta 11 ed, it was determined that the component
classification on the work order was in error.
The switch was
satisfactorily tested but it remained in an inoperable status pending
the necessary work* to upgrade it to a safety related component.
The licensee is continuing the investigation of this discrepancy.
Since this was identified late in. the inspection period and an
investigation is still in .. ,process, this item is identified as URI
280,281/90-21-03, Review "'of Classification of Safety Related
Components.
Two additional problems were identified by the licensee during the
replacement of the switch.
The first was that the initial switch used
for rep 1 a cement was discovered to be defective after it was
installed.
This precipitated the installation of a second switch.
Based on this problem, the licensee
wa~ evaluating if a 10 CFR 50
Part 21 Notice is required: The second problem was that the control
room Q-list was was found to be outdated. The licensee initiated a
deviation report in response to the outdated control room Q-list.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Inspections (61726 & 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as
follows:
Test prerequisites were met.
Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
Test procedures appeared to perform their intended function.
Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
Test data was properly collected and recorded.
5
Inspection areas included the following:
a.
Testing of ESW Pump lA
On June 15, 1990, ESW Pump lA was tested in accordance with PT 25.3A,
Emergency Service Water Pump (1-SW-P-lA) dated October 10, 1989.
The
test was performed to verify pump operability after completion of
corrective maintenance on the pump diesel fuel oil line.
This
maintenance activity was discussed in paragraph 4.a.
The inspector
reviewed the completed periodic te~t with the system engineer.
No
discrepancies w~r.e nqt~d.
b.
Testing of Turbine Driven AFW Pump 1-FW-P-2
On June 2 Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was tested
in accordance with 1-PT-15.lC, T.urbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump {l-FW-P-2), dated May 10, 1990. This pump was tested after unit
restart as required by TS .. The pump was then declared operable and
unit startup continued.
On June 12, during a review of the completed
PT by the system engineer, it was discovered that the procedure had
been perfonned incorrectly and deviation report Sl-90-815 was issued.
On June 17, after management became aware of the DR, the problem -of
imp~oper testing was discussed with the residents.
The DR addressed the fact* that procedural steps were performed which
-_ were not required.
Step 5.29 of periodic test 1-PT-15. lC states in
part,
11 If the shaft speed does not exceed 4250 RPM, N/A all steps
below and proceed to step 5.30.
11
During performance of step 5.28,
the operator recorded shaft speed as 4145 RPM.
If procedure had been
followed, the operator would not have made adjustments to shaft speed
and would have proceeded to step 5.30.
However, the operator
adjusted the pump shaft speed upward to 4200 RPM at the direction of
the SRO in charge of the test in accordance with Step 5.29.
This
adjustment was not in accordance with procedural requirements.
It
was also noted that this readjustment was a recurrence of a past
similar problem.
TS 6.4 requires, in part, that procedures for the testing of
components and systems involving nuclear safety of the station
shall be followed.
Failure to follow the procedural requirements of
1-PT-15.lC on June 2 is identified as a violation of TS 6.4
(280/90-21-01).
This is a repeat of a similar violation that
occurred when this pump was tested using the same PT on August 1,
1989.
The violation for this occurrence is discussed in NRC
Inspection Report 280,281/89-24, dated September 28, 1989.
The inspectors discussed the DR with the system engineer and were
informed that an analysis was conducted which concluded that the pump
operability was not affected by the governor adjustment.
The system
engineer explained that previous test results show that when the pump
c.
d.
6
is operated at 4200 RPM*, the pump head fa 11 s within the acceptable
range and that the pu~p will not trip from overspeed when started.
On June 20 the inspectors witnessed the test on the same pump using
the same PT.
The valve alignment, pump start, and the taking of the
data was observed by the inspectors.
The reading recorded for step
5.28 was 4196 RPM and no adjustments were made.
The test was
performed satisfactorily with no-discrepancies.
The inspectors noted that the .problem with the* auxiliary feedwater
pump periodic test was identified during the system engineer's revie~
of the completed test procedure and was documented on a DR.
Additional reviews of DRs by the inspectors noted where heat trace
circuits were left outside their setpoint tolerances during periodic
testing. This problem was also identified and documented by a system
engineer as the result of his review of the completed test procedure.
These examples of problem identification by
systems engineers are
.constdered a strength with regards to engineering/technical support
at the station.
Verification of Position and Stroke Testing on Valve TV-DG-208A
Trip valve No. TV-DG:..208A had indicated an intermediate position on
the control room board i.e. both the closed and open light positions
were illuminated.
This required the licensee to make a containment
entry in order to repair this valve.
On Jurie 7 the inspectors
witnessed verification of valve position using periodic test
2-PT-18.lOA, Verification of Local and Remote Valve Position
Indications of Containment Trip Valves Inside Containment, dated
October 27, 1989.
The inspectors observed the coordination between
the control room operators and the maintenance personnel in adjusting
the valve position and the position indicator. After completion of
the adjustment, the stroke testing of the valve was performed in
accordance with 2-PT-18.6B, Quarterly Testing of Miscellaneous
Containment Trip Valves, dated December 12, 1989.
2-PT-18.lOA was
subsequently completed to return the valve to service.
The*
inspectors observed the manipulation of the valve by the control room
operators, the illumination of the appropriate valve position
indication light, and the timing of .the stroking of the valve.
No
discrepancies were noted.
Control Rod Assembly Testing
On May 21 the inspectors witnessed the performance .of periodic test
1-PT-6.0, Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement, dated February 15,
1990, from the control room.
The purpose of this test was to verify
movement of the control rod assemblies as required by'TS 4.1.
During
the test, the inspectors noted that control bank D was not tested .
Operations explained that control bank D was routinely moved to
control reactor temperature and flux distribution which satisfied the
TS requirement to verify contra l rod system operability every two
7
weeks.
Al so during the test, a *icomputer printout rod control
system" alann occurred and would not clear.
The operator .annotated
the procedure critique sheet of this condition.
After the test was
satisfactorily completed, it was reviewed by the inspectors. A work
request, No. 689961, was also issued to clear the alarm.
With the
approved work request, an I&C technician then cleared the alarm by
resetting the P250 computer.
The operator annotated on the procedure
critique sheet that this condition had occurred.
The inspectors.have
noted similar occurrences in the past where annunci_ators would not
automatically. clear when their alarm condition cleared.
The
inspectors will continue to monitor this _condition during routine
tours to evaluate the effect of similar occurrences on operator
performance.
No discrepancies were noted.
e.
Failure to Conduct Periodic Testing of Fire Dampers
On June 28, the licensee discovered that periodic test PT-24.38, HVAC
Fire Damper Operability, had not been perfonned within the allowable
TS frequency requirements.
TS 4.18.G.l.a requires that PT-24.38 be
perfonned every 18 months.
It was last performed on May 26, 1988.
Therefore, .after addition of a 25% grace period, the periodic test
was required to be performed by March 1990. Failing to accomplish
this testing resulted in the fire dampers associated with the control
room, emergency swithgear rooms, and battery rooms being classified
as inoperable.
Upon discovery that *the periodic test had not been
perfonned, the licensee established fire watches in the affected
areas within one *hour in accordance with TS 3.21.B.7.
PT-24.38
was then satisfactorily accomplished and the fire watches secured.
At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was still
investigating why the test was not accomplished within the allow-
able TS frequency requirements.
Failure to accomplish PT-24.38
within TS frequency requirements was identified as a violation (NCV
280,281/90-21-02).
This licensee identified violation is not being
cited because criteria specified Section V.G.l.of the NRC Enforcement*
Policy were satisfied.
Within the areas inspected, one violation and one NCV were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Report review
(92700)
The inspector reviewed the LER's listed below to ascertain whether NRC
reporting requirements were being met and to evaluate initial adequacy of
the corrective actions.
The inspector's review also included followup on
implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation
that all required corrective actions were complete.
(Closed) LER 280/89-35, Unplanned ESF Actuation, Automatic Start of an
Auxiliary Ventilation System Fan Due to an Incorrectly Landed Lead.
The
issue involved improper landing of a previo.usly lifted lead on a pressure
switch due to personnel error. The incorrectly landed lead resulted in an
auto-start of the subject fan when the fan control. switch was returned to
8
the auto position. Immediate corrective action included properly relanding
the lead and verifying correct fan operation. A root cause investigation
of the event was conducted.
That evaluation identified the root cause to
be poor self checking techniques by the craft.
In addition, the licensee
determined that additional engineering guidance for this type of work
would be provided.
The inspector reviewed the root cause evaluation and
agreed with the licensee's conclusions. This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/90-03, Unit 1 LP Heater Drain System Pipe Leak Due to
Excessive Pipe Wall Thinning.
The issue involved a failure of piping
do~nstream of one of the _Unit 1 low pressure heater drain pumps due to
excessive pipe wall thinning,
Immediate corrective action included
- isolation of the leak area by stopping the pump and shutting the required
valves.
Some spurious actuations of fire protection equipment occurred
due to the heat and moisture cause by the br.eak. Moisture affected
electrical circuits to alarm and heat caused some sprinklers to activate.
The failure was attributed to single phase flow erosion/corrosion caused
by the higher localized flow in the line inrnediately downstream of a flow
control valve.
Corrective action included replacement of the failed pipe
and additional inspections of similar configurations for thinning.
Based
on these inspections, the piping in the same locatioh for the other pump
was replaced. A licensee task team was formed and investigated the event.
They concluded in a report dated June 20, 1990, that several additional
corrective actions were warranted to prevent recurrence of the event tnd
identified these actions as concerns.
The licens~e added these concerns
to their COOIJlitnient tracking program for proper disposition.
The
inspectors monitored licensee corrective actions and reviewed the task
team report.
The inspectors noted that the task team* report was very
comprehensive in scope and is considered as a strength in the lic~nsee's
self assessment capability. This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/90-04, Unit 1 Reactor Trip/Turbine Trip Due to Deluge
Actuation on the
11A
11 Main Transformer and Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip Due
to Erratic IRPI Indications. * The details of this LER along with the
corrective actions required to subsequently restart Units l and 2 were
discussed in NRC Inspection Report 280,281/90-20.
In order to preclude
similar occurrences, the licensee will evaluate enhancements to the IRPI
system and its power supply and also evaluate the separation between the A
Main Transformer and the A Reserve Station Service bus .bars. In the.
interim, the.licensee has isolated the deluge system from the A Main
Transformer.
The inspectors consider the licensee's corrective actions to
be adequate.
(Closed) LER 281/90-01, TAVE Protection Channel I ~eclared Inoperable* Due
to a Faulty Summator. This issue involves installation of a faulty
summator in one of the three average temperature channel inputs to the
The original summator was replaced with a
rebuilt su1T111ator that provided more noise filtration in the circuit to
minimize spurious alarms.
The replacement summator was satisfactorily
bench tested before installation.
However, after installation the
temperature of the summator increased due to the_ambient temperature of
9
the cabinet.
The licensee considers that the surnmator failure which
occurred after installation was caused by an increase in .ambient
temperature.
This failure mechanism was not able to be duplicated_during
the bench test. In order to simulate the increased temperature on electri-
cal components when bench testing, the licensee has obtained an oven to
heatup electrical components prior to performance of a bench test. This
type of testing should detect failure of electrical components such as the
faulty summator prior to installation.
The inspectors consider the
licensee actions adequate.
(Closed) LER 281/90-02, Inoperable Individual Rod Position Indicators Due
to Instrument Drift.
At 77% during a rampdown from 100% power, IRPI fo~
two control rods of control bank D differed from the rod group demand
counter by greater that 12 steps which exceeded the TS limit. Corrective
action involved changing abnormal procedure O-AP-1.02., Individual Rod
Position Indication, dated May 19, 1990 to require operators to stop the
ramp if !RPI and rod group demand counter differ by more than 10 steps.*
The inspectors.reviewed O-AP-1.02 and consider the licensee actions
adequate.
7.
Action on Previous Inspection findings
(92701, 92702)
a~
(C"!osed) VIO 280/89-24-01, Failure to Comply With TS 3.0.1. This
issue involved the licensee's incorrect use of a JCO to exit TS 3.0.1
action statement which resulted in a failure to follow the TS's
action statement requirements.
The licensee responded to this
violation in a letter dated October 27, 1989.
In that letter, the
licensee stated that administrative procedure SUADM-LR-12, Safety
Analysis/10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Safety Evaluations And Justifications For
Continued Operation, was revised to clarify that JCOs alone may not
be used to exit a TS action statement. The inspectors reviewed
SUADM-LR-12 and consider that the licensee's corrective action was
adequate.
b..
(Closed) VIO 280, 281/89-24-03, Failure to Comply With the Allowable
TS Intervals For Station Battery Testing.
This issue involved
battery surveillances not being performed in accordance within TS
frequency requirements.
The licensee responded to this violation in
a letter dated October 27, 1989.
In that letter, the licensee stated
that corrective action involved daily listing of outstanding.
electrical surveillances, designating an electrical shop fo~eman to
be responsible for the completion of electrical surveillances, and
placing an increased emphasis on scheduling electrical surveillances
on the plan of the day.
The inspectors discussed this issue with the
station battery system engineer who is responsible for reviewing and
trending battery surveillance results.
With the implementation of
the above corrective action, the system engineer stated that
surveillances have been performed in accordan_ce with the TS frequency
requirements.
The inspectors consider that the licensee's corrective
actions were adequate.
I
10
8.
10 CFR Part 21 Closeout
(92700)
(Closed) 280,281/P2190-04, Notification by Rosemount, Inc. of Potential
Failure for Models 1153 and 1154 Transmitters.-
On December 12, 1988 and
February 7, 1989, Rosemount notified the industry of a potential failure
mode for their 1153 and 1154 transmitters.
As a result of identification
of this _problem, the NRC issued. Information Notice 89-42, Failure of
Rosemount Model 1153 and 1154 Transmitters on April 21, 1989; and more
tecently, on March 9, 1990, the NRC issued NRC Bulletin 90-01, Loss of
Fi 11-0il in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount.
The Part 21 nottfication indicated that the_ internal loss of fill-oil can
cause the transmitters to exhibit reduced performance prior to a
detectable failure.
The reduced performance is considered most noticeable
by a drift in the zero setpoint, by a drift in span setting, or as a slow
response time to changes in pressure input.
The notice also indicated
that all reported failµres occurred during the first 3o*months of service
and that all were preceded by the detectable degraded conditions discussed
above.
The inspector discussed this issue with the licensee and was provided the
_ following information:
Most of the subject transmitters have been in service at Surry longer
than the 30 months called out in the Part 21 notice.
An engineering/evaluation for Rosemount transmitters has been
established.
Operations and l&C personnel have been briefed on the potential
internal fill-oiJ loss failure mechanism and associated symptoms.
Procedure IMP-C-MI-50, Transmitter Pre-installation, Testing and
Replacement, had been revised to notify engineering and the NPRDS
coordinator when replacing a transmitter that required changeout due
to a failure.
Surry has had transmitters fail in the past that exhibited_
characteristics similar to those discussed in the NRC Information
Notice.
In those cases, the transmitters were replaced in accordance
with approved maintenance practices.
The inspector noted that NRC Bulletin 90-01 requested licensee's to
provide NRC with information/data on Rosemount transmitters and to take
specific corrective actions to minimize undetected failures of the subject
transmitters.
Based on the licensee's actions to date and the requested
actions of NRC Bulletin 90-01, this item is closed.
11
9,
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were sulTITiarized on July 3, 1990 with
those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1. The follow.ing
summary of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during *this
exit.
A violation (280/90-21-01) was identified for failure to follow
procedure while testing the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feed
- water pump which was similar to a previously issued violation
- (paragraph 5.b).
A non-cited violation (280, 281/9b-21-02) was identified for failure
to accomplish PT-24.38 within the Technical Specification frequency
requirements (paragraph 5.e).
An unresolved item (280, 281/90-21-03) was identified involving
NRC review of the licensee's evaluation of proper classification of
safety related parts (paragraph 4.b).
In the area of engineering/technical support, strengths involving
system engineer knowledge of their system and system engineer review
of completed periodic test procedures were noted (paragraphs 3.d and
5.b).
In the area of safety assessment/quality verification, a strength was
identified with regards to the licensee's evaluation of the Unit 1
low pressure heater drain system pipe leak due to excessive pipe wall
thinning.
The inspectors noted that the task team report was very
comprehensive in s'cope .and made recorrmendations which should minimize
recurrence of the event.
This report was considered to be an
excellent example of the licensee's self assessment capability
(paragraph 6),
Licensee management was informed of the items closed in paragraphs 6
and 7.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection conclusions with no dissenting
corrrnents.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
10.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms
CFR
cs
DR
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
COMPONENT COOLING WATER
CHARGING
DEVIATION REPORT
EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER
I '
- t *
I&C -
!RPI
JCO
LCO
LER
N/A
MS
NRC
TS
12
HEATING 'VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
INDIVIDUAL ROD POSITION INDICATION
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NOT APPLICABLE
NON-CITED VIOLATION
NUCLEAR PLANT RELIABILITY DATA SYSTEM
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
PERIODIC TEST
REVOLUTIONS PER MINUTE
RADIATION WORK PERMIT
SAFETY I.NJECTION
SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS*
UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY