ML18152A376
| ML18152A376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1988 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Holland W, Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A377 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-88-26, 50-281-88-26, NUDOCS 8808290073 | |
| Download: ML18152A376 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1988026
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-280/88-26 and 50-281/88-26
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Richmond, Virginia 23261
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50~281
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
License Nos.:
Approved by~* E. ~ctor
F. s.~ASectoef
Division of Reactor Proj ts
Date Signed
8'/1; /g:FJ
tfate Signed
Scope:
SUMMARY
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas
of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, plant operations,
plant maintenance, plant surveillance, and licensee event report
closeout.
Results:
One violation was identified in this inspection report.
The
following new items were identified in this inspection-report.
One violation (paragraph 6) was identified for failure to provide an
adequate procedure for installation of non-reversible flow orifices
( 280; 281/88-26-01).
-
.. __ .. - ..... .
One unresolved item (paragraph 6) was identified with regards to
cleanliness
controls
and
foreign
material
exclusion
(280;
281/88-26-02).
One licensee identified violation (paragraph 8) was identified with
regards to failure to maintain proper configuration control of a
containment isolation valve as required by Technical Specification
(280/88-26-03).
8808290073 ggggA~BO
ADOCK
PNU
Q
" *
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
J. Bailey, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Benson, Station Manager
- H. Blake, Superintendent of Site Services
R. Blount, Super~ntendent of Technical Services
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor
G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator, Surry
- H. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- F. Mone, Supervisor, Quality, Quality Assurance
- J. Ogren, Superintendent of Maintenance
J. Price, Site Quality Assurance Manager
S. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics
- Attended exit meeting.
Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
2.
Plant Status
Unit 1
Unit 1 began the reporting period in day 59 of a maintenance/refueling
outage.
During this period, all reactor coolant pump work was completed,
the reactor cool ant system was fi 11 ed and vented, and the containment
integrated leak rate test was completed.
The unit ended the inspection
period in cold shutdown making preparations to complete required testing
on safety-related pumps.
Unit 2
Unit 2 began the reportins period in cold shutdown with repairs being made
to the 11A11 reactor coo 1 ant pump.
Repairs were completed to the pump on
June 12; however, the discovery of foreign material in the containment
sump, and cleaning delayed leaving cold shutdown until June 18.
The unit
was critical on June 19, and resumed power operations late the same day.
The unit operated at power for the remainder of the inspection period .
2
3.
Licensee Action on Previous*Enforcement Matters
(92702)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 280; 281/88-18-02, Review the controls and
procedure regarding installation of flow orifices.
This item was the
subject of a specific maintenance inspection discussed in paragraph 6
and is being identified as a violation for failure to have adequate
maintenance procedures.
This unresolved item is therefore closed.
(Closed)
Violation 280; 281/ 87-21-B (02), Failure to adequately perform
safety injection undervoltage functional tests.
The inspector reviewed
the licensee response to this violation dated January 28, 1988,
and
verified compliance with that response during the Unit 1 refueling outage
testing which occurred during this period.
Testing to demonstrate that
the loss of voltage protection is defeated and subsequently reinstated
whenever the emergency diesel generator is the sole source of power to the
emergency bus was included, and was performed as part of the refueling
test program.
The inspector witnessed testing and documentation of test
discrepancies during this outage (see paragraph 7) and considers the
licensee corrective actions to be adequate.
This violation is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations.
One new unresolved item (paragraph 6) was identified for
review of the licensee 1 s program for control of cleanliness and foreign
material exclusion in safety-related systems or components.
5.
Plant Operations
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence
to approved procedures, technical specifications, and limiting conditions
for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other
reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are
operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders,
plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components.
to verify compliance with approved procedures.
-.. ..
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected emergency safety features systems
by
valve alignment,
breaker positions, condition of equipment or
component(s),
and operability of instrumentation and support items
essential to system actuation or performance.
Plant tours which included observation of general
plant/equipment
conditions, fire protection and preventative measures,
control
of
activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security
controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazards.
'* **~
3
The
inspectors routinely monitor the temperature of the auxiliary
feedwater pump discharge piping to ensure steam binding is prevented,
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect;
review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples,
boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of
control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem
identification system; verification of selected portions of containment
isolation lineup(s); and verification that notices to workers are posted
as required by 10 CFR 19.
Certain tours were conducted on backshi fts or weekends.
Backshi ft or
weekend tours were conducted on June 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 19, 26, 27, 30,
and July 2.
Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults,
Units 1 and 2 containments, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas,
emergency
switchgear
rooms,
diesel generator rooms,
control
room,
auxiliary building, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel
storage facility, low level intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit
and pump pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to
ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded,
investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if
re qui red.
The inspectors routinely independently ca 1 cul ated RCS 1 eak
rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and
specific work activities were monitored to assure they were
being
conducted per the RWPs.
Selected radiation protection instruments were
periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency
were verified.
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of
the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various
shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls;
searching of personnel,
packages and vehicles; badge issuance and
retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.
On June 19, the inspector observed *the restart of Unit 2 after completion
of a forced outage that lasted over 30 days.
The inspector reviewed the
appropriate procedures and watched selected startup activities including
taking the reactor critical.
No discrepancies were noted.
Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown
(71710)
The inspector performed a walkdown of the vital and emergency electrical
distribution system.
This verification also included the following:
confirmation that the licensee's system lineup procedure matches plant
drawings and actual plant configuration;
hangers and
supports are
operable; housekeeping is adequate; valves and/or breakers in the system
are installed correctly and appear to be operable; fire protection/
prevention is adequate; major system components are properly labeled and
6.
4
appear to be operable; instrumentation is properly installed, calibrated,
and functioning; and valves and/or breakers are in correct position as
required by plant procedure and unit status.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Maintenance Inspections (62703)
During
the
reporting
period,
the
inspectors
reviewed
activities to
assure
compliance
with
the appropriate
Inspection areas included the following:
ASSEMBLY OF FLANGED JOINTS
maintenance
procedures.
The inspector reviewed the licensee program for reassembly of flanged
joints.
This inspection was initiated in part due to the discovery of
flow orifices in the auxiliary feedwater (AFW)
system being found
backward as discussed in Inspection Report 280;281/88-18.
The scope of
this inspection included the following procedures:
MMP-C-G-201
dated 2/3/86, Corrective Maintenance Procedure For
Flanged Joints In General.
MMP-C-G-201 dated 5/5/88, Corrective Maintenance Procedure Flanged
Joints In General.
MMP-C-G-201.1 dated 6/10/88,
Corrective Maintenance Procedure For
Blank Flanges, Spectacle Flanges And Orifice Plate Flanges.
The inspector submitted the following comment applicable to all the above
procedures:
A step in the front of the procedures requires the verification that
all bolt or studs have at least one and one-half threads above the
top of the nut prior to disassembly of the flange, yet no step
verifies the as-left thread standout meets any criteria.
Prior to
beginning bf the outage, the inspector discussed this item with the
licensee and identified several fasteners on the Unit 1 service -water
flanges to the reci rcul at ion spray heat exchangers that were much
less than flush with the top of the nut.
These flanges with
insufficient bolt thread standout/engageme~t--were- removed
and
repaired during the current refueling outage.
The licensee agreed
with the inspection findings, and stated that all craft personnel had
been reinstructed on proper thread standout. The licensee considers
that thread standout falls within
11 requirements.
The inspectors also researched the problem of installing flow orifices
backward as identified in unresolved item 280;281/88-18-02.
Prior to
June 10, 1988, orifice flanges were reassembled in accordance with the
genera 1 flange procedure MMP-C-G-201.
This procedure made no reference
or provisions for special cases such as orifice installation or blank and
spectacle flange installation.
As a result, on March 31, 1988, station
5
deviation S2-88-161 identified that AFW flow orifice 2-FW-FE-200A was
installed backward.
The corrective action documented on the deviation
was to reverse the orifice.
Subsequent blockage of the AFW system
required further work on this system; and on June 7, 1988, it was
discovered that the same flow orifice was again installed backward.
The licensee performed an extensive field walkdown and identified the
following six flow orifices that were installed backward:
2-CH-FE-2127
l-CC-FE-1308
l-SW-FE-120A
l-SW-FE-1208
2-RS-R0-210A
2-RS-R0-2108
11 8
11 RCP Seal Injection
l-CC-P-2A Discharge to HHS! Pump Seal Cooler
1-SW-P-lOA Flow to Intermediate Seal Cooler
l-SW-P-108 Flow to Intermediate Seal Cooler
Outside RS Pump Restricting Orifice
Outside RS Pump Restricting Orifice
Engineering Work Request (EWR)88-252 documented the field inspection
findings, and concluded that the incorrect orientation of the above
orifices did not constitute an operational concern.
The EWR states that
reversing the orifice, resulting in the beveled edge oriented upstream,
moves the vena contracta in relation to the downstream pressure tap and
causes an approximately 5 percent lower than actual indicated flow.
The inspectors reviewed the findings and the corrective actions performed
to date and consider them acceptable.
The licensee has performed
extensive work to recover from the lack of adequate controls, including
issuing maintenance procedure MMP-C-G-201.1 dated June 10, 1988, to
specifically address the installation of flow orifices, and prevent this
problem from recurring.
The failure to have an adequate maintenance
procedure that included instructions and verification that flow orifices
were
installed
correctly
constitutes
a
violation
of
Technical
Specification 6.4.A.7. (280; 281/88-26-01).
Based on the NRC's review of
this violation and review of the corrective action, this violation is
closed.
UNIT 1 AND 2 CONTAINMENT SUMP INSPECTIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The screen assembly that surrounds the containment sump is designed to
exclude debris large enough to cause clogged spray nozzles or to affect
the operability of the systems.
The first stage of the screen assembly
consists of inclined bars, which act as trash scre~ns to prevent large
pieces of debris from reaching the sump.
Inside the bars, there are two
layers of screening, the first consists of a roughing mesh, and the
second of a final mesh with an opening approximately the size of the
smallest nozzle orifice in the recirculation spray header. The second
stage of screens consists of cylindrical screens of fine mesh over each
pump suction point. This sump arrangement provides suction for the inside
and outside recirculation spray pumps as well as the low head safety
injection pumps.
6
After discovery of foreign material in the Unit 1 inside recirculation
spray pump lA test strainer, (see paragraph 7), the licensee decided to
inspect the Unit 2 containment sump for similar problems.
The unit was in
cold shutdown while repairs were being accomp 1 i shed on the
11A
11 reactor
coolant pump motor.
On June 9, the licensee commenced the inspections of
the Unit 2 containment sump and gained ful 1 access to the six suet ion
areas on June 11.
Damage and/or imp-roper configuration of screening was
observed during removal of the screen sections.
The licensee contracted
for Westinghouse personnel to conduct visual inspections using fiber optic
equipment in order to survey the six sump areas, and determine if foreign
material was located in these areas.
The inspection scope included the
two
inside recirculation spray pump containers,
the
two
outside
recirculation spray pump suction lines from the sump to the pump suction
isolation valves, and the two low head safety injection pump suction lines
from the sump to the pump suction isolation valves.
The inspection
revealed that foreign objects were present in the two inside recirculation
spray pump containers, and the two low head safety injection pump suction
lines.
No foreign objects were found in the outside recirculation spray
pump suction lines during the initial inspection; however, one foreign
object was found during the final closeout inspection.
Licensee actions to correct these deficiencies included removal of all
foreign objects that were found in the pump containers or suction lines.
Additional actions included repairing of the sump screens, (both circular
and roughing), and maintaining foreign material exclusion during the
reassembly process.
The inspectors monitored licensee actions and also
monitored the repair work in the Unit 2 containment sump area.
Also, the licensee performed an engineering evaluation of all materials
and conditions found, and concluded that the operability of the sump
screens, recirculation spray, and safety injection systems were not
seriously impacted by the discrepancies found.
The licensee provided
copies of the report to NRC Region II and Headquarters staffs.
The
resident inspector reviewed the report and all corrective actions
accomplished by the licensee, and considers that the foreign material issue
in the containment sump for Unit 2 has been resolved.
However, the inspectors conducted a review of the station programs which
allowed this condition to occur. That review concentrated on appropriate
procedures or controls which should have insured exclusion of foreign
materi a 1 , and re qui red that cleanliness was ma i nta iried.
During this
inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following procedures:
Engineering and Construction Work Procedure WP-G08 dated 3-31-88,
Confinded Entry and Tool Control.
Engineering and Construction Work Procedure WP-MOl dated 11-20-87,
Shop Fabrication and Installation of Piping Systems.
7
Surry
Power Station Administrative Procedure SUADM-M-03 dated
April 28, 1988, Cleanliness Control of Plant Systems and Components.
During the review of the procedures, the inspectors noted that cleanliness
and
accountability
controls
had
been
addressed.
SUADM-M-03
requires controls for primary systems, steam generators, and feedwater
piping from feedwater regulating valves to the steam generators.
However,
the procedure did not specifically address any other systems or areas
other than those deemed by station management as requiring cleanliness or
access control.
WP-G08 also requires controls for basically the same
systems listed above.
However, this procedure also does not specifically
address any other systems or areas other than those deemed by engineering
and construction as requiring cleanliness or access control.
WP-MOl
requires that open ends of pipe, pipe-fittings, valves, and connections
be temporarily capped to maintain proper cleanliness until ready for
fitup; however, no reference is made to identify proper cleanliness
requirements.
The inspector then reviewed the following work orders which were performed
in the past two years to determine if appropriate controls were in place
with regards to cleanliness and/or accountability.
Work Order Job Number (WOJN) 3800040809, Rem./Inst. RS Sump Grating
dated 10/10/86.
WOJN 3800040816, Inst/Remv 12
11 Suet Fng Pen 68 dated 10/10/86.
WOJN 3800040817, Inst/Remv Suet Fng Pen 69 dated 10/10/86.
WOJN 3800046068, Inst. RS Sump Grating dated 11/24/86.
The inspector noted that all of the above work orders were classified as
being safety related; however, all of the work was done without a. formal
procedure.
The inspector did note that each work order cover sheet
identified the work as minor maintenance which he concluded was the
licensee's reasoning for not using procedure to perform the work.
The
inspector concluded that the above work involved some form of entry into*
the containment sump for Unit 2 during the refueling outage in the fall of
1986.
From review of the available information, the inspector also
independently concluded that no controls were placed on these maintenance
activities with regard to cleanliness in the sump(s) nor was tool/
material accountability control documented during these evolutions.
The inspector also reviewed the following design change packages which
were recently accomplished during the Unit 1 refueling/maintenance outage
in the Spring of 1988.
Design Change (DC) -86-13-1 which was approved by the station safety
committee
on
3-24-87, R.G.
1.97 -
CONTAINMENT
SPRAY
FLOW
AND
PRESSURIZER HEATER STATUS/SURRY/1.
8
DC-87-22-01 which was approved by the station safety committee on
3-29-88,
REPLACEMENT
OF CONTAINMENT
RECIRCULATION SPRAY COOLERS/
SURRY /1.
The inspector noted in DC-86-13-1 that a precaution step was included in
the procedure which required system cleanliness to be maintained during
installation.
However,
no
steps in the procedure documented any
conditions fer maintenance of system cleanliness or accountability. This
area was discussed with engineering personnel, and the reply was that craft
and quality control personnel
are trained to maintain appropriate
cleanliness during evolutions in which systems are open for repair.
Discussions with quality control supervision indicated that while quality
control personnel w*ill do inspections for foreign materials during fitup
and
welding
evolutions
requiring
quality
control
verifications,
inspections
are
not
normally
made
for cleanliness or material
accountability during the entire time that systems are open for
maintenance unless specifically required by procedure.
The inspector noted in DC-87-22-1 that no mention of cleanliness or
accountability requirements was made in the precautions or body of the
procedures.
This condition was also discussed with engineering and the
reply was that cleanliness was controlled by WP-MOl, which requires open
ends of pipe, pipe-fittings, valves, and connections be temporarily
capped to maintain proper cleanliness until fit-up.
The
inspector
concluded that although administrative procedure does require temporary
capping, the cleanliness or foreign material exclusion consideration was
not adequately addressed to ensure foreign material exclusion was being
maintained.
At the end of the inspection period, the inspector discussed his concerns
with station management and requested any additional information which
would provide assurances that appropriate cleanliness or foreign material
exclusion was
being maintained during maintenance on safety-related
systems or components.
This i tern is i dent i fi ed as unreso 1 ved ( 280;
281/88-26-02) pending the inspector
1 s review of additional information
concerning the issue.
HEAT TRANSFER CAPABILITY OF UNIT 2 RECIRCULATION SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGERS
During this inspection period, a concern was identified regarding
operability of the Unit 2 recirculation spray heat exchangers due to
fouling of the heat exchanger tubes thereby reducing the heat transfer
capability.
The fouling was due to service water leakage into the heat
exchangers when the design considerations assumed that the heat exchangers
would be maintained dry.
Unit 1 was not immediately affected by the
concern due to the fact that it was in the middle of a refueling outage in
which new recirculation spray heat exchangers were being installed.
At
the time the concern was identified, Unit 2 was in cold shutdown while
repairs were being accomp 1 i shed to a reactor coo 1 ant pump motor.
The
licensee had conducted an engineering evaluation of this condition in 1984.
That evaluation concluded that sufficient design margin existed with
7.
I
9
regard to fouling factor to conclude that the heat exchangers could perform
their safety function with higher values than was originally considered
during design.
These values were larger than 0.001, but less than 0.0015.
The licensee, because of the concern, decided to open and inspect the
service water side of the four recirculation spray heat exchangers prior
to Unit 2 restart.
The licensee also contracted a heat exchanger
specialist for these in~pections.
Although initial inspections concluded
that the fouling factor was approximately 0.001, the licensee decided to
clean the tubes of the four heat exchangers in order to further reduce the
fouling.
Cleaning was accomplished, and the final inspections estimated
that the fouling factor was 1 ess than O. 001.
The 1 i censee issued a
report,
(TECHNICAL
REPORT
NO.
ME-0166)
dated
June
10,
1988,
which concluded that the Unit 2 recirculation spray heat exchangers, after
cleaning, are capable of performing their design function as stated in the
Final Safety Analysis Report.
In addition, the licensee instituted new operational actions which monitor
for leakage past the service water supply valves, and thereby allow for
determination as to whether the heat exchangers are being maintained in
dry layup.
The inspectors monitored the licensee actions, reviewed the
engineering report, and verified that procedures were in place to monitor
for service water leakage prior to Unit 2 restart.
Also, the NRC
Region II and Headquarters offices were
kept apprised of licensee
actions, and were provided a copy of the licensee
1 s technical report prior
to Unit 2 restart.
Additional reviews in this area are discussed in
Inspection Report 280,281/88-27.
OVERHAUL OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP
The
inspector witnessed portions of the overhaul
and preventive
maintenance on motor-driven AF'vJ pump 1-FW-P-38.
This work was performed
under work order #3800067955 in accordance with procedure MMP-C-FW-092,
Dissasembly, Inspect and Repair of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2 &
2-F\\v-P-2.
This procedure was written for the turbine-driven pump, and
required deviating for work on the motor-driven pump.
The inspector
reviewed documentation for the parts that were replaced, and verified all
measurements were within the acce.ptab 1 e range.
The work package was
complete and maintained up to date.
No discrepancies were noted.
Within-the areas inspected, one violation was identified.
Surveillance Inspections
(61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as
fo 11 ows:
Test prerequisites were met
Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures
10
Test procedures appeared to perform their intended function
Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test
Test data was properly collected and recorded
Inspection areas included the following:
Testing of the Unit 1 Inside Recirculation Spray Pumps (1-RS-P-lA and B)
During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed testing of
1-RS-P-lA in accordance with special test l-ST-214, Operability of IRS
Pumps.
The stated purpose of this test was to prove operability of the
inside recirculation spray pumps, and to establish reference values for
inside recirculation spray pump testing in accordance with ASME Section
XI, Subsection IWP.
The inspectors reviewed the test procedure prior to
test performance, attended the shift briefing prior to test performance,
and observed the initial testing of 1-RS-P-lA from the control room, and
from inside containment.
The first series of test runs on the
11A
11 pump occurred on June 7, 1988.
During the first run, the pump was secured after approximately a three
minute run due to the discharge strainer in the test 1 i ne becoming
partially clogged with debris from the sump.
The sicond pump start was
secured from the control room after the pump ran for approximately two
minutes due to no flow indication output from the flow instrument.
There
had been actual flow, but due to communication problems, this was not
understood in the control room.
The third pump run lasted approximately
24 minutes, and the pump was secured after the discharge strainer again
indicated partial blockage.
The inspector noted that flow indication as
specified in the test was not available during any of the runs. Also, the
causes for the partial blockage of the strainers was debris including
paint chips, nuts, bolts, washers, welding rods, and other material .. The
licensee conducted an inspection of the second stage sump screen, and
found evidence of degradation that would allow passage of material as
found in the strainer. Additional corrective actions for the condition of
the sump cleanliness and screen repair are addressed in paragraph 6.
On June 16, 1988, the licensee tested the inside recirculation spray pump
(2-RS-P-lA) in accordance with Unit 2 periodic test 2-PT-17.2, Containment
Inside- Recirculation Spray Pump.
During that run, the pump was.-stopped
after approximately 10 seconds due to high current readings.
The sump well in which the
11 1N' pump is located and, therefore, the pump
itself, had been drained of water during inspection of the sump area (see
paragraph 6).
The well was not refilled with water prior to this short
"bump" test ( nor was it required by procedure).
It was theorized that
without the water acting as a lubricant, the motor drew much higher
current.
An engineering evaluation was written at this point and the sump
well was refilled with water.
On June 17, 1988, the inspector witnessed
the retesting of the
11 1A
11
pump.
Prior to the test, the inspector
8.
11
independently verified that the pump would turn freely by hand, before and
after the test.
Also, the inspector reviewed the engineering evaluation
of the
11 lA
11 pump due to an unsuccessful pump run on the
11 lA
11 pump the day
before.
The engineering evaluation was documented in Engineering Work
Request (EWR)88-256 dated June- 17, 1988.
The EWR was approved by the
station safety committee on the same day.
The
EWR cone l uded that
2-RS-P-lA was operable based on the successful performance of the pump
periodic test, and the statement by the pump representative that water in
the pump can result in satisfactory pump operation.
No discrepancies were
noted.
On Jur,e 27, 1988, the inspector witnessed part of testing of the safety
injection system in accordance with 1-PT-18.1, High Steam Flow Test of
Steam Line Trip and RWST Crossconnect Valves.
This test simulates a high
steam flow in conjunction with low Tave, verifies the main steam trip
val~es close, and the RWST crossconnect valves realign to the opposite
unit.
The inspector noted that the operators performing this test were
knowledgeable, and communicated well with the control room.
All equipment
appeared to perform as required.
No discrepancies were noted.
On June 29 & 30, 1988, the inspectors witnessed portions of the Unit 1
periodic test 1-PT-18.2A & B, Safety Injection Train A - H Bus Under-
voltage Functional Test and Safety Injection Train B - J Bus Undervoltage
Functional Test. This test verifies proper alignment and operation of the
safety injection system, when initiated in conjunction with an undervol-
tage condition on the emergency bus.
The inspector witnessed pre-job
planning and noted that communications and assignments were adequate.
Testing was well coordinated by two Senior Reactor Operators.
The inspec-
tor reviewed the test results and documentation of discrepancies and found
this area to be improved from previous tests of this nature.
No discrepan-
cies were noted.
On June 30, 1988, the inspector witnessed testing of the safety injection
check valves per periodic test 1-PT-18.3A, Refueling Testing of High Head
Safety Injection Check Valves to the Cold Legs.
This test verifies flow
from the refueling water storage tank to the cold leg.
The inspector
verified that testing was performed in accordance with the procedure, and
that equipment performed as required.
No discrepancies _were noted.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review
(92700)
The inspector reviewed the LERs listed be 1 ow to ascertain whether NRC
reporting requirements were being met, and to determine appropriateness of
the corrective action(s).
The inspector's review also included followup
on implementation of corrective actions, and review of licensee documenta-
tion that all required corrective action(s) were complete.
LERs that identify violation(s) of regulation(s) and that meet the
criteria of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V are identified as
Licensee Identified Violations (LIV) in the following closeout paragraphs.
12
LIVs are considered first-time occurrence violations which meet the NRC
Enforcement Policy criteria for exemption from issuance of a Notice of
Violation.
These items are identified to allow for proper evaluation of
corrective actions in the event that similar events occur in the future.
(Closed) LER 280/88-01,
Containment Isolation Valve Not Properly Locked
Under Administrative Control Due To Human Error.
This report involved a
non-automatic containment isolation valve (1-SI-150) that was not properly
locked under administrative control, although the valve was found in the
required closed position.
The inspector verified that the valve is
currently locked, and reviewed the licensee enhancements regarding control
of keys.
Technical SpGcification 1.0.H.1 requires that all non-automatic
containment isolation valves be locked closed and under administrative
control.
Technical Specification Table 3.8-1 further identifies valve
1-SI-150 as a manual containment isolation valve.
The failure to maintain
this valve locked is a violation of technical specifications and is
identified as a LIV (280/88-26-03).
This item is closed.
9.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 5, 1988, with
those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1.
The following
new items were identified by the inspectors during this exit.
One violation (paragraph 6) was identified for failure to provide an
adequate procedure for installation of non-reversible flow orifices (280;
281/88-26-01).
One unresolved item (paragraph 6) was identified with regard to cleanli-
ness controls and foreign material exclusion (280; 281/88-26~02).
One
licensee-identified violation (paragraph 8) was identified with
regard to failure to maintain proper* configuration control of a
containment isolation valve as required by Technical
Specification
(280/88-26-03).
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no dissenting
comments.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
. .. **-...::-****--* .
,...,_ .._ __